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This Summer issue of *International Security* is the first in Volume Three and marks the beginning of this journal's association with The MIT Press—an association which we are confident will be a productive and complementary one. The Editors of *International Security* will of course continue to exercise full responsibility for determining those areas of the discipline that can benefit most from timely discussion, and for soliciting and selecting manuscripts. The MIT Press, in turn, will place its professional resources—involving services to subscribers and the production and dissemination of the journal—at the disposal of the Editors. The Harvard University copyright will be retained.

The Editors recognize and appreciate that *International Security's* success to date reflects the confidence of a significant number of subscribers with a variety of professional interests. We would like to reiterate with emphasis our invitation to prospective authors: manuscripts, reports, and statements of opinion that contend with the journal's concerns will be welcomed.

Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights

Mariano Grondona

Development as a concept involves both economics and politics; this concept also prevails in the field of national security. A nation is developed or internally secure when criminal challenges are kept under control by the security forces without impairing the principles or institutions of the prevailing political system. On the other hand, when those forces are unable to control the situation without receiving the support of the military or infringing upon democratic principles, there exists an underdeveloped or what we can call an "undersecure" country. In the developed countries, the challenge of crime is relatively low because of both the citizenry's level of education and the efficiency of the security forces. The countries that are developed in the area of security may fulfill simultaneously the two requisites of the liberal ideal of a government of law: the maintenance of public order and the observance of individual liberty. In this way, the objective of internal security and the principle of human rights are compatible.

I prefer the term undersecure rather than insecure because the former has a connotation of permanence; it implies a structural or at least prolonged insufficiency, while the latter could refer to a more transient situation. In undersecure countries, the police cannot fight crime alone; the militarization of police functions and repeated violation of citizens' personal rights often result. The goal of internal security and the principle of human rights then clash, and the more undersecure the country the larger the clash. Undersecurity can arise from the exceptional extent of the criminal challenge or from the inefficiency of the police.

It might seem strange that an assurance of human rights could depend on the efficiency of the security system of a certain country. However, what is at stake here is not an abstract moral goal in itself but the possibility of its application in a specific situation. The dilemma of the limited application of moral values generally recognized as absolute is present throughout the process of a nation's development. It is extremely difficult for developing countries to counter-balance economic progress with political participation, two goals that in developed countries reinforce each other¹. In situations of underdevelopment, the general application of moral values is not always possible. This causes a dissociation between what is desirable and what is feasible—and this is the current dilemma of many third

1. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976).

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world countries. Nobody doubts that social justice is a universally appreciated value, but could it have been achieved in the economic conditions prevailing before the industrial revolution? It should not surprise us, therefore, that Aristotle, for example, praised slavery². But in the conditions of the time, the alternatives were either misery for everybody or misery for nearly everybody. The latter situation at least allowed for a minority to enjoy freedom and the possibility of improving society.

Economic and political underdevelopment, as well as undersecurity, today produce even more acute moral dilemmas. In the preindustrial era, the possibilities for promoting social justice, political participation, and human rights were severely restricted by the lack of economic resources and the absence of examples of more advanced societies. Today's underdeveloped nations live instead under the pressure of knowing that other countries, sometimes very nearby, are able to ensure the full effectiveness of moral values that they also accept. Hence the feelings of guilt in some cases and the proclaimed utopias in others. Still other states cynically accept that if their social structure cannot hope to contain justice and other civilized virtues, then these values must descend to the level of their social structures.

Countries with police and judiciaries that cope adequately with criminal challenges can overlook minor institutional errors concerning internal security, letting some offenders go unpunished in exchange for the full effectiveness of human rights.

What happens when the impotence of the police and judiciary permits criminal challenges to jeopardize public order? Searches without warrants, imprisonment without trial, repressive excesses, and the militarization of the police and judiciary then appear. In national emergencies, internal security prevails over human rights unless a state chooses to perish for the sake of principles. Since this is seldom the case, the statute of human rights suffers violations that can be compared to those historic situations in which externally threatened nations eventually ignored the Geneva Convention and proceeded to slaughter the civilian populations of their enemies.

This moral deterioration affects the minds of the protagonists. What begins as emergency behavior tolerated for the sake of *primum vivere* can end by overtaking some of these states in the form of fascism—the thought that the indiscriminate application of force, instead of being a regrettable exception to the ideal of human

2. *Politics*, I, II (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959).

rights, is the only valid answer to public disorder. Necessity, in these cases, becomes a kind of heresy which denies the dilemma of choosing between internal security and human rights by definitely selecting the former against the latter. The drift towards fascism in order to justify repressive behavior is by no means the smallest danger that undersecure states must face in their effort to provide their societies with minimum conditions of internal security.

Hobbessian and Lockean types

Depending on whether the conditions of internal security descend to the abyss of undersecurity or climb instead towards societal harmony, they approach two reference points. We will call a "Hobbessian situation" those critical conditions in which the participants finally acquiesce to the Leviathan of an all-powerful state as the only alternative to chaos³. On the other hand a "Lockean situation" reflects those conditions in which the participants, based on the satisfactory experience of internal security, intend the mechanisms in charge of preserving social order to act in accordance with the primacy of human rights⁴.

None of these conditions, of course, can be found in pure form. But what I want to point out is that in undersecure countries the fear caused by the increase in common and politically subversive crime induces a large portion of public opinion as well as an increasing number of leaders to accept a Hobbessian view of society, in which the *primum vivere* of public order eventually becomes the absorbing objective.

In Lockean societies the reconciliation of order and human values produces only slight frictions. Such societies would struggle for the humanization of prisons or the education of wayward youth. The Hobbessian situations instead destroy the general consensus, especially in societies of western tradition whose ideal of common life is the rule of law. In these cases, three different mentalities struggle for dominance. At one extreme are those who insist on being liberal in the midst of a Hobbessian situation. If they come to power, however, their weakness contributes to expanding criminal activities. Intransigent liberalism in undersecure


3. The starting point of Thomas Hobbes' political analysis is an extreme situation of "undersecurity" in which the only possible alternatives are dictatorship and chaos. The goal of his Commonwealth is security at any price. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*.

4. The starting point of John Locke's political analysis is a situation in which security has only to be institutionalized. For Locke the goal is merely to consolidate and guarantee the preexistent compatibility between internal security and human rights. See John Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*.

countries tends towards utopianism. At the opposite extreme flourishes fascism which is the intellectual transformation of an emergency situation into a political *desideratum*. In the center, finally, remain those "resigned liberals" who would like to have a Lockean situation but act under the constraints of Hobbessian conditions. They dream with Locke: they obey Hobbes.

Hobbessian situations are nowadays produced by the increase of common crime to unbearable levels, the organization of common criminals in powerful *mafias*, and the organization of terrorists in guerrilla bands to create a general climate of fear.

The models that Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson propose, concerning compatibility between political participation and economic development, could be applied to relations between human rights and internal security. Huntington and Nelson outline three possible models.⁵ The liberal model or "virtuous circle" assumes an easy compatibility between economic development and political participation according to the following scheme:




However, this Lockean model exists only in developed countries. It is the view of the authors that in developing countries certain harsh alternatives can come to replace this liberal ideal. One of them—the technocratic model—grants priority to development over participation and leads finally to an explosion of long-restrained participation. This brings forth a populist model that sacrifices economic development to political participation and ends in an implosion of participation in favor of development. Both models naturally produce political instability. Huntington and Nelson present them as follows⁶:


5. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *ob. cit.*, p. 19.

6. *ob. cit.*, pp. 24 and 25.

The Technocratic Model




The Populist Model



The Lockean model in the area of security could therefore be as follows:

INTERNAL SECURITY → HUMAN RIGHTS → COLLECTIVE CONSENSUS
 The Hobbessian model would in turn be as follows:



In the same way as economically underdeveloped countries must often choose between economic development and political participation, the dilemma of undersecure countries is to choose between unconditional respect for human rights and the need to safeguard a seriously threatened public order. There is a distressing struggle between the expedient and the ideal. A large sector of the elite of undersecure western countries accepts the ideal of human rights and its abstract primacy over the less exalted function of protecting public order. This function, however, carries an urgency that in the end prevails over theoretical support for human rights. This position, which we have called "resigned liberalism," is in fact very far from totalitarianism or fascism. It must be differentiated from them because the violation of principles such as due process, habeas corpus, and the subordination of repressive action to the criminal law are exceptional. Resigned liberalism accepts these principles in those areas of society that are not affected by crime, whereas fascism and totalitarianism extend emergency conditions to the whole society.

Development is not only a social science concept, but also an ethical idea. Pope Paul VI has defined it as: "The advance, for each and for all, from less human to more human conditions"⁷ But this moral promotion from "being less human" to "being more human" is not always made, in practice, by orthodox means. The means do not necessarily reflect the desired end. Confronted with dilemmas such as the ones I have noted, the underdeveloped or undersecure countries sometimes deny those principles towards which they aspire. *Is it sometimes necessary to be less human in order to become "more human"?* Unfortunately an accurate analy-

7. Paul VI, encyclical *Populorum Progressio* paragraph 20.

sis of the difficult circumstances of undersecure nations forces us to ask this hard question.

The Case of Argentina

Between 1959 and 1969 there had been only isolated cases of subversive action in Argentina, and the country is characterized even now by a lack of non-political crime. With the so-called "Cordobazo" in May 1969, however, Argentina began to turn into an undersecure nation challenged by two guerrilla organizations that, initially, had the advantage of surprise.

In 1959, 1965, and 1968 there was guerrilla activity in the provinces of Salta and Tucumán. The woods and mountains favored these groups, which found their inspiration in the methods of Mao and Che Guevara. The police and rural constabulary easily suppressed these actions with no alteration of the legal and institutional order.

By contrast in May 1969, the city of Córdoba—second in importance after Buenos Aires—was for a whole day practically occupied by workers and student rioters. Here terrorist groups made their first attacks. While the astonished workers and students retreated from the violence, the terrorists dominated the city until the army ousted them during the night. Many of the terrorist organizers had been trained in Cuba⁸. From this first experience onwards the two principal guerrilla organizations consolidated and they became a permanent threat to the authorities. They were the Castroist "Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo" (ERP) and the Peronist "Montoneros," who would later adopt an ideological focus near to Marxism. Journalists and officials estimated that there were 1,500 and 7,000 organized combatants respectively during the peak of activity. There were also many sympathizers. While the ERP was a closed and militarized organization,

8. According to a study by the Commander in Chief of the Argentine Army issued on April 19, 1977, the "Cuban connection" with the guerrillas dates from the beginning of August 1966. At that time, the Tricontinental Conference (with representatives from America, Asia and African nations) took place in Havana. At this conference OLAS, the Organization for Latin American Solidarity) was founded and a military arm organized for each revolutionary Marxist party which functioned under the generic name of Armies of National Liberation (ELN). Certain Argentine Marxist groups, notably the PRT (The Workers Revolutionary Party) continue to adhere to this system. The ERP (Revolutionary Army of the People) had its origin in the PRT.

Around 150 Argentinians travelled clandestinely to Cuba in 1967 to receive ideological instruction and military training. Cuban political/military courses instructed not only the future ERP members but also terrorists who later became conspicuous Montonero leaders.

the Montoneros were more numerous and less disciplined, and consequently more penetrable.⁹

The "Cordobazo" astonished the military government of General Juan Carlos Onganía. Since the 1966 coup, the military had not applied any exceptional measures impairing individual rights other than suffrage. After the "Cordobazo," General Onganía established a "state of siege," a constitutional prerogative that allows the suspension of individual guarantees in case of civil disorder. It can nevertheless be said that under generals Onganía (1966-1970), Levingston (1970-71) and Lanusse (1971-73) the state answered the escalation of violence with rules congruent with constitutional tradition.

Terrorism erupted after the "Cordobazo." The police and judiciary were unable to contend with paramilitary threats by numerous and well-organized groups which resorted to guerrilla tactics. As in Germany today and Italy, these groups often contained ruthless young professionals and university students without police records. Kidnappings and murders of army officers, industrialists, and union leaders multiplied.

Beginning in 1970 the guerrillas started attacking military headquarters and bases. Among those murdered were Lieutenant General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, former president of Argentina, Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Sánchez, Chief of the II Army Corps, Dr. Oberdam Sallustro, president of the Fiat Company (Argentina's most important private enterprise and the largest loci of Fiat investment outside of Italy), and the principal labor leader, Augusto Vandor. Five thousand lives from both sides were lost between 1969 and 1977.¹⁰

On May 25, 1973 the elected president, Héctor J. Cámpora, assumed power. His political beliefs were to the left of Peronism, and he therefore had a close relationship with the guerrilla leaders. The leader of the Montoneros became an important political personality and eventually described in a Montonero newspaper—which was freely sold—all the details of the kidnapping and murder of General Aramburu.¹¹ On the date of his inauguration, Cámpora pardoned all

9. There are a variety of fragmentary sources that are considered reliable by official spokesmen. Estimated figures are: 10,000 ERP followers of which 1,500 were combatants; 70,000 Montonero followers of which 7,000 were combatants; 20,000 followers of other organizations of which 1,500 were combatants. Thus there were approximately 100,000 persons altogether. Meanwhile, there were 200,000 Argentines under arms in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other security forces.

10. The Army has officially acknowledged 93 deaths, among which were 43 officers (4 generals and 15 colonels). Counting the Navy, the Air Force and the Police casualties (the latter by far the largest), around 1,000 men of the security forces were killed during this period.

11. See *La Causa Peronista*, Buenos Aires: September 3, 1974.

the guerrillas awaiting trial, thus returning the leadership to all the subversive organizations. When Juan Domingo Perón returned to Argentina in 1973, he stopped the drift of Peronism towards the left, and publicly debated the Montoneros. But during the presidencies of Cámpora and Perón, the guerrilla groups controlled the Education and Interior ministries, as well as the universities. The violence never abated. When Perón returned to the country, his partisans of both the left and right clashed bloodily in the neighborhoods of Ezeiza. On the same day that Perón won the elections, José Rucci, general secretary of the unions, (CGT) was murdered.

In general, the subversive organizations consolidated and enlarged themselves under the favorable political conditions of the consecutive Peronist presidents (Cámpora, Lastiri, Perón, and Perón's widow). (A review of what happened from Perón's death in July 1974 through 1975 is included at the end of this article.)

Since the armed forces assumed power on March 24, 1976, the struggle against terrorism has been their principal aim. A real internal war began between the military and the guerrilla organizations. Months of extreme violence finally led to the total defeat of first the ERP and then the Montoneros. The Army's offensive in Tucumán had been precursor of what would happen later in the country as a whole. In this struggle Buenos Aires has proved the last field of operations. Today, guerilla activity is limited to acts of desperation, self-preservation and, in some cases, isolated terrorism in the capital.¹²

The chronicle of violence in Argentina between 1969 and 1977 allows us to draw the following conclusions.

Up to the "Cordobazo" of 1969, Argentina was a secure country with no exceptional police/judicial activity and with relatively little crime. Even though

12. Since March 1976, Army activity has included:

1. In July the chief of the ERP, Roberto Mário Santucho, and members of his staff, were killed.
2. In October, the political secretariat of the Montoneros was broken up.
3. In November, the guerrillas' most important arms factory, "Sabino Navarro," fell.
4. In December, the guerrillas' last important press was destroyed.
5. In January, 1977, Ana Maria Gonzalez, who was responsible for the death of the Federal Police Chief, General Cesareo Cardozo, was killed.
6. In April, the investigation of the "Graiye" case began. The financial organization of terrorism suffered a definite blow.

The military debacle of the guerrilla organizations necessitated the turn to selective terrorism. During late 1977 the most important events of this type were:

1. The murder of General Cardozo, Federal Police Chief.
2. The bomb placed in the dining-room of the Security Superintendent of the Federal Police.
3. The bomb placed in the family cinema of the "Circulo Militar" (the Army Officers club).
4. The bomb placed in the police headquarters of the Province of Buenos Aires.
5. The bomb placed in the cinema of the Ministry of Defense.

the country has had a troubled political history (with military governments in 1930-1931, 1943-1946, 1955-1958 and from 1966 up to 1973), respect for human rights and the dignity of the individual generally existed. Up to 1969, Argentina satisfactorily reconciled internal security and human rights.

From the "Cordobazo" onwards, Argentina has been sinking rapidly into the condition of an undersecure country because the traditional police and judicial structures were overwhelmed by the terrorist organizations. The police was infiltrated up to the point that nearly all its important movements were known in advance by the guerrillas. Infiltrators also made possible the murders of two chiefs of the Federal Police. Furthermore, judges were restrained by a campaign of personal threats that led to the murder of magistrates considered unyielding to the terrorists.¹³

The first reaction of the Argentine elite towards these new conditions of undersecurity reflected a liberal tendency. General Lanusse, who removed and later succeeded General Onganía in the presidency, called elections in the hope that violence would diminish with the reestablishment of representative democracy. The leaders of the Unión Cívica Radical and of the Partido Justicialista (Peronist) declared during the election campaign that guerrilla violence was only an armed demand for electoral freedom, and that once the Constitution was restored Argentina would return to its traditional internal peace. The amnesty of May 25, 1973 was therefore unanimously passed by Congress.

In spite of these democratic measures, however, violence continued to increase. The ERP never fully halted its clandestine operations and it only gave the new government a brief period of grace. The terrorists took advantage of the permissive conditions created by the prevalence of liberal premises and the withdrawal of the army from police and court functions. The ERP raised its warlike goals to the point of attacking military bases and occupying a part of the mountainous area of the province of Tucumán. The Montoneros operated partially in the open for some time until they realized that Perón would not favor them. During this period, they limited their violence to "reprisal actions" against union leaders or political opponents. They then returned underground. The Peronist ultra-right headed by José López Rega answered with the same methods. The illegal acts of the "Triple A" (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance) became a new cause of disruption.

Under these circumstances, the armed forces decided to return to militant anti-

13. This peaked from May 1973 to May 1974. Judge Quiroga, for example, was murdered on April 28, 1974. Eleven judges and members of the Federal Court emigrated, mostly to Uruguay, during this year.

terrorism. This was fulfilled in two stages. First, under the government of Isabel Perón, they attacked the ERP in Tucumán. A warlike confrontation between two armed organizations resulted. Second, the armed forces dismissed Isabel Perón from power. From then onwards the face-to-face war against the terrorist organizations spread over the entire country.

The military campaign that started in February 1975 in Tucumán was nearly completed by late 1977. Meanwhile, Argentina had abandoned the liberal system of justice to confront directly the insurrectionary forces. The dirty war dominated the nation.

The anti-terrorist elite divided into three segments of opinion: intransigent liberalism which prevailed in the middle classes, the intellectual circles, the Church, and the Unión Cívica Radical; fascism, which was preached by the ultranationalist groups; and resigned liberalism, to which the popular majority and most senior officers belonged. When obliged to choose, the "intransigent liberals" naturally became what I have labeled "resigned liberals."¹⁴

Resigned liberalism is characterized by its intellectual preference for the transitory option of internal security over the liberal statute of legal process. The military and civil elite essentially chose internal war. Since the country was at war, judicial processes were not applicable to the enemy. No war has ever applied them, and this war was no exception. This doctrine of internal war rationalized that since the country was in an emergency state, the liberal principles must be suspended but not abandoned. This rationalization noted the parallel that in a war-time economy, economic liberty is forgotten. Exceptional conditions justify these exceptional measures.¹⁵

Conclusion

What is the relevance of the Argentinian case for the study of this theory of un-

14. The liberal American press, in its own terms, chose in the same way. See *The New York Times'* editorial of May 25, 1977.

15. These two presidential quotations illustrate official reasoning 1) "We are very close to winning this dirty war, initiated by the subversives. This was a war we had tried to avoid and were forced to fight because the nation's survival was at stake. The armed forces had no alternative left; there was no other possible answer and the results obtained prove us to be right." Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla, press conference with Chilean journalists on November 13, 1976 (*La Opinión*, Buenos Aires, November 13, 1976). 2) "We must win the war but we must also win the peace—a peace with dignity in which Argentina will find its traditional values once again." (Lieutenant General Videla, press statement in Caracas, *La Opinión*, Buenos Aires, May 13, 1977.

dersecurity? "History is the laboratory of theory."¹⁶ But each political case is essentially unique and not transferable. Argentina's struggle is only one among many in an age marked by internal violence. Even though these observations are limited, lessons can be drawn from the Argentine example.

Argentina has been one of the most important battlegrounds of internal violence during recent years. Its transit from security to undersecurity came jointly with a succession of structural changes. Argentina passed from a Lockean to a Hobbesian situation and then suffered a dilemma that is characteristic of undersecure countries: the stark choice between the necessity of security and the value of the legal process with its statute of human rights. Argentina endured a relatively liberal approach with largely unrestricted personal freedoms throughout 1969-1975. But elimination of the guerrilla organizations and a return to normalcy required applying the doctrine of internal warfare. The historical record shows that the 1969-1975 method failed and the 1975-1977 one succeeded. Many who lived in Argentina during those tragic years are convinced that there was no other way to fight the chaos generated by the prevalence of terrorist organizations, even though many also regret that it was necessary to go so far.

But was it really necessary to choose security against due process of law as a response to the challenge of widespread terrorism? It could be suggested that an efficient police and judicial organization would have avoided the dilemma. It could be argued further that if Argentina would have maintained from 1930 onwards the constitutional stability she had enjoyed since 1860, accepted rules of co-existence would have prevented the 1969-1977 deterioration altogether. But this is only speculation. Each one of the chief participants felt that there was "nothing else to do." In 1970, some believed in democratic restoration. But in 1976 they resigned themselves to warlike confrontation. No military or civilian policymaker during the period saw himself in possession of a wide spectrum of practical choices.

It is necessary to continue exploring the problem of reconciling internal security and human rights. Meanwhile, the Argentine case shows that just as it is difficult to apply justice and democracy in economically underdeveloped conditions, so it is difficult to apply all the guarantees of individual freedom in conditions of undersecurity. The circumstances that both nurture and threaten human integrity have to be fully analyzed in order to find more sophisticated responses than merely denouncing the national policies that one finds unacceptable.

16. Raymond Aron, *Penser la Guerre—Clausewitz*. Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1976. Volume I, p. 317.

During 1974 and 1975 the terrorists created an impressive political/military machine.

1. The Authentic Peronist Party had 70,000 members. It reached into universities and colleges, and involved important district organizations.

2. Guerrilla activity was mounted in the unions, as in the industrial center of Villa Constitución, Province of Santa Fe.

3. The kidnapping of the Born brothers was an attack on industry. For their liberation, the Montoneros demanded \$60,000,000. This was a third of the Argentine military budget for 1975. The terrorists made foreign investments and acquired local enterprises in order to finance their activities.

4. The ERP and Montoneros had three newspapers with national circulation and more than ten publications in various formats for sale. On the contrary, their access to radio and television was practically of no account.

5. Internally, the terrorists developed a military hierarchy, endowing their leaders with ranks and military signs of authority. This structure was spread all over the country and was regionally distributed.

6. In the countryside, the ERP centralized its efforts in the province of Tucumán, where it came to control a third of the territory, establishing a virtual parallel government in the last months of 1974. By then they managed to perpetrate an average of one terrorist act per day.

7. A Revolutionary Coordinating Board (JCR) was established with similar terrorist groups in Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay. The JCR was conducted from Argentina, where terrorism was more powerful and could act more freely.

During this period, the axis of the terrorist offensive was openly developed against the Army. The most important confrontations included:

1973

September: The Army Public Health Command in the city of Buenos Aires was attacked.

1974

January: Attack on the barracks of the 10th Armoured Regiment. The guerrillas were repulsed, but they kidnapped a military chief.

1974

August: The military arsenal, located in Villa María, province of Córdoba, was attacked. One hundred guns were taken and an officer was kidnapped.

1974

August: There was an attack on the 17th Airborne Infantry Regiment, located in the province of Catamarca. The aggressors were killed or arrested.

1974

September to November: As a reprisal for their defeat in Catamarca, the ERP started a succession of murders, eventually killing seventeen Army officers.

1975

February: The Army started operating in Tucumán, where the ERP had virtual control of a third of the province. The ERP had 300 combatants in the hills and over 1,000 collaborators throughout the province. Five thousand troops and policemen took part in these operations.

1975

April: The barracks of the 121th Arsenal Battalion, located in San Lorenzo, province of Santa Fe was assaulted. Over one hundred guns were taken and a senior officer was killed.

1975

September: In the province of Tucumán, the Army defeated an ERP contingent in the rural zone of Acheral. The chief of the guerrillas that operated in this area was captured.

1975

October: The attack on the 29th Ranger Infantry Regiment, located in Formosa, failed. The ERP combatants killed seven soldiers but they lost approximately 30 men.

1975

December: The guerrillas failed in an attack on the 601st Arsenal Battalion, located near Buenos Aires. It was a significant defeat for the Montoneros; they had more than one hundred casualties.

Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom

R. James Woolsey

The Spring 1978 issue of *International Security* presented two essays addressing the contentious political and technical problems central to shaping the U.S. Navy in the 21st century. Senator Gary Hart and ship designer Reuven Leopold examined respectively Congressional sentiment and state of the art weapons acquisitions as they each confronted the certainty of a numerically constrained fleet.

This debate over force structure—and the national defense policies reflected by the structure—inherently embraces a number of assumptions, as well as a variety of analytical approaches. We have asked Under Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey to assess the competing arguments that have surrounded discussions of alternative naval futures for the past months. What results is both a personal evaluation of now standard criticism, and a comprehensive recommendation for weathering what the Navy sees as difficult days ahead.

Forty-three years ago John Maynard Keynes closed his *General Theory* with the following words:

... the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not **likely** to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.

Keynes's principle—let us call it the principle of intellectual stagnation in the public service—has some important implications for naval forces, or at least for one conventional wisdom about naval forces. I say "one conventional wisdom" advisedly, because if there is one thing that has become clear in recent years about

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naval forces it is that the number of offices, institutions, and influential individuals in the government with different but firmly held views about the proper future of the Navy is beginning to approach the number of ships in the fleet.

The Conventional Wisdom

The particular conventional wisdom about the Navy that I want to examine, with Keynes's principle in mind, is a rather widely-held one. It is bottomed on two views. The first is an assumption about the future of technology. It is that, due to projected improvements in anti-ship missiles and the difficulty of defending against them, surface ships over the next twenty or thirty years will become increasingly unable to survive at sea. The second basis of this particular conventional wisdom is harder to describe. It is a set of views that might be called quantitative policy analysis. It is the notion that military forces should be designed almost exclusively to yield favorable results from computer calculations of the outcomes of very specific military engagements, using complex models with many assumptions. The particular conventional wisdom produced by these views runs something like this:

Naval forces, particularly surface ships, are becoming increasingly obsolete. Ever since the Israeli destroyer, *Eilat*, was sunk in 1967 by a Soviet-made cruise missile, this trend has been clear and it becomes clearer each year. Cruise missiles make surface ships increasingly vulnerable to attack by all sorts of platforms—submarines, other surface ships, and aircraft.

The U.S. Navy has compounded this problem because it has become used to placing all its offensive power entirely in a single platform, the large-deck aircraft carrier. These ships are becoming so expensive that it is going to be difficult for the Navy to maintain very many of them, and they create the difficulty of having all of one's eggs in very few baskets.

Vulnerability and limited numbers mean that carriers and other surface ships could not prudently be risked in a major war in the future. This means that surface ships should primarily be used for specific purposes: showing the flag in peacetime and projecting power ashore in contingencies such as Korea or Vietnam, where they can operate from an ocean sanctuary against third world countries that lack the sophisticated naval forces of the Soviet Navy. But, for these peacetime and minor contingency purposes, the expense of operating carriers is unsupportably high. The United States could probably afford some reduction in large carriers and substitute, e.g., amphibious ships. Since many of them are large, look impressive, and roughly resemble carriers, they could be used for port visits and peacetime deployments.

The Navy's main, and only vital, mission in a U.S.-Soviet war is to protect the sea lines of communication from the East Coast of the United States to Western Europe. A war in Europe would likely be over quickly since it would either turn nuclear or one side would suffer significant defeat within the first thirty-odd days. Sealift might thus not be a particularly significant factor, but to hedge against a longer war, some Navy for sea lane protection is necessary. This could be done primarily by land-based anti-submarine warfare aircraft such as the P-3, small surface ships such as frigates, and a few nuclear attack submarines. In a big war, any other mission for naval forces—such as conducting operations within range of Soviet land-based aircraft—is too dangerous, or at least too expensive, to plan.

This particular conventional wisdom is not wholly in error, but it has serious flaws for the reasons Keynes described. First is its key technical judgment: that surface ships will become ever more vulnerable to anti-ship cruise missiles over the next two to three decades.

It is instructive to note that the people who lost the *Eilat* in 1967 have learned something. I have recently been on an Israeli patrol boat and reviewed their 100 percent successful tactics for avoiding hits by the large number of anti-ship missiles that were fired against them in the 1973 war. Suffice it to say this is an area in which their, and the United States' advantages and potential advantages, are far from irrelevant—e.g., skill with electronic countermeasures, innovative tactics, and intelligent and well-trained crews.

Moreover, defending ships that can move and, in a conventional war, that can tolerate a small number of hits, is inherently an easier problem than perfectly defending a fixed land-based site in a strategic nuclear exchange—where the penalty for leakage is greater. Even if a surface ship, particularly a large one, is hit by a conventionally-armed anti-ship missile, the probability of the ship being put out of action, much less sunk, is certainly not unity. It is true that, for a number of years in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States constructed ships in part under the assumption that any large-scale war would be nuclear and that hardening or passive protection was not, ordinarily, worth the money. However, a new Sea-Based Air Platforms Assessment, done by the Navy at the request of Congress, indicates that substantial improvement in the survivability of carriers, large or small, is possible by constructing new ships with more armor and passive protection than has been used in recent years. Further, vertical and short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft could significantly improve the capability of any carrier, of whatever size, to conduct its mission after suffering damage, because such aircraft can continue to operate even if the ship has been slowed (for that

matter, if it is dead in the water) and even if the deck area, where catapults or arresting gear would normally be located, has been damaged.

Most importantly, however, systems now coming into U.S. naval forces have been in development over the last decade that will make significant contributions toward reducing the number of missiles that might be able to penetrate defenses—electronic warfare suits, the PHALANX Close-In-Weapon-System, and particularly the AEGIS area air defense system.

Furthermore, there are either in the fleet, entering it soon, or in development, systems capable of destroying the platforms launching the incoming missiles to guard against gradual attrition. The F-14 fighter and E-2C early warning aircraft provide a good capability against aircraft launching anti-ship missiles, although that difficult job is one which needs substantial work in the future. Improvements in anti-submarine warfare forces—towed arrays, and others—make the job of engaging the missile-launching submarine a more reasonable enterprise than was the case a few years ago. And hostile surface ships can now be engaged by carrier-based aircraft and soon by the HARPOON missile just coming into the fleet.

Torpedoes continue to be a problem for any surface ship that permits a hostile submarine to move sufficiently close, but in the open ocean this can be made difficult. In any case the death of the surface navy from the cruise missile—as Mark Twain said of his own premature obituary—has been greatly exaggerated.

What about the problem of all U.S. offensive eggs being locked into a few large carrier baskets? There are two ways open for packing some offensive punch into a much larger number of platforms. They are not mutually exclusive. The first, of comparatively low cost, is to equip as many as possible of combatant platforms with cruise missiles. The program is already under way to equip all surface combatants as well as a number of aircraft and submarines with the HARPOON. Over the longer haul, cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines could be equipped with the considerably longer range TOMAHAWK cruise missile both for the anti-surface-ship mission and for land-attack missions. In some of the latter it is possible to have a significant military impact by delivering only a relatively small number of very accurate conventional warhead weapons.

The second way to spread out offensive punch is to disperse the aviation eggs in more baskets by developing V/STOL aircraft for deployment on small carriers and other air capable surface combatants. This may prove expensive, but it is a road that should be explored vigorously in research and development for a few years. Even if no more large-deck carriers are built, there will be at least twelve of them in our naval forces nearly into the 21st century. The only invest-

ment required to ensure this is to conduct a set of very thorough overhauls, called the Service Life Extension Program, beginning in 1981. Because of this, any transition to V/STOL would not, and need not, be a sudden proposition. It is more akin to an evolving reliance on solar power in place of fossil fuels than it is akin to, e.g., replacing one rifle with another.

"Well, all right," the answer might be, "suppose surface ships are not becoming as vulnerable as the conventional wisdom might indicate, and suppose there are ways to spread our firepower on to more platforms than twelve large-deck carriers. You still haven't told me what you want to use the Navy for. Are you interested in power projection? Are you interested in sea control? You can't afford to do everything. Shouldn't the United States be concentrating, for example, on protecting the sea lines of communication in the event of a NATO war, using the most cost-effective systems possible? Tell me the scenario you want to operate in and I will help you design and size your force. I will help you discover 'how much is enough.' The Navy has to get its act together and decide what war it wants to fight."

The Limitations of Quantitative Policy Analysis

These sorts of questions, claims, and advice are the bread and butter of what I described earlier as "quantitative policy analysis": a method of decisionmaking that relies heavily, in the military field, on designing forces to cope with very specific scenarios, utilizing complex computer models dependent on numerous detailed assumptions.

I am not using "systems analysis," because that term—the name of both the original office established in the Defense Department by Secretary McNamara and the decisionmaking methods it spawned throughout government—has become identified in many people's minds with a number of specific issues. Further, I am not referring to that office itself, nor to the role of particular individuals who worked or work there. Having worked there myself, I have a high regard for many others who have, for those who have led it, and for those who lead it today. What I am describing is an admittedly rather single-minded attachment to a specific tool of decisionmaking: a single-mindedness I would attribute to no one all of the time, but to lots of us some of the time, and to some of us most of the time.

This type of analysis has made several very positive contributions.

First, it has concentrated the public debate on outputs rather than inputs. Clearly it is better that we discuss U.S. capabilities and the costs of them rather than, line item for line item, whether 5 percent more or fewer generators

should be bought this year than last. Second, analysis, when properly done, can turn attention toward overall systems—toward the capability, say, of destroyers and helicopters operating together as an anti-submarine warfare system; this is clearly better than merely looking at the pieces of the puzzle. Third, analysis and the budget procedures that accompany it can help develop better balanced capabilities within budget constraints by, for example, calling attention to the fact that adequate airlift, sealift, or logistics may not be provided for the number of divisions being bought.

These alone are enough to say that analysis deserves one or two cheers—not three by any means, but not zero either. A background in analysis is especially useful additional learning for those who are schooled in the arts of leading men and women and commanding. This seasoning has produced some of the ablest members of the military.

But one of the oldest and most honorable strains in the analytic discipline is the principle that one must always tell the client or decisionmaker who asks the questions that set up the analysis, whether or not his questions are the right ones.

In that spirit, we should ask whether “how much is enough,” the quintessential question for quantitative policy analysts, is the right, or at least the most important, question for defense planning.

The leading reason why “how much is enough” may not be the major question that needs to be asked in naval force structure debates is that, in answering it, analysts often assume away the important issues in the process of designing forces for the specific scenarios that they know how to work within. Designing a Navy around specific scenarios requires one to look too far into the future to be realistic. Ships are platforms—more like capital investments than like specific weapons. Over 70 percent of the ships that will be in the fleet in the year 1990 already exist or have been authorized. A carrier authorized in the next year or two can spend over half its service life in the 21st century. For an example, in the year 2010, such a carrier (which would enter the fleet in the mid-1980s) would just be entering middle age—that is, it would be coming out of its major service life extension overhaul and would be looking forward to another fifteen years in the fleet. Now, we have no better idea today what specific wars or crises will occur between now and 2010—thirty-two years from now—than we had in 1946—thirty-two years ago—about the crises of today. Who foresaw in 1946 that in 1978 our thinking about when and how we might need naval forces could be significantly influenced by, e.g., a commitment to Israel, the need to protect sea lines of communication to Persian Gulf oil, a split between a Communist China and the Soviet Union, or U.S.-Soviet parity in strategic nuclear weapons? In 1946 the State of Israel did not

exist, Persian Gulf oil was just being discovered, the People's Republic of China was just being born, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had heard of an ICBM or an SLBM. What makes anyone even remotely confident that the national security problems of the early 21st century are any clearer today than the forces that drive naval needs in 1978 were clear in 1946?

It is neither lack of effort nor a temporary and remediable lack of will power that leads to the Navy not being able to tell now just what sort of war it wants to fight in thirty years. Designing a Navy is not like planning a Cook's Tour—next week I'll be in Belgium, it will be March, so I'll need a raincoat. It is far more like forming the Lewis and Clark Expedition: preparations for a wide range of problems are necessary, so flexibility is vital.

How this can best be done is a massive subject. But three points are relevant. First, since ships are capital investments and last such a long time in peacetime, and since the pace of technological change for weapons and sensors—such as radars and sonars—is so rapid ships must be able to accommodate change and modernization readily. Carriers are inherently capable of doing this. As the suits of aircraft are changed, the ship can thereby accommodate major alterations in missions. The carriers have done this many times since World War II. Another way to promote flexibility is to build even small surface combatants to take some aircraft. U.S. destroyers and frigates took on important new capabilities when anti-submarine warfare helicopters were put aboard them a few years ago. They will evolve further as more advanced helicopters replace these in the 1980s. This interest in the flexibility provided by multiplying the number and type of platforms that can use aviation at sea is another key reason to support the development of V/STOL aircraft. A third way to make it easier for ships to accommodate change is to build surface ships in such a way that their weapons suits—guns, radars, missiles, etc.—can be changed far more readily and cheaply than is now possible as new weapons and sensors become available, almost as if one were changing modules. The United States is currently working hard on this promising concept, but there is much to do.

The Spectrum from Peace to War

In addition to the need to design a Navy for flexibility over a long period of time, there is another major reason to consider rejecting the precise quantitative and scenario-dependent method of designing a Navy. It is that naval forces are particularly vital for dealing with the *dynamic* problem of the transition, a transition we want to prevent, from peace to war. Any specific scenario, whether it is

protecting the sea lines of communication to Europe in the event of a NATO war, projecting power in a certain type of crisis in the third world in the absence of Soviet intervention, or any other, has to be a snapshot in time. One does not want to ask only the question convenient for quantitative policy analysis to answer—"What might things look like at a specific time?"—but the much harder question: "What are the problems of going to or being forced from one position to another, and how can I control that process to avoid risk?" The President and his advisers need to know what sort of forces can best help them manage the perennial danger of crises escalating into war, and to manage them in such a way that the other side will know that at each step of the road the United States is in control. Unfortunately for the analyst, it is in the complexity of evolving and dynamic situations, of peace threatening to evolve into war, that naval forces are most relevant. That makes them difficult to analyze in one- or two-mission or one- or two-scenario formats. Naval forces are highly relevant to this delicate transition because they can do three things: (1) they can help maintain stability in peacetime through forward deployments and perceptions of their potential power if used; (2) they can help contain or manage crises as they evolve; and (3) they can help deter general war by being clearly better able to fight it than their foreseeable adversaries. These tasks are, in a very real sense, a seamless web. They have recently been reviewed in a major study for the Navy, *Sea Plan 2000*. Let me summarize its message at the risk of radical oversimplification.

Naval forces can help maintain stability in peacetime by forward deployment. The United States maintains today two carrier task groups in the Mediterranean and two in the Western Pacific; several Marine amphibious units are deployed in both areas as well. Since 1945, the United States has used such sea power as a means of affecting the behavior of decisionmakers in other nations in peacetime. These forward deployments are intended to demonstrate U.S. interest and resolve, to reassure allies, to deter enemies, and to ensure quick response. So one important question in designing a Navy is, how do force structure decisions have an effect on these forward deployments? For the issue is not whether a permanent reduction in U.S. naval forces would constrain forward deployment and therefore foreign policy, but rather to what degree it would do so.

Another part of the picture of assessing the overall contribution of naval forces to peacetime stability is the perception of the Soviet-U.S. naval balance. It is not inevitable that the United States concede to the Soviets parity in all military capabilities. They do not enjoy it now. The forward strategy linking the United States to other continents requires use of the seas, and makes any perception that the Soviets could deny the United States control of the seas particular-

ly damaging. Such perception is not warranted by the projected trends in technology, if the United States has the will, the skill, and the money to proceed to deploy what has been developed.

Another major task that national decisionmakers must face in the spectrum between peace and war is the containment or management of local crises. In some crises a President may wish to commit U.S. troops immediately to preempt certain potential moves by an adversary, to evacuate Americans in jeopardy, or to ferry supplies rapidly to a friend or ally. Naval forces are not the only possible means. The quick response of airlift provides the President with a valuable tool, for example. But airlift has limitations and in a number of cases, naval forces may be preferred for good reason. For example, naval forces can be deployed to a crisis area without being committed to battle and without committing allies. Such demonstrations manifest both U.S. concern and capabilities. In over 200 crises, large and small, since 1945, in which the United States was involved, U.S. Navy and Marine forces were deliberately employed in 177 cases, while U.S. land-based air or ground forces alone were demonstrated in fewer than 90 cases.

Naval forces may be the most acceptable form of military presence in crisis situations. They can convey, if the policymaker chooses, calculated ambiguity and calibrated response. Their presence does not irrevocably commit the United States to a given course of action. They do, however, seriously complicate the calculations of opposing parties. U.S. fighting forces can be assembled for action without using bases in other nations. Indeed naval forces help make the United States comparatively indifferent to the vicissitudes of other nations' policies about base rights, whether for itself or for hostile countries, and Naval forces thus help make it more able to tolerate shifts in political winds without feeling that vital interests are injured. If a crisis is resolved satisfactorily, naval forces can be withdrawn with limited fanfare. In sum, naval forces provide a policy maker with important flexibility, and a tool for orchestrating events.

To be able to successfully support U.S. policy in a crisis, its naval forces require several things.

They must have the striking power to affect events ashore.

They must have local superiority over potential adversaries. The benefit of naval superiority is that it signals to the Soviets and others that their adventurism occurs against the backdrop of local U.S. forces that are capable of fighting and winning. In a crisis the United States wants it to be the other commander on the scene who is forced to tell his superiors that he must back down or risk escalation.

There must be sufficient forces to permit coverage of different crisis areas, so that responding to a crisis in one area does not involve a risk of being unable to deal quickly with a new outbreak somewhere else. This does not imply that the United States must be everywhere all the time. It does mean that reductions in U.S. force levels will increasingly constrain its credibility.

Most of all, there is the possibility that a crisis could escalate to actual fighting, with some losses to U.S. forces. These forces are becoming more, rather than less, capable of responding to a sudden attack. Nevertheless, prudent planning requires that the possibility of some initial losses be recognized. Calculations of total forces must take this possibility into account.

Another major task for national decisionmakers is the deterrence of a major war. The deterrence of conflict will depend upon a credible warfighting capability. Maintaining such a capability is complex and difficult for a whole series of reasons, but two are salient. First, U.S. Allies are overseas—many of the most important ones close to the borders of the Soviet Union. If there is effective sea denial, by *both* sides, the United States loses. It must be able to use the seas to maintain its alliances and security. Second, it is no longer the case that the threat to use of the seas occurs only in the near-coastal waters of the Soviet Union. The increasingly-capable blue-water Soviet Navy, and particularly the long-range Backfire bomber going into the Soviet Naval Aviation forces, makes all the world's waters of interest a potential theater of conflict. The Backfire, for example, can range from Soviet bases to the environs of the Azores in the Atlantic and Pearl Harbor in the Pacific.

One of the most immediate concerns to the United States in deterrence and warfighting must be the defense of vital sea lanes. No matter what the scenario—minimum warning or long warning, short war or extended war—large amounts of material must be moved by sea. This is usually viewed strictly in the context of the North Atlantic. But Hawaii and Western Pacific allies must be supported by sea, and a continuing flow of vital overseas resources—particularly petroleum products—must be delivered to the United States and its allies to sustain economy and industry.

Naval forces contribute to deterrence and to the ability to fight a global war by a clear demonstration of an ability to support allies or strategic friends on the flanks of the Soviet Union. Sea lane defense, by itself, does not protect flanks. NATO is a collective alliance, relying upon the commitment of all its members to the common defense. If any of these members doubted America's commitment or capability to support them, it could generate serious pressures on alliance cohesion.

Then, in a general U.S.-Soviet war, U.S. Naval forces must be capable of flexible options worldwide. A major conflict will almost certainly be conducted on a global scale. If that should occur, we must be able to destroy Soviet naval forces in many areas of the world. By our having that capability, Soviet planning is complicated, for they are forced into a defensive posture. Whether or not a national leader chose to exercise the option, the capability to conduct offensive operations against an enemy fleet is crucial in order for these forces to be useful to the nation. Alfred Thayer Mahan hammers this point home throughout "*The Influence of Sea Power on History*." An offensive capability, Mahan points out, was the central difference over the years between the British and French fleets, and the key to British success.

Conclusion

These needs for managing dynamic situations—for maintaining stability in peacetime, for providing the tools to manage crises, for deterring war by being able to fight it—require a range of types of naval forces. Managing stability, crises, and deterrence means being able to conduct military operations, where needed, on, under, above, and along the shores of 70 percent of the earth's surface. This is simply too complex a task to be accomplished by one or two specific types of platforms or systems. Before asking "How much is enough?" the balance of forces to cope with dynamic, distant, and complex needs must be determined. This latter problem is far harder, and far less amenable to quantitative policy analysis.

There is a final reason why it is unwise to design a Navy to prevail only in certain specific scenarios, relying primarily on the techniques of quantitative policy analysis. It is that such analysis, in general terms, may lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of war. It is often said that quantitative analysis focuses attention where it should be focused—at marginal changes. Now, at one level, concentrating on the margin—that is, on the costs and benefits of the next decision, not some overall historical average—is just common sense. Ignoring sunk costs is the first principle of most successful businessmen and all successful poker players. But a fixation on marginal change can be stultifying if it so narrows the analyst's imagination that he never moves his gaze from the bow-wave to the horizon. A focus on changes at the margin and on quantitative questions can too often produce an attitude that innovation is suspect and that the only changes of any interest are to buy several fewer of these or slightly increase the number of those—a sort of military instinct for the capillaries.

Military breakthroughs do not come that way. They come by approaching things from a new perspective, by devising a different way, for example, to exploit the effect of mass or shock, a way to use surprise or concealment to accomplish what was previously accomplished by ponderous force, or a way to disperse and then concentrate for battle that confounds the enemy's planning. Quantitative scenario-specific analysis often misses this fundamental truth about military matters. It does not take each element, for example, of naval warfare—anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and so on—and ask how in each type of combat we might most readily make a potential enemy's past investments in weapons worthless. Such analysis doesn't ask, "How can I exploit my advantages?" "How can I destroy the will of an enemy commander?" As the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote long ago—the least desirable way to achieve victory is to destroy an enemy's cities; the next least desirable is to kill his soldiers; better is to destroy his alliances; but best of all is to destroy his plans and never have to fight at all. Only intellectual audacity permits this most humane type of victory, and intellectual audacity is not normally found at the margin.

This capacity for asking the right question, for intellectual audacity, is not a talent that is foreign to totalitarian or aggressive societies. One needs only to recall Heinz Guderian's development of tank warfare and the blitzkrieg in Germany in the late 1930s. The United States must not be the only superpower on this planet which is asking only, "How much is enough?" We must ask many other, and more audacious questions too, or risk ugly surprises. The best illustration is probably one such surprise that occurred some time ago.

In the late 18th century, during the re-evaluation that defeat always forces on a country's military establishment, French armorers discovered methods of casting cannon that improved accuracy and made artillery light enough to be pulled by horses rather than oxen. The implications of this development were not immediately clear. There was some experimenting, but most commanders used horse-drawn artillery as they had oxen-drawn—to make ponderous sorties from fixed forts and magazines and to fight in the rigid 18th century manner. Viewed in this context, horse-drawn artillery was a marginal improvement of sorts—it probably was not cost-effective. The development was only fully exploited during and after the French Revolution, in particular by a young Corsican artilleryman. Doubtless his success depended heavily on his own tactical genius and on the social effects of the French Revolution, which permitted the *levée en masse*—making possible the 19th century version of a human sea attack. But accurate horse-drawn artillery opened radical and unforeseen new possibilities of organization, mass, maneuver, and surprise that enabled his armies to shatter 18th

Century concepts of warfare and the armies that practiced them. New units called "divisions" were formed under aggressive young commanders, and each was given its own artillery. Forts and magazines were bypassed, and the Alps crossed, in rapid marches; firepower was massed quickly to destroy opposing armies before they could concentrate on the battlefield. In other men's hands, a lighter cannon barrel had been just a lighter cannon barrel. In his, it was a major element in the conquest of Europe.

So the risks of becoming rigid in thinking about military forces—of designing forces to fight the way they have always fought, of concentrating only on how much is enough at the margin—are great. Keynes must be proven wrong. The United States naval forces must not perpetually be the slave of vulnerability calculations of 1967 or analytical tools of 1963. Naval planners must learn continuously. The risks of doing otherwise are clear—the learning will take place, but much more painfully. For example, it took the rest of the European continent twenty years to learn enough from that artilleryman, turned Emperor, to defeat him. And, even then, as his ultimate conqueror said, it was a near-run thing.

What Are the Russians Up To?

Les Aspin

Sometimes it appears that the main export of Washington is hyperbole. It grows well in the political atmosphere of the Capitol city, and it flourishes best where the media is thickest.

The debate over defense policy has always had its full share of overstatement. But lately the hyperbole has been spreading like weeds in an untended garden.

The defense debate of late has centered on the ongoing Soviet military expansion. Many key elements of the Soviet military program—spending, manpower, strategic forces, major combat equipment—have indeed been on the rise.¹

As in any public debate, much attention has been focused on the most alarming view—that the Soviets, using detente as a smokescreen, are striving for military superiority. To underscore the imminent danger, the proponents of this school draw a parallel between the Soviet military expansion of today and the Nazi military buildup leading to World War II.

The Committee on the Present Danger, for example, says the Soviet expansion is "reminiscent of Nazi Germany's rearmament in the 1930s."²

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones, is more direct: "Not since Germany's rearmament in the 1930s has the world witnessed such a single-minded emphasis on military expansion by a major power."

Firmer yet, Robert Heintz, a syndicated columnist and retired Marine colonel, says the Russian buildup "even exceeds Hitler's in the 1930s."

Frank Barnett, director of the National Strategy Information Center, states that as a result of Russian military growth, the United States "is about where Britain was in 1938, with the shadow of Hitler's Germany darkening all of Europe."

And Daniel Graham, a retired three-star general and one-time director of the

1. See Appendix.

2. The quotations cited here are from the following sources:

The Committee on the Present Danger, "What is the Soviet Union Up To?" pamphlet, Washington, DC, 1977, p. 10.

Gen. David Jones, as quoted in Edgar Ulsamer, "The Soviet Juggernaut: Racing Faster Than Ever," *Air Force Magazine*, LIX (March 1976), p. 57.

Col. Robert Heintz, "Soviet Leads World in Arms Outlays," *Detroit News*, 7 April 1976, p. 8B.

Frank Barnett, as quoted in Linda Charlton, "Groups Favoring Strong Defense Making Gains in Public Acceptance," *New York Times*, 4 April 1977, p. 50.

Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham (Ret.), in *United States/Soviet Strategic Options*, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, 95 Cong. 1 Sess. (1977), p. 123.

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Defense Intelligence Agency, sees "an ominous parallel between today's reactions to the Soviet military buildup and the 1930s' reaction of much of British opinion to Hitler's rearming of Germany."³

Shorn of the rhetoric, the individuals and groups quoted above are saying that the Soviet Union is expanding its military might today at breakneck speed, just as Germany did in the 1930s. The Soviets, they say, would not necessarily even have to go to war; the overwhelming power they are about to achieve may force the West to make political concessions without a war. The Soviet and German buildups are analogous, they say, and their intentions are therefore analogous as well: they aim to present the West with an offer it can't refuse and, at the extreme, defeat the West on the battlefield if it should be so foolish as to challenge their might.

Behind the rhetoric lies the same point—a very reasonable one—that one can draw inferences about intentions by looking at *trends in capabilities*. In other words, a nation which is working at breakneck speed to expand its military capabilities, like Nazi Germany, is far more threatening than an already powerful state which is simply cruising on its existing capabilities. So one way to get a fix on Soviet intentions is to look at the trends in Soviet capabilities.

This study examines those trends by displaying the dimensions of the Soviet buildup side-by-side with those of the German buildup. To widen the perspective beyond the usual comparison with the United States, this study also shows the military expansions of four other states that other commentators have found threatening. In each case, the military growth has been analyzed for a five-year period. The countries and periods examined are:

- The Soviet Union, 1972–76, the most recent period for which data are available;
- Nazi Germany, 1935–39, the five years of Hitler's rule immediately preceding the start of World War II on September 1, 1939 (the last German pre-war fiscal year ended March 30, 1939, so no time after the declaration of war is involved);
- Egypt and Syria combined (labeled Arab on the charts), 1968–72, the period between the 1967 and 1973 Mideast wars;
- Israel, 1968–72, the same period as the Arab expansion;
- China, 1967–71, the main five-year period of Peking's military expansion after the Sino-Soviet split;

3. While looking over this hyperbole, I happened to come across a yellowed news clipping from 1959. It reported that Allen Dulles, then director of central intelligence, had said in a speech that Russia's "continuous diversion of economic resources to military support is without parallel in peacetime history." There is nothing new under the sun; the verbal excesses of one generation are dusted off and used in the next.

—North Korea, 1971–75, the most recent data covering an expansion which has received substantial attention in the United States as possibly heralding a military attack on the South.

Two points should be made about the following charts.

First, the charts do not deal with absolute numbers, but rather with the degree of growth from the base year. All the countries, therefore, show up as equal in Year One. The charts do not show that country X could defeat country Y; they show that country X's military forces grew more on a proportional basis than country Y's.

Second, the reference on each chart to "Year One" is to a different year in each case. Year One is 1972 for Russia, 1935 for Germany and 1968 for the Arabs. For this reason also, the charts do not suggest that any country could defeat another. The charts show different time periods because they illustrate different national reactions in different periods of stress or of preparation for attack.

What the charts do give is one indication of Soviet intentions. If a country wishes to develop its military might to use for political purposes, or if a nation, believing war is imminent, intends to take the offensive, those intentions are likely to be reflected in the growth of its military capability.

Gross Comparisons

A key element of the Soviet expansion often cited is the steady increase in funds devoted to the military. According to the CIA, however, Russian outlays on their armed forces have recently been rising at about 3 percent per year. Figure 1 shows that this rise is dwarfed by Hitler's expansion. But Soviet growth also pales in comparison with Arab and Israeli growth of 16 percent and 18 percent a year respectively. Even the Chinese growth rate of 7 percent a year was more than double Russia's—and it is not unreasonable to assume that the Chinese expansion helped drive the Soviet expansion.

There are two kinds of military budget expansions. In the first, a nation's military outlays increase each year because its economy is growing. In other words, a country can devote a constant percentage of its gross national product (GNP) to the military every year; but if its economy is growing, then its military budget will grow. In the second kind of expansion, the state will consciously devote a growing proportion of its GNP to the military. If intentions are being considered, the latter type of expansion is usually seen as more threatening. Figure 2 shows that the Germans devoted the smallest percentage of their GNP to defense at the

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
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Figure 1
Defense Expenditures (constant terms)



Note: Reliable data on North Korean defense expenditures are not available.

4. Sources for Figure 1 and all succeeding figures are listed at the end of the article.

omy and not because an increasing share of resources has been devoted to the armed forces.

Figure 2 also shows that in the final year of the measuring periods, the Soviet Union devoted a smaller portion of its resources to the armed forces than any of the other countries analyzed.

Manpower is another gross measure of effort. The Russians have indeed been putting more men in uniform in recent years. But, again, when we look at other expansions, we find the Chinese expansion was double that of the Soviets, and both these expansion rates are dwarfed by the others shown in Figure 3. The German increase from about 300,000 men to 1.27 million personnel is again the most dramatic by far.

Finer Measures

Money and manpower are gross measures. We can fine tune the comparisons by looking at expansion in the cutting edge of military forces—the numbers of divisions and the quantities of the main pieces of air, sea and ground equipment. Figures 4 through 7 show the Russian growth trailing in all four categories.

No growth occurred in the number of Soviet tactical aircraft (Figure 4) which stabilized at roughly 5,200 planes (while German frontline aircraft grew to 4,100 planes). The Russians actually suffered a decline in the number of major naval combatants (Figure 5). These are both key areas if the Soviets intend to confront the West with its immense air and naval might.

The cutting edge of a ground confrontation would come from tanks. As Figure 6 shows, the Russians have expanded their tank forces by 6 percent. But the Israelis nearly doubled their armor forces, the Arabs and North Koreans tripled theirs, and Nazi armor almost septupled.

In terms of divisions available, the Russians—with 169 divisions in 1976—showed a modest increase (Figure 7). But their growth trailed all the others, including that of Germany which grew from 21 divisions to more than 50. The curious Israeli pattern is an anomaly, the result of a reorganization of the forces.

Strategic Forces

Much attention has focused on the expansion of Soviet missile forces because these are the weapons that can be used to threaten the United States directly. The other nations examined in this study are not strategic missile powers so there is no ideal comparison. The closest equivalent was the Luftwaffe bomber force de-

Figure 4
Tactical Aircraft




Figure 5
Major Naval Combatants




Figure 6
Number of Tanks





Figure 7
Number of Active Army Divisions



signed with the strategic mission of demolishing Britain and France. Figure 8 shows that the pre-war expansion of Germany's bomber force far exceeded the Russian missile expansion regardless of whether the Russian expansion is measured in terms of warhead totals, strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs) or equivalent megatonnage (EMT)—all three popular ways of looking at strategic power.

Modernization

Preparations for war involve more than increases in quantities of weapons. Qualitative improvements, with ever more capable weaponry being introduced, are also important.

Equipment wears out so some production is always required just to keep the force from declining as older weapons are retired, and to allow for the orderly modernization of the inventory. For example, tanks will usually last about 20 years so a production rate of about 5 percent of inventory is the floor for a steady force. For submarines, a 30-year lifespan is a rough rule of thumb, so a production rate equal to about 3 percent of inventory is called for. A fighter plane will last roughly 15 years, so annual production of about 7 percent of inventory is needed to keep the force level even if no expansion is planned.

Figure 9 shows some comparative rates of tank modernization. Russian production in 1976 equaled 6 percent of its inventory, barely higher than the 5 percent steady-state requirement. In contrast, Germany in 1939 built tanks equal to 22 percent of its force at the start of that year.

Figure 10 provides a comparison of submarine modernization. Russian production as a portion of inventory in 1976 was 3 percent, which is about the rate needed to maintain a steady inventory. But the German rate in 1939 was 19 percent, far above the steady-state requirement.

Figure 11 illustrates the point using aircraft production figures. The Soviet output as a proportion of inventory in 1976 was 13 percent, demonstrating a fair amount of modernization relative to the 7 percent replacement requirement. But Germany built more planes in 1939 than it had in its entire aircraft inventory at the beginning of 1939.

In simple terms, the Russians are producing only a little more than is required to keep their forces from declining in size and to keep the average age of their force stable. Germany's modernization pace, by contrast, was phenomenal.

Another way to measure the pace at which a country is modernizing its forces is to look at the number of new types of equipment it is introducing into its forces—new models of tanks and new designs of fighters. Figures 12 through 14 provide

Figure 8
Strategic Forces




Figure 9
Tank Production as a Percent of Inventory in Final Year of Buildup



* Production rate required to maintain a level inventory.

comparative data for Germany and the Soviet Union for the same types of equipment shown in Figures 9 through 11.


Soviet Defenses: A Long-Term View

Since trends in capabilities are one potential indicator of Soviet intentions, we would expect that shifts in those trends might result from a shift in Soviet intentions. If the Soviets have become progressively more hostile and aggressive, we would expect to find an acceleration in the growth of Soviet defenses over time.

The charts in this study cover Soviet activities from 1972 to 1976. But this

Figure 10

Submarine Production as a Percent of Inventory in Final Year of Buildup



* Production rate required to maintain a level inventory.


should not leave the impression that the Russians have been doing anything these last five years very differently than in previous ones.

The expansion of Soviet military efforts has been surprisingly steady over time, with some minor fluctuations depending on the stage of weapons development and the deployment cycles the Soviet Union is in. For example, Figure 15 shows the trend in defense spending going back all the way to 1960 and the relatively steady growth over nearly two decades.

More variation can be found by looking at specific forces and force deployments. Figure 16 tracks Soviet military personnel levels since 1960. There was some decline in the early 1960s, but a steady growth since then.

Much greater fluctuations appear when the Soviet forces assigned to its European allies are tracked. Increases since the Czech uprising have been impressive,

Figure 11
Aircraft Production as a Percent of Inventory in Final Year of Buildup



* Production rate required to maintain a level inventory.

Figure 12
Number of Types of Tanks Introduced Into Service over Six Year Period




Figure 13
Number of Types of Submarines Introduced Into Service over Six Year Period




Figure 14
Number of Types of Aircraft Developed over Six Year Period




Figure 15
Dollar Cost of Soviet Defense Programs




Figure 16
Soviet Active Military Manpower



although the number of troops now appears to have leveled off. However, in the longer view the Russians have really only matched their deployments of the early 1950s, as shown in Figure 17.

By way of comparison, the long-term trend in the United States defense program is shown—using budget data since 1948—in Figure 18. The pattern that emerges is a quantum jump in spending between the pre- and post-Korea budgets followed by a series of increases and decreases at this very high base level. Even after discounting for the Korean and Vietnam war humps, U.S. defense spending has been erratic.

The most recent decline in U.S. defense spending corresponds with our withdrawal from Vietnam. It also corresponds with SALT and detente. Many Western observers have felt that if detente were other than rhetoric to the Kremlin, Soviet defense spending should have declined similarly in recent years.

But if we put the charts on Soviet and American defense spending (Figures 15 & 18) side by side, there is no discernible relationship. One chart might just as well show the price of prunes in Manchuria and the other population growth in Las Vegas. This suggests there are factors driving the Soviet military budget other than the level of our activity. A few of those factors might be:

—Bureaucratic momentum—In the United States we are only beginning to

Figure 17
Soviet Military Personnel in Europe




realize the power of large bureaucracies to influence policies. The Soviet Union is far more bureaucratized. Its leaders, after all, come up through the governmental and party bureaucracies and owe their positions to them. One of the largest bureaucracies centers around defense production. That can help explain the consistency of Russian military outlays as opposed to the jerkiness of ours.

—Buying military support—American political leaders do not fear a coup; Soviet leaders must live with that fear. One response can be to buy off the military. Slashes, such as those imposed in our country, could be destabilizing to the Soviet political system. Brezhnev may also be buying military support for SALT, a concept not unheard of in our country.

—Rupture of empire—Thirty years ago Moscow stood at the center of the communist universe. The Eastern European puppet states of that era have become increasingly more independent—and less reliable. Three decades of empire have produced two major anti-Soviet outbreaks and several minor ones. Russia finds it

Figure 18
U.S. Defense Spending, 1948-1977 (Constant FY 77 Dollars; Total Obligational Authority)



must occupy its western marches like the czars of old. For example, the five occupation divisions put into Czechoslovakia in 1968 remain there today.

—Rise of China—In that same 30-year period China has been converted from a feudal state in chaos to a major power challenging Moscow both territorially and ideologically. One quarter of Russia's land and air forces are now focused on an adversary that did not exist until the 1960s.

Conclusion

These charts show that without a doubt Soviet power has been increasing. And it has been increasing at a time when U.S. spending on its military has been declining. Looking at what has happened to Soviet and American forces since 1968, a rather frightening picture emerges. A great gulf appears to open—a spending gap to add to the other popular gaps of recent history.

Actually the gap is caused more by a drop on the American side than by a Soviet jump. A drop primarily, though not exclusively, the result of the winddown from Vietnam.

It is, however, this gap of recent years which gets the most attention. If we take a broader view and, one, look at what the Soviets have been doing over a greater time period and, two, compare their rates of growth with those of other military powers, we get an entirely different perspective.

The individuals and groups quoted at the beginning were saying, in effect, if you look at what the Russians are doing, you will see they are mounting a challenge on the scale of the Nazis. We have here looked at what the Russians are doing and find no such evidence. We do find that:

—The Soviets have devoted a constant level of their GNP to their armed forces for several years;

—While they have been building newer and more modern equipment, they have not been adding them to their forces at much more than the rate needed to replace aging pieces of equipment;

—The Soviets are failing to match our reduction of recent years, but they never matched our jumps of previous years;

—While reasonable men can disagree over the validity of any single kind of measurement, 14 different measures here *all* show the Russian expansion to be far from dramatic. Rarely will such a broad spectrum of measurements all point in the same direction.

Contrary to the remarks of Colonel Heintz quoted at the beginning, the recent Russian buildup comes nowhere near "exceeding" Hitler's in the 1930s. In fact, it

isn't even "reminiscent of Nazi Germany's rearmament," as stated by the Committee on the Present Danger. And as the comparisons with the Arab, Israeli, Korean and Chinese buildups show, contrary to what the Air Force chief of staff said, the Russian military expansion is not even the largest since Nazi Germany's.

No one is suggesting that the Soviet leadership is benign, docile or unthreatening. The Politburo clearly does not have the best interests of our political or economic systems at heart. But to reach the conclusion that Moscow is preparing for a confrontation is to leap beyond the evidence. Clearly, so far as Soviet intentions can be deduced from the trends in their military program, they are not as hostile as some have portrayed them to be.

Soviet military activity cannot be ignored, wished away or dismissed out of hand. Our response ought to be measured to the extent of the threat and not out of proportion to it. Rhetoric about "Nazi-like" buildups only hinders our efforts to devise a measured response.

Sources

Data on defense expenditures (the basis for Figure 1) were in billions of 1974 U.S. dollars for Egypt/Syria, Israel, and China and were taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975*, Washington, DC, 1977 (hereafter cited as ACDA). For the Soviet Union, figures in 1975 U.S. dollars were from Central Intelligence Agency, "A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1966-1976," SR 77-10001U, January 1977 (hereafter cited as CIA, "Dollar Cost"). German figures in billions of Reichsmarks cover fiscal years 1934 to 1938, which ended on March 31, 1935 and 1939 respectively, and are from Burton H. Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), Table 60, p. 254. Joachim Fest, *Hitler* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. 902 uses identical numbers. Others are available, but these are considered the most reliable and the most comparable in coverage to data for the other countries. No reliable economic data are available for North Korea.

Defense spending as a percent of GNP (Figure 2) for Syria/Egypt, Israel, and China came from ACDA. Soviet data were based on Central Intelligence Agency, "Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970-1975," SR 76-10121U, May 1976, p. 16. (The 11-12 percent figure corresponds definitionally with the other country estimates used.) Unfortunately, no more precise annual formulation of the figures was available. German numbers were from Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations*, pp. 252 and 254.

Data on active military manpower (Figure 3) for Egypt/Syria, Israel, and China were from ACDA. Figures for North Korea and the Soviet Union are from the intelligence community; see, e.g., CIA, "Dollar Cost," pp. 7-9. German figures were assembled from a number of sources, including U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Overall Economic Effects Division, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy," October 1, 1945, p. 33 (hereafter "Effects"); Maj. Robert Kennedy, *The German Campaign in Poland*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-255, Washington, DC, 1956, Chapter 2; Robert J. O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939* (London: Cassell and Co., 1966); David Irving, *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), Chapter 4; plus others.

Aircraft and Naval Combatants data (Figures 4 and 5) for Egypt/Syria and Israel were from

Ahmed S. Khalidi, "The Military Balance, 1967-73," in Naseer H. Aruri, ed., *Middle East Crucible*, AAUG Monograph Series No. 6, (Wilmette, Illinois: Medina University Press Intl., 1975), pp. 21-63 (hereafter cited as Khalidi) and Dale R. Tahtinen, *The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Today* (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute, October 1973) (hereafter cited as Tahtinen). Both of these sources rely heavily on International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) figures. Chinese figures were from *United States Military Posture for FY 1978*, Statement to Congress from Gen. George Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1977, and statements from prior years (hereafter, *JCS Posture*). North Korean and Soviet numbers were intelligence estimates; for the Soviets, see, e.g., *JCS Posture*. German aircraft figures come in part from Fest, Hitler, p. 802; Kennedy, *German Campaign*; Irving, *Rise and Fall*; and Edward L. Homze, *Arming the Luftwaffe* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1976). German naval ship estimates were based in part on Taylor, *Sword and Swastika*; Kennedy, *German Campaign*; William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York, 1960); and Frank Davis, "Wolf Pack," *Strategy and Tactics*, no. 47, 1974.

Tank data (Figure 6) for Egypt/Syria and Israel were from Khalidi and Tahtinen. Soviet figures were extracted from *United States Military Posture for FY 1978*, Statement to Congress from Gen. Brown; see also John Collins, "America and Soviet Armed Services, Strengths Compared, 1970-76," *Congressional Record*, CXXIII (August 5, 1977), pt. III, p. S14079 (hereafter cited as Collins). German data, as usual, were pieced together from a number of sources, including "Effects"; Victor Madej, "The Blitzkrieg: An Analysis," *Strategy and Tactics*, no. 29, 1971; Albert A. Nofi, "Mechanized Warfare: Experiment and Experience, 1935-40," *Strategy and Tactics*, no. 41, 1973; plus others. North Korea figures were Defense Department estimates. No data for China were available.

Army division figures (Figure 7) for China and North Korea were from IISS, *The Military Balance*, various years. For Egypt/Syria and Israel, see Khalidi and Tahtinen. For the Soviet Union, data were from the intelligence community. For Germany, a reliable time series was again assembled from a variety of sources, including O'Neill, *German Army*; "Effects," p. 165; E. M. Robertson, *Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933-1939* (New York: The Citadel Press, 1967), Chapter 9; Pierre Renouvin, *World War II and Its Origins* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); plus others.

Soviet strategic forces data (Figure 8) were primarily from Collins; German bomber figures were primarily derived from Homze, *Arming the Luftwaffe*; Irving, *Rise and Fall*; and Kennedy, *German Campaign*.

For the modernization figures (9-14) Soviet aircraft production as a percent of inventory data were from the DoD (e.g., Donald Rumsfeld, "Defense Perspectives, Fiscal Year 1978," January 1977), for the 1972-76 period and covered total tactical aircraft production (including interceptors) divided by Frontal Aviation plus PVO-Strany (Air Defense) active inventories; tank production also came from DoD (e.g., Rumsfeld, "Defense Perspectives,"), with inventory data already available for Figure 6 above. Submarine production and inventories were from the intelligence community. Comparable German figures: aircraft production was from USSBS, "Overall Report (European War)," September 30, 1945, p. 11; tank and submarine production and all inventories from same sources cited above for Figures 4-6.

Numbers of new Soviet aircraft and submarines developed were derived from numerous sources corroborated with unclassified DoD data (compare, e.g., Stephen Lukasik, "Military Research and Development," in Francis Hoerber and William Schneider, eds., *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1977), p. 215, with Rumsfeld, "Defense Perspectives." The T-72 tank, which actually went into service in 1970, was counted in the 1971-76 period since its deployment in large numbers occurred during that period. For Germany aircraft developed were derived on a plane-by-plane analysis of Homze, *Arming the Luftwaffe*; plus others. For tanks, see Nofi, "Mechanized Warfare," p. 9; Madej, "Blitzkrieg"; and "Effects," pp. 162ff. For submarines, see Davis, "Wolf Pack"; "Effects"; and Kennedy, *German Campaign*.

Data for the years 1966-76 for Figures 15 and 16 are the same used above from the CIA. For prior years, figures were based on Defense Department and intelligence data. For example, a trend line in spending for the years 1960-66 from the CIA appears in *Allocation of Resources in*







the Soviet Union and China, Hearings before the Joint Economic Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, 93 Cong. 2 Sess. (1974), p. 68. (This estimate has since been revised.)

Figure 17 is derived from Defense Department figures. See Chart B-12 in *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1977*, Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, 94 Cong. 2 Sess. (1976), p. 592.

Data used in Figure 18 are from the Defense Department.

Appendix

Soviet-U.S. Defense Programs 1966-1976



Sources for these figures included Central Intelligence Agency, "A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1966-1976," SR77-10001U, January 1977, for both the spending and manpower figures. The remaining charts come mostly from *United States Military Posture for FY 1978*, Statement to Congress from Gen. George Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1977, and statements from prior years. This was supplemented by available intelligence data and other open sources, e.g., John Collins, "America and Soviet Armed Services, Strengths Compared, 1970-76," *Congressional Record*, CXXIII (August 5, 1977), pt. III, p. S14063ff.

The Neglected Threat of Chemical Warfare

Amoretta M. Hoeber
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Beginning in the late sixties, and triggered at least in part by the Dugway sheep incident of 1968,¹ the chemical warfare (CW) capability of the United States underwent a rapid and almost complete decline. By the mid-seventies, the Army Chemical Corps was almost disbanded, and the ability of U.S. forces to conduct operations in a chemical environment has now decreased to the point where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says the U.S. is "not prepared" (Ref. 3, p. 90). Coincident with this unmistakable decline in U.S. interest and capability, the Soviets moved in the opposite direction, not only improving their capability; as they have done in all fields of military activity, but significantly upgrading the relative importance as well. These trends have reached a point where now, among all of the comparisons of U.S./Soviet military capabilities, one of the most lopsided is that for chemical warfare and operations in resulting toxic environments. There, the Soviet superiority over the United States is assessed not by mere factors of two or three, but more often than not, by two or three orders of magnitude. This differential is believed to apply almost uniformly to munitions stockpiles, testing facilities, training activities, equipment, personnel and force structure. While the U.S. attitude about this facet

1. The "Dugway sheep incident" was an accident in 1968 when the nozzle of an aerial spray tank carrying the toxic chemical VX malfunctioned during an open-air test at the Dugway Proving Ground, an Army chemical warfare test site. Within the next several days, 6,000-6,400 sheep grazing some 27 miles away were found dead. While the cause and effect has never been proven conclusively, minute quantities of VX were said to have been found in the sheep tissues, and the connection of the sheep deaths to the chemical test is usually presumed. (Ref. 1, p. 6 and Ref. 2, p. 26)

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of preparedness is characterized by widespread apathy and repugnance,² the Soviet approach, as in other military endeavors, is one of serious warfighting capability and readiness.

Whether the mounting Soviet interest and capability derive from the development of more tolerable protective clothing and equipment, from the development of an antidote that enables them to better exploit the use of their own chemical weapons, or merely reflects their seizing upon the opportunity to capitalize on the U.S. decline is not known. What is clear, however, is that the Soviets have an impressive capability and appear well trained and ready; that the United States and the rest of NATO are neither equipped nor trained to any extent comparably to the Soviet Union for this type of warfare;³ and that the main and significant advantage of chemical warfare emerges in exactly such a condition of asymmetry.

While this state of affairs is now recognized at some of the highest levels in the armed services, and while some actions have been initiated to improve U.S. preparedness (Ref. 4), the program still suffers. The efforts which have been initiated to ameliorate the situation in which we now find ourselves are still definitely of subcritical mass and will probably remain so unless nurtured and guided by unequivocal and widespread high-level support. The trends of improvement are marred by a severe sense of paranoia, continued lack of attention, coordination, and direction, and a fairly common belief that the only politically practicable "solution" is an arms control or disarmament agreement aimed at erasing the problem. The dangers inherent in such an approach and the potential for error in the underlying assumptions are, the present authors believe, of such a magnitude as to warrant a critical review of the subject.

Hence, this article will summarize the state of Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive; rationales from the Soviet point of view on the utility of chemical employment in both nuclear and non-nuclear conflict; the state of the U.S. posture to cope with such a threat; and the basic problems associated with resolving chemical warfare issues within the U.S. defense establishment. As the article will show, this assessment leads the authors to the conclusion that there is a significant vulnerability in a critical aspect of U.S. and NATO military capability and that the actions currently under way to reduce the vulnerability in no

2. It is a mark of the U.S. attitude that the author of "Close Encounters of the Third Kind" selected a nerve-gas "accident" as the circumstance that would most assure complete evacuation of an area!

3. In the Chairman's Posture Statement (Ref. 3) the adjectives used to describe these aspects of the U.S./NATO capability range from "not prepared," to "marginal" and "extremely limited," while those used to describe Soviet capabilities are "extensive," "superior," "formidable," and the like (pp. 15, 90, 91).

way match the seriousness of the threat. U.S./NATO forces should expect to have a toxic environment forced on them, and if, as today, they are "not prepared" (Ref. 3, p. 90) to operate in such an environment and to impose comparable problems on the Warsaw Pact forces in response, Soviet use would clearly have disastrous—and potentially decisive—consequences for NATO. And the U.S./NATO lack of capability may well invite exactly that which might be avoided, that is, Soviet use of their chemical warfare superiority.

Chemical Warfare

Chemical weapons are unique among modern weapons in that they impact only on living things—that is, they attack people without destroying physical facilities or equipment.⁴ There are several types of chemical warfare agents, with widely differing properties. Some are colorless, some odorless; others can be seen, as, for example, in an approaching cloud, and some can be detected by their characteristic smell. Some are quickly dissipated and lose their effectiveness in as short a time as a few minutes; others persist—or can be made to persist—for a day or so; and the more persistent agents, either by nature or by the addition of thickeners, can last for a week, a month, or more, depending on the atmospheric conditions.

The chemical agents of greatest concern today are the nerve agents sarin, soman and VX, which attack the human nervous system, although older agents, such as mustard and hydrogen cyanide, have important military advantages and hence are serious threats in particular circumstances, some of which will be discussed below. Nerve agents can be absorbed as vapor through the respiratory system or directly through exposed skin that comes in contact with liquid agent droplets or concentrated vapor clouds. Even very small doses are sufficient to have an effect. Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning are a running nose, tightness in the chest, dimmed vision, difficult breathing, drooling, sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, twitching, jerking, headache, confusion, drowsiness, convulsions and, if a lethal dose has been absorbed, death. (Ref. 5, p. D-7) While the after-effects of the older, mustard-type agents are serious and usually permanent—and, in fact, the horror of these lasting effects may well be one of the major causes for the general repugnance about this type of warfare⁵—full recovery from less-than-lethal doses of today's

4. While biological weapons likewise attack only people, they are generally not viewed as *battlefield* weapons due to the time delay required before onset of effect.

5. Such an explanation, however, would hold in reverse as a factor in the Soviet emphasis on this type of warfare—in World War I the Soviets suffered almost as many chemical warfare fatalities and casualties as all other countries combined.

nerve agents is entirely possible. Such doses can put personnel out of action for days to weeks, however, depending on the amount of the dose and the medical treatment available, and thus would increase the military impact, both through preventing performance of military functions and, in addition, tying up many personnel in the administration of medical care for the incapacitated.

Chemical weapons are primarily tactical and can be delivered in a variety of munitions, such as land mines, artillery rounds, multiple-rocket launchers, tactical rockets such as the Soviet FROG, longer-range operational-tactical missiles such as the Soviet SCUD, cruise missiles, air-delivered short-range attack missiles, and bombs. In addition, agents can be sprayed by both land vehicles and airplanes and helicopters.

Chemical weapons are basically area munitions; they affect anyone who is not properly protected both at the time of agent delivery to the area or, in the case of areas attacked with the more persistent agents, anyone who subsequently enters the area without proper protection. The lethal areas associated with the employment of these munitions depend on the agent, on the number of munitions employed, with several munitions normally used to "blanket" the area of interest, and on a number of outside factors, such as weather, terrain, local vegetation, etc. Areas that one can efficiently attack with a single salvo of a few rounds of the larger weapons, i.e., bombs and missiles, may be roughly the size of a major logistics area, depot, or an airbase, and areas which might be attacked with a few battalion volleys of artillery might be the size of an anti-tank defense position.

Chemical weapons are particularly appropriate for use against facilities just prior to overrunning them, or when it would be desirable to capture and use particular assets, or in circumstances when continued offensive progress would be hampered by the rubble created by conventional or nuclear explosives. Not only different types of chemical agents but also specific agent/munition combinations are more or less useful for different purposes. A non-persistent agent attack would be logical in advance of an assault, for example, in a concentrated, surprise mode to cause heavy casualties at the position to be attacked. Multiple rockets, artillery, or tactical air might be the best mode of delivery for this purpose. A persistent agent, on the other hand, would most logically be employed to secure flanks or to block off routes of counter-attack, to "put out of action" bypassed urban areas, or to prevent the opponent's access to favorable ground or vital facilities—again, particularly those whose preservation for one's own use appeared necessary or desirable, such as rail or road networks or airfields. (Refs. 6 and 7, *passim*)

Atmospheric conditions are very important in determining the method of employment of chemical weapons and in predicting effects. Chemical agents drift

with the wind, and lower temperatures lower their evaporation rates; these sensitivities vary, depending upon the agent. According to the relevant Army Field Manual (Ref. 8), the meteorological conditions of interest are wind speed and direction, temperature, and atmospheric stability. Predictability of agent dissemination patterns and of the potential persistence of effects is an issue in determining the different agent/munition/target combinations of choice and the effects of use. While uncertainties exist, except for very high winds the weather conditions can be accounted for, and the type of agent selected and the weapons employed in such a manner as to take into account those conditions. This should not be considered as major an issue as it often is. Other factors, such as target location uncertainty, may well introduce more severe problems and apply to all weapons effects calculations. Minimizing the uncertainties associated with the behavior of chemical agents is largely a function of the attention paid to this matter.

Effectiveness of CW munitions can also be quite sensitive to the readiness of the unit under attack. Here, readiness includes the type of uniform, the capabilities of other individual and group protective equipment, decontamination capabilities, and, of exceptionally great importance, training in the use of available equipment. Chemical warfare is rather special in that considerable protection and readiness to cope with the resulting environment, while technically and physically demanding, can be achieved at relatively low cost. However, the measures that need to be undertaken are often extremely cumbersome and inconvenient. No one likes the idea of having to remain inside special clothing and to wear gas masks while fighting a war. The incentives and capabilities to do so require special emphasis on understanding the threat and on regular training in operating in a CW environment. Even with serious attention paid to these factors, a unit might well expect 5 to 15 percent casualties just from errors, oversights, or faulty equipment, e.g., a leaky overgarment or gas mask; however, that is much better than the heavy casualty level which might result from the only-marginally effective protective posture of both the current U.S. forces and most of the rest of the NATO forces⁶ (Ref. 3, p. 90).

Considering the effects of chemical weapons throughout a target area, the ability of such agents to penetrate into trenches and buildings, and the "lasting" nature of their effects (if desired), chemical weapons should be recognized as very effective on a pound-for-pound basis. While they do different things, and hence are not directly comparable with conventional munitions, a rough estimate might well con-

6. Great variation in protection exists; according to Ref. 3, capabilities range from adequate to essentially none (p. 90).

sider them close to an order of magnitude more effective. During World War I, when chemical weapons were used extensively, they were judged to be between four and eight times as effective as high-explosive weapons (Ref. 9, p. 11-1 and Ref. 2, p. 30). Current chemical weapons should be considered significantly more effective in producing fatalities than World War I mustard and lewisite against similar levels of protection. In a sense they might more accurately be compared to nuclear weapons of a few kilotons yield, except without the attendant blast, thermal and atomic radiation effects. However, comparative effects calculations for chemical weapons which consider them in isolation are of limited utility because such weapons are often used in combination with others to achieve complementary benefits. Thus one should expect the use of different agents at the same time against one target and also expect the use of agents coupled with explosive and fragmentation weapons, thus enhancing the impact of both. This latter combination would be particularly synergistic in attacking most NATO operations complexes, considering the nature of the facilities and the lack of readiness of the personnel to deal with such combinations. For example, many buildings are relatively soft, that is, easy to puncture, and contaminated portions that would result from a combined conventional and chemical attack would be difficult to seal off. Another example: while NATO may be prepared to repair damage, e.g., craters in runways, it is not prepared if the area to be repaired is also contaminated.

The Current Soviet CW Posture

Chemical warfare clearly is a major contingency for which the Soviet Union plans. Capabilities for chemical warfare are serious and specialized, and are integrated throughout ground, air, and naval forces. The seriousness is demonstrated in force structure and personnel, equipment, training and testing, and agents and munitions. The overall Soviet capability to conduct chemical warfare has been termed "awesome" (Ref. 10, p. 22), and it is reportedly the "official Army position" today that there is a "considerable" chemical threat to NATO forces and that the Soviets are continuing to add to their CW capabilities (Ref. 6, p. 17).

Chemical defense units are organic to every Soviet command from front to regiment. Smaller units, even down to company size, have special Chemical Troops (Ref. 7, p. 3). There are "scores of Soviet generals and some 70,000-100,000 full-time chemical warfare officers and men" (Ref. 10, p. 22). (The United States has at most 2,000 officers and men engaged fulltime in some form of chemical chores, and, of these, probably no more than a small percentage could be regarded as equivalent.)

Chemical warfare preparedness is also integral to the Soviet main fighting equipment. All modern tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) are designed to offer protection in both nuclear and chemical contaminated areas (Ref. 7, p. 3). The tank and armored personnel carrier protection includes integral "protective sealant liners," and air filters are provided which protect against chemical and biological contamination. The remainder of the new Soviet generation of fighting vehicles, including support vehicles, missile transporters, command vehicles, etc., are provided with supplies of individual protective equipment for the crews (Ref. 11 and Ref. 12).

There is also a considerable amount of issued individual protective equipment and equipment for decontamination. The soldiers all have personal masks, protective clothing, chemical detectors and "effective" atropine-based compound syringe antidotes (Ref. 7, p. 3, and Ref. 12).⁷ Each Soviet division has decontamination companies which are to decontaminate and return to combat men and equipment. The specialized chemical decontamination equipment includes a unique type of vehicle called "TMS-65," a truck-mounted turbojet spraying apparatus for rapid decontamination of large vehicles (Ref. 7, p. 3). These capabilities do not appear to be merely defensive but appear designed and deployed for use as part of the Soviet offensive capability, i.e., to enable Soviet troops to exploit the results of the employment of their chemical weapons. While the Soviet protective clothing for the troops imposes considerable operating stress, as does the U.S. clothing, the current asymmetry in CW offensive capability means that the Soviets need have almost no fear of being subjected to contamination not of their own making. Hence, rather than being continuously on the alert and in their protective gear, they, unlike the U.S., would know when, where, and what agents are planned for employment. Thus, they would need to don the cumbersome gear only at essential times and places. Training in the use of the equipment for the purpose of fighting during chemical attack is standard and is emphasized in all individual and unit training (Ref. 7, p. 3), which, as a further indication of their seriousness, includes training in live agent environments (Ref. 3, p. 90).

The magnitude of Soviet attention to CW in the design of their forces was not clear to the U.S. defense community, despite the available intelligence material, until analysis of the Soviet actions during the 1973 Middle East War and analysis of the Warsaw Pact equipment captured during that war made many begin to question the appropriateness of the U.S. lack of attention. As indicated in Ref. 13,

7. Prompt use of antidotes can protect personnel against several times the nerve gas exposure that would otherwise be required for lethal effect.

information gathered from [that] Middle East War has emphasized that foremost among the potential adversaries of the United States in CW is the Soviet Union. Although the CW equipment they furnished in the October War was defensive, their forces are considered to be well-equipped for offensive and defensive CW operations. Evidence of CW delivery systems and weapons development, chemical, biological and radiological protective systems (CBR), realistic CBR training and civil CBR training support the fact that the Soviets can operate in a toxic environment.

The large amounts of Russian CBR equipment captured in the Middle East . . . reflect this capability and emphasize Soviet CW preparedness. As the Army's [then] Chief of Staff, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, testified before Congress on 14 February [1974], the U.S. Army was surprised by the [CW preparedness of the] Arab forces, and is determined to improve its own CBR defenses. (pp. 21-22)

Analysis of captured assault equipment indicated that it had been designed to operate in a CW environment and that personnel had been provided with individual CW protective gear and antidote inoculants. From the universality of protective aspects of the captured weapons it was inferred that such protection on Soviet equipment was standard (Refs. 11 and 14). General Abrams, for example, said that he concluded that

chemical, biological and radiological defenses were now standard on all Soviet weapons and *thus* had been included on the equipment sent to Egypt and Syria. (Ref. 14, emphasis added.)

As to offensive capability, actual evidence is scarce. Knowledgeable persons, however, including Professor John Erickson of the University of Edinburgh (as quoted in Ref. 7, p. 3), have stated that Soviet chemical warfare agents include both World War I agents and more modern ones:

- mustard gases
- phosgene
- hydrogen cyanide
- soman
- other nerve gases
- an agent that "the Soviets label VR-55"

According to Erickson, chemical rounds exist for the 122-mm and 152-mm artillery, the FROG surface-to-surface short-range rocket, the longer-range SCUD surface-to-surface missile, and the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (as quoted in Ref. 7, p. 4).

Chemical artillery, mortars, mines, air-delivered bombs and spray tanks were

in the Soviet inventory in World War II. There is no evidence that those munitions have been destroyed, and a similar pattern of weaponization can therefore logically be assumed for the post-World War II agents. A relatively more recent system, the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher, may well, as Erickson says, also have such rounds. It would be an ideal weapon system for delivery of a non-persistent agent, such as hydrogen cyanide. Because of the short lifetime of delivered toxic concentration, such an agent would be most useful against enemy forces immediately in front of forward-moving troops; occupation or assault of facilities attacked with such an agent can be carried out in a very short time after that attack with minimal danger to the assault troops. However, in the case of hydrogen cyanide in particular, this would not be very effective unless a lot of it were delivered to the target in a short time. Hence, the value of a multiple rocket launcher:

The BM-21 . . . provides a multiple container for the agent, it insures effective and rapid distribution of the agent over a target area, and the round can release the agent in active form. A battalion volley can impact 720 rounds on a target. (Ref. 7, p. 3)

Soviet Rationale for Use

The potential Soviet use of chemicals in a major theater conflict which includes the use of nuclear weapons seems certain: there would be many advantages to the Soviets in hitting some targets without physically destroying them. And the impact of the use of chemicals on the likelihood of coupling to a strategic nuclear exchange might be viewed as minimal in that scenario: if escalation did not result from the use of theater nuclear weapons, it would be unlikely to result from the additional use of chemical weapons.

It is possible, however, that, should such a major theater war begin, the Soviets might favor keeping it conventional, at least for some period of time, if they believed that they could do so while still accomplishing their objectives. These objectives, relative to NATO in such a context, could be, first, to improve the position of the Soviet Union if the conflict should come to the point of a nuclear exchange (by reducing or eliminating the NATO nuclear capability), and, second, to quickly overrun NATO defense positions and seize critical territory. The primary problem in achieving the first objective would be the destruction or "putting out of action" of NATO nuclear forces—air capabilities, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery—and their associated command/control. The primary problems in achieving the second objective would be overrunning NATO anti-tank defenses, disabling NATO ground-attack tactical air, and inhibiting NATO force movements.

An important question here, particularly since the answer determines a great deal of the impetus or lack thereof in the U.S. programs to cope with a potential chemical threat, is whether chemical warfare agents would be employed by the Soviets in such a non-nuclear phase of conflict in Europe. The U.S. perception—both official and unofficial—for many years has been, and, for the most part, still is, that, given the Soviet definition of chemical weapons as “weapons of mass destruction,” chemical warfare would only occur as part of a nuclear attack, whether that nuclear attack initiated a conflict or occurred at some later point. The present authors disagree. While it is clear that an important thread of the Soviet view of chemical and nuclear weapons is that the two are considered much alike, this thread by itself is a gross oversimplification and cannot and should not be relied upon to limit the type of conflict in which chemicals would be employed.

For the major Soviet concerns or targets in the event of either a conventional or a nuclear start to a war in Europe—NATO anti-tank defense; NATO nuclear capability, including command and control; NATO reserves; and NATO tactical air—chemical weapons in all cases offer important advantages that complement rather than duplicate the effectiveness of both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, and recommend their use in both contexts. Without a good protective posture on the part of NATO, fast-acting chemical weapons could paralyze NATO anti-tank defenses without inhibiting Pact armor operations. Non-persistent agents, such as hydrogen cyanide, delivered by multiple rocket launchers, coupled with normal artillery preparation and smoke delivery, can effectively neutralize such defenses within a few minutes and be safe for Pact overrun some minutes later. Should nuclear weapons not be used, chemical weapons with persistent agents would likely be very important and effective for disabling NATO nuclear capabilities that are dispersed over areas, such as airbases and nuclear supply depots. Without a considerable protective posture on the NATO side, including decontamination capability, Soviet use of chemical weapons could put such bases out of action for extended periods of time with only a few repeated strikes with persistent chemical munitions. Many command/control targets, such as radars, ground control stations, navigation transmitters, and so forth, are neither large enough to warrant a nuclear strike nor vulnerable enough to be reliably destroyed with one sortie of conventional munitions. For such targets, generally unprotected against chemical agents, chemical weapons are the most efficient means of putting them out of action in a context of nuclear or conventional conflict.

Further, in both conventional and nuclear scenarios, it would be preferable from the Soviet point of view, to seize, rather than destroy, many targets including airbases, petroleum-oil-and-lubricant storage depots, and transport centers (har-

bors and airports). The objective is not to destroy these targets but merely prevent their use by U.S./NATO forces until the Soviets can seize them and put them to their own use—perhaps immediately, perhaps within a week or so (Ref. 15). In these cases, again, chemical weapons offer important and unique advantages; with selection of the proper agent, under conditions where the U.S. and other NATO forces have almost no decontamination capability, as today, such targets can be rendered unfit for NATO use but available for Soviet occupation and use at the planned time.

Finally, the movement of NATO reserves, which is already a severe problem given their deployment (Ref. 16, p. 19), could be seriously impeded by the application of the more persistent chemical weapons to important nodes.

The effectiveness of CW weapons can be especially high in exactly these mission areas because the desired results—disabling of the particular forces and contamination of particular areas—would not depend upon lethal doses of chemicals being delivered over the entire target. Sublethal dose areas that extend well beyond the lethal-dose areas will impose physically disabling effects on personnel who are not protected. These effects, in particular the optical pain and miosis⁸ caused by small doses of nerve agent, will prevent or seriously degrade the performance of missions such as aiming, sighting, instrument reading, and flying, thus significantly increasing the effectiveness of these weapons beyond the usual estimates of effectiveness that are based only on the lethal areas.

All in all, chemical weapons offer very significant advantages to the Soviets in any kind of war, nuclear or conventional. Considering their advantages, many of which the Soviets obtain because of the "marginal" (Ref. 3, p. 91) U.S./NATO preparedness either to cope with such employments or to subject the Soviets to the same environment throughout the depth of their offensive deployment, it is inconceivable to the present authors that the Soviets would not capitalize on their capabilities. The benefits to be derived—disabling NATO tank defenses, paralyzing NATO nuclear capabilities, rendering inaccessible logistics areas and equipment depots, and hence greatly shortening the war—are far greater than any additional incremental risk or political cost associated with their employment over that of the war itself.

This conclusion is gradually gaining acceptance. The current Army Manual 100-5, the basic Army document on tactics, published in 1976, notes that the Soviets clearly have a *capability* to use chemicals in any level of conflict:

8. Miosis is contraction of the pupil of the eye, resulting in dimmed vision.

... Soviet or Soviet-equipped and trained forces *could* initiate and sustain large-scale CW operations in *either a conventional or conventional-nuclear conflict*. Their doctrine emphasizes the employment of chemical weapons in close coordination with conventional and nuclear weapons to capitalize on the attributes of each. (Ref. 9, p. 11–5, emphasis added.)

And this year's Department of Defense Annual Report (the Secretary's Posture Statement) goes a bit further and says that this capability is likely to be *considered* for use:

It is *likely* that the Soviets would *consider* using a combination of chemical and conventional weapons, as well as a combination of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons—and *they have the capability to do either*—if they believed a significant tactical advantage could be gained. (Ref. 17, p. 157, emphasis added.)

The old *Penkovskiy Papers* book includes the statement: "let there be no doubt: if hostilities should erupt, the Soviet Army would use chemical weapons against its opponents" (Ref. 18, p. 249). Further, the *Papers* state that "the U.S.S.R. has already given political release for chemical weapons" (Ref. 18, p. 249). John Erickson has stated more explicitly that "Soviet division commanders have chemical weapons planning, release, and employment authority" (as quoted in Ref. 7, p. 3). It is the conclusion of the authors of this paper that if such delegation is assumed, use of chemicals should be considered a certainty early in any conflict. Further, even if such authority has not devolved, the Soviet use of chemical warfare during a conflict or a phase of a conflict limited otherwise to "conventional" weapons, *should not be discounted*. We agree with the statement that:

The Soviets are so immersed in chemical weaponry, tactics, doctrine, equipment and personnel, and so much of their training centers around the use of lethal agents, that it would be odd, from a military standpoint, if they did not employ them. (Ref. 10, p. 22)

Protective Aspects of the Current U.S. Posture

The U.S. posture to cope with a chemical attack was evaluated by the Army in 1975, by the Air Force in 1974, and by the Navy in 1977, in response to the concern over the threat which was generated as a result of the 1973 Mid-East War. These analyses showed that there was a great deal to be desired. The Soviet superiority over the United States in chemical warfare capabilities was assessed as considerable. However, not only was the imbalance serious at that time, but it has continued to grow.

Improvement programs in the Army and Air Force are now, belatedly, under way to ameliorate *some* of the deficiencies in their protective postures. The Navy appears less concerned. The "ultimate" goal of the Army and Air Force programs, toward which currently funded improvements are a first step, is for units to be protected sufficiently to continue sustained operations in a chemically contaminated environment, a capability for which, according to Ref. 3, the forces are "not prepared" today (p. 90). To first survive and then operate, the units as a whole, and the individuals separately, must be thoroughly trained in:

- Interpretation of intelligence and detection and warning data indicating chemical attack.
- Immediate actions necessary to protect against the agent.
- Reporting procedures to insure warning/notification of adjacent and higher elements.
- Operations in the appropriate protective posture.
- Recovery from the protective posture and resumption of normal operations.

In addition to the education and training implied by the above requirements, improving the defensive posture means provision for individual protective equipment, collective protection equipment for facilities, decontamination and evacuation equipment, and development of the proper procedures and the proper training for the use of these. Specialized units are needed to support operations in the contaminated environment and, therefore, some force structure changes will be required; regular and extensive training for all individuals and units in performing their normal mission operations in a contaminated environment is necessary; and equipment for the forces not only for both operational use but also for training use must be provided. Fortunately, such training can and, in fact, should, be primarily integrated training; the desired proficiency in operating in contaminated environments must and can be achieved while performing other mission-related training tasks. And, further, while resources are required to accomplish all the above-listed tasks, a chemical warfare defense program does not involve large amounts of money. Much can be gained at relatively low cost.

Concurrent with initiating development of comprehensive doctrine and equipment procurement, the Army is also beginning to establish a chemical defense capability as part of an overall NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) defense improvement at division level. The major effort here will be the provision of reconnaissance and decontamination support in the form of an NBC defense company which is to support the brigades of the division. This improvement is scheduled to provide support for forward Army units within the next year or two. As the Army

doctrinal work is completed, efforts will be expanded to include the necessary rear area support. In a related force-structure effort, the Army has reviewed staffing and recommends an addition of several thousand spaces to the total force for NBC defense. Procurement efforts are expanding to begin supplying the forward-based personnel with equipment.

The Air Force is also moving to establish some chemical warfare defense preparedness. Procurement of protective equipment is being accomplished. Priorities for equipment distribution for the Air Force are for in-place units in the high-threat areas; however, equipment is also being provided to CONUS Air Force bases for training purposes, and an Air Force-wide effort has been initiated to ensure that personnel receive adequate CW training. Additional manpower has been judged necessary to support the training and management of the additional equipment in the Air Force as well as in the Army. The Air Force gained 300 additional personnel authorizations for the disaster preparedness mission, which includes CW defense, in FY 77, and identified several hundred additional manpower authorizations believed necessary for the FY 79/83 period. (In the opinion of the present authors, the size of the immediate Army and Air Force manpower needs for CW defense are an indication of how bad the situation currently is.)

Both the Army and the Air Force have special problems in regard to the special protection requirements for pilots and crews. It is not likely that aircraft interiors can be kept free from agent contamination. Absorption of even very small quantities of nerve agent will cause miosis, thereby rendering the crew member virtually unable to fly his aircraft. For this reason, the Air Force has adopted a "dirty cockpit" concept, which requires that whole-body and eye/respiratory protection for air crews be provided in addition to normal flight gear. An ensemble has been developed for this purpose by the Air Force and when procured will be the first tactical-fighter qualified CW protective ensemble in the free world.

As all the armed services will admit, the task is by no means finished, and, in fact, is only barely getting under way. There is a great deal still to accomplish in all areas:

- Attention
- Awareness of the threat
- Personnel
- Material
- Doctrine
- Training
- Facilities

And progress seems interminably slow: procurement rates are such that equipment sufficient for more than a very limited survival time, and only limited operations during that time, will not be available until sometime in the mid-1980s; training depends on both equipment with which to train and qualified personnel to do the training and evaluation, and all progress in beginning training programs is being handicapped by the "insufficient issue of equipment" (Ref. 3, p. 90), by the personnel deficiencies, and by the general attitude of repugnance about CW that permeates the military forces. Current training is described as "limited" and "usually rudimentary" (Ref. 3, p. 90).

Clearly, considerable integration and coordination is required in moving toward a uniform protective posture for our forces as a whole. Unfortunately for the coordination of both policy and program aspects of solving the problem, there are almost no focal points at significant levels in the services for force development, training, coordination, direction, or plans, and none in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Responsibilities for CW defense generally are fragmented, left up to individuals at different levels to respond as they see fit, or at best, assigned as secondary responsibilities. The store is, in effect, left largely untended. Although the recent Army action to reestablish a CW focal point at the Departmental level is a significant step, it should be recognized that this was done by adding the CW responsibility to the existing position of nuclear responsibility. As recognized by the Marine Corps, "the defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks requires special consideration and training" (Ref. 19, p. 153). While such defense should not be viewed as "special," but rather should be considered an integral part of the standard posture, perhaps special coordination and integration of efforts to improve are temporarily warranted until considerably further progress is made in developing a momentum toward an integrated and adequate capability.

There is another aspect that must be considered as well. In warfare some of the personnel, no matter what the protective efforts, will suffer physical trauma. Medical evidence indicates that even a small, nonlethal dose of some agents can severely complicate other medical problems likely to occur. Agent effects can possibly inhibit necessary life-sustaining and recuperative mechanisms. Medical treatment, further, requires not only a biologically clean environment, but chemically safe surroundings as well. Even if a medical treatment facility were to remain initially uncontaminated, there is the problem of preventing secondary contamination, for example, from contaminated clothing that the victim is wearing at the time of entry into the treatment space. The limited number of medical personnel must be protected and yet still permitted to perform their mission. Many such issues are

still without solutions. Equipment and training can go a long way toward overcoming inherent design and use deficiencies, but further research, analysis, and development is clearly necessary to provide more answers and solutions.

We must meet the requirement of providing adequate protection, when feasible, to the officers and men of our armed forces. The complex systems used today, and those likely for the future, require skilled manpower that must spend a long time in the training pipeline. No matter how sophisticated the equipment, no matter what degree of automation it entails, we must continue to rely on people. They are an integral link in the systems of modern defense. The current and continuing climate of austerity points toward military forces of reduced size with reduced manning levels; hence, the importance of each individual, very specialized individuals with only minimal crosstrained backup, is growing. It is for the integrity of our forces that we must consider whether or not we are moving fast enough on defense against CW, as well as defense against the myriad other threats.

The value of each man is difficult to quantify. It may well be possible to place a dollar value on his salary, even, perhaps, on the expense of his long period of training. But it is beyond our capability to place a price tag on his services if, as a result of relatively simple and unopposed enemy action, he cannot continue effectively—and the result is a defeat.

Problems in Improving the U.S./NATO Posture

Despite the beginning of programs to improve the CW protection of the U.S. forces, the overall effort is limited and suffers from a serious sense of insecurity, and from concern over anything that might draw adverse publicity from the press, Congress, the arms control community, or academia. As explained to the authors by several senior U.S. officials, while the character and magnitude of the problem were clear, because of the political sensitivities associated with the topic, as one phrased it, he "could not stick his neck out." Furthermore, because of the low state of interest in and efforts focused on this area for a number of years, there have been relatively few persons thinking about the contributions that such protection could make to either deterrence or warfighting. Consequently, the value for deterrence and warfighting of improvements in the U.S. CW posture has not been convincingly articulated. This problem is demonstrated in the following passages:

There are statements in testimony, in field manuals, in CW studies and in war games which purport to show that CW has a high utility and that it could be a

decisive factor in future battles. But *the long-standing low state of both defensive and offensive CW capabilities in U.S. forces belies that conclusion. The low priority assigned to CW would be inexplicable if that were true.* (Ref. 20, p. 27, emphasis added.)

And,

In summary it can be said that the U.S. chemical warfare policy is stable, consistent with tradition and in general accord with the basic attitude of Americans towards chemical warfare . . . it can be said that a lingering ambiguity persists with respect to CW policy, as to whether a major chemical warfighting capability is required for an adequate U.S. national security posture. Because it has long been technologically feasible and financially possible to have such a capability, if deemed essential to cope with the threat of known major Soviet CW offensive and defensive capabilities and *in view of the apparent absence of such a U.S. capability* (as acknowledged in testimony before Congress), *it may reasonably be inferred that chemical warfighting is not an essential military requirement.* (Ref. 20, p. 41, emphasis added.)

Further, to be politically viable, any improvement program has to be strictly defense or protection oriented. At this time "efforts to improve the CW retaliatory capability have been halted" (Ref. 3, p. 91), despite the fact that U.S. policy allows for continued offensive capability for deterrence and to permit a reasonable degree of retaliation (Ref. 3, p. 90), and despite the fact that the current stockpile is "inadequate . . . becoming obsolete." (Ref. 3, p. 90)

The current policy of the United States regarding chemical and biological warfare was promulgated by the President on 25 November 1969. The policy objective was stated to be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. First use of chemical weapons and all use of biological weapons were renounced. In January, 1975 the U.S. ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol which essentially contains the same chemical/biological policies as those unilaterally stated in 1969. Additionally, in April 1975, Executive Order 11850 extended the no-first-use policy to riot control agents and herbicides in war except for defensive purposes.

In May of 1977, a review of the chemical warfare policy and posture of the United States was directed by the President. This review resulted in a presidential decision which stipulated no immediate policy changes but called for another review of both the policy and posture in 1978, pending the outcome of another year's effort at the ongoing CW treaty negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. This decision appears to move the United States more seriously than ever toward negotiating a treaty banning chemical weapons,

if possible, despite the fact that there are still major points to be worked out in the on-going negotiations, involving both verifications measures⁹ (Ref. 6, p. 20) and the sorts of items to be banned or limited (Ref. 2, p. 6). Meanwhile, the "halt" in any improvements in U.S. forces for CW retaliation-in-kind is, in the present authors' opinion, the result of a mistaken impression that such restraint might be reciprocated or is necessary to demonstrate to the Soviets the good U.S. intentions with respect to the on-going treaty negotiations.

Given the results of the 1977 review, it is not surprising that the few improvement programs are progressing so slowly. Chemical warfare preparedness, in general, has only recently benefitted from any attention at all; for most of the ten years since the Dugway test accident, as has been noted, it has been a neglected area, even compared to other neglected areas of security needs. While the Dugway accident served as a trigger, however, it was, the authors believe, only that; the reasons for neglect of this facet of warfare go much deeper. There are a number of causes, and they should be understood in detail, because they continue to affect the fragile impetus for improvement.

First, the neglect has occurred partly because the predominant U.S. assumption, given the Soviet definition of chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruction," is that CW would be used by the U.S.S.R. only as an adjunct or supplement in a large scale theater nuclear conflict. In that case, the nuclear use is seen as dominant in terms of war conduct and outcome; chemical weapons are discounted as of relatively minor importance in that nuclear environment. Hence, the relative lack of preparedness in the chemical posture is not considered to seriously compound other preparatory oversights, such as maldeployment. Further, because the United States focus has been on deterring nuclear war, not on evolving a capability to fight it, U.S. nuclear capabilities are, according to this logic, not only the primary but also a sufficient deterrent by themselves. Chemical warfare preparedness is viewed as, at best, an unessential component of deterrence, and, at worst, a potential source of disaster. One example of the latter logic is:

. . . Since nuclear weaponry, tactical or otherwise, is a built-in deterrent to war, it would make sense to reduce the number of other dangerous alternative weapons such as chemicals, lasers, and electromagnetic weaponry. With them out of the way, nuclear war conceivably could be less likely because fewer types of weapons

9. There is widespread agreement that a ban on chemical weapons is not fully verifiable without inspection measures so intrusive as probably to be both politically and commercially unacceptable. Among other reasons, this is because production facilities for chemical agents cannot be distinguished either from the air or from external ground inspection. (Ref. 21, pp. 323-326)

would be around for starting trouble with, thus risking escalation with nuclear weapons. (Ref. 6, p. 19.)

It is believed by the present authors that this approach only works if both sides concur. And, in contrast to the United States, the Soviets appear to view warfighting capabilities not only as a feasible but also as a principal objective of military preparation and, further, to view chemical offensive capabilities as a unique and extremely important aspect of that preparation for all modern warfare, be it nuclear or non-nuclear. As noted above, considering the potential benefits for the Soviets in using chemical agents in attack of air bases, in assaulting critical facilities and features of the terrain, in denying NATO use of nuclear weapons, and in disabling NATO anti-tank defenses in conjunction with conventional artillery and smoke, and the facts that all aspects of Soviet training—conventional as well as nuclear—emphasize operations in toxic environments and that chemical capabilities are integrated throughout their force structure, it appears entirely plausible that the Soviets intend far more than just retaining chemical weapons as an adjunct to nuclear weapons in a major war. There is clear evidence to suggest that the Soviets do distinguish between chemical and nuclear, that they have separated the two, and that chemical weapons are considered to have an effective and important role both in a nuclear conflict and in a conventional conflict. Further, because the use of such weapons in a conventional conflict, or in a conventional phase of a conflict, might satisfy multiple Soviet political and military objectives, such use must be considered plausible. Under this assumption, lack of U.S. preparedness for such an environment looks considerably more dangerous.

Second, U.S. repugnance and fear associated with the topic of chemical warfare and the mirror-imaging assumption that the Soviet Union shares this repugnance, permeates the political and defense establishment. Chemical warfare, curiously much more so than nuclear warfare, is termed "not chivalrous" and "bordering more on murder than on the killing according to the rules of warfare" (Ref. 6, p. 17). This fear and repugnance can be said to describe the traditional overall U.S. approach to CW, in contrast to an approach based on understanding.

At least part of this perspective appears to result from the strong memories of the World War I use of chemicals and the panics associated with those uses. Concern over such panics extended into World War II and provided an enlightening glimpse of the impact of this fear on actual combat capabilities. Although chemicals were officially not used, there was one cry of "gas" during the Omaha Beach invasion. This led to the loss of discipline and the complete disruption of command throughout an entire division, which subsequently was not reconstituted as an effective fighting force for three hours.

Part of the repugnance and fear may well have originated from a moral basis, and part of it has also probably derived from the simple pragmatic problem of fighting while wearing protective clothing and gas masks. The latter is viewed as a real ordeal that poses a major hindrance and presents severe training incentive problems, particularly in peacetime and when chemical weapons have not been used extensively for fifty years.

Additionally, there is considerable skepticism in the U.S. defense community as to the effectiveness of chemical weapons, and this, in turn, feeds the fear and repugnance. In arguing against the effectiveness of CW weapons, many people cite the problem of predicting coverage areas. As discussed above, this involves the effect of local meteorological conditions on the dispersal, settling, and evaporation of the chemicals. And, while it is true that there are uncertainties associated with planning CW employment, and some potential that such use might impact on the user's troops, the issues of "uniformity of effect" and "prediction of effect" should not be confused. The state of the art of prediction could be much further advanced in the United States than it is today. It is not, not because of limitations in the currently available U.S. analytical models and quantitative methodology to calculate effects areas, but rather because of lack of knowledge about the models and methods and lack of people to apply them (partially a result of the lack of priority and apathy about this subject and the resulting lack of effort). Such limitations need not be continued, however, nor do they imply that the weapon itself is any less effective. Other problems, which apply to all weapons, as noted above, may introduce more severe uncertainties than errors in estimating precise coverage or dose concentration contours. Also, the problem of the potential for variations in coverage that might impose a danger on friendly troops can be compensated for by selecting the proper delivery system and agent combination and by preparing the protective posture of one's own side, both to guard against unknown wind currents and drafts that may carry the agent back over the troops using it and to permit rapid movement through those areas over which the contamination has been disseminated. In general, the use of CW need not end up introducing any more unknowns than are already associated with normal conventional warfare and certainly far less than are associated with theater nuclear warfare.¹⁰

10. Among the more illuminating findings on the analysis and uncertainty problems associated with normally "well-understood" conventional war are the results that HERO has obtained in analyzing more than 100 engagements and campaigns of World War II and the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. That study concludes, among other things, that there is "no apparent relationship between force ratios and rates of advance" (Ref. 22, p. 12).

The problem of skepticism about utility again has exacerbated the U.S. rejection of chemical warfare because of the U.S. propensity to mirror-image: because the United States does not believe CW weapons have military utility, the Soviets are viewed by some as rejecting an effective role for such weapons. Thus, according to this rationale, attention need not be paid to either offense or defense preparedness.

Again, it is believed by the authors that, while the repugnance and fear may be a perfectly reasonable view of the "immorality" of chemical warfare, the evidence is that the repugnance is *not* shared by the Soviet Union. The authors believe the evidence supports the interpretation that:

Chemical warfare, to the Soviet leadership, is just another means of winning. This form of warfare holds for them none of the disgust and fear with which it is justly regarded in the West. (Ref. 2, p. 22)

Third, and closely related to the preceding problems, communicating the extent and significance of the Soviet CW threat and its import for the U.S./NATO posture has been and remains a significant problem. The basic problem here has not been one of lack of intelligence analyses. The fundamental problem has been that of communicating to an audience that basically has not wanted to "believe" or to address the problem in earnest, for the reasons cited in this section. In effect, it required the "hard" evidence of the actual, physical materiel captured during the Middle East War of 1973 to get some command attention. To a lesser extent, however, the problem is also generated by the limitations of scope and breadth of the analyses available on the threat and its impact as follows:

(1) Most of the threat analysis that has been available within the defense community has been, and is, largely technically oriented. The reporting of available data on stockpile of agents, systems for offense and protection, and order-of-battle tend to receive the emphasis. To develop a credible story, however, interpretation of the data, rationale for use, doctrine, potential employment plans, and most importantly, impact on U.S./NATO survival and operations is critical, and, generally speaking, has been least available.

(2) This is a result, in part, of the lack of priority assigned to this subject and, therefore, the number of experienced people that are charged with CW threat analysis. There are very few such people, only a handful, and the majority of these are technical specialists. It is no wonder, when these numbers are compared with the numbers of analysts devoted to other tasks, that the chemical warfare problem has not received the attention which it has deserved. The base for advocacy has been extremely limited.

(3) A further reason for limited communication of the threat has been the limited extent to which analyses are distributed, not only within the Department of Defense itself, and to other government agencies, but also to contractors, who play a major role in the U.S. national security decisionmaking process. While detailed information in its original form should rightly be restricted to a very small community, even the derivative analyses have had an extremely limited audience because of what have been, in the present authors' opinion, unnecessarily constraining levels of classification.

(4) An additional, and very important, part of the problem has been that the intelligence analysts concerned are, generally speaking, restricted by charter from looking at the U.S./NATO capabilities to cope with the imposition of the toxic environments which the threat could present. Hence, either they have not understood or they have been prohibited from including in their analyses consideration of the impact of threat use. It is only generation of and communication of that *impact* which could have and can now lead to further attention being paid to the available analyses and further efforts being allocated to generating other needed analyses.

(5) To the extent information on Soviet CW activities has been examined at all, moreover, the primary focus has been on CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) protection, and its "defensive" nature. And, given the common assumption that such weapons would only be used in nuclear conflict, the common view of a large-scale, highly destructive, nuclear war in Europe leading to "radioactive deserts" (Ref. 23, p. 40) had led to an interpretation that the large Warsaw Pact CW protective capabilities, training, etc., could well be primarily for anti-radiation and anti-fallout purposes. Again, the CW role has been largely dismissed.¹¹

Fourth, the inherent U.S. belief in arms control and/or disarmament as a solution to military problems, and the resulting widespread assumption that the terms of the Geneva Protocol forbidding the first use of chemical weapons will be observed by the Soviet Union, has contributed to the paralysis in CW preparatory efforts by making preparations to cope with such use appear unnecessary, particularly in a time in which resources are severely limited. Likewise, the hopes for a new arms control treaty banning chemical weapons altogether have minimized incentives to solve the imbalance, as noted above, by halting improvements in the retaliatory posture, and have also reduced incentives to improve protection. How-

11. The authors believe that a widespread better understanding of the Soviet approach to war in Europe in a broad sense, as well as a better understanding of the resulting potential role for CW would help clarify the situation. For some ideas on the former, see, for example, Refs. 15 and 24.

ever, it is one contention of this article that depending on the goodwill of one's opponent in wartime, that is, assuming that the current in-force treaty which constrains only actions rather than capabilities will have any effect in a crunch, is unwise and may well lead to disastrous consequences. In fact, since 1925 two of the three uses of CW in conflict have been by signatories of the Geneva Convention against defenseless forces which had no capability for retaliation-in-kind.¹²

Allowing a potential treaty which is merely under discussion—and about which there is considerable fundamental disagreement between the negotiating parties as to terms and, in particular, verification provisions—to determine the U.S. posture at this stage makes a travesty of the arms control negotiation process. Arms control negotiation is meaningless if the Soviets can halt U.S. efforts to redress Soviet advantages merely through their continuing presence at the negotiating table, with no noticeable reins on their own programs. Further, while the proponents of a treaty such as that currently under negotiation will argue that the purpose of the treaty is to constrain capabilities by eliminating a class of weapons—unlike the Geneva Protocol—the authors believe that, because of the difficulties associated with verification, this purpose is simply unachievable. The security of our forces would again rest essentially on the goodwill and conscience of the Soviets to uphold their side of the bargain. The only Soviet motivation that the authors believe can reasonably explain the continuous Soviet interest in negotiating a chemical weapons ban is a deception or propaganda move whose objective is the continued debilitation of U.S. efforts to redress the balance, thus cementing an asymmetry in their favor. This would also mesh with and follow an apparent Soviet disinformation scheme designed to influence President Nixon to halt chemical and biological weapon development in 1969, as reported in Ref. 25. And the continued curtailing of any improvements in the U.S. CW retaliation areas is exactly what is happening.

A better approach to a two-aspect policy of arms control negotiations and necessary improvements was indicated by Brigadier General Lynwood B. Lennon, then Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for the Army, as quoted in Ref. 6:

Chemical warfare deterrence and chemical weapon arms control efforts are not mutually exclusive alternatives. Both can be pursued as prudent, logical, and complementary approaches to an eventual elimination of chemical warfare. *Near-term national and collective security requirements need not and should not be sacrificed*

12. The three uses were Italy against Ethiopia in 1935, Japan against China in the 1940s, and Egypt against Yemen in 1967. Japan had, at the time of use, not yet ratified the Convention; it did so in 1970.

to the allure of an illusive arms control agreement. The history of such negotiations seems clearly to reinforce the common sense notion that deterrence must continue until an enforceable verifiable agreement can be reached. (p. 17, emphasis added.)

Fifth, collateral changes in other aspects of the overall military balance—strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, conventional—may well have made the CW situation more important, and this appears not to be recognized. As force component balances shift, the relative positions of total force postures change, and the contribution of each aspect should be re-weighed. Changes in the nuclear balance, at both the strategic and theater levels, have perhaps weakened the extension of the nuclear deterrent umbrella over other types of conflict. Further, NATO nations have generally considered the option of increasing NATO's conventional warfare posture to match the Warsaw Pact conventional capability unrealistic; this deficiency was viewed for many years as offset by U.S. nuclear superiority. However, if that offset does not apply at all any more, and may well soon apply in the opposite direction, another serious asymmetry—in chemical warfare postures—may have a real impact on the delicate balance of deterrence and security.

In addition to a shift in the potential relative role of chemical warfare postures in the overall force balance, there have been changes in the CW posture balance itself, as discussed above; the asymmetry in the chemical warfare postures of the two sides has increased. Furthermore, in the opinion of these and other authors, the imbalance is continuing to grow (Ref. 3, p. 89) and may soon reach the stage where it becomes threatening to (1) our ability to survive in Europe, (2) our ability to fight in Europe, and (3) our ability to control escalation.

One of the more disconcerting aspects of chemical warfare is that the greatest advantages and incentives for the use of chemicals exist when there is a serious asymmetry in chemical warfare capability between the two opposing combatants. Historically, chemical weapons have been used only when such an imbalance existed; and, conversely, their use has in actuality been deterred when a balance in capabilities has been perceived by a potential user. The absence of any extensive use of gas in World War II is a good example of the deterrent value of an offensive symmetry—or perceived offensive symmetry. On both sides, the reason for not employing chemical weapons appears to have been a perception that the other side had an equal or better capability and, hence, the fear that retaliation would be severe and would undermine any advantages that the surprise first use might provide. In particular, the British considered using CW but decided not to because they thought—and correctly—that the German capability exceeded their own. At the same time, the Germans considered using CW but did not, because their intelli-

gence attributed a greater capability to the Western powers. (This particular German intelligence assessment was based on an analysis of the amount of U.S. research in the area of insecticides, particularly DDT. The abrupt cessation of publications about that research as the capabilities involved in the research moved to support the war effort was taken by the Germans to mean that the CW aspect of the research, i.e., nerve agents, had become a war priority.)

The impact of defensive postures depends, to a considerable extent, on the fact that chemical warfare agents as a class can largely be countered through the use of appropriate protective equipment, given adequate warning, training, and doctrine. In addition to the relative ease, technically, of developing such protection against chemical weapons, as compared with many other types of defense, it is not, as has been noted, particularly expensive to procure in adequate quantities. While a protective posture is unlikely to be perfect, it could have considerable effect, and, hence, would minimize the incentives for the use of chemicals, particularly for an attacker who is depending on speed for his own troops and who would be hampered at least somewhat if his own troops had to don their protective gear—whether to pass through self-imposed contamination or because of fear of retaliation.

In contrast, it is in a situation of asymmetry in both aspects that a user of CW can attain both maximum effect on his opponent and, because of minimum fear of retaliation in kind, a minimum hindrance of his own forces.

Recommended Actions

Thus, there appears to be a significant vulnerability in a critical aspect of U.S. and NATO military capability, and actions under way to reduce the present vulnerability do not match the seriousness of the threat. United States/NATO forces should expect to have a toxic environment forced on them, and, if they are not prepared to operate within such an environment and impose comparable problems on the Warsaw Pact forces, Soviet use would clearly have disastrous consequences for NATO.

Decisions on the importance of improvements in the chemical warfare posture will have to be made in the near future—that is, what budgetary and other priorities should be assigned to the solution of this problem, recognizing that improving the current U.S. position is not a “big money” question. Decisions are also needed on the value of arms control and disarmament measures which attempt to limit this area of military capabilities. It is important not to confuse a national policy of no first use and a national goal of effective arms control with the need to be able, first, to cope with the imposition of a toxic environment, and, second, to respond in kind

if and as long as that remains a U.S. policy option. At present the United States is not prepared to do either. And this imbalance tends to invite exactly that which should be avoided, that is, Soviet use of their chemical warfare superiority.

However, redressing the imbalance, or even understanding its implications, is not a short-term proposition. The protective posture improvements required cannot be accomplished by the mere infusion of funds to buy more masks and protective garments. What is required is a major change in attitude toward chemical munitions and an understanding of how to conduct operations in a toxic environment. Additionally, the issue of retaining, destroying or replacing the chemical munition stockpile is to be re-examined this year, after another year's experience in the ongoing arms control negotiations in Geneva. What is required here is a clear understanding of the risks of such a treaty as that now being discussed and the role of a retaliation-in-kind capability for both deterrence and war-fighting.

Unusual attention and direction from the top in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and also in the armed services are now required to avoid continuing in this position of grave weakness vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact forces. The first step should be to preserve those basic assets and experienced skills required to build a basis of understanding. Considerable data exist, together with a modicum of experts who have weathered the decline and fall of CW preparedness. Immediate attention and moderate funding are warranted to stabilize these capabilities and, using them as a base, to plan a rebuilding effort and establish priorities. The initial priority should be to build the foundation for a widespread understanding of chemical warfare and toxic environments.

Immediate actions that should be conducted within all agencies and appropriately coordinated and disseminated include, first, detailed analysis and evaluation of the total Soviet and Warsaw Pact CW offensive capabilities and employment strategy in both nuclear and conventional conflicts. This should be disseminated not just among people concerned with the CW area, but among all agencies and contractors whose concern includes some aspect of the posture in Europe. Second, and in parallel, analysis, test, and evaluation efforts should be undertaken to understand the impact of different dose level exposures, particularly low-level exposures, on the operation and effectiveness of weapons systems and on the performance of military missions; these efforts should also examine how military operations might be conducted when toxic environments are imposed on various force elements, installations, or areas. Third, considerable work is required to rethink the problem of deterrence of and response to the use of chemical weapons in a conventional

conflict. Today, the only "solution," given the asymmetry and the paralysis resulting from the arms control efforts, appears to be to depend upon tactical nuclear weapons to deter the employment of chemical weapons—an interesting peacetime alternative, but one that will be of little comfort in a crisis.

Until these problems are addressed in considerable depth, the United States should not curtail CW activities out of a "spirit of the negotiations" and, in negotiating, should not continue to unilaterally constrain its security choices. A ban on chemical munitions, for example, would eliminate the option of retaining a U.S. CW retaliatory capability. Unless it were adequately verified, which certainly appears to be impossible today, the ban would not constrain the Soviets from continuing to upgrade their already formidable capability. We hope that the 1978 review called for by the President will examine the entire range of CW-related security issues.

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The United States is now moving towards nonproliferation and nuclear export policies which will directly or tangentially affect the Soviet Union. Policymakers may be assuming that cooperation between the two countries on nuclear matters will be easy, and may be inclined to engage in a degree of mirror-imaging and wishful thinking about Soviet interests. In designing nonproliferation schemes, it is important to understand what the United States can reasonably ask of the other superpower. The Soviet Union has been considerably more consistent and effective than the United States in promoting policies to prevent nuclear spread; the Soviet nuclear export control approach may suggest certain lessons for the United States.

Past Practice and Policy

The Soviet Union exhibits the discomfort to be expected from a conservative world power towards the potential changes in international political and strategic behavior patterns suggested by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many observers of the 1958–1975 period of Soviet nonproliferation policy have noted that the policy seemed highly integrated with more general aspects of Soviet foreign behavior—a continuation of foreign policy by specific means.¹

More precisely, proliferation appears undesirable for the Soviet Union because the countries currently most able to obtain atomic weapons would threaten Soviet security either directly, as in the case of West Germany, or indirectly, through threatening Soviet client states, as in the cases of Israel and South Africa. Lambeth measured varying levels of "proliferation-tolerability" for the Soviet Union—a high level of concern about the "special case" of West Germany's nuclear potential, a medium degree of concern over the "lesser" revanchist states of South Africa and Israel, and a low level of concern about other countries.²

1. See Gerhard Wettig, "Soviet Policy on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966–1968," *Orbis*, Winter 1969, p. 1058; Benjamin Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy," *Orbis*, Summer 1970, p. 296, and Tobi Trister Gati, "Soviet Perspectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation," California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1975.

2. Benjamin Lambeth, *Orbis*, 1975, p. 307.

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Based upon its high level of concern about proliferation to certain countries, the Soviet Union has maintained tight controls over its own exports of nuclear technology. The Soviet Union has limited its nuclear exports to a variety of reactor which is least susceptible to accumulating fissionable material, has forced client countries to accede to international nonproliferation protocols, has maintained control over the spent rods from its fuel exports, and until quite recently has limited the number of countries eligible to receive Soviet nuclear aid.

It is often pointed out in comparing the nuclear export policies of the United States and the Soviet Union that the Soviets had no Atoms for Peace program as did the United States; nor did they export nuclear secrets to allies for fear that such "allies" as Yugoslavia might obtain weapons and turn them upon the Soviet Union itself. Thus the Soviets supposedly assumed long ago the close connection between civilian nuclear power technology and nuclear weapons technology dawning upon the United States today. That assumption is broadly correct, but too simplistic. The Soviets had to undergo one very unpleasant experience before tightening export controls.

It is easy to forget that in the genealogy of atomic spread, Soviet nuclear technology begat the Chinese atomic bomb, and that for a short while the Soviet Union did indeed conduct an enthusiastic "Atoms for Peace" program. The motivations and circumstances surrounding Soviet technical assistance to China between January of 1955 and August of 1960, particularly the precise nature of the actual and promised aid, remain matters of debate among Western historians of the period.

Two things seem fairly certain about the unsafeguarded transfer of a 6.5 megawatt (Mw) reactor, and most likely also of a gaseous-diffusion uranium enrichment plant, to China between 1955 and 1958. The Soviet aid seems to have been part of a larger program designed to demonstrate political solidarity with friendly countries following a Council of Ministers declaration in January 1955 that atomic aid would be forthcoming.³ And the Soviets' failure to apply safeguards seems part of a more general policy stemming from a sense of political control over the nuclear programs of allies, a lack of realization on the part of Soviet officials that the material could be used so easily for weapons and that the Chinese might actually do so, and Khrushchev's willingness to accept the risks in trade for the

3. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968), p. 15.

political benefits gained. Significantly, the Soviet Union failed to apply safeguards during this period to reactors promised to Egypt and Czechoslovakia.⁴

The 6.5 Mw reactor was scheduled to start operating in September 1958. In May of that year, however, a debate within China over reliance on Soviet military aid, sparked by objectionable Soviet behavior, culminated in the announcement that China intended to produce her own nuclear weapons.⁵ Between the summer of 1958 and August of 1959, Soviet atomic aid was suspended and work on the gaseous-diffusion plant stopped. According to most accounts, the Chinese finished construction of the enrichment plant at Lanchow, removed the enriched uranium, perhaps further concentrating the substance through an electromagnetic process, and used the material for their first weapons tests in October 1964.⁶

Peking's decision to use the Soviet nuclear energy aid as the seed of a weapons program forced a reappraisal of Moscow's nuclear export policy. Just after the January 1955 Council of Ministers' declaration, the Soviet Union had signed agreements for nuclear research assistance with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Rumania, in addition to China. Similar cooperative arrangements were made with Bulgaria and Hungary in the summer of 1956.⁷ Further agreements on the development of commercial nuclear power were concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1955 and with East Germany and Hungary in 1956.⁸

According to the agreements, the Soviet Union was to supply not only technical assistance and design work, but actual reactor units for several of these countries. Czechoslovakia was promised a 150 Mw natural uranium, heavy water-moderated reactor, Hungary a 100 Mw reactor, and East Germany a small 70 Mw device. Counting on Soviet help, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland made ambitious plans for developing nuclear generating power.⁹

At the time the Soviets first promised to transfer nuclear technology to China between 1955 and 1957, they might have intended to share knowledge of nuclear weapons manufacture to increase the power of their socialist ally.¹⁰ As the political rift between the two countries widened between 1958 and 1959, the

4. George Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 36.

5. Clemens, p. 18.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

7. Jaroslav Polach, "Nuclear Power in East Europe," *East Europe*, May 1968, p. 4.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

10. Clemens, p. 16.

Soviets were undoubtedly dismayed to find that a loss of political leverage with China precluded Soviet control over the Chinese nuclear program. The ease with which the Chinese transformed Soviet nuclear aid into a weapons program seemingly was taken by the Soviets as an ill presentiment of the way Soviet nuclear exports might be manipulated in the future by other recipient countries. The China case seemed to make the connections for Soviet officials that exports of civilian technologies could be turned to military purposes with little difficulty, should political leverage lapse, if enriched uranium or plutonium or the capacity to manufacture the fissionable substances were left in the hands of the receivers.

After 1958 the Soviets showed a strong impulse to slow down transfers of nuclear energy technology to the East European countries and to add safeguards to political leverage as insurance against proliferation. Many nuclear commitments were drawn out, re-negotiated, or left unfulfilled. Hungary never received its 100 Mw reactor, scheduled to go on-line by 1965.¹¹ The Soviets stalled on direct technical assistance with the Czech A-1 reactor, presumably because the natural uranium reactor's high plutonium productivity appeared in a different light after the Chinese experience. The A-1, designed for use beginning in 1960, finally reached criticality in 1972; the Czechs were forced to finish it on their own.¹² Of the 26 power reactors exported or on order from the Soviets worldwide as of 1978, the Czech A-1 was the first and last heavy-water reactor supplied by the Soviet Union (See Table 1).

The Soviets had capitulated in 1955 to the Czech desire to exploit their vast deposits of natural uranium through developing heavy-water technology, perhaps as a strategy to ensure continued exclusive Soviet access to large Czech uranium deposits at Jachymov.¹³ Such trade-offs were not made after 1958. Depending upon infusions of expensive and difficult-to-produce heavy water in addition to raw uranium fuel, a heavy-water power system might be considered even less suitable to support a weapons program than a light-water reactor. Yet the prospect of Czech control over both reactor and fuel was distasteful enough to the Soviets after the Chinese episode to bring an end to their part in the project.

Besides slowing the transfer of nuclear know-how and limiting reactor exports exclusively to light-water, pressurized-water reactor systems, the Soviet

11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

12. Atomic Industrial Forum Release, "Nuclear Powerplants Outside the US," June 2, 1976.

13. Jaroslav Polach, "Nuclear Energy in Czechoslovakia: A Study in Frustration," *Orbis*, Fall 1968, p. 833.

Table 1
Power Reactors Exported, under Construction or on Order from the USSR, 1978

Country	Operating	Under Construction	On Order	Planned
Bulgaria	2	2	—	4
Cuba	—	2	2	—
Czechoslovakia	1*	4	—	16
Finland	1	1	—	—
GDR	3	—	2	—
Hungary	—	2	—	—
Libya	—	—	1	—
Poland	—	—	2	—
Rumania	—	—	1	—
Total	7	11	8	20

*Gas-cooled, heavy water reactor

Source: Atomic Industrial Forum Release, "Nuclear Powerplants Outside the US," February 1978.

Union instituted a notable safeguard, years before any serious similar inclination by other nuclear suppliers. The Soviets demanded that all countries receiving reactors from them—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania at that point—obtain the uranium fuel for reactors from the Soviet Union, and return all spent fuel rods to them for processing. In that way none of the raw material for nuclear weapons has been allowed to rest outside the Soviet Union. The Bloc countries have not been allowed to develop reprocessing and enrichment plants which would enable them to prepare uranium or plutonium for explosive purposes, even if they had the raw materials in their possession.

This system of control is reinforced by the research and development framework in the nuclear energy field constructed by the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. In March 1956 the Soviets established the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, headquartered at Dubna, just north of Moscow. The Joint Institute coordinates nuclear research and development through a theoretical physics lab, nuclear problems lab, cyclotron, and various other activities.¹⁴ The costs of the Joint Institute are borne 47 percent by the Soviets and 53 percent by the coun-

14. Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1959), p. 188.

tries of the socialist commonwealth. The director of the Joint Institute has always been a Soviet scientist.

Throughout the 1950s scientists and technicians from Bloc countries were sent to train at Dubna. By 1971, a Soviet nuclear energy official reported that more than 1000 Soviet specialists had helped set up nuclear programs in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) countries, and more than 3000 Bloc scientists had been trained at Dubna and elsewhere in the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Thus the Soviet Union controls research and training of nuclear scientists in the Bloc.

Soviet technicians supervise directly the building of power plants in the Bloc countries. When the Soviets built power plants within the Bloc in the past, their foreign trade organization Atomenergoexport (Atomic Energy Export) has served as the prime contractor. In the future, according to reports in the Soviet and East European press, an intra-Bloc agency, Interatomenergo (International Atomic Energy), will take over construction. Interatomenergo was founded in 1973 under Soviet sponsorship. Each CEMA country is represented by members of the appropriate national economic enterprises, but Soviet influence predominates.¹⁶

The Permanent CEMA Commission for the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes coordinates nuclear industrial activity, including safety rules for the transport of used nuclear fuel and other safeguards. The Commission is, of course, chaired by a Soviet representative.¹⁷ And Interatominstrument (International Atomic Instruments) coordinates production and exports and imports of nuclear technical equipment within the Bloc. According to East European press reports, production under the aegis of Interatominstrument is to Soviet specifications.¹⁸

In addition to Soviet control over the technology traded through these organs, the Soviet Union has required recipients of nuclear technology within the Bloc to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and submit to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which include on-site inspection of nuclear facilities and materials accountancy.¹⁹

15. Andranik Petrosyants, "Nuclear Energy: A Productive Force," *New Times*, 1971, No. 11, p. 21.


16. "International Nuclear Powerplant Organization Makes Haste Slowly," *Vilaggazdosag*, Budapest, 10 February 1976, p. 1.

17. A. Panasenkov and V. Panushkin, "Certain Urgent Problems of CEMA Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Power," *Ekonomicheskaja Storiidnichestvo Stran-Chelov Sev*, Moscow, 17 February 1977, p. 70.

18. M. Melkoyan, "A Great Step Forward," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 19 February 1976, p. 3; L. Parlapanova, "Prospects for the Development of Bulgarian Nuclear Power Industry," *Energetika*, No. 8-9, Sofia, 1976, p. 3.

19. Cuba has not signed the NPT, but accedes to the statute of the IAEA.

Table 2
Decisionmaking for Soviet Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Exports



V. S. Emelyanov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, a body which might be equated with the old U.S. Atomic Energy Commission at the height of its powers, has long been a spokesman for Soviet nuclear energy and nuclear export policies. In 1963 he told a European nuclear energy official that there would be no proliferation problem if all countries would follow the Soviet policy and "each take care of its own." That indeed characterizes the policy followed by the Soviets after the China episode. They "took care of their own" client states, refraining from making tradeoffs of nuclear assistance for political payoffs if any risk of proliferation were involved.

"Taking care of its own" was also the limit of Soviet nuclear export policy until recently. Apart from advocating the NPT, and rhetoric about particular "revanchist" states, the Soviet Union seemed relatively unconcerned with pressuring countries other than direct clients to refrain from developing reprocessing or enrichment capabilities, stockpiling plutonium, or testing atomic devices. The Soviet reaction to the Indian nuclear test was indicative of this attitude. They praised the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" as "striking a blow for the developing world," failing, at least publicly, to express even the limited apprehensions voiced by the United States.

Soviet advocacy of the NPT—virtually every Soviet article on nuclear exports and nonproliferation begins with an exhortation to nonsigners to accede to the Treaty and to signers to uphold its principles—might be understood in terms of a more general Soviet foreign policy impulse. Perhaps the genesis of vigorous support for the NPT has its roots in a bureaucratic system which cranks out such prefaces automatically. Perhaps it is a Soviet effort to avoid real constraints on its own actions by offering recognizably toothless but rhetorically appealing arms control proposals. Or possibly Soviet leaders wish to gain recognition for Moscow by reminding the world that the NPT was signed in Moscow, partly at Soviet prodding. Advocacy of the NPT after it has been recognized by most other countries as an ineffective nonproliferation instrument is part of the same foreign policy impulse that gives rise to periodic Soviet proposals for General and Complete Disarmament at the United Nations. Such proposals seem to serve some abstract, internal function for the Soviet political system, but they should not be taken seriously as an indication of Soviet nonproliferation policy.

New Trends

There are signs that the Soviet Union has entered a period in which concerns

about proliferation are broader than "each taking care of its own," and Soviet proposals for strategies to control proliferation are more specific than recommending adherence to the NPT. Wider Soviet concern is reflected in the development of a new nuclear exports policy which is being articulated abroad as well as practiced at home.

Distinguishing an actual policy change in Moscow from cumulative but unrelated shifts of specific actions in various areas remains a difficult problem. Paul K. Cook, a senior Soviet specialist in the U.S. State Department, draws a distinction between "negative" and "positive" policies. "Negative" policies are indicators of the limitations of Soviet action in any particular area—permitting client states to keep spent fuel rods or build enrichment or reprocessing facilities, in this case. "Negative" policies may in truth only indicate the absence of a coherent policy from the top.

"Positive" policies are clearly directed towards some desirable goal or future situation, placing particular actions in a larger context. Today it is possible to see elements of a positive Soviet nuclear exports policy. Indeed, not only are there shifts in behavior noticeable, but there are also indications that attention to the subject at the Politburo level has resulted in a set of "positive," coherent positions which the Soviet Union has begun to advocate internationally.

The development of the Soviet position in recent months can be traced in good measure to changes in the role the country plays in the international nuclear business. Placed against the background of extremely constrained Soviet nuclear export activities after 1958, the increase of their actual role in the nuclear trade is striking. Since 1975, the Soviet Union has allowed sales of nuclear reactors and components outside the Bloc and has become a significant force in the world nuclear fuel market, supplying 55 percent of the European Economic Community's (EEC) contracted uranium enrichment services in 1977.²⁰ Several times in the last year the Soviet Union has indicated it will pursue development of the breeder reactor jointly with the Comecon countries, and encourage the utilization of breeder technology within the Bloc.²¹ In the fall of 1977 the Soviets signed an accord with the French to cooperate on breeder research. They have even tried, with mixed success, to buy reactor technology from the United States and West Germany, and associated technical assistance from Japan, during the past two years.

20. Horst Mendershausen, "Europe's Changing Energy Relations" (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1976), p. 45.

21. *Nucleonics Week*, 31 March 1977, p. 8.

The Soviets' nuclear thrust is a result of many economic and political concerns. First and most simply, they support the development of nuclear power on principle, and particularly favor its exploitation by developing countries low in energy resources.

Second, the Soviets are stepping into the vacuum in the supply of nuclear commodities precipitated by confusion in the major capitalist countries over the future of nuclear power. In the case of Soviet enrichment services for the European Community, for instance, the United States supplied 100 percent of the services until 1975, when the United States placed all foreign enrichment contracts on conditional status until U.S. domestic needs could be determined. The Soviets merely stepped into the gap left by the U.S. withdrawal, as it was the only other country with a large enrichment capacity. The Soviets are presently negotiating to sell reactors to the Philippines, replacing Westinghouse, whose exports remain uncertain pending the outcome of U.S. Congressional scrutiny of contracting improprieties with the Marcos regime.²²

In fact, numerous signs point to a Soviet effort to move into full market competition with traditional suppliers of power reactors. In 1978 the Soviet Union is scheduled to complete construction of "Atomash," a gargantuan plant to manufacture nuclear power stations.²³ Designed as an "assembly line for nuclear power plants," Atomash has been the top priority industrial construction project of the Tenth Five Year Plan, involving the creation of an entirely new city at Volga-Donsk near Rostov in the manner of another recent massive industrial undertaking—the Kama River Truck Plant.²⁴

Atomash will not only alleviate a Soviet domestic shortage of power plant manufacturing capacity, but by increasing production capabilities to two or three reactors per year, may be calculated to support an active export program. The Soviet Union has drawn the Eastern European countries into the expansion of the Soviet production capacities by promoting specialization among the countries manufacturing components for the standard Soviet Voronezh (VVER) 440 Mw reactor. Equipment produced under Interatominstrument auspices in Czech plants, according to the Czech press, "will be used not only for the completion

22. *Wall Street Journal*, 15 February 1978.

23. "Nauka-'Atomashu,'" *Sotsialisticheskaya industriia*, 29 April 1976; "Volga-Donskii 'Atomash,'" *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1976:27, p. 24; and "'Atomash-dostrochno.'" *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1977:28, p. 3.

24. "Svet atoma," *Pravda*, 4 August 1977; "Adres-'Atomash,'" *Sotsialisticheskaya industriia*, 16 May 1976.

of Soviet nuclear plants but also in other countries of the socialistic camp, possibly also in third countries."²⁵

The Soviets are also perhaps signalling their ability to build nuclear reactors with safety features acceptable to buyers outside the Bloc. Soviet design for power stations both at home and in Eastern Europe does not normally include construction of containment vessels around reactors or redundant emergency core cooling systems.²⁶ Recently, however, the Soviets have built containment and emergency cooling systems not only for two reactors under construction in Finland, but for their fifth unit at Novovoronezh.

Soviet sales to Libya and Cuba and overtures to the Philippines indicate that the Soviet Union is aiming for the less-industrial segment of the world reactor market. The Soviet VVER-440 reactor is the only small light water power reactor on the market today. Including the CANDU heavy water reactor, it is one of only two small power reactors on the world market. Since the 700-1000 Mw reactors marketed by the major suppliers are uneconomic for the power grids of all but the most advanced of the less-industrial countries, the Soviets may be aiming for a sector of the market with relatively little competition.

Nuclear power goods are a prestige product of the Soviet Union, representing a frontier of high technology and industrial development. At the Soviet National Exhibition celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution (held in Los Angeles in November 1977), Soviet nuclear energy technology took second place only to space exploration equipment in displays highlighting technological progress. The Soviets are proud to replace the advanced capitalist countries as a supplier of nuclear goods.

A third reason the Soviets may be moving into the nuclear market is that they are aware of joining the United States as a target of vituperation from the non-aligned nations, which have repeatedly charged both countries with discrimination in the sharing of nuclear know-how mandated by Article 4 of the NPT.²⁷ The Soviets' limited nuclear sally is an attempt to show their good faith in contradistinction to the United States, which is becoming ever more reticent to engage in the dispersal of nuclear technology, peaceful or otherwise, until nuclear

25. "Increased production for nuclear plants," *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 24 May 1974.

26. Philip and Lucy Prude, "Soviet Nuclear Power: A Different Approach to Nuclear Safety," *Environment* 16, no. 3 (April 1974): 31-32.

27. See William Epstein, "Retrospective on the NPT Review Conference: Proposals for the Future," Occasional Paper No. 9, The Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa, 1976.

export policies are clarified. The Soviets are careful to guard their exports so a proliferation event cannot be attributed to them, but are demonstrating that they are nonetheless ready to share.

Fourth, the Soviets are seriously concerned that American policies, rather than making the nuclearization of third countries *more* controllable by the superpowers, are actually rendering it *less* manageable than ever by creating an insecurity of supply of nuclear goods. They fear that this will prompt nonnuclear-weapons countries to seek self-contained (and hence weapons-capable) fuel cycles. The Soviets agree, interestingly enough, with the self-serving argument of the American nuclear industry, which holds that regularization of the international nuclear trade is necessary to prevent the growth of incentives for closing the fuel cycle in non-weapons countries.²⁸ Perhaps the Soviets are trying to reassure their clients that they intend to engage in the smooth trade of nuclear materials.

A fifth motive is undoubtedly economic. It is unclear precisely what compensation the Soviets receive for enriching Western Europe's uranium, but given the cost of enrichment in the West, the payment could be significant, and is received in welcome hard currency. The United States presently charges about \$53,400 for providing one metric ton of separative work to foreign customers. At that price, total firm commitment to the European countries of 37,680 metric tons will bring the Soviet Union over \$2 billion by 1990. If the Europeans picked up all the additional options on Soviet services they now hold, the Soviets would be assured of another \$187 million in revenue.²⁹ These figures do not even take into consideration Soviet income from exporting power plants within and outside the Bloc, or compensation from fuel sold to intra-Bloc customers.

Aid with nuclear development in Eastern Europe also ensures continued Soviet access to uranium deposits, the source of over half the Soviet supply. And Soviet aid to the French with breeder development could pay off handsomely, both in cash and prestige.

Finally, if one could sit in on a Politburo staff meeting discussing the nonproliferation policies of the United States, not only might one find concern with the insecurity the Americans are creating in the world market, but a degree of cyni-

28. R. Zheleznov, "Atomic Power and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *International Affairs*, February, 1977, p. 51.

29. U.S. Department of Energy, "Estimate of Status of Foreign Uranium Enrichment of Service Activities, 1977," Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, *Nuclear Proliferation Factbook*, September 23, 1977, pp. 178-183.

cism about the true intentions of the United States. To the Soviets, U.S. policy appears to be dualistic. They observe that the U.S. Government apparently allowed highly enriched uranium to be "hijacked" to Israel in the early 1960s to aid Israel's now well-developed weapons program, while at the same time professing high-blown anti-proliferation theology and slapping the wrists of a "progressive" country like India for testing a nuclear device.³⁰ To a large degree the Soviets feel it is the fault of the two-faced U.S. policies that a proliferation problem exists today.

Perhaps the Soviets assume the inevitability of nuclear spread, and observe that U.S. policies have made it likely that future proliferators will be countries which threaten the Soviet Union or its protege states—Iran(Iraq), Pakistan(India), Brazil(Cuba), and Israel(Libya, Syria, Egypt). It is notable that the two recent Soviet reactor exports outside Eastern Europe and Finland have been to Libya and Cuba. Although the Soviets are clearly uninterested right now in a Colonel Qadaffi with nuclear bombs, Moscow may receive ever more frequent demands for nuclear help as a result of these countries' fears of their nuclearizing neighbors. Perhaps the Soviets are not completely critical of friendly leaders who may be laying the groundwork for a nuclear weapons option to prepare for a future in which they may find themselves faced with local nuclear enemies.

As the shift to a larger role has occurred, the Soviet Union has become both more articulate and more creative in its approach to nonproliferation policy. Until recently, Soviet statements on nuclear exports and nonproliferation were characterized by a vagueness and legalistic approach, centering upon the NPT. In a paper, "Nuclear Reactors will Spread," prepared for a Pugwash meeting in 1969, V. S. Emelyanov included a few paragraphs headed, *What is the Solution?* From his perspective, the four important elements of a nonproliferation strategy were: (1) the NPT; (2) the formation of nuclear-free zones; (3) the prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons; and (4) "confidence among nations."³¹ While all of these measures would mitigate the proliferation problem if they were possible to execute, this prescription did not offer a realistic approach to deal with the more immediate aspects of the dilemma. Since 1975, however, Soviet declaratory policy has become far more concrete and clear-cut. In 1976-77 a consistent set of Soviet recommendations for "creating a reliable barrier" against the proliferation of nuclear weapons became apparent.

30. "Huge Quantities of Nuclear Materials Unaccounted for in U.S.," Tass, 26 November 1977; FBIS/USSR, 28 November 1977, p. B3.

31. V. S. Emelyanov, "Nuclear Reactors Will Spread," in C. F. Barnaby, ed., *Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 71.

The Soviet position began appearing in the press in mid-1976. A commentary in English beamed to North America on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions with the United States in June 1976 advocated increasing the number of signatories of the NPT, assuring that IAEA safeguards are applied by all suppliers, and establishing multinational fuel cycle centers to perform uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction.³²

R. Zeleznov, a frequent Soviet writer on disarmament matters, repeated these positions in 1977: uphold the NPT; increase the effectiveness of the IAEA inspection system; insist on comprehensive IAEA safeguards on the part of the suppliers, led by Soviet adherence to that position; and strict control over reprocessing and enrichment technologies by the suppliers.³³ Commenting on a May 29, 1977 television appearance by Chairman Brezhnev which apparently dealt with proliferation, *Pravda* writer Z. Dmitriyev re-emphasized these same prescriptions, particularly dwelling upon the multinational fuel cycle center concept.³⁴

The Soviets have taken visible steps to pursue these policies over the past two years. In line with encouraging wider adherence to the NPT, the Soviets have apparently made signing of the Treaty a condition for countries outside the Bloc that now seek Soviet nuclear assistance. Libya's accession to the NPT just before concluding an agreement involving the export of research and power reactors is widely regarded as the result of concerted Soviet pressure.

The Soviet Union has promoted the applications of IAEA safeguards both in international arenas and bilaterally. While the Soviets have not voluntarily opened their national nonmilitary nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections as has the United States (both countries are technically exempt from such supervision under the NPT because they are nuclear-weapons states), today they conduct research on inspection techniques, the results of which they provide gratis to the IAEA. In 1977, the Soviets granted a 250,000 rouble loan in national currency to enable the organization to study technical aspects of inspection.³⁵ This is a marked shift from earlier years when they refused to support the IAEA because of general objections to inspection of national facilities by international bodies.

At the meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in London throughout 1976 and 1977, the Soviet Union, along with Great Britain, consistently sought more stringent controls over nuclear exports than other suppliers, several times reject-

32. *FBIS/USSR*, 7 June 1976, p. AA2.

33. *International Affairs*, Moscow, February 1977, p. 52.

34. "To Create a Reliable Barrier," *Pravda*, 8 July 1977; *FBIS/USSR* 12 July 1977, p. A1.

35. R. Mikhailov, "Disarmament is the Behest of the Times," *Pravda*, 22 December 1976, p. 4.

ing guidelines set forth by the United States as "minimal requirements."³⁶ The Soviet Union argued for comprehensive IAEA safeguards to be applied to recipients of any items on the IAEA "trigger list" (the list of goods that trigger the application of safeguards) long before the United States accepted that position.

The Soviets have scrupulously observed safeguards in their bilateral dealings. In one recent case, involving the transfer of heavy water from the Soviet Union to India, American observers wondered if that would indeed prove to be true. Evidence came to light in the United States in 1975 that heavy water (a substance used to moderate the nuclear chain reaction in certain reactors) exported from the United States to India had been used to produce fissile material for the Indian nuclear test in May 1974. Although shipments of heavy water had ended, a coalition of environmental groups filed an action against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, succeeding for a time in cutting off further shipments of low-enriched uranium fuel; and it became apparent that the American political climate would not favor further nuclear exports for some time.

As recharge of the Indian reactor at Rajasthan became necessary in late 1976, the Indians turned to the Soviet Union, one of the world's large producers of heavy water. As a gesture of good faith, the Soviets immediately agreed to supply the requisite amount, and shipped 25 percent of the total Indian order of 240 tons on the spot, with no mention of safeguards. Many observers in the United States jumped to the conclusion that the Soviets had no intention of pushing the Indians to agree that Soviet heavy water would not be used to produce plutonium in the same way the U.S. heavy water had been employed.

By mid-1977, however, it became evident that the Soviets did not intend to transfer any more than 25 percent of the heavy water until a safeguards agreement with the Indians was in hand.³⁷ There were also indications that the Soviets had obtained assurances from the Indians before any heavy water had been shipped that they would not use it in plutonium production for explosive devices.³⁸

What began as a gesture of political support from the Soviets ended in a disconcerting situation for the Indians. The Soviets have pressed them to agree to

36. "Despite Faith in Nuclear Trade Controls, USSR Rejects U.S. Policy," *Energy Daily*, 24 May 1977, p. 2.

37. "Soviet Sale Raises Question on India's Nuclear Plans," *Washington Post*, 12 December 1976, p. F7.

38. *Ibid.*

apply tight safeguards uniformly to *all* their reactors for an indefinite period of time as a condition of this single sale of heavy water. The Indians, who stood for guarantees only on the use of the reactors infused with *this* particular shipment of heavy water, and only for the period of time the Soviet heavy water is physically in the reactors, were ultimately forced to accept the Soviet position.³⁹ Soviet pressure on the Indians, pursued despite the political interest Moscow may have in lending support to India, has been much harsher than anyone expected.

Besides applying pressure bilaterally and internationally for safeguards, the Soviet Union has been pushing other suppliers to maintain the firebreak between nuclear power technology and fuel processing capabilities sought by their clients. Ever since the conclusion of the West German reactor export deal with Brazil in 1975, the Soviets have become progressively more critical of the reprocessing and enrichment technology transfer involved. Today the "deal of the century" is seen by Soviet commentators as signalling a destructive trend towards development of an unconstrained international plutonium economy. "If such growth is not hindered," *Pravda* correspondent V. Mikhailov warned in April 1977, "there will be from 200 to 300 such enrichment plants in the world by the end of this century, and control over the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will become virtually impossible."⁴⁰

While the Soviet Union may lack diplomatic leverage with the West Germans, it can exert pressure upon other suppliers. There is every indication that Secretary Brezhnev took up the matter of the French reprocessing plant export to Pakistan with President Giscard at their Rambouillet summit meeting in June 1977. Communiques released after the talks noted that nonproliferation was a major subject of discussion. As Leonid M. Zamyatin, a member of the Soviet delegation, said later in an interview, the Soviet side gave "very serious attention" to this question, making the point "with complete clarity" that the Soviet Union and France must follow common policies so as not to permit the spread of nuclear weapons "through all sorts of loopholes." According to Zamyatin, the Soviet position was greeted "with attentiveness" by the French delegation.⁴¹

It is fair to surmise that Brezhnev took Giscard to task over the sale to Pakistan, demonstrating both the Soviets' sense of the dangers of the spread of fuel process-

39. International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors Document No. 1857, 8 September 1977.

40. "Battles Over Deal of the Century," *Pravda*, 17 April 1977.

41. Tass, 17 June 1977; FBIS/USSR, 20 June 1977.

ing facilities and their willingness to spend diplomatic chips to convince other suppliers to stop aiding the process.

The Soviets also offer a longer-term proposal to make access to plutonium stockpiles more difficult for non-weapons states—i.e.; the concept of multinational fuel cycle centers to prepare uranium fuel and process atomic wastes that has circulated in the West for the last two years. The idea is appealing to the Soviets on at least two grounds.

First, it is a measure permitting further refinement of the nuclear fuel cycle and movement to an actual, albeit regulated, plutonium-based fuel cycle, a step the Soviet Union heartily supports. To quote from Dmitriyev's July 1977 *Pravda* article:

At the request of a number of countries, the IAEA is at present studying the problem of creating regional centers for the nuclear power industry fuel cycle, as well as international "banks"—stores—for the plutonium obtained by the non-nuclear countries from power industry and experimental reactors. The creation of regional centers and plutonium banks would contribute to strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation set-up and at the same time to the more efficient development of the nuclear power industry.⁴²

Second, the Soviets already run a regional fuel cycle system within the CEMA framework, with the processing facilities located in the Soviet Union. Thus not only would the Bloc presumably be left relatively untouched by any new international arrangements, but the Soviets have a model to show the rest of the world. Two Soviet members of the CEMA secretariat wrote in February 1977 that "the most favorable conditions for creating regional centers for the the fuel cycle of atomic power exist within CEMA. The countries of the Socialist community already have definite experience in large-scale cooperation in building projects on a multilateral basis in the fuel power and raw material areas."⁴³

Forcing non-Bloc clients to sign the NPT, strictly applying wider safeguards than ever before, pressuring the other suppliers and supporting internationalization of the fuel cycle are all elements of the tighter post-1975 Soviet position on nuclear exports. It seems clear that these elements of a toughening Soviet attitude are signs of a "positive" nuclear export policy today.

Why has the Soviet concern become particularly acute now? Certainly the intense consciousness-raising about proliferation that has occurred in the United States in the past two years has had a ripple-effect upon discussions in the Soviet

42. Dmitriyev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1977, p. 4.

43. Panasenkov and Panyushkin, p. 71.

Union. Heightened American apprehensions about proliferation stem from signals that the ease with which non-nuclear countries could derive material for military nuclear applications from civilian power generation technology has increased as their motivations to do so have grown. Movement towards a plutonium-based fuel cycle has coincided with an increase in regional tensions and weakening of the confidence of small states in the security assurances of the super-powers.

The ways in which the Soviet concern today is phrased indicate that their apprehensions closely parallel those of the United States—mainly turning upon recognition of the connection between civilian nuclear exports and nuclear weapons and a desire to prevent the establishment of self-contained fuel cycles in non-weapons states. Soviet grasp of the same points that have become part of the conventional wisdom in the United States seems to have built upon wider Soviet foreign policy considerations to produce the current high level of attention to the problem.

But today Soviet concern about proliferation arises as well from an impulse to go cautiously as they have moved into a much more significant role in the world nuclear energy market, embarking upon new and uncertain relationships. The Soviets have no desire to see a proliferation "happening" attributed to their nuclear aid. Thus, since they are committed to the development of atomic energy, it is not remarkable that they have moved to safeguard their ever-broadening range of dealings in the field as closely as possible.

Domestic Roots of Policy

As concerted as the Soviet effort to control its own exports may be, in the future that goal could be complicated by the directions in which the Soviet Union is moving in the international nuclear energy market. A basic contradiction in the Soviet position, which may affect policies even more acutely than the same problem plagues the nonproliferation stance of the United States, is the Soviets' enthusiastic support of nuclear energy and advanced fuel cycle development.

It is interesting to note the extent to which the Soviets are the inheritors of the technocratic progressivism so characteristic of the economic policies of the capitalist societies in the pre-limits to growth, pre-environmental consciousness years. In energy development, the Soviet goal is higher production with little consideration of the opportunity costs of particular avenues of development, a current version of Lenin's famous 1920 dictum that "progress equals electrification."

The Russians today have the underdog's naive faith in the automatic merits of

newer, bigger, and more complex technology. A critique of nuclear power from the viewpoint of the "appropriate technology" school of observers (the late British economist E. F. Schumacher or Amory Lovins) reminiscent as it is of the early Marx, is far out of the realm of possibility in the Soviet Union today. The Soviets even take a rather cavalier attitude towards safety, siting nuclear power plants close to population centers for convenience in transmission, and eliminating from their plant design the costly protective containment structures built around reactor cores in the West.⁴⁴

It is frequently remarked in the West that because the Soviet Union does not suffer from domestic public opposition to nuclear power, development can proceed relatively unhampered.⁴⁵ The upward spiral of public suspicion of nuclear power (leading to increased capital costs for power plant construction and rendering nuclear power economically unfavorable compared to other generating sources) has not occurred in the Soviet Union, as it has in the West and Japan.

Soviet discussions give the impression that they experience absolutely no public or scientific doubt about nuclear power. Soviet nuclear energy officials boast of the excellent safety record of their industry. As Dr. Igor Morokhov, first Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, told a Tass correspondent in July 1977, "Experience in the exploitation of atomic power stations has confirmed that we have not had one single dangerous incident in this field."⁴⁶

Perhaps Morokhov was making a fine distinction between accidents involving radioactive material inside the power station and elsewhere. If the latter is taken into account, the Soviets have a considerably worse safety record than Morokhov implies. Evidence has slowly come to light over the past year indicating that twenty years ago they suffered the most disastrous nuclear accident on record. Dr. Zhores Medvedev, the Soviet dissident biochemist and writer now working at the National Institute for Medical Research in London, has painstakingly gathered material pointing to the conclusion that an underground storage facility for nuclear wastes exploded in the South Urals, probably in late 1957 or early 1958.

In a fascinating piece of scientific detective work published in the British journal *New Scientist* in June 1977 (drawing inferences from published Soviet studies on the effects of intense radiation on plants and animals), Medvedev deduces startling conclusions about what must have been the contaminated area

44. Philip and Lucy Pryde, p. 30-32.

45. Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Union Steps Up Installation of Nuclear Power Plants," *New York Times*, 14 January 1977.

46. Tass, 20 July 1977; *FBIS/USSR*, 22 July 1977.

under observation by researchers reporting over the years in Soviet medical and scientific periodicals. The directly contaminated area, he surmises, may well have measured in the hundreds of square miles, with strong winds carrying "a mixture of radioactive products and soil over a large area, probably more than a thousand square miles in size." The explosion, he conjectures, caused the "deaths later of several hundred people from radiation sickness."⁴⁷ U.S. intelligence sources have confirmed Medvedev's claim of an accident, but theorize that a plutonium production reactor exploded, not a waste dump.⁴⁸

Given the rapidity with which unconfirmed rumors tend to spread and become exaggerated among the Soviet people, it is fair to guess that the story of the Urals disaster has become widely known in the Soviet Union. There is perhaps a latent public concern about nuclear power that cannot be judged by the views reflected in the pages of the Soviet press or scientific journals.

Even Soviet nuclear officialdom is not monolithic in its support of nuclear power today. There are fairly frequent indications in the Soviet and East European press that waste storage, reactor containment vessel design, and other specific areas in the industry suffer from technical problems.⁴⁹ Apparently there have been divisions in the scientific community over siting of power plants near population centers and other issues.⁵⁰ A speech delivered by scientific elder statesman Pyotr Kapitsa at the 250th Anniversary celebration of the Academy of Sciences in 1975 hinted at a loss of faith by some scientists in the inevitable benefits of progress in utilizing nuclear power. In his reportedly well-applauded address, Kapitsa touched on the dangers of power plant accidents, the difficulties of waste disposal, and the prospect of proliferation. These problems, he said, had not in his view been solved.⁵¹

After Kapitsa's speech, however, the Soviet nuclear scientific and bureaucratic community closed ranks against any doubts about nuclear power. Kapitsa's address was printed only in the *Academy of Sciences Bulletin*, not in the general press. Numerous actual or coincidental rebuttals of his doubts appeared in the public press in succeeding months, under by-lines of the magnitude of Dr. Andranik Petrosyants, chairman of the State Committee, and Dr. Anatoli Alexan-

47. *New Scientist*, 30 June 1977, pp. 761-764.

48. Robert Gillete, "Russ Atom Accident Laid to Reactor," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 November 1976, p. 1.

49. Andranik Petrosyants, *New Times*, Moscow, March 1976, p. 20.

50. Robert Toth, "Russ Try to Ease Doubts on A-Power," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 May 1976, p. 10.

51. *Ibid.*

drovich, head of the Kurchatov Institute, the chief Soviet nuclear physics research institution, and President of the Academy of Sciences.⁵² As a result of Soviet perceptions of their future energy needs, the official Soviet position today on nuclear energy remains that expressed by Emelyanov in 1969: "further progress of civilization is impossible without nuclear power."⁵³

The Soviet Union does not merely support nuclear power, but a very specific path of nuclear development. Because of domestic uranium scarcity, and a conviction that this option will allow the most efficient utilization of the fuel they have, the Soviet Union is moving towards a fast-breeder reactor-based nuclear power economy with all due haste.⁵⁴ Many Soviet domestic nuclear priorities and export policies must be understood in light of this ultimate goal.

Directing resources towards rapid breeder development has meant a set of domestic policies oriented towards stockpiling the plutonium feedstock that will eventually fuel the breeders. Because the Soviets have a fairly small number of reactors operating (29 in 1977 compared to 63 for the United States), Russian nuclear energy officials have become concerned about the sources of the plutonium that must become available from the processed cores of conventional reactors to provide the first charge for future breeders.⁵⁵

The rationales behind recent Soviet reactor development and installation patterns have been explored at length elsewhere.⁵⁶ But a significant aspect of the installation pattern since 1968 seems to have been the commissioning of a large number of 1000 Mw channel graphite reactors. The CGR is, according to experts, "a slightly better plutonium producer" than other types of reactors, and may be a transition plant to precede the introduction of breeders by supplying their initial plutonium fuel.⁵⁷ Plutonium from ten 1000 CGRs installed between 1968 and 1977 is perhaps intended to supplement the precious highly-enriched uranium that the Soviets must use to run their breeders at first.⁵⁸

A second consequence of the push toward breeder development in the Soviet Union is the extreme caution exhibited in dispensing uranium supplies, hoarding available resources for domestic use in plutonium-producing reactors. The Soviets

52. Ibid.

53. Emelyanov, p. 70.

54. R. Gillette, "Nuclear Power in the USSR: American Visitors Find Surprises," *Science*, 10 September 1971, p. 1005.

55. Ibid.

56. See Peter DeLeon et al., "Foreign Nuclear Reactor Development Programs" (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1976).

57. Gillette, *Science*, p. 1005.

58. Ibid.

mine uranium in "large quantities" at Zheltaya Voda near Krivoi Rog, at Lermontov near Pyatigorsk, and at new deposits in Kazakhstan's Kyzylkum Desert.⁵⁹ East Germany and Czechoslovakia supply large quantities to the Soviet Union, delivering ore and concentrate without processing.⁶⁰ The Soviet Union has exclusive rights to uranium deposits in Czechoslovakia, which until recently were considered the largest deposits in the world.⁶¹ Small amounts of uranium are produced for the Soviet Union in Hungary and Bulgaria.⁶² Rumania annulled its treaty for the supply of uranium to the Soviets in the early 1960s, while Poland now mines no uranium at all.⁶³

The Soviet Union has reportedly amassed an impressive reserve of uranium in recent years. Out of an annual supply of 17,500 tons—10,500 tons from Eastern Europe and 7000 from domestic mines—the Soviets consume only 9000 tons of raw uranium per year. Since 1946 they have built up a stockpile estimated at 200,000 tons.⁶⁴

The Soviet Union also has a surplus uranium enrichment capacity at present. A gaseous-diffusion enrichment plant in Siberia has an annual capacity of about 9 million separative work units (SWUs), of which 7 million or fewer SWUs are needed to fill domestic enrichment demands.⁶⁵

The Soviets have turned this extra enrichment capacity to profit by providing toll enrichment services to Western Europe. Since 1975 they have moved into the gap between a shortfall of U.S. uranium enrichment capacity to supply world needs and a lag in construction of new facilities in Europe to become a supplier. In 1977 the Soviet Union used 1.6 million SWUs of its enrichment capacity to provide 55 percent of the European Community's enrichment needs, as well as to prepare fuel for purchasers of Soviet reactors in the Bloc.⁶⁶ Contracted Soviet services will comprise at least 40 percent of the Community's supply through 1979.⁶⁶

The Soviet Union does not, however, provide natural uranium to the European

59. "Karel Bocek, "Czechoslovakian Uranium and the USSR," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, 9 July 1974, p. 1.

60. *Ibid.*

61. Polach, "Nuclear Power in East Europe," p. 833.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Newsweek*, 14 March 1977, p. 13.

64. *Nuclear Proliferation Factbook*, 1977, p. 175.

65. Horst Mendershausen, "Worldwide Energy Demand and Supply: Medium Term Forecasts" (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 9.

66. Horst Mendershausen, "Europe's Changing Energy Relations," p. 45.

countries, nor does it sell any uranium abroad except in the form of fuel rods to buyers of its reactors.⁶⁷ Countries contracting for enrichment services with the Soviet Union must provide their own uranium; the Soviets process it and return the enriched uranium, along with the tails (waste matter), to the consumer country. To the occasional alarm of the U.S. Congress, much of the uranium consigned by the European countries for enrichment in the Soviet Union since 1975 has been purchased from the United States.

Clearly there is a perception in the Soviet nuclear energy bureaucracy of a shortage of uranium for future domestic uses. In an interview in 1976, Andranik Petrosyants compared the world reserves of uranium to oil, and predicted the depletion of both in the future.⁶⁸ As A. P. Alexandrov wrote in *Soviet Science* in 1975:

At the present time, the extensive construction of atomic power stations has led to an intensification of efforts directed towards increasing the available reserve, but it is still expected that the delay in the mining of uranium will lead to temporary difficulties in the growth of nuclear power sources in the West [of the USSR] during the next 10 to 15 years because the delay between the discovery of the deposit and its commercial exploitation can be up to ten years. The supply and demand of uranium will become balanced in about 1985–1990 and will probably remain in balance until the end of the century.⁶⁹

Officials of Combustion Engineering, Inc., an American reactor manufacturing company, report that several years ago a Soviet trade delegation initiated discussions with them about the possibility of aiding the Soviet Union with construction of pressurized water reactors. According to a company spokesman, however, Soviet interest in the deal immediately evaporated when Combustion Engineering indicated its desire to obtain natural uranium from the Soviet Union as the barter quid pro quo for U.S. help with PWR technology.

Given the relatively small number of conventional reactors operating in the Soviet Union, pursuing a breeder economy forces stockpiling uranium to fuel reactors like the channel graphite systems which will produce plutonium for the breeders. In the near future the Soviet Union is likely to operate from a perception of uranium scarcity which will tend to constrain nuclear dealings with other countries.

67. Export of uranium is, in fact, prohibited by Soviet law.

68. *New Times*, Moscow, March 1976.

69. A. P. Alexandrov, "Atomic and Thermonuclear Power," *Soviet Science* 45, no. 2 (1975): 20.

Complications

Besides limiting domestic and export options, heading for a breeder economy may pose dilemmas for the Soviets in their concerns about proliferation in the Bloc and elsewhere. Soviet nuclear energy officials have repeatedly asserted that breeder development is to be pursued jointly with the Eastern European countries.⁷⁰ It is unclear just what this may mean. Will the Soviet Union allow breeder reactors to become the follow-on systems to conventional reactors they have supplied to the Bloc countries? If so, then the carefully constructed Soviet nuclear relationship with Eastern Europe, designed to prevent accumulation of fissionable materials outside the borders of the Soviet Union, could literally disintegrate.

According to the former director of the Czechoslovakian uranium mines, Karel Bocek, Czechoslovakia wished to process uranium ore into nuclear fuel independently in the late 1960s. The Soviets intervened, "firmly," according to Bocek, ruling that no fuel processing activities would be permitted on Czech soil.⁷¹ Yet if Czechoslovakia or other Bloc countries operated breeder reactors, plutonium would have to rest within their borders, and almost necessarily have to be handled by indigenous technicians, since it is the fuel for breeders. It is also the fissionable substance today regarded as the most likely raw material for atomic weapons. Thus a key question today for those Soviet experts concerned with nuclear exports must be to determine at what point the participation of Bloc countries in breeder development becomes dangerous, or alternatively, what technical or physical safeguards might adequately guard against diversion of stocks of fissionable material if the Bloc countries are pushed to the breeder by the enthusiasm shown by the Soviet Union itself for such a route.

Perhaps an even more serious quandary may be presented to the Soviets as a result of their movement towards becoming a supplier of reactors to countries outside the Bloc. Observers in the West might well speculate about Soviet motives for selling a nuclear reactor to a country like Libya precisely at the time of greatest international apprehension about the spread of fissionable materials. A benevolent/political interpretation would see the Soviets, concerned about Colonel Qaddafi's ability to satisfy his atomic aspirations through buying technology from abroad, preemptively responding to the Libyan nuclear request to forestall deals with less scrupulous suppliers.

70. Panasenkov and Panyushkin, pp. 68-72.

71. Bocek, p. 2.

A malevolent/political explanation would show the Soviet Union countering the Israeli nuclear potential by giving Libya a perceived weapons option. A neutral/commercial view would highlight the ample evidence that the Soviets are aiming for world-wide reactor sales and argue that they were trying to demonstrate their suitability as a supplier for less-industrial countries. Given the general direction of Soviet nuclear export policy, a mix of these motives was surely present, with the neutral/commercial goals perhaps uppermost in the Soviet mind.

Whatever the particular motivations, the Libyan deal seems to signal a shift of necessity back to the pre-1960 nonproliferation philosophy. The Soviet approach seems to be turning back towards relying upon political rather than primarily technical control over the activities of non-weapons trading partners as they begin to deal outside the easily manipulable countries of the Bloc. To rationalize the Libyan sale, the Soviets have applied stringent safeguards and seem confident of their ability to influence this avowedly aspiring nuclear power not to violate the safeguards to make weapons. Political leverage added to technical control has served the Soviet Union well in the past eighteen years as a non-proliferation strategy, but only where leverage has been strong and direct. Libya, like China in 1959, is a country over which political leverage is far from secure.

Articles in the Soviet press frequently allege that commercial interests of the capitalist states in nuclear exports impede effective nonproliferation policies.⁷² The Soviet Union may now be developing precisely the sort of economic concerns which would compromise their hitherto successful strategy of strict export control.

It could be argued that the reason the safeguards the Soviets have applied to nuclear exports in the Bloc have been effective lies more in the integrated system of responsibilities and controls in the academic, technical, industrial and bureaucratic hierarchies the Soviet Union has established in those countries than in the specific nature of the safeguards. If fuel rods are to be returned to the Soviet Union, the recipient country must feel that the sanctions for defying the rule would be immediate and direct, thus deterring diversion for weapons purposes.

In the Bloc, there are multiple levels of possible and believable sanctions the Soviet Union could pursue, from military interference to embargoes on the supply of unrelated commodities. But the level of responsibility to the Soviet Union and the believability of threatened Soviet sanctions against states like Libya and

72. Nikolay Vladimirov, "Security Aspect of Nuclear Technology Export Considered," *TASS*, 29 June 1977; *FBIS/USSR*, 30 June 1977, p. A13.

Cuba is much less certain. In fact, once the Soviets begin to supply states outside their direct political sway, the question arises (as it does more generally for the United States in its supplier relationships), whether any measures are sufficient to deter a future leader from defying the sanctions and appropriating the material to build weapons.

This suggests that the central dilemma in nuclear export and nonproliferation policy is basically the same for the United States and the Soviet Union, only more acute for the latter. Neither country wishes nonnuclear-weapons states to develop reprocessing and enrichment capacities. The United States has undertaken a series of exemplary policies—deferring domestic reprocessing and slowing progress on the breeder reactor—designed to show non-weapons countries its good faith in following the policies it prescribes for others.

Other countries do not regard the U.S. energy situation as analagous to their own, simply because the United States produces as much uranium as the remainder of the non-communist world combined, and can afford not to reprocess or move to the breeder at present. While demonstrating good will, America's exemplary policies are thought to be inappropriate examples by many of the countries at which they are aimed.

The Soviets, in asking other countries to forego reprocessing and enrichment, cannot even offer themselves as an example. They are moving ahead to a plutonium economy, and cannot help but appear more discriminatory than the United States when they attempt to impose measures to forestall reprocessing and enrichment upon client countries.

U.S.-Soviet Cooperation

The two underlying realities of the Soviet energy situation which may cause them problems in pursuing unilateral nonproliferation goals—the domestic uranium shortage and resultant commitment to advanced fuel cycle developments—are likely to create dilemmas for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in designing nonproliferation strategies. Aside from the general disparity between a contracting American posture in the world nuclear trade and an expanding Soviet promotion of nuclear power, there are more specific issues on which the two countries may find themselves at odds.

Two policies the United States is now promoting, for which the Soviet Union is not likely to find much sympathy, are the discouragement of new breeder development and strategies to organize the distribution of uranium fuel, particularly the plan to establish world nuclear fuel banks. Given their commitment to

the plutonium economy, the Soviet Union is likely to proceed with breeder development. As mentioned before, the Soviets have recently affirmed their intention by signing an agreement for joint breeder development with the French, and will surely be inclined to pursue the breeder with other countries in the future.

The extremely restrictive Soviet position with regard to uranium resources could pose a problem for them in participating in some of the multi-national nonproliferation schemes they approve so heartily in theory. While commentators in the Soviet press specifically applaud the notion of enriched uranium fuel banks to cushion the shocks of supply fluctuations for uranium-poor countries, they seem to feel they have barely enough uranium to support their own planned nuclear power sector, much less enough to tie up in international banks. If the U.S. plan materializes, there will surely be an internal fight in the Soviet Union over scarce uranium between diplomats who want it for international banks, military spokesmen who want it for warheads, and nuclear energy officials who want it for power generation. Given concerns about retaining influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviets will also be very careful about the structure of any multi-national fuel cycle center schemes beyond the fuel banks that are presented for their consideration.

In the year since it has become top official priority, even in the rare instances that policy has been clearly defined and executed, the U.S. anti-proliferation crusade has met with mixed success. The European suppliers have more often repulsed U.S. exhortations than taken them to heart. The United States is now in the initial stages of designing policies which will ultimately affect the Soviet Union. If the United States makes flat demands of the Soviets like those that it has made of the other suppliers then it is likely to be greeted with the same surprise and outrage that has characterized French, German, and Japanese reaction.

This suggests three principles for future U.S. dealings with the Soviets about nonproliferation specifically, and perhaps for relations more generally. First, it is imperative to try to *understand* where Soviet sensibilities on this issue lie, and to comprehend their needs from their own perspective. If in the future the Soviet Union seems hesitant to participate in multinational schemes involving uranium fuel, perhaps the United States will realize that the Soviets are bound by on-going domestic processes and priorities, and can find ways for the Soviets to participate that would be more palatable for them. A guarantee of continued income from enrichment services might encourage the Soviets to contribute enrichment capacity to international arrangements if it is impossible for them to give uranium.

Second, realizing that real conflicts exist between U.S. and Soviet philosophies about the immediate development of nuclear power, the United States might find it worthwhile to try to tap Soviet thinking where it *intersects* with our own, rather than trying to change it where it diverges. The Soviet development of and potential to export the breeder reactor and the expansion of power reactor exports to countries like Libya are alarming, and of legitimate concern to the United States. Rather than focusing upon breeder development itself, since the Soviet Union is clearly committed to the reactor for domestic use, perhaps the United States might exchange agreements with the Soviets to ban exports of the breeder or to jointly devise strict safeguards for the technology. In that way, the United States might build upon apprehensions the Soviets feel about the future of breeders in Eastern Europe.

Regarding Soviet exports outside the Bloc, surely the Soviets are no less interested than the United States in ensuring that General Amin is not the next recipient of a nuclear reactor after Colonel Qaddafi. The United States might try to make use of Soviet concern by engaging them, along with other suppliers if possible, in a process of excluding certain countries from receiving any nuclear assistance, establishing nuclear technology-free zones in much the same sense as nuclear weapons-free zones. Such a process might forestall development of a complex, perceptions-oriented balancing act in which each superpower tries to provide its clients with neutral technology but nevertheless succeeds in creating the perception that the client has a weapons option.

Finally, to deflate the momentum of such a spiral before it begins, the United States must take particular pains to reinforce its own *credibility*, since Soviet cynicism about the sincerity of U.S. nonproliferation policies is not entirely without cause. The United States could use to its own advantage a lesson to be taken from the history of Soviet nuclear export policy. For the most part, Soviet nuclear export policies have been consistent—largely because the Soviets have made a decision about the role nuclear power will play in the future development of their society, and by extension, in the world at large.

Soviet policymakers believe that nuclear power will be the basic source of energy in the foreseeable future, and have therefore promoted its use. Simultaneously, they have attempted to tighten the safeguards and political controls which prevent its use for military purposes.

It is more than likely that the Soviets are consistent and also consistently wrong, and that neither safeguards nor political leverage will matter in the long run if nuclear power technology becomes widely disseminated. But at least the Soviets have made the decision about nuclear power, a less complex decision for

them than for the United States because of the centralized nature of Soviet economic planning. And certain of their nuclear export policies follow naturally from their pro-nuclear energy position.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that many contradictions the United States faces in trying to promote nonproliferation policies—the source of domestic confusion as well as Soviet suspicion—would be considerably simplified if the United States came to as clear a decision about the future of nuclear power as has the Soviet Union.

Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy

Raymond L. Garthoff

One of the most controversial—and important—questions underlying debate on Soviet intentions, detente, and strategic arms limitations (SALT) in particular, has concerned the Soviet view on mutual deterrence. Do they, or don't they, believe in mutual deterrence? Do the political and military leaders in Moscow accept mutual deterrence as an underpinning to strategic arms limitation? Or do they hold a fundamentally different view of the strategic relationship between the two superpowers, and are they "taking us for a ride" in SALT? Although some decisionmakers and commentators have expressed judgment on this matter as though there were no doubt as to the answer, many others have been unsure and concerned. In particular, the continuing Soviet military buildup, and the continuing expressions in published Soviet military writings of the pursuit of a war-waging and war-winning military doctrine, have convinced some and troubled others as to Soviet views of mutual deterrence, and as to Soviet aims.

The present essay will seek to illuminate Soviet thinking on this subject, with a view to the interrelationship of Soviet ideological beliefs, political imperatives and calculation, military views and doctrine, and their intersection and reconciliation in Soviet policy.

The central conclusion of this analysis is that by the late 1960s, when SALT was launched, and since that time, the Soviet political and military leadership has recognized that under contemporary conditions there is a strategic balance between the two superpowers which provides mutual deterrence; that the nuclear strategic balance is basically stable, but requires continuing military efforts to assure its stability and continuation; and that agreed strategic arms limitations can make a contribution, possibly a significant one, to reducing these otherwise necessary reciprocal military efforts.

More broadly, the Soviet leaders believe that peaceful coexistence—with continued political and ideological competition—is the preferable alternative to an unrestrained arms race and to recurring high-risk politico-military confrontation; that detente and a relaxation of tensions is in the interests of the Soviet Union; and that nuclear war would not be. This does not mean that Soviet foreign policy is passive or based on satisfaction with the status quo. But the Soviet leaders

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demonstrate their recognition that the need to avoid a nuclear war can best be served by prudent actions within a framework of mutual strategic deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Questions of War and Peace in Soviet Ideology and Policy

Marxism-Leninism is based on historical determinism, a belief that socio-economic forces, through a struggle of classes, are the driving force of history. With the advent of the Soviet Union as a socialist state, the question of war between states as a possible form of class struggle arose—indeed, it was the central fact of life to the Bolshevik leaders. The Soviet leaders have seen the greatest danger to the socialist cause (identified with the Soviet Union) as coming from the capitalist military threat—and the one mortal danger faced during the first half-century of Soviet rule after the victorious conclusion of the Russian Civil War was the attack by Germany in World War II. Since World War II, the greatest threat in Soviet eyes has been the unparalleled destructive power of the American nuclear arsenal. Marxist-Leninist ideology sanctions the use of military power (and any other means) available to the socialist (Soviet) leaders whenever, *but only if*, expedient in advancing the socialist cause and not jeopardizing the security of achievements already gained, above all the security of the Soviet Union. Military power is considered necessary to *defend* the socialist cause, may be used if expedient to *advance* it, but is *not* seen as the decisive element in advancing the historical process, which will progress when conditions are ripe through indigenous action by the rising working class.

With the failure of "world revolution" after the successful conclusion of the Russian Civil War, the new Soviet state turned to recovery and then to achievement of "socialism in one country." Priority was given to economic development and to assurance of political control. Military power was secondary; the key role of military power on behalf of world socialism was seen as guaranteeing the survival of the first socialist state. Although the term was not then in vogue, *deterrence* of renewed military intervention by the capitalist powers was the underlying strategic conception. Later, when attacked, the role of the armed forces was of course defense and defeat of the attacker. The same deterrent conception has governed the period since World War II, except that there now exists a socialist camp or commonwealth, and of course it is recognized that military power in the nuclear age is enormously more dangerous and important. The principal role of Soviet military power has consistently been to dissuade im-

perialist powers from resort to *their* military power against the Soviet Union (and, later, also against the other countries of the socialist camp) in an effort to thwart the progressive course of history driven by social-economic revolutionary dynamics—not by military conquest.

The Soviets also see other important ideologically sanctioned *uses* of military force, but the basic Marxist-Leninist ideological framework predicates a fundamentally deterrent role for Soviet military power.¹

The Soviets have, nonetheless, faced a doctrinal dilemma. While jettisoning Stalinist views on the inevitability of war and the necessary or desirable role of war as a catalyst of socialist advance in the world, the Communists must assume that socialism is destined to survive and to triumph, even if a world nuclear catastrophe occurs. If they openly discarded that view, it could place in question their whole world-view, and their basis for legitimacy. Hence there are reaffirmations of confidence in the ultimate triumph of socialism even if a world nuclear war should, despite Soviet efforts to prevent it, occur.

Military Views

Lenin embraced the observation of Clausewitz that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," and this indeed represents a natural Marxist-Leninist conception.² Remarkably, some Soviet writers (mainly but not exclusively civilians) have over the past decade and a half been so impressed by the inexpediency and enormous dangers of any nuclear world war (or indeed any war which could escalate into such a war) that they have challenged this view. They, in turn, have been criticized and refuted by other spokesmen, mainly military. Yet the question keeps arising. Why? Mainly because the two sides are not engaged in a theoretical disputation, but in political argument with considerable potential importance for military programs if not policy. In fact, both sides accept the real basic premise that war is a matter of politics or political motivation; both sides even accept the fact that nuclear war is not expedient as a matter of policy. The real underlying debate is whether war is recognized as so unpromising and dangerous that it can never occur. Such a question has profound implications for

1. In addition to the very summary discussion in these paragraphs, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1966), chapters 1, 4, 10 and 12.

2. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 9–19 and 51–57.

military requirements. Is a deterrent force enough? And if war were to occur, is a war-fighting capability needed to seek a pyrrhic "victory"?

In the early and mid-1960s, after general acceptance of the theses on the non-inevitability, non-necessity, and non-expediency of nuclear war, Khrushchev and many lesser advocates of his views began to argue further that nuclear war would spell the end of world civilization, and was therefore not only unacceptable but unthinkable. One civilian commentator on political-military subjects carried this argument to the point of paraphrasing Clausewitz (and Lenin) to say "War can only be the continuation of madness."³ This statement, along with a number of others, was made in the context of ideological-political Soviet polemics with the Chinese Communists. The more orthodox Soviet military line was, while agreeing that nuclear war made no sense as a continuation of politics *as a policy option for the Soviet Union*, to insist on the risks that such a war could occur and on the need for powerful Soviet military forces to deter such a war.⁴

Other military spokesmen distinguished between war as a continuation of politics, which was reaffirmed, and war as a useful instrument of politics, which it was found increasingly not to be.⁵ Yet others stressed the need to be able to wage and win war if it could not be averted.

In 1965, the late Major General Nikolai Talensky, former editor of the military theoretical journal *Military Thought* (at the time of military doctrinal rejuvenation after Stalin's death in the mid-1950s) and an outspoken "revisionist," argued: "In our days there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and still survive..."⁶ Several Soviet military writers subsequently attacked General Talensky's position (and criticized him by name), arguing not that his position was theoretically wrong but that it was practically dangerous because it undercut the rationale for maintaining necessary large military forces.⁷

3. Boris Dmitriyev, "Brass Hats: Peking and Clausewitz," *Izvestiya*, 25 September 1963.

4. For example, Marshal Sergei Biryuzov (then Chief of the General Staff), "Politics and Nuclear Weapons," *Izvestiya*, 11 December 1963.

5. For example, Maj. Gen. N. Sushko and Major T. Kondratkov, "War and Politics in the 'Nuclear Age,'" *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* [Communist of the Armed Forces], no. 2, January 1964, pp. 14-23. (Kondratkov, as a colonel, was to return to this theme in the late 1960s and 1970s.)

6. Maj. Gen. N. A. Talensky, "The Late War: Some Reflections," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* [International Affairs], no. 5, May 1965, p. 23.

7. Lt. Col. Ye. I. Rybkin, "On the Nature of Nuclear Missile War," *Kommunist vooruzhen-*

Subsequently, other civilian writers have stressed the cataclysmic nature of a nuclear world war, and clearly indicated there would be no meaningful "victor" in such a war. Some of these writers have held positions close to political leaders.⁸ And there have been a number of counter-argumentations, usually by military theoretical writers, mainly challenging implications of these discussions for Soviet military strength as a deterrent, but also as a war-fighting and war-winning force if a world nuclear war should ever come.⁹ (More recently, however, as shall be considered later, some of these writers have made a rather sharp turn toward accepting the view they had criticized.)

Some discussions have sought to reconcile the two opposing views. Dr. Trofimenko, for example, in a recent discussion has cited "the Leninist thesis on the fact that war is a continuation of policy . . . by forcible means," but one which is no longer "in practice a usable instrument of policy when an aggressor in the course of struggle for 'victory' can himself be annihilated."¹⁰ He finds the chief reason for the abandonment of war as an expedient usable instrument not in the destructive nature of the weapons themselves, arguing that "imperialism would not hesitate to resort to any weapon to realize its designs," but rather in the fact that "the other side has analogous means at its disposal in a potential con-

nykh sil, no. 17, September 1965; Col. I. Sidel'nikov, "V. I. Lenin on the Class Approach in Determining the Nature of Wars," *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star], 22 September 1965; Col. I. Grudin, "On the Question of the Essence of War," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 July 1966; and Editorial, "Theory, Politics, and Ideology: On the Essence of War," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 24 January 1967.

8. In particular, Aleksandr Bovin, Georgy Arbatov, and Veniamin Dolgin. See A. I. Krylov, "October and the Strategy of Peace," *Voprosy filosofii* [Problems of Philosophy], no. 3, March 1968; G. A. Arbatov, "The Stalemate of the Policy of Force," *Problemy mira i sotsializma* [Problems of Peace and Socialism], no. 2, February 1974; A. Bovin, "Internationalism, and Coexistence," *Novoye vremya* [New Times], no. 30, July 1973, and "Peace and Social Progress," *Izvestiya*, 11 September 1973 (only in the first edition, substituting a different article, also by Bovin, in later editions!), and "Socialist, Class Politics," *Molodoi kommunist* [The Young Communist], no. 4, April 1974; and V. G. Dolgin, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Factors Contributing to its Deepening and Development," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 1, January 1974. There have been many others, usually with references not developed so fully as these key articles.

9. For example, see Maj. Gen. K. Bochkarev, "Nuclear Arms and the Fate of Social Progress," *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* [Soviet Kirgizia], 25 August 1970; Maj. Gen. A. Milovidov, "A Philosophical Analysis of Military Thought," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 17 May 1973; Col. I. Sidel'nikov, "Peaceful Coexistence and the People's Security," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 14 August 1973; Col. Ye. Rybkin, "The Leninist Conception of Nuclear War and the Present Day," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 20, October 1973; Rear Adm. V. Shelyag, "Two World Outlooks—Two Views on War," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 7 February 1974; and Col. T. Kondratkov, "War as a Continuation of Policy," *Soviet Military Review*, no. 2, February 1974.

10. G. A. Trofimenko, *SShA: Politika, voyna, ideologiya* [The US: Politics, War and Ideology] (Moscow: Mysl', 1976), pp. 292–293.

flict,"¹¹ thus justifying the need to maintain a strong (and perhaps even war-waging) military force as a deterrent in order to buttress mutual deterrence.¹²

Military Thought, the important confidential Soviet General Staff journal, is a particularly revealing source for illuminating the "debate" on the role of war in the nuclear age. Its circulation is restricted to Soviet officers, and it can therefore be comparatively free of concerns over effects on less sophisticated mass military and lay Soviet readerships—or on non-Soviet audiences. The then Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovsky, in an unpublished Order (No. 303 of November 6, 1965) noted that *Military Thought* is "the main military theoretical organ of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR," and that "it plays an important role in the working out of military-theoretical problems."¹³

It is clear in official directives and other discussions in *Military Thought* that since the mid-1960s the Soviet military command has seen a need to prepare for various possible wars, including both non-nuclear and nuclear. But this requirement is framed exclusively in terms of flexible response options to meet various possible Western military actions. Moreover, to cite Colonel General Povaly, then Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff,

But no matter what character the war assumed, it would represent a great danger for all mankind. This is why our Party and Government are conducting a determined struggle for the exclusion of wars from the life of human society in order that no state will ever use against other states means of force for achieving its political aims, for resolving disputed international questions.¹⁴

There are, to be sure,¹⁵ many discussions of Soviet military doctrine for waging a nuclear war should one come. Usually these do not also address the *role* of war. One such discussion, however, directly addresses frankly and in some detail the debate over "the end of civilization," and provides further insights. It appeared in 1968, after the round of debate in the public press in 1965–67, and was specifically addressed to the article by A. I. Krylov in *Problems of Philosophy* which had appeared in March 1968 (cited earlier). Six months after the latter article had appeared, Major General K. Bochkarev, Deputy Commandant of the General Staff Academy, published a scathing polemical rebuttal.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

12. See also [Col.] T. R. Kondratkov, "Social-Philosophical Aspects of Problems of War and Peace," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 4, April 1975.

13. "Fifty Years of Military Thought," *Voyennaya mysl'* [Military Thought], no. 6, June 1968, p. 26.

14. Col. Gen. M. I. Povaly, "Development of Soviet Military Strategy," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 2, February 1967, p. 74.

General Bochkarev states that a "great popularity" has been enjoyed in the West by the view that "a world nuclear war would signify 'the end of the world', and the death of all civilization, that in such a war 'there would be neither victors nor vanquished'."¹⁵ He then says these ideas had also "made their way into our press," citing in particular the Krylov article. Bochkarev argues that imperialism has lost forever its military superiority, and has "to some degree" recognized the new military-strategic situation in the world. Written precisely at the time that the SALT talks had been scheduled to begin, he notes that "the ruling circles of the imperialist states are even making some concessions on questions of nuclear disarmament."¹⁶ But, he stresses, the imperialists have not given up ideas of preemptive or even preventive war. "This," he notes, "unquestionably is an adventuristic gamble, but there is no serious proof that it has already been discarded by the general staffs of the Western powers, and above all by the Pentagon."¹⁷ Krylov had not so argued, but it is clear that Bochkarev and no doubt many of his colleagues would take some convincing or are reluctant to allow that the West was in fact reliably deterred. The language suggests the latter: he does not want to give up this rationale for further Soviet military buildup.

Bochkarev asserts (not unfairly) that Krylov sees no victor in a world nuclear war—both sides would perish. He then states that "*subsequently* we will return to an evaluation of this position. *Now*, we will stress that from the point of view of the defense of the socialist homeland, this question cannot be posed and solved in this manner."¹⁸ In this revealing formulation, Bochkarev admits that *apart* from the question of the validity of Krylov's position, even posing the question in this manner is disadvantageous to justification for Soviet defense requirements. He then goes on to admit:

Unquestionably, a world nuclear war would bring unprecedented calamities to all mankind, and our Party and Government are doing everything to prevent it. This is one of the primary tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. . . . However, *if* international imperialism unleashes a nuclear war the progress of the socialist states and their Marxist-Leninist Parties will not be paralyzed in terror and will not drop their arms as the enemies of peace and socialism would desire.¹⁹

15. Maj. Gen. K. Bochkarev, "The Question of the Sociological Aspect of the Struggle Against the Forces of Aggression and War," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 9, September 1968, pp. 3–4.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 7; emphasis added.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Bochkarev agrees with Krylov that "it is inadmissible" to ignore the conclusions of scientists on the catastrophic effects of the use of "even a part" of the vast existing nuclear stockpiles. But, he argues, there is more to war than stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including "resolution to employ the weapon" and "the socio-political base" on which they operate.²⁰

In turning to his "evaluation," General Bochkarev argues "it is absolutely obvious" that "one cannot take at their face value" the admissions of Western military men "concerning the lack of prospects for a world nuclear war"; such statements are intended in part "to camouflage the preparations of the imperialist aggressors for world war," as is the doctrine of "flexible response." He then tallies the (1968) military forces of the Western blocs together at: 1560 strategic missiles, 600 heavy and 220 medium bombers, 37 aircraft carriers, 625 escort ships, 265 submarines including 70 nuclear, and regular ground forces totalling 4,735,000 men. "It is also common knowledge that the ruling circles of the United States are devoting major attention to the development of strike forces intended for war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries."²¹ He notes the "plan" to spend \$30-40 billion on deployment of an ABM system.

Bochkarev argues that "the military might of the USSR and the entire socialist camp deters imperialism but does not create an absolute guarantee against . . . war."²² War, while deterred and unlikely, is not seen as inconceivable, and it must be prepared against with "vigilance" and with "capabilities to repel aggression."

Bochkarev then turns to the *effect* of Krylov's arguments and conclusions.

. . . The reader may get the idea of the doom of the socialist countries and all mankind in a world thermonuclear war . . . the assumption that there will be no general nuclear war and that if it does break out, struggle in it is in general excluded . . .

Well, and what if the indicated condition does not happen, if the imperialists nevertheless do unleash general nuclear war? In such a situation, will there be any kind of foreign policy goals for the socialist states and can they be attained? . . . it is assumed that with general nuclear war the "end of the world" sets in, when there can be no talk of policy in general.²³

Bochkarov then cites Krylov on the need for realization of the enormous destruc-

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

tive consequences of a world nuclear war, in order to help prevent such a war. He is most unhappy with this formulation. Rather the General believes:

In explaining the truth of the nature of nuclear war *to the masses* it is necessary, consequently, to bring them to an understanding not only of the criminality of unleashing such a war on the part of imperialism, but also on the justice of the corresponding retribution against the aggressor. In this way, *and only in this way*, can this problem be posed and solved *from the view* of defending the socialist homeland and the interests of international communism and all progressive mankind.²⁴

He is also troubled by another aspect of Krylov's stress on the improbability of world nuclear war, and his very brief reference to military strategy as applicable essentially only to possible limited wars. Again, the General:

What if the possibility of a world nuclear war nonetheless becomes a hard reality and turns into actual war? In that case—the entire content of the [Krylov] article leads us to this—a situation arises in which the concept of “military victory” is unacceptable and “military strategy, the strategy of conducting war, loses its significance.” In other words, the armed forces of the socialist states at the present time, in principle, will not be able to set for themselves the goal of defeating imperialism and the global nuclear war which it unleashes and the mission of attaining victory in it, and our military science should not even work out a strategy for the conduct of war since the latter has lost its meaning and its significance . . . *In this case, the very call to raise the combat readiness of our armed forces and improve their capability to defeat any aggressor is senseless.*²⁵

It is clear what is troubling General Bochkarev. The entire rationale for supporting Soviet military efforts is seen as undermined.

Another aspect of Krylov's position greatly disturbs Bochkarev. Krylov contends that knowledge of the true situation strengthens the morale of the armies of socialism. The General comments:

Surprising logic: to strengthen the morale of the troops on the basis of their recognition of the hopelessness of the struggle for which they are preparing: The morale-combat qualities of Soviet soldiers are moulded on the basis of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism which . . . instills in them unflagging confidence in the indestructability and final triumph of the forces of socialism.²⁶

In summing up these latter points, Bochkarev concludes: “The positions of the

24. *Ibid.*, p. 14; emphasis added.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 15; emphasis added.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

author [Krylov] on the question of the capabilities and tasks of military strategy of the socialist countries in the world nuclear arena are unquestionably unacceptable."²⁷

General Bochkarev ends his article with a ringing endorsement of the policy of renouncing world nuclear war, and of preventing a world war by deterrence.

Recognition of the possibility of the victory of the socialist states in a global nuclear war, as is perfectly clear, by no means signifies justification for its kindling or unleashing. The CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties decisively reject the irresponsible declarations on this account by the Peking adventurers, of those who talk profusely about the desirability of a world nuclear war from the point of view of the interests of the world proletariat revolution, that such a war allegedly is called upon to play the role of a "bridge" to the shining future of mankind. Communism does not need wars for its final assertion of a new social system. Its triumph is assured by the course of history . . . On the contrary, the actual possibility for the complete and decisive defeat of the military machine of the imperialist states which is assured by the economic, scientific-technical, and military might of the socialist countries plays the role of one of the primary factors determining the effectiveness of our policy of peace and the attainment of newer and newer positions in the struggle of international communism to prevent a world war.²⁸

General Bochkarev's main conclusions were repeated (without attribution, but in virtual paraphrase) in a subsequent important article by Major General V. I. Zemskov, the Chief Editor of *Military Thought*. Zemskov acknowledged:

Yes, a possible nuclear war would, undoubtedly, bring unprecedented disaster to all mankind. It would be distinguished from all past wars, and would cause enormous devastation and millions of victims. . . .

Recognizing the extreme danger inherent in nuclear war, Marxist-Leninists at the same time oppose a pessimistic view toward the future of mankind.

If international imperialism unleashes a war, the peoples of the socialist states and their Marxist-Leninist parties will not cringe in terror and will not lose heart, as the monopolists would like. The peoples of the world of socialism will engage the enemy decisively, filled with confidence in the triumph of their just cause. This would be a just and victorious struggle.²⁹

While some of the concerns expressed in *Military Thought* are to a lesser extent also indicated in open publications, such discussions have not laid out the

27. Ibid., p. 15.

28. Ibid., p. 16.

29. Maj. Gen. V. I. Zemskov, "Characteristic Features of Contemporary Wars and Possible Means of Conducting Them," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 7, July 1969, p. 23.

range of military concerns so clearly indicated by General Bochkarev, in particular those relating to "the tasks of military strategy."

Soviet military doctrine continues to be predicated on the assumption that if a general nuclear war occurs, all elements of the armed forces will contribute to waging a decisive struggle aimed at defeating world imperialism. The late Marshal Grechko presented the standard description of the role of the Soviet armed forces in these words:

Imperialism . . . is still in a position to throw the nations into the abyss of a new world war. One must be vigilant every day and every hour. That is why the Communist Party is constantly concerned with strengthening the State's defensive capability and with increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces. Their high state of combat readiness serves as an important guarantee of peace and security . . .³⁰

Soviet military power, and the constant enhancement of its capability and readiness, is thus justified primarily for deterrence, as well as to wage a war if one should come despite Soviet efforts to prevent it. This view is held by the military and political leaders. It is not accurate, as some Western commentators have done, to counterpose Soviet military interest in a "war-fighting" and "war-winning" capability to a "deterrent" capability; the Soviets see the former capabilities as providing the most credible deterrent, as well as serving as a contingent resort if war should nonetheless come.

The three editions of the basic Soviet work on military doctrine, *Military Strategy*, edited by a commission headed by Marshal Sokolovsky, show both Soviet military recognition of the emergence of mutual deterrence and an equivocal and changing view on its public embrace. In the first edition, which appeared in 1962, there is a passage which attributes the concept to Western strategists and leaders, but also endorses it:

Thus, under contemporary conditions, when there is a "balance" (approximate "parity") in strategic means of destruction and a superiority of the USSR in conventional armed forces, American strategists are compelled to reconsider their previous attitude toward general nuclear war.

They began to understand that where both sides have extremely large stocks of nuclear weapons and various means of delivery to targets, mainly strategic means, general nuclear war involves enormous danger of complete mutual anni-

30. Marshal A. A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennye sily Sovyetskogo gosudarstva* [The Armed Forces of the Soviet State], 2nd edition (Moscow, 1975), and in translation by the USAF in its series *Soviet Military Thought*, No. 12, p. 75.

hilation. Consequently, the greater the buildup of means of mass destruction, the greater the conviction in the impossibility of their use. Hence the growth of nuclear-missile power is inversely proportional to the possibilities for its use.

There was created, as they put it in the West, a "nuclear stalemate": on the one hand a full-scale increase in the quantity of nuclear-missile weapons, and on the other the inconceivable danger in their use. In this situation, according to the evaluation of political and military circles in the United States and NATO, both sides find themselves in a position of "mutual deterrence."³¹

In the second edition, appearing in 1963, the second paragraph above was deleted; there were no changes to the text of the other two paragraphs.³²

In the third (and latest) revised edition, issued in 1968 (shortly before Marshal Sokolovsky's death) there are three small changes to the first sentence. Instead of "contemporary conditions" the revised text refers to "conditions which have developed"; the statement that American strategists "are compelled" is changed to "have been compelled" (i.e., the situation is seen as now an accomplished fact); and the whole reference to a "balance" and "parity" is now modified by the phrase "according to Western evaluation." Otherwise there are no changes in the cited passages.³³

In discussion of "Contemporary Means of Armed Combat and Their Effect on the Nature of War," all three editions stress the colossal and unacceptable consequences of a world nuclear war. In addition to citing American and other sources on tens of millions of casualties, the second edition added a quotation from Khrushchev (made in the interval after publication of the first edition) stating that at the beginning of 1963 the United States had more than 40,000 nuclear weapons, and "the USSR also has more than enough of these means," so that "scientists have calculated that 700-800 million people would die as a result of the initial strikes alone, and all the large cities of many countries."³⁴ In the third edition this (as well as all other references to or statements by Khrushchev) was deleted. But a new passage was added which, while less graphic and precise, is even more clear on the *unacceptability* of a world nuclear war to the Soviet Union:

The losses in a world nuclear war would be suffered not only by the United States

31. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, ed., *Voyennaya strategiya* [Military Strategy] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), pp. 74-75. The second and third paragraphs appear in the original text as a single long paragraph.

32. *Ibid.*, 2nd edition, 1963, p. 80.

33. *Ibid.*, 3rd edition, 1968, p. 72.

34. *Ibid.*, 2nd edition, 1963, p. 244.

and its NATO Allies, but also by the socialist countries. The logic of a world nuclear war is such that in the sphere of its effect would fall an overwhelming majority of the world's states. As a result of the war many hundreds of millions of people would perish, and the majority of the survivors would in one or another degree be subject to radioactive contamination.

This is why we speak of the unacceptability of a world nuclear war, of the necessity for its prevention, of the achievement of general disarmament and the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The extreme catastrophic threat of a world nuclear-missile war is hovering like a spectre over mankind. It can break out suddenly as the result of some initially local military conflict. The alternative to a devastating world nuclear war is the peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders.³⁵

Thus, the most authoritative Soviet open military publication of the 1960s, with changing shadings, was quite forthright in recognizing the fact of mutual deterrence, despite some reticence to endorse the concept as formulated in the West.

Mutual deterrence in Soviet writings is usually expressed in terms of assured retaliatory capability which would devastate the aggressor, because this formulation (rather than "mutual assured destruction" capability) is more responsive to ideological sensitivity over the idea that the Soviet Union could be considered a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred—only adversaries (the United States, more broadly the imperialists, and also the Chinese Communists) are described as potential aggressors. In addition, this formulation avoids identification with the specific content of the American concept of "mutual assured destruction," often expressed in terms of a countervalue capability for destroying a specified percentage of the opponent's industry and population. This American interpretation is much more limited than the Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence resting on mutual capability for devastating retaliation unacceptable to a rational potential initiator of war, without calculations of arbitrary industrial and population losses which theoretically would be acceptable costs.

It is of interest that the political leaders in their programmatic statements endorse the idea that *deterrence* requires strong and ready combat capability, but do not go on to discuss meeting requirements for waging and winning a war. Brezhnev, for example, states: "Any potential aggressor is well aware that any attempt to launch a nuclear missile attack on our country would be met by devastating retaliation."³⁶

35. Ibid., 3rd edition, 1968, p. 239.

36. L. I. Brezhnev in *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS* [Materials of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), p. 81, and see A. N. Kosygin, *ibid.*, p. 186.

It is also of interest that the action deterred is limited to any nuclear missile attack (or sometimes, any attack) on the Soviet Union itself (sometimes broadened to include the socialist states, meaning the countries of the Warsaw Pact, but not such countries as Vietnam or Cuba).

Mutual Deterrence and the Soviet SALT Decision

There is reason to believe that the American proposals in 1967 and 1968 to hold bilateral strategic arms limitations talks (SALT), and in particular the emphasis on avoiding an arms race in ABM systems, coincided with internal Soviet consideration of the implications for their own security, and for their future military programs, of the emerging attainment of mutual deterrence. While the transition to *mutual* deterrence had been long anticipated in the United States, it nevertheless meant a shift from prior American superiority and an unmatched American assured retaliatory capability. For the Soviets, however, it meant the achievement for the first time of a real second-strike capability, and in their view greatly enhanced security not only against a possible American first strike but also against diplomatic-military pressures supported by the superior American "position of strength" based on its monopoly of a secure second-strike capacity.

This Soviet perspective has recently been stated with unusual clarity by one of the leading Soviet commentators on the Soviet-American strategic relationship, Dr. Genrikh Trofimenko, in the following passage:

In his time, when McNamara advanced his theory of "deterrence" or "mutual deterrence" by means of a second strike dealing "unacceptable losses," he conceptually postulated parity in the capabilities of the two sides for "mutual assured destruction." The Pentagon leaders, however, calculated privately that the U.S. had greater capabilities in the sense that only the U.S. had a "full-valued capability" for a second strike, while the USSR disposed of such a capability only conditionally, "in embryo," and that this imbalance in fact and in real capabilities (with their parity theoretical) gave the U.S. an opportunity to translate it into "tangible political advantages," continuing a policy of pressure "from positions of strength" against the USSR. But no matter what illusions American strategists built on this calculation in the 1960s, and no matter what political capital they attempted to draw from it, the 1970s completely scattered such hopes: in the U.S. now no one doubts that the USSR can deal "unacceptable losses" in a second strike even under circumstances of a massive American nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.³⁷

37. G. A. Trofimenko, *SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya*, pp. 318–319.

In the exchanges in 1967–1969 leading up to the SALT talks and in their critical opening phase, the Soviet leadership showed an increasingly clear acceptance of and commitment to mutual deterrence, and awareness of the role strategic arms limitations could play in reinforcing mutual deterrence and dampening the arms race.

In the earliest Soviet responses to the American SALT proposal, the discourse was primarily in traditional disarmament terms. By the time the Soviets were prepared to meet, in 1968, both sides had expressed interest in a wider dialogue on the strategic relationship and in confidential exchanges had agreed that a main objective of the strategic arms talks would be to achieve and maintain stable strategic deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union through agreed limitations on the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive arms, balanced so that neither side could obtain any military advantage and so that equal security should be assured for both sides.³⁸

In the very first business meeting of the two SALT Delegations in Helsinki (on November 18, 1969), both sides—and not by prearrangement—stated that mutual deterrence was the underpinning of strategic arms limitation. The Soviet Delegation, in a prepared statement cleared by the highest political and military leaders in Moscow, expressed the Soviet view that:

Even in the event that one of the sides were the first to be subjected to attack, it would undoubtedly retain the ability to inflict a retaliatory strike of crushing power. Thus, evidently, we all agree that war between our two countries would be disastrous for both sides. And it would be tantamount to suicide for the ones who decided to start such a war.³⁹

The Soviets prior to SALT had often described their own posture as one of deterrence, and had in their open military publications described deterrence, avoidance of war, and readiness to rebuff any aggressor as the main objectives of their defense policy and posture.⁴⁰ But the above-cited explicit formulation of mutual deterrence had never before been so clearly expressed by authoritative

38. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT I: An Evaluation," *World Politics*, October 1978.

39. See Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, *SALT: The First Strategic Arms Negotiation* (New York: Doubleday, forthcoming) for his report on the initial Soviet presentation at SALT. By happenstance, the initial Soviet statement—though not made public—can be cited, as it was the only one not stamped "SEKRETNO"; from that time on, copies of formal statements exchanged between the delegations were marked SECRET (SEKRETNO).

40. For an example that coincided closely with the first Soviet response to the American proposal for SALT, see "Theory, Politics, and Ideology: On the Essence of War," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 24 January 1967.

Soviet spokesmen. The public military press, in particular, has avoided positive references to *mutual* deterrence and *mutual* assured destruction, for reasons discussed earlier.

It is, therefore, of considerable interest and significance that during the key formative period of Soviet policy toward negotiated strategic arms limitation there were a number of very clear and explicit endorsements in *Military Thought* by influential Soviet *military* leaders of the concepts of mutual assured retaliation and mutual deterrence.

At the very time the decision on whether to enter SALT talks was still being debated and decided in Moscow, although without reference to that fact, Marshal Nikolai I. Krylov, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, wrote in November 1967:

Under contemporary circumstances, with the existence of a system for detecting missile launches, an attempt by an aggressor to inflict a surprise preemptive strike cannot give him a decisive advantage for the achievement of victory in war, and moreover will not save him from great destruction and human losses.⁴¹

Later, in mid-1968, another article stated:

Everyone knows that in contemporary conditions in an armed conflict of adversaries comparatively equal in power (in number and especially in quality of weapons) an immediate retaliatory strike of enormous destructive power is inevitable.⁴²

These professional discussions, soberly stated in terms clearly applying to *both* sides, are quite different from the tone of articles in the public military press with their political purposes and stress on deterring the *other* side. Similarly, in May 1969, General of the Army Semyon P. Ivanov, Commandant of the prestigious Military Academy of the General Staff, and previously Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of its Operations Division, wrote:

With the existing level of development of nuclear missile weapons and their reliable cover below ground and under water it is impossible in practice to destroy them completely, and consequently it is also impossible to prevent an annihilating retaliatory strike.⁴³

41. Marshal N. I. Krylov, "The Nuclear Missile Shield of the Soviet State," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 11, November 1967, p. 20.

42. Maj. Gen. N. Vasendin and Col. N. Kuznetsov, "Contemporary War and Surprise," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 6, June 1968, p. 42.

43. General of the Army S. P. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 5, May 1969, p. 47.

In the same May 1969 issue of *Military Thought*, its Chief Editor, Major General (now Lt. General) V. I. Zemskov, after citing American sources (including Secretary McNamara) that "the Soviet Union would be in a position to destroy all America after having withstood the first powerful strike on the part of the United States," went on to cite the buildup of American strategic forces from 1963 to 1968. He then declared:

This growth in nuclear potential, in the estimate of foreign specialists, led to the situation whereby a kind of "nuclear balance" was created between the major nuclear powers. In military-political circles of the United States, there has long been a lack of confidence in the supremacy of their nuclear-missile capabilities. Precisely for this reason they talk about a nuclear balance, the essence of which consists in the following: The capabilities for mutual destruction in a limited time by nuclear strikes on the main vitally important regions of the countries and the main groupings of armed forces are relatively equal. The presence of stock-piles of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery are such that their complete use theoretically makes it possible to destroy every living thing on our planet.

A nuclear war, states the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communists and Workers Parties of 1960, "can inflict unprecedented destruction on entire countries and turn the largest centers of world production and world culture into ruins. Such a war would result in the death and suffering of hundreds of millions of people, including those in countries not participating in the war." A nuclear war, as in general any war, cannot and must not serve as a method of resolving international disputes.

Realistically considering this, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are pursuing a consistent line toward preventing a world war, including a nuclear war, and toward excluding it from the life of society.⁴⁴

The passage cited makes an interesting transition from attribution of concepts of a "nuclear balance," parity and mutual deterrence to Western sources, to the Soviet and other Communist Parties' Declaration of the devastation that would be caused by a world nuclear war, and from that to the Soviet policy aim of prevention of a world nuclear war. Later in the article, in discussing Soviet military policy, he states:

The degree of probability of a particular type of war does not, of course, remain the same for each historical period, and changes under the influence of a number of political and military-technical factors. Of special importance in this connection can be the disruption of the "nuclear balance." It is possible, for example, in case of further sharp increase of nuclear potential or the creation by one of the

44. Maj. Gen. V. I. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 5, May 1969, p. 57.

*sides of highly effective means of anti-ballistic missile defense while the other side lags considerably in solution of these tasks. A change of the "nuclear balance" in favor of the countries of imperialism would increase manifold the danger of a nuclear war.*⁴⁵

It is clear from these passages that General Zemskov believed in 1969 that there was a "nuclear balance" providing mutual potential destruction and therefore mutual deterrence, but that it was at least at that time a somewhat precarious balance from the Soviet standpoint, and particularly if the United States, which was well ahead of the Soviet Union in developing anti-ballistic missile technology, should deploy an effective ABM defense. There is a clear relationship between this discussion and the Soviet decision, taken by that time and soon to become evident in SALT, that ballistic missile defenses of the two sides should if possible be sharply limited through a strategic arms limitation agreement so as not to risk restoring the United States to a position of superiority that could imperil the still unstable state of mutual assured destruction and mutual deterrence.

A related point of considerable interest was made explicit in these same confidential General Staff discussions. The reader may have noted the reference by Marshal Krylov to "the existence of a system for detecting missile launches" as one element in his conclusion on mutual deterrence. In his discussion, he explains further that he has in mind, and the Soviet Union had under at least some unspecified contingency guidance, a policy of "launch on warning" (though he does not use that Western expression), as well as some "fallback" reliance on hardening of missile launchers.

It must be stressed that under present conditions, when the Soviet Armed Forces are in constant combat readiness, any aggressor who begins a nuclear war will not remain unpunished, a severe and inevitable retribution awaits him. With the presence in the armament of troops of launchers and missiles which are completely ready for operation, as well as systems for detecting enemy missile launches and other types of reconnaissance, *an aggressor is no longer able suddenly to destroy the missiles before their launch on the territory of the country against which the aggression is committed. They will have time during the flight of the missiles of the aggressor to leave their launchers and inflict a retaliatory strike against the enemy. Even in the most unfavorable circumstance, if a portion of missiles is unable to be launched before the strike of missiles of the aggressor, as a result of the high degree of protection of the launchers from nuclear explosions,*

45. Ibid., p. 59; emphasis added.

*these missiles will be preserved and will carry out the combat missions assigned to them.*⁴⁶

Again, the previously cited 1968 article by General Vasendin and Colonel Kuznetsov also is explicit on the importance (and existence) of contemporary means of reconnaissance, detection, warning, and control of one's own forces in assuring retaliation (in a passage immediately preceding the one earlier quoted):

With contemporary means of reconnaissance, early detection, warning, and control should an aggressor succeed in placing into action the chief means of destruction (mass missile launches, takeoffs of aircraft, launch of space vehicles, etc.), this does not mean that he will not receive deserved retribution.⁴⁷

General of the Army Ivanov also states:

Contemporary means of *early detection*, moreover, make it possible to discover the *initiation* of an enemy nuclear attack and to take necessary retaliatory measures in a timely manner.⁴⁸

Although a little less precise, the "launch on warning" concept is unmistakable in these passages as well.

The Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, may have referred more obliquely to this same launch on warning concept in an openly published article in January 1967, when he wrote of "practical elaboration of methods of conducting armed conflict under conditions of contemporary warfare" in a "nuclear missile war," stating that "Soviet military thought in devoting special attention to the study of methods for increasing combat readiness of the forces in every way possible . . . for frustrating the enemy's aggressive intentions."⁴⁹

During the SALT I negotiations, in 1970, the Soviet Delegation referred to the existence and continuous improvement of early-warning systems, owing to which ICBM silos might be empty by the time they were hit by an attacker's strike, the ICBMs having been launched by that time. The American Delegation commented later on this statement and expressed the hope that no government would launch its ICBM force solely on the possibly fallible reading of signals from its early-warning systems. It expressed the view that such a strategic doctrine seemed inconsistent with a proper concern for the problems of acciden-

46. Krylov, "The Nuclear Missile Shield," p. 20; emphasis added.

47. Vasendin and Kuznetsov, "Contemporary War," p. 42.

48. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 47; emphasis added.

49. Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, "October and the Building of the Armed Forces," *Kommunist*, no. 1, January 1967, p. 35.

tal or unauthorized launches or provocative third-party attack. The Soviet Delegation clearly was not authorized to enter a discussion of this subject, and had not intended its initial statement to do so. Accordingly, it replied with an attempt to disassociate the question from accidental, unauthorized or provocative attacks, and to refer to *American* statements (not made in SALT) about possible launch on warning. The U.S. Delegation then provided an official American disavowal of the concept by the Secretary of Defense, with further criticism of the idea as potentially dangerous for automatic escalation or even for starting a war by accident.⁵⁰ But efforts to elicit a statement on Soviet policy with respect to the concept met with silence, and an unofficial comment by a senior military representative that such matters went beyond the proper purview of SALT, and should not be discussed with civilians.

These indications in *Military Thought* and in the exchanges in SALT that the Soviet authorities, at least in 1967–70, were prepared to consider seriously a launch on warning concept helps to explain their relatively less excited concern over ICBM silo vulnerability. It raises the further question whether a concept which may have arisen at a time of relative Soviet inferiority may have continued since as a justification for keeping such a large ensiloed ICBM force (still today constituting 75 percent of Soviet strategic force capability) even after the United States has considerable counterforce capacity, and its further developing and planning to deploy highly effective counterforce capabilities which could threaten the entire Soviet ICBM force—if it remained in its silos and tried to “ride out” an American attack. U.S. pursuit of such a capability with the MK 12A warhead for Minuteman III, the MX missile, and Trident II may serve only to increase Soviet reliance on a launch on warning concept.

It should be noted that in the mid-1950s the Soviet military (initially through discussions in the same General Staff organ) developed a concept of preemptive Soviet action in response to a Western imminent intention to attack.⁵¹ This concept, developed in the pre-missile age, was evidently modified, if not super-

50. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in 1977 and 1978, was much more ambiguous in Congressional testimony as to conditions under which the United States might or might not launch its ICBMs before Soviet missiles struck the United States. See George C. Wilson, “Brown Cautious on Response to Attack,” *Washington Post*, 24 October 1977, and Brown’s speech of June 23, 1978, stating: “The Soviets would have to consider the possibility that our minuteman missiles would no longer be in their silos when their ICBMs arrived. We have not adopted a doctrine of launch under attack but they surely would have to take such a possibility into consideration.”

51. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 84–87.

seded, in the 1960s by the launch on warning concept (although there are hints of the possibility under some circumstances of preemption, as in the second passage from the 1968 article cited earlier). From this standpoint, launch on warning is a step forward toward stability from preemption, but it remains a potentially destabilizing and dangerous possibility and the United States should seek ways to discourage the Soviets from any degree of reliance on it—as well as not succumbing to its temptations as a “shortcut” way to maintain a deterrent. Inherently, the *possibility* of launch on warning (or launch on first impact, or on multiple impacts, etc.) *does* contribute to the uncertainties any potential attacker must consider and that is good, but it is dangerous if in fact resorted to in defense against anything except a massive assault.

In April 1969, an article by Anatoly A. Gromyko (son of the Foreign Minister and a distinguished “American expert” in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then at the Academy of Sciences Institute of USA Studies) appeared in *Military Thought*. Articles in this journal by non-military contributors are rare; clearly the purpose of Gromyko’s contribution was to present a rationale for SALT in terms appealing to its select military readership. The thrust of his argument was that American reaction to the buildup in Soviet strategic power (ICBMs were specifically noted) had led not only to the need for the United States to shift from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” concepts and to accepting “mutual assured destruction,” but also had compelled the United States to seek strategic arms limitations and to curb the strategic arms race. (Incidentally, he suggested that Secretary McNamara had been forced out of his position as Secretary of Defense because of hard-line opposition by “the military-industrial complex” and others to his “realism” in recognizing the emergence of mutual deterrence.) More broadly, he argued in terms of differentiation among various elements of the American policymaking and policy-influencing elite which—by implication—should be recognized by the military readers, rather than assuming all are single-mindedly hostile to any improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.⁵²

Soviet military theorists and leaders, including those we have cited above, continue to discuss ways and means of waging and seeking to win a general nuclear war should one come. For reasons discussed earlier, they see no inconsistency in recognizing that such war would be an unprecedented disaster endangering all mankind, and therefore in supporting mutual deterrence based on

52. Anatoly A. Gromyko, “American Theoreticians Between ‘Total War’ and Peace,” *Voen-naya mys’*, no. 4, April 1969, pp. 86–92.

mutual retaliatory destructive capability, while also preparing to attempt to cope with the eventuality of such event if it should come and to seek to emerge from it victorious, that is, less totally destroyed than "capitalism."

Accordingly, too, the Soviet military have had an active interest and role in SALT.⁵³ The strong endorsement of mutual deterrence made by the Soviet side from the very outset of the SALT talks, including by senior Soviet military representatives at SALT, was noted earlier. This was backed up by further concrete signals, including above all the Soviet indications (also from the very outset of SALT in late 1969) that they were opposed to a nation-wide ABM deployment which not only could fuel the competition in strategic offensive arms, but also could upset mutual assured destruction. The explicit prohibition on such nation-wide ABM deployments contained in Article I of the ABM Treaty was, in fact, included on Soviet initiative.⁵⁴

In sum, we see that far from having to *infer* from such things as the Soviet acceptance of the ABM Treaty that there is a Soviet interest in mutual deterrence based on assured mutual retaliatory capability, there is a clear case for it in previously unavailable confidential Soviet General Staff discussions preceding the opening of SALT, and from the SALT negotiating history as well.

Maintaining Mutual Deterrence

The Soviet leadership, as the American, continues to look in the first instance and in the final account, to its own unilateral military strength as the guarantor of deterrence of the other side and of mutual deterrence. In both cases, the professional military leadership in particular remains somewhat skeptical of the role that arms control—especially bilateral (or multilateral) negotiated commitments to strategic arms limitations—can play in securing such deterrence. At the same time, there is good evidence that national leaderships, including at least some professional military men, have increasingly come to accept negotiated strategic arms limitations as a contributing element in providing more stable and less costly deterrent military forces. As one of the few established Soviet civilian commentators on strategic matters put it (in 1976): "Under contemporary circumstances a real possibility to find a common interest with a poten-

53. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1975, pp. 21-37.

54. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," *International Security*, 1, no. 4, (Spring 1977): 17.

tial adversary is to be found in the area of . . . the stabilization of the military balance by means of limiting the arms race."⁵⁵

In the Soviet view—shared by military and civilian leaders—just as in the mainstream of American thinking in the 1970s, overall “parity” has existed for about a decade. There are those—again in Moscow and in Washington—who are apprehensive as to whether this parity will be upset by some successful effort of the other side. But successive U.S. Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed, even when sometimes sounding such an alarm for the future (fortunately, one that seems each few years to recede to a few years hence), that “at present” there is an overall strategic parity—that while each side has certain areas of superiority they balance out to yield an overall parity.

Parity was of course for the Soviet side an improvement over the previous American unilateral superiority. Soviet political leaders had from the ebullient Khrushchev of the late 1950s on been claiming superiorities, and overall parity. But only in the early to mid-1970s did the Soviet military leaders admit that an assured retaliatory capability for the Soviet Union had come about only in the 1960s—actually, the late 1960s. And the Soviet military have acknowledged throughout the 1970s, as have the American, that while each side has certain areas of superiority, these balance out to yield an overall parity. Nevertheless, there remain uncertainties as to the future.

The Soviet military leaders, and other Soviet leaders and commentators, with varying degrees of alarm continue to display considerable suspicion of American intentions and concern over growing American capabilities *and* as to why this continued increase in capabilities is sought. To be sure, some of these expressions of concern serve other purposes, such as argument to support requested Soviet military programs. But many have the ring of sincerity about them and many cite incontrovertible evidence to support their arguments on capabilities, as well as “evidence” which to a Soviet reader (and writer) may seem convincing in allegations of nefarious American objectives and intentions.

Much of this may sound familiar to an American reader as a description of the obverse *American* suspicions of Soviet military buildup and hostile designs. A description of an adversary in terms of a “mirror image” of oneself (either as equally benign or belligerent) based on unverified assumptions, often unconscious ones, must be eschewed; when, however, there is a parallel perception of the other side it is important to recognize that fact.

55. Trofimenko, *SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya*, p. 324.

In the Soviet perception, the United States has continued, notwithstanding SALT and detente, to seek military superiority. Although some highly placed American leaders and others have or are considered to have "soberly" evaluated the strategic situation and given up pursuit of supremacy, powerful forces are believed to continue to seek advantage and superiority in order to compel Soviet acquiescence in American policy preferences. Moreover, actual American military policy and programs are seen as seeking to upset or to circumvent the nuclear mutual deterrent balance.

A series of developments since the SALT I agreements were signed in 1972 are seen in this light, above all the open pursuit of counterforce capabilities through increasingly accurate and numerous MIRV systems. The existing 1046 Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles with their 6000-7000 independently targettable warheads (to say nothing of having in addition the vastly superior American strategic bomber force, the other 664 ICBMs and SLBMs, and American theater nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet Union) *do* currently provide a superior counterforce capability against the Soviet ICBM force (and, for that matter, against the Soviet bomber and submarine missile forces, since these are not kept on the same degree of airfield alert or deployment at sea as are their American counterparts). This superiority is evident in two senses: first, greater than present Soviet capability (although the Soviets are, not surprisingly, moving to upgrade their capacity); and second, more ominous for the Soviet side because far more Soviet than American strategic eggs are in the fixed land-based ICBM force basket. Also, as noted above, other Soviet intercontinental forces are less numerous, less capable, and more vulnerable. Given the concerns in the United States over the growing—but still future—Soviet threat to American ICBMs, is it any wonder that conservative Soviet military planners and responsive political leaders would be concerned over the growing *existing* American capabilities? And the full currently planned and announced American programs for the Mark 12A warhead for Minuteman III, the MX ICBM, and the Trident I and II submarine and missile systems—to say nothing of strategic cruise missiles—would result in a still *greater* American overall (and counterforce) advantage ten years from now than we have today, *even* with all Soviet programs estimated to be deployed within that period!

It is not the purpose of the present discussion to argue for or against particular American military programs. Moreover, the Carter Administration has declared its readiness to foreclose at least some future programs in balanced strategic arms limitations in SALT II or III. But from the vantage-point of Moscow, while a general nuclear balance had come into being by the late 1960s, and parity was

recognized and supported in the SALT I accords, continued major Soviet military efforts are needed to keep up the balance.

Soviet generals often cite a statement made by General Secretary Brezhnev in 1970:

We have created strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of deterring any aggressor. We shall respond to any and all attempts from any quarter to obtain military superiority over the USSR with a suitable increase in military strength to guarantee our defense. We cannot do otherwise.⁵⁶

This of course remains a postulate of Soviet policy (as, indeed, of parallel American policy).

What effect has SALT had on the applicability of this postulate, and what is the potential role for SALT in the future?

Let us recall the important discussion by General Zemskov in the General Staff journal in 1969. He spoke of a "nuclear balance" and of the particular importance of the possible "disruption" of that balance in case of "the creation by one of the sides of highly effective means of anti-ballistic missile defense while the other side lags considerably in solution of these tasks" and that it would "increase many times the danger of a nuclear war" if the West achieved such an advantage.⁵⁷ It is clear that this reflected a view held at the highest political and military levels, and the congruence of Soviet and American views and objectives led to the ABM Treaty in SALT signed in May 1972.

Many Soviet writers have noted in general terms the effect of SALT in reflecting and supporting parity and even the nuclear balance. Trofimenko expressed with particular precision the effect of the ABM Treaty on mutual deterrence, as seen by the Soviets. He described "a situation of equality of strategic capabilities of the USSR and the U.S. stemming from the essential equality in the balance of strategic arms (in particular, since each of the sides under any circumstances retains the capability for a retaliatory strike on the vital centers of the other)." While this situation had developed by the late 1960s, and was only implicitly codified in the SALT I agreements in 1972, Trofimenko does speak of "the equalizing of the capabilities of the USSR and the U.S. for a retaliatory strike (in particular as a result of the prohibition on the creation of nation-wide ABM systems through the 1972 Treaty) . . ."⁵⁸ and most specifically, he writes:

56. L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* [The Leninist Course] vol. 3 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), p. 541.

57. Zemskov, *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 5, May 1969, p. 59.

58. Trofimenko, *SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya*, pp. 318 and 317.

The conclusion of the ABM Treaty and its subsequent Protocol [reducing the number of permitted ABM defense areas from two to one for each side] for all practical purposes cast off the key link of 'offense-defense' in the field of strategic systems. By relinquishing deployment of nation-wide ABM systems, the two sides eliminated one of the main motivating stimuli to the further buildup of efforts in the field of offensive systems.⁵⁹

This recognition of the key significance of the ABM Treaty in "preventing the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive arms" was specifically cited by Marshal Grechko, then Minister of Defense, and General of the Army (now Marshal) Kulikov, then Chief of the General Staff, in endorsing the Treaty when it was formally considered by the Supreme Soviet in the ratification process.⁶⁰

In viewing broadly the overall current situation, Trofimenko (and others, including Brezhnev) continue today to refer to "contemporary conditions, when Soviet-American strategic parity exists."⁶¹

But there was another element in General Zemskov's analysis in 1969. In addition to noting the possibility of the disruption of the nuclear balance if "one side" (the United States) obtained an effective ABM capability and the other did not, he also noted such a danger "in case of a further sharp increase of nuclear [strike] potential" by one side.⁶² And this is the risk some Soviet military planners have seen in the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the United States in MIRVed systems throughout the 1970s. If Soviet discussions in *Military Thought* in the mid and late 1970s were available there is no doubt this would appear as an explicit concern, notwithstanding recognition of the contribution of the SALT ABM Treaty to strategic stability.

There are many indications of this concern in Soviet discussions. Albeit without specific reference to MIRV, one worth citing is the statement by the now retired former General Staff Colonel Vasily M. Kulish, writing soon after the SALT I agreements had been reached:

The appearance of new types of weapons could seriously affect the relation of military forces between the two world systems. . . . Far-reaching international consequences could arise in the event that one side possessed qualitatively new

59. Ibid., pp. 324-325.

60. The quotation is from General of the Army Viktor G. Kulikov, cited in *Izvestiya*, 24 August 1972; a similar statement by Marshal Andrei A. Grechko appears in *Pravda*, 30 September 1972.

61. Trofimenko, *SShA: Politika, voyna, ideologiya*, p. 323.

62. Zemskov, *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 5, May 1969, p. 59.

strategic weapons which could serve to neutralize the ability of the opposing side to carry out effective retaliatory operations . . . even a relatively small and brief superiority by the United States over the Soviet Union in the development of certain "old" or "new" types and systems of weapons that significantly increase the strategic effectiveness of American military power could exert a destabilizing influence on the international political situation throughout the entire world and present extremely unfavorable consequences for the cause of peace and socialism.⁶³

The main concern of the Soviet leadership is American political-military strategic intentions. They are concerned over growing American counterforce capabilities and parallel American advocacy of counterforce concepts both because of their impact threatening destabilization of the existing balance and because of what they suspect as to the underlying American intentions. Dr. Trofimenko, for example, concludes that the "genuine parity" reflected and bolstered by the SALT ABM Treaty "does not suit American military theoreticians." He argues that "the true nature of American strategic missile targeting is a most important state secret, and the American command can target its missiles in any way it wishes without speaking out publicly about it. Hence the public campaign of the Pentagon connected with the advertised 'retargetting' [of the Schlesinger Doctrine] is . . . a conscious effort to put psychological pressure on the other side . . ."⁶⁴

The reversal of American stated policy on the destabilizing nature of counterforce capabilities, and the open pursuit of such capabilities since 1974 has considerably raised Soviet suspicions, especially as it accompanied the failure to reach a SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.

At the outset in SALT II in late 1972, the Soviet side did probe for reciprocal restraints on MIRV (and MARV) as well as more generally on new strategic programs of both sides. These efforts were swamped by the tough overall Soviet position in SALT II, the lack of synchronization of MIRV technology (with the United States unwilling to restrain its advantages for early deployment, particularly since the Soviets could then catch up and gain from the greater MIRV potential of their larger throw-weight missiles), and the U.S. priority on efforts in SALT to move toward equalization of missile throw-weight.

In short, despite some efforts on both sides, SALT II has not yet succeeded (as of this writing) in reinforcing and moving beyond the modest restraints estab-

63. V. M. Kulish, in *Voyennaya sila i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [Military Force and International Relations] (Moscow: IMO, 1972), p. 226.

64. Trofimenko, *SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya*, p. 319.

lished in the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972 on strategic offensive weapons. Accordingly, while both sides continue to seek SALT limitations on strategic offensive arms, success in this effort—in contrast to the success of the ABM Treaty—has eluded them. And accordingly, both sides continue to place reliance on their respective unilateral programs to ensure not falling behind in the strategic balance. Differences in these programs, in turn, make increasingly difficult any agreement on meaningful limitations.

Recent years have, however, seen hopeful developments in Soviet acceptance of the implications of mutual deterrence for strategic and political objectives. This may in time facilitate strategic arms limitation, or at least mute and stabilize the competition.

Soviet military and political leaders have ceased to call for strategic superiority as an objective since the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, which also marked a turning point in SALT. Instead, mutual deterrence, a balance, parity, and equal security are advocated. To be sure, this is often expressed in terms implying that it is only the West which had aggressive aims which are restrained by mutual deterrence. But it is nonetheless an important advance. Brezhnev stated the general Soviet political view in 1975 in these words:

International detente has become possible because a new relation of forces has been established in the world arena. Now the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer entertain serious intentions of resolving the historic dispute between capitalism and socialism by force of arms. The senselessness and extreme danger of further tension are becoming increasingly obvious under conditions where both sides possess weapons of colossal destructive power.⁶⁵

Notwithstanding the fact that each side sees only a need to deter the other, both recognize the fact of mutual strategic "sufficiency" and assured retaliatory capability and the resulting mutual deterrence.

On the eve of the Carter Administration, in a major policy address at Tula, Brezhnev authoritatively disavowed the aim of military superiority aimed at a first strike, reaffirming security as an aim, deterrence and the goal of disarmament:

Of course, comrades, we are improving our defenses. It cannot be otherwise. We have never neglected and will never neglect the security of our country and the security of our allies.

But the allegations that the Soviet Union is going beyond what is sufficient

65. L. I. Brezhnev, "In the Name of Peace and Happiness for Soviet People," *Pravda*, 14 June 1975.

for defense, that it is striving for superiority in arms, with the aim of delivering a "first strike," are absurd and utterly unfounded . . .

Our efforts are aimed at preventing both first and second strikes and at preventing nuclear war altogether . . . The Soviet Union's defense potential must be sufficient to deter anyone from disturbing our peaceful life. Not a course aimed at superiority in arms but a course aimed at their reduction, at lessening military confrontation—that is our policy.⁶⁶

The Soviet position was spelled out more fully in *Pravda* shortly after the Tula speech by the American affairs expert, Academician Arbatov. He vigorously refuted arguments that the Soviet Union was seeking superiority, and accurately described in some detail areas of the strategic balance in which the Soviet Union leads (the overall number of ICBM and SLBM missile launchers; strategic missile "throw-weight") and in which the United States leads (numbers of strategic bombers and bomber "throw-weight"; numbers of missile warheads; forward submarine bases; "and much else"). Thus, he notes, "while enjoying an approximate equality (parity) in general, the two countries have within this parity considerable differences (asymmetries) in various components of their armed forces, connected with differences in geographic situations, the nature of possible threats to their security, technical characteristics of individual weapons systems, and even in traditions of military organization." The main thing, though, is "the existence of an approximate balance, that is, a parity in the relation of forces about which the USSR and the United States came to agreement with the signing of the principle of equal rights to security."⁶⁷

Public acceptance of parity began to be stressed in early 1977, even prior to Brezhnev's speech. For example, TASS political correspondent Kornilov noted that "there exists parity, equality of military might. It is precisely this principle, the principle of parity and the principle of equal security stemming from it which is steadily and persistently upheld by the Soviet Union . . ."⁶⁸ Viktor Berezin, another commentator, also noted:

. . . there can only be approximation and never absolute balance in military potentials of the two great powers. . . . if we look at the general relation of forces between East and West, we will not see any basic advantages [to either side] . . .

66. L. I. Brezhnev, "Outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula," *Radio Moscow*, 18 January, and *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 19 January, 1977.

67. G. A. Arbatov, "The Great Lie of the Opponents of Detente," *Pravda*, 5 February 1977. Arbatov repeated this point in a broadcast interview on *Radio Moscow* on February 12, 1977.

68. Yury Kornilov, TASS Commentary, *Radio Moscow*, 12 January 1977.

with powerful strategic arms being possessed by both sides, any small advantage by either is seen as illusory.⁶⁹

Again late in 1977, on the occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Brezhnev returned to this theme, stating:

The Soviet Union is effectively looking after its own defense, but it does not and will not seek military superiority over the other side. We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength existing at present . . . between the USSR and the United States. But in return we insist that no one else should seek to upset it in his favor.⁷⁰

This is a more far-reaching statement than the earlier one denying an aim of superiority "with the aim of a first strike"; it denies superiority as a current or future aim for *any* purpose.

A major Soviet statement on the SALT negotiations, which appeared as an unsigned editorial in *Pravda* on February 11, 1978, noted approvingly "the objectively existing equilibrium of strategic forces between the USSR and the U.S."⁷¹ Similarly, Marshal Kulikov wrote:

The Soviet state, effectively looking after its defense, is not seeking to achieve military superiority over the other side, but at the same time it cannot permit the approximate balance which has taken shape . . . between the USSR and the U.S. to be upset, to the disadvantage of our security.⁷²

Many other authoritative commentators have echoed these themes of parity, equal security, and the non-pursuit of superiority.

Especially interesting have been a number of commentaries and discussions in the open military press. Before Brezhnev's Tula speech, in early 1977, *Red Star* carried two commentaries asserting that "parity" was a reality and had been the basis for U.S.-Soviet relations "in recent years," and that the military power of the United States and the Soviet Union was said to be regarded by "unbiased experts" as "about equal."⁷³

69. Viktor Berezin, *Radio Moscow*, 31 January 1977.

70. L. I. Brezhnev, "The Great October Revolution and the Progress of Mankind," *Radio Moscow*, (live) 2 November 1977; also in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 3 November 1977.

71. Editorial, "The Task of Limiting Strategic Arms: Prospects and Problems," *Pravda*, 11 February 1978.

72. Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, "Sixty Years on Guard over the Achievements of the October Revolution," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 1, January 1978.

73. TASS unsigned, "Who Sets the Tone?" *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 January 1977, and Yuri Kornilov, "Myths and Facts," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 14 January 1977.

Appearing about the same time as Brezhnev's Tula speech, although signed to press a month earlier (December 17, 1976) was an interesting article in the *Military-Historical Journal* by Colonel Ye. Rybkin, long regarded in the West as a "Red Hawk." Colonel Rybkin, a professor on the Lenin Military-Political Academy staff, citing Lenin that "war is a continuation of politics," but in almost direct refutation of Rybkin's earlier expressed views, cited the essential need for the possibility of peaceful coexistence and the prevention of war.⁷⁴ The point of particular interest to the present discussion is not only Rybkin's conclusion that "Rejection of a nuclear war . . . is dictated by the new realities of the era," but that "a so-called 'nuclear parity' has been established between the USSR and the United States, that is, a certain balance of power, which was officially recognized at the Soviet-American talks in 1972-74, with a mutual agreement not to disrupt the balance."⁷⁵ Moreover, in arguing that there is "an objective need to end the arms race," Rybkin cites the argument that "the quantity of nuclear weapons has reached such a level that a further increase would in practice make no change," and he cites Brezhnev's statement of July 1974 that "a sufficient quantity of arms has been amassed to destroy everything alive on earth several times over."⁷⁶ (Brezhnev, incidentally, had echoed his own 1974 remarks a few weeks earlier in a speech in Bucharest.⁷⁷)

Another prominent Soviet military writer, Major General Rair Simonyan, a professor at the Frunze Academy, has argued:

Given the priority of strategic forces, when both sides possess weapons capable of destroying many times over all life on earth, neither the addition of new armaments nor an increase in their destructive power can bring any substantial military—and still less political—advantage.⁷⁸

He also cites and explicitly agrees with an American statement that: "In the contemporary world it is impossible to insure security by means of an arms build-up."⁷⁹

An editorial in *Red Star* in mid-1977, in arguing the need not to be complacent

74. Col. Ye. Rybkin, "The 25th Congress of the CPSU and the Problem of Peaceful Coexistence Between Socialism and Capitalism," *Voyenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal* [The Military-Historical Journal], no. 1, January 1977, pp. 5 ff.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 8. (The original Brezhnev statement is in *Pravda*, 22 July 1974.)

77. L. I. Brezhnev, *Radio Moscow*, TASS, 24 November 1976.

78. Maj. Gen. R. Simonyan, "Disarmament—Demand of the Times: Concerning the Risk of Confrontation," *Pravda*, 14 June 1977.

79. *Ibid.*

in the quest for peace, commented: "After all, it is a case of the fate of world civilization and the future of all mankind."⁸⁰

We thus see a new readiness even by military commentators to accept strategic parity, mutual deterrence, and the inadmissibility of nuclear war publicly.

It is of some interest and significance that there is now also a campaign to go *beyond* codification of a nuclear balance on the basis of parity at the very high levels currently existing. This criticism from "the left" so to speak is more noticeable with the quieting of reservations from the "right" so sharply dramatized by Colonel Rybkin's "conversion." A writer in *Pravda* in late 1976 argued:

Trying to justify the arms race, certain political circles in Western countries propagandize some sort of balance of terror which is supposedly necessary to maintain peace and insure the security of peoples. But such a balance is an unreliable foundation for security. The real way to achieve security is to observe the principle of the non-use of force . . .⁸¹

This does not *oppose* a nuclear balance based on parity; it argues a need to go beyond it. Others arguing this point usually stress the need to proceed to disarmament.

The accumulated means of mass destruction are such that an exchange of nuclear strikes contradicts even the most narrowly construed national security interests and seriously threatens the lives of peoples . . .

The "balance of terror" cannot guarantee security . . . There is a danger of their [the accumulated weapons] accidental or unsanctioned use. The numbers of these weapons are constantly growing . . .

In other words, if one wants to live in security, struggle to resolve the problems of disarmament.⁸²

Even Brezhnev's major speech on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, after renouncing an aim of superiority and stating that the Soviets "did not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength that now exists," went on to state: "Needless to say, maintaining the existing equilibrium is not an end in itself. We are in favor of starting a downward turn in the curve of the arms race and of gradually reducing the level of the military confrontation. We want

80. Editorial, "Vigilance Must Be Raised Higher!" *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 22 June 1977.

81. V. Larin, "A Topical Proposal," *Pravda*, 27 October 1976.

82. Yu. Nilov, "The Time Has Come to Call a Halt," *Novoye vremya*, no. 23, June 1977, p. 6.

to reduce substantially, and then to eliminate, the threat of nuclear war—the most formidable danger for mankind.”⁸³

Perhaps the most sophisticated argument along this line was made several years ago by two retired military men now with the Institute of the USA and Canada, General Milshtein and Colonel Semeyko. They stressed the importance of the Soviet-American agreements of 1972 and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement of 1973, which they said were made possible only by “proceeding from their mutual recognition of the fact that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind and from the need to reduce and in the final analysis to eliminate the danger of nuclear war . . .”⁸⁴ Milshtein and Semeyko are realistic in their criticism of mutual deterrence as not being an “ideal solution.”

Of course, the concept of “mutual deterrence,” which presupposes the existence of enormous nuclear forces capable of “assured destruction” is not an ideal solution to the problem of peace and the prevention of nuclear conflict.⁸⁵

They argue that some influential elements in the United States have tried to escape mutual deterrence by pursuing “acceptable” limited nuclear options, “selective targetting” concepts and the like. This course they reject, while endorsing the effort to move from mutual deterrence on the path of detente, arms limitation, disarmament and peaceful coexistence. “Preventing nuclear war in any of its forms, large or small, and the limitation of the arms race, are the central problem of Soviet-American relations.”⁸⁶

Another analyst at the USA Institute, Dr. Trofimenko, has argued that the United States was led into SALT only by “a realization of the impossibility of the United States achieving a position of strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union” and readiness to accept parity, and by recognition of “the inevitability of a crushing counter-strike if the United States delivered a nuclear missile strike on the USSR . . .”⁸⁷ But he is led by consideration of military developments over the period 1972 through 1976 to conclude that:

83. L. I. Brezhnev, *Radio Moscow*, TASS English translation, 2 November 1977; *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 3 November 1977. This supplementary passage was omitted in the speech as delivered live on Radio Moscow, but was included in subsequent broadcasts in translation and in all printed versions of the speech.

84. [Lt. Gen.] M. A. Milshtein and [Col.] L. S. Semeyko, “The Problem of the Inadmissibility of a Nuclear Conflict (On New Approaches in the United States),” *SShA*, no. 11, November 1974, p. 4.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12.

87. G. A. Trofimenko, “US Foreign Policy in the Seventies: Words and Deeds,” *SShA*, no. 12, December 1976, pp. 15 and 19.

Indeed, the matter of preventing nuclear war is not a policy of passive temporizing based on a presumption that a certain formal codification of the Soviet-American nuclear balance carried out in recent years is necessary and sufficient to maintain military stability, but only major new constructive steps in the sphere of military detente are able really to prevent a gradual slide toward nuclear catastrophe.⁸⁸

A number of discussions in 1977 and 1978 have reflected disappointment and concern at the U.S. position. As Brezhnev put it in a speech in May 1977, "I am convinced that not a single statesman, or public figure, or thinking person can avoid his share of responsibility in the struggle against the threat of war, for this means responsibility for the very future of mankind itself. I shall not conceal the fact that our concern over the continuing arms race, including the strategic arms race, has grown in connection with the positions adopted in these matters by the new American Administration."⁸⁹

A commentator commemorating the fifth anniversary of the first Nixon-Brezhnev Summit in May 1972, noted:

Both our powers possess tremendous economic and military potential, and because of this a state of conflict between them, which would be fraught with the risk of an armed clash, could lead to fatal consequences for the entire world.

...

For thousands of years war has been a continuation of policy, only by other, forcible, means. When diplomacy was unable to achieve one or another objective, armed force was used. A rejection of the use of armed force and the threat of its use together with a commitment to resolve differences by peaceful means would mean, at least in prospective—clearly not yet in the near run—transition to a completely new and unprecedented method of conducting international relations, where armed force and war cease to be instruments of policy . . .

...

Whereas in previous eras whole peoples were sometimes exterminated and great civilizations perished as a result of wars, at that time an aggressor, having well prepared for the attack could calculate that in case of victory his country had a chance of surviving, even after a very destructive war. In our age there is no such chance.⁹⁰

Soviet thinking, increasingly expressed by military as well as political leaders and spokesmen, even in open publications, reflects the readiness to give an im-

88. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

89. L. I. Brezhnev, *Radio Moscow*, 29 May 1977.

90. V. M. Berezhkov, "The Basic Principles of Soviet-American Relations," *SShA*, no. 4, April 1977, pp. 3, 5, 8 and 8-9.

portant place to agreements on strategic arms limitation and on political relations with the United States—if such agreements can be reached on a mutually acceptable basis. In the United States there is a similar readiness. But there are substantial difficulties in negotiating such agreements, even given a compatibility of aims, and success is by no means assured. Moreover, there are skeptics and recalcitrants on both sides. And there is prudence, hedged by desire for a margin of insurance, and fed by suspicions and fears—to say nothing of technical and intelligence uncertainties—all affecting respective unilateral military programs designed to safeguard deterrence, and negotiating stance and objectives. Maintaining mutual deterrence is not easy, even though mutual deterrence is a desirable situation. And negotiating agreed restraints is, while the best way to support it, also the most difficult.

Conclusion

A number of American commentators have argued that the Soviets, and in particular the Soviet military, reject or at least do not accept the concept of mutual deterrence, and they sometimes go on to question the basis for possible strategic arms limitation. These writers may not have been sufficiently aware of the record. It has sometimes been alleged that Soviet statements on such propositions as mutual deterrence and the unacceptability of general nuclear war are “for export,” and they are contrasted with open Soviet military discussions. The evidence from such sources as the confidential General Staff organ *Military Thought* dispels such erroneous conclusions.

The record indicates that the Soviet political and military leadership accepts a strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States as a fact, and as the probable and desirable prospect for the foreseeable future. They are pursuing extensive military programs to ensure that they do not fail to maintain their side of the balance, which they see as in some jeopardy given planned American programs. They seek to stabilize and to maintain mutual deterrence.

In Marxist-Leninist eyes, military power is not and should not be the driving element in world politics. With “imperialist” military power held in check, the decisive social-economic forces of history would determine the future of the world. In their view, the United States has come to accept mutual deterrence, and some strategic arms limitations, not because it is our preference, but because we have no alternative given the general world “relation of forces,” and Soviet military power in particular.

Strategic arms limitation achieved one signal concrete success in the SALT I •

ABM Treaty. The absence of success to date in limiting effectively strategic offensive arms is seen as requiring continuing unilateral efforts, even strenuous ones, to prevent upsetting the strategic nuclear balance—which is generally stable, but is not assured without continuing efforts primarily through unilateral military programs but also potentially through agreed arms limitations.

Much of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs could easily be turned around to describe American views of the situation. This is not because of any careless resort to a "mirror image." There are, in fact, at this juncture a number of parallel perceptions—and misperceptions—held by both sides. Despite greatly differing ultimate objectives, the principal problems in arms control accommodations are *not* due to differing operative aims of the two sides, but to differing perceptions, to suspicions, and to the difficulties of gearing very different military forces and programs into balanced and mutually acceptable strategic arms limitations. To illuminate Soviet thinking on this matter is one step to understanding the problem and to finding its solution.

Beyond the "Plane Package": Arms and Politics in the Middle East

Andrew J. Pierre

Arms for the Arabs create a new and critical dimension of the evolving American twin pillar approach in the Middle East. The once assumed Israeli-American special relationship in arms supplies is losing its exclusivity.

In the past Israel has benefited from significant amounts of U.S. arms, including the most sophisticated (such as the F-15), while America's Arab friends have had relatively limited access: for a long time, Egypt was not granted the F-5 in which it had expressed interest and was restricted to a small number of transport aircraft and minor arms; Saudi Arabia, despite its historically close ties with the United States, never received any of the most advanced weapons.

Political perceptions are now in the process of change. There is a growing public understanding of the Arab point of view in the Middle East conflict. The dependence of the West upon Arab oil, with all its implications for energy supplies and the viability of Western economies, has also had its impact on American policy.

The American relationship with Israel remains, in fundamental terms, sound and secure. But a second special relationship has developed in the Middle East, this time with Saudi Arabia and, in a different context, with Egypt. (It has long existed on a modest scale with King Hussein's Jordan.) Willingness to sell arms to the Arabs in greater quantities and at higher levels of sophistication is the military dimension of the re-equilibration of the American stance in the Middle East which is apparent in the political and economic spheres. It is in this context that the Carter Administration's \$4.8 billion plane package deal for Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel must be understood.¹

Israel's recent surprise and dismay at the so-called plane package is indicative of the inability thus far to accept psychologically the implications of the American twin pillar approach, based upon good relations with both sides. One is struck, in discussions with Israeli leaders, by the refusal of many to acknowledge the new realities of the Middle East. The growing American ties with the Saudis and with President Anwar Sadat are interpreted, too frequently, as signifying the

1. The package includes 60 F-15 Eagle aircraft, the most advanced fighter in the U.S. inventory, for Saudi Arabia; 50 F-5 Es for Egypt; 15 F-15s additional to the 25 already sold and 75 F-16s for Israel. Israel will receive 20 additional F-15s later.

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erosion of the Israeli-American relationship. The image is of an either/or relationship, a zero-sum game, with little willingness to accept the creation of a new Arab-American relationship side-by-side with the continuing U.S.-Israeli one. To the extent that this new relationship's existence is acknowledged, it is seen as the result of momentary factors such as the public relations success of Sadat's peace initiative, or the alleged tilt of the Carter Administration toward the Arabs. Rarely does one hear the view that a closer American relationship with the Arabs may facilitate the difficult task of negotiating peace.

If the Israelis are loathe to accept the loss of the privileged nature of their arms supply relationship with the United States, the Arabs feel strongly that it is long overdue. In Arab capitals, the explanation for Israel's perceived unwillingness to enter into serious negotiations involving a return to the 1967 boundaries with modifications, is not the same as that often argued elsewhere, i.e. Menahem Begin's lifelong political and ideological beliefs. Having made the transition from philosopher-politician to Prime Minister, even Mr. Begin is expected to accommodate to objective political factors. Rather, the Arabs believe that it is the military strength of Israel and its clear superiority that is deadlocking the peace process. And they fault the United States for having over-armed Israel to the point of making her intransigent.

- During the Kissinger years the accepted wisdom was that arms for Israel would make its leaders sufficiently secure so as to feel able to make territorial concessions in negotiations with a minimum of risk. Following this reasoning, American military assistance to Israel rose sharply after the 1973 war and during the two Sinai and Golan Heights disengagement agreements. U.S. arms shipments to Israel increased from \$189.9 million in 1973 to \$977.9 in 1974, dropped to \$655.6 in 1975 but rose to \$728.7 the following year and totalled \$875.3 in 1977. In the last decade, the United States has sent Israel \$4.2 billion worth of arms. The Arabs argue that the military machine which has been created enables Israel to be intransigent, as well as less vulnerable to American pressures to expedite the political negotiations.

Arms transfer policies have, in fact, become central to the process of negotiating peace in the Middle East. A new policy of arms for Egypt is regarded by the Carter Administration as necessary to buoy a floundering Sadat. And fulfillment of the Saudi's request for the F-15 is similarly viewed as important in order to enhance the forces of Arab moderation. These steps, Tel Aviv counters, are severely detrimental to the negotiating process. As to the longer term, it is probable that a negotiated peace settlement, even a partial one, will need to be accompanied by overall assurances of arms availability, or of restraint on arms transfers.

Yet given the new realities in the Middle East, especially the creation of a second American special relationship, the long-term risks of relying exclusively upon arms supplies for achieving security may be great. Arms transfers into the region will have a competitive dynamic of their own. The acquisition of arms by one side will induce a similar action by another; the F-15 sale is an example of what will occur. Once Israel acquired this jet that is acknowledged to be the best fighter in existence (and the United States thereby first sold it abroad), it was almost inevitable that Saudi Arabia, which was shopping for an advanced fighter to replace its obsolescent British Lightnings, would ask for the same. Saudi officials do not mask their belief that if the Israeli air force is allowed to possess the F-15, so should theirs. And given the extent of Saudi claims upon the United States, the satisfaction of which the F-15 became the Litmus test, the Carter Administration's decision to sell should not have been surprising. A more far-sighted Israeli policy might have been to forego the longer range F-15, relying more on the substantial inventory of F-16s, in order to forestall the former's introduction into the region.²

The lesson for the future is that neither side in the Arab-Israeli confrontation may be able to rely upon maintaining clear cut military superiority. Arms will be available, but given their prospective accessibility to both sides, they may reduce rather than enhance security. Israel, which in the past has relied upon maintaining a military edge, may need to rely more upon negotiations for peace.

Throughout the Middle East the role of arms—why nations want weapons, why states supply them—is becoming more politically-oriented and less security-related. Seen from within the region the domestic incentives for acquiring arms and for developing particular supply relationships, as well as creating an indigenous source of arms production, are extraordinarily complex and differ from one country to the next.

Saudi Arabia

There is no classic military threat against which Saudi defense officials plan the composition of their forces. Direct conflict with Israel is considered highly improbable, almost implausible. The military buildup in Iran is being watched with care and there is latent concern about what policies might follow after the Shah. But there is not as much of an arms race syndrome in the Persian Gulf as

2. According to Major-General Israel Tal, former Chief-of-Staff and now Assistant Minister of Defense, this was briefly considered in 1975 but rejected. Interview. Tel Aviv. February 21, 1978.

might be expected. If the Saudis were once motivated by a desire to catch up with Iran, they now believe that Tehran is condemned to a secondary role and has been overshadowed by more important considerations. It is Saudi Arabia's dominant position in the petro-market that gives it the leading role in the politics of oil. (The Iranians attempt to maintain compatible relations with the Saudis, and would now be unlikely to intervene in the Persian Gulf, as they did in the Dhofar war in 1973, if it risked Riyadh's disapproval.³) Saudis fear the growth of Soviet influence in South Yemen and in the Horn of Africa, but it is Iraq with its radical Ba'athist leadership that is the regional state most distrusted. Defense of the oil fields is another often cited military objective. But given the installations' high vulnerability, their defense would be extremely difficult against industrialized consumer countries, or even against a determined Israel or Iran.

The substantial Saudi defense buildup since 1974 must therefore be seen as a search for increasing political credibility. And it is more within the Arab world than outside it that credibility must be maintained. The fears expressed in Saudi Arabia can be summed up in the deep concern about a radicalization of the Arab world which would isolate the country and ultimately subvert the royal family's control—hence the desire to contain the Palestinian problem by supporting the creation of a Palestinian state and Israel's return to the 1967 boundaries.

This also explains Riyadh's growing regional role through its support for moderate regimes (as well as less moderate ones such as Syria), tempering their behavior by making them more dependent. The weapon is money. Funds have been distributed from the Saudi treasury with increasing largesse. In 1977, Egypt received \$2.5 billion in economic and military aid; Syria \$1 billion; Jordan \$500 million; North Yemen \$150 million; plus undisclosed amounts for the PLO. Beyond the Middle East, the Saudis granted more than \$2 billion to African and Asian states, usually those with large Moslem populations which are or could be subject to radical and communist influences. Communism is deeply feared, not because of any direct threat of Soviet expansionism, but because of the ideological support that it could give to Arab radicalism. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Saudi officials state that one of the basic justifications for their armed forces is to provide defense for Islam's holy sites of Mecca and Medina. The Saudis, rather than the more extremist Iraqis or Syrians, are to be recognized as the guardians of the faith.

The Saudis are unlikely to become a confrontation state in the Middle East

3. Interviews. J. Nadim, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs and others, Teheran, January 26–February 1, 1978.

conflict. The growing Saudi interest in the peaceful resolution of the conflict stems from fear that it could further radicalize the Arab nations. The Saudis eventually supported Sadat's initiative, but initially they feared that the trip to Jerusalem would split the Arab world even more deeply than it did. In the 1973 war Riyadh did send token forces designed to show political solidarity. But Israel's concern that the F-15 sale will make Saudi Arabia a confrontation state, and thereby draw it into war, is surely exaggerated. Although perhaps militarily justifiable in terms of a new Saudi capability, a political assessment of Saudi intentions should put Tel Aviv's fears to rest.⁴

America's military connection with Saudi Arabia has a long history, with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers completing construction of a military airfield at Dhahran in 1954. Given the role of the Arabian American Oil Company in developing the country's oil production, it was natural that close ties should also grow in the military sphere. A U.S. military training mission has been in Saudi Arabia for over twenty-five years. In 1970 a U.S. Department of Defense team evaluated Saudi Arabia's defense plans and programs; its recommendations led to the Peace Hawk program whereby the F-5 fighter was made available. A second DoD study was undertaken in 1974 at the request of the Saudi government; this time, the need to replace the aging Lightning with a more advanced fighter was pointed out. According to Ambassador John West in Saudi Arabia, the Carter-appointed former Governor of South Carolina, both Presidents Nixon and Ford committed the United States to sell the Saudis the advanced fighter of their choice to replace the Lightnings.⁵ And their choice was the F-15 Eagle—the best available. (This is not surprising, given the recent Saudi propensity for the best available civilian technologies; i.e., the fully computerized King Faisal Hospital.) In the summer of 1976 Washington had second thoughts. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, Jr., sought to persuade the Saudis that the F-15 was too sophisticated for their needs. But the Saudi Air Force would not change its mind and the commitment was renewed by President Carter when he visited the country in January 1978.

Whether the original 1974 promise to sell the Saudis the aircraft of their choice was wise is doubtful. Nevertheless, in a traditional society whose attitudes are strongly affected by courtesies and symbols, the F-15 has become a symbol—or test—of American friendship which far transcends the broader military di-

4. In any case, the Saudi pilots, who are still learning to fly their F-5s, would be no match for the Israeli pilots, among the best in the world. Moreover, the plane package *in toto* strengthens Israel's already powerful air force far more than that of the Arab states.

5. Interview. Jiddah. February 6, 1978.

- mension. Oil is, of course, the single most important element of the special relationship. America has become increasingly dependent upon Saudi oil (25 percent of U.S. oil imports) and still larger amounts from the Arabian peninsula will be required in the future. Saudi Arabia will remain the most important country in determining world oil production and price levels. In return, Saudi Arabia has invested over \$10 billion of its surplus funds in American industry and a large, secret amount estimated at \$25 to 30 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds and other securities. A switch from dollar holdings to other currencies could have grave consequences for the U.S. economy.

But "Arms for Oil" is simplistic as an explanation. In the minds of Saudi leaders, their special relationship with the United States has a fundamental political base analogous to the U.S.-West German relationship. These leaders believe that the United States and Saudi Arabia share a common abhorrence of communism and a determination to resist its encroachments. Nowhere else in the Middle East does one hear such concern about the Soviet Union or eurocommunism—concerns that are acted upon through Saudi policies designed to assist the West European states in coping with their economic crises.

In addition, Saudis see themselves as an important source of moderation in the Middle East and as an ally of the United States in the search for a peace settlement. There is an important element of self-interest for the Saudi ruling family in a political settlement—stemming the radicalism which could threaten its internal rule. Although the Saudis court Arab support by reminding Washington of the continuing need to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, their contribution is a constructive one in that their money weapon is used both to support political moderates and to restrain Arabs who might exacerbate the conflict.

For all these reasons, Saudi Arabia has replaced Iran as America's closest partner among the oil producers—a switch from the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Yet it is shortsighted to argue that since Saudi Arabia is apparently inextricably tied to the West, the United States need not give it such attention. This overlooks social and religious pressures within Saudi society that could turn the country away from its existing ties. There are members of the royal family led by Prince Muhammad, King Khalid's full brother, who are opposed to the current rapid modernization of the society because of the impact of the presence of so many foreign workers and the erosion of traditional Moslem values. In addition, young Saudi technocrats, most often trained in American universities yet nationalistically-inclined, are critical of the prevailing waste and inefficiency; some believe that oil production should not be expanded at the rate necessary to meet the needs of the industrial world in the 1980s, preferring to keep more oil in the

ground for later exploitation. (By 1985, the Western world may need 14 to 20 billion barrels a day from Saudi Arabia, but it will only need to pump up 5 billion to satisfy its development program.) The present Saudi-U.S. special relationship cannot be assumed to be immutable.

Egypt

Three days after Sadat's surprise withdrawal of his delegation from the Jerusalem negotiations of the Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. political committee in January 1978, he made a dramatic speech before the People's Assembly, the Egyptian parliament. After stating that Begin was able to take a tough stand on the retention of controversial Israeli settlements in the Northeastern Sinai because of Israel's large stock of American weapons, Sadat disclosed that he was asking President Carter for "every armament" that the United States had shipped to Israel. They would not be used to attack Israel, he said, but were needed to give Egypt "equivalent bargaining power." In Washington, a few weeks later, Sadat indicated that he wanted F-15s and F-16s, not just the F-5 which he described as "tenth-rate." He has been vocal in his belief that Israel should not be able to "monopolize" close relations with the United States.

This is one more indication of the increasing linkage between arms and the negotiating process. The Carter Administration's decision to sell 50 F-5 Es to Egypt (120 were requested) was strongly influenced by the political need to keep the Sadat peace initiative alive at a time of great frustration and discouragement in Cairo because of Israel's perceived failure to respond adequately. The stalemate in the negotiations, after the euphoria following Sadat's personal breakthrough of November, led to fears that his resignation was imminent. But Sadat was disappointed with the United States even before his trip to Jerusalem. He had expelled Soviet military advisors in 1972 and subsequently broke diplomatic relations, but had received from the United States little more than 6 Hercules C-130 military air transport for his armed forces. And the vaunted opening to the West had produced relatively little in the way of badly needed economic investments for Egypt.

Egyptians blame the United States for having over-armed Israel, especially since the Yom Kippur war. They believe that Washington countenanced Israeli development of a nuclear option. Only Washington, they argue, now has the resources in the form of political influence and the manipulation of military and economic aid to pressure Israel into making the necessary concessions in the nego-

tiations. This is what Sadat means when he asks Washington to be a partner, not just a mediator, in the peace process.

Hitherto, the United States has only been willing to transfer relatively insignificant "non-lethal" arms to Egypt. The sale of the F-5 opens a new era. Even though it is a defensive interceptor aircraft, with short range, limited load capability, not suited for ground attack missions, and is chiefly produced for export to selected third world countries, the sale establishes a new principle of relative even-handedness for U.S. arms transfers into the confrontation area. It is intended to provide reassurance for Egypt, and influence for the United States, at a delicate moment in history.

To refuse Egypt would have discredited Sadat's policy of reliance upon America. It would also have created the risk of a reluctant but possible turn-back to the Soviet Union. Egypt's air force is aging, consisting predominantly of Soviet MiG 17 and MiG 21 fighters transferred before the break with Moscow and suffering from an acute shortage of spare parts—including workable engines. Among the reasons why Sadat needs new arms is to keep his professional officers loyal and satisfied, and to demonstrate that his policy of working with Washington can produce dividends. The Soviet presence was never popular, and at times invoked intense hostility. But the Egyptian military establishment—as was Churchill—is perfectly willing to ally itself with the devil if this is believed necessary. And many Egyptian officers remain critical of the split with the Soviets.⁶

An important segment of Egyptian opinion believes that Sadat made a great mistake in putting all his eggs in the American basket. He remains personally popular with the masses and there is admiration for his political courage. But among the left-leaning intelligentsia, as well as many officials, there is doubt about the wisdom of his policies. They ask what gains the alliance with the United States has brought to Egypt and the Arab world. Strong criticism emanates from the Al Ahram newspaper establishment, once led by the influential Muhammad Heikal who split with Sadat over the Soviet expulsion. There are other issues. Critics believe that Sadat was wrong to divide the Arabs through his November visit thus isolating Egypt. The first task of his successor, this critique continues, must be to restore pan-Arab unity. Many are dismayed at corruption within the regime: the Egyptian economy has virtually collapsed; Cairo is physically disintegrating; and the population's standard of living has declined,

6. Interview. Major-General Hassan El Badry, Cairo, January 15, 1978.

while a proportionately very small business and managerial elite prospers. There are, it is said, more millionaires today than ever before.

Sadat, in order not to be overly dependent upon the United States, an uncertain ally, has attempted to diversify Egypt's arms purchases. With the promise of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to pay for the re-equipment of the armed forces, Egyptian defense officials have also sought arms in Western Europe. Britain is now emerging as the chief supplier, with important contracts in hand for Westland Aircraft's Lynx helicopters, British Aircraft Corporation's Swingfire anti-tank guided missiles, and the overhaul by Vosper-Thornycroft of the Egyptian Navy's Russian-built missile boats. MIG 21 engines, it is reported, will also be refurbished by Rolls Royce. France is not far behind. An accord was completed in Paris in March 1978 by Egyptian Minister of Defense General Abdel-Gany Gamassy for several cooperative ventures, including the Franco-German Alpha-Jet, some of which may be co-produced in Egypt.

European arms, however, cannot replace American ones in Egyptian eyes for it is only the latter that carry with them the necessary symbol of political support. In order to assuage fears in the Congress, Sadat has said that he wants the U.S. aircraft not for use against Israel, but to deter or deal with conflict in Africa. The long term threat to Egypt of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Sudan and Libya is taken seriously in Cairo. But the psychological and political importance of even a relatively modest amount of American arms, in the context of the Arab-Israeli contest, far outweighs this consideration.

Israel

Today Israel is militarily stronger than at any time in its history. This should give its leaders the political and moral strength to take the calculated risks which are an inescapable requirement if a political settlement is to be reached. Unfortunately this is not the approach of Prime Minister Begin. His government appears to be more interested in increasing Israel's position of strength through its settlements policy in the West Bank and Sinai and by way of a further accumulation of arms, than in productive negotiations.

The Israeli defense forces have fared comparatively well in the military build-up since the Yom Kippur War, with estimates of Israel's capabilities ranging from 40 to 60 percent above the 1973 posture, while Syria has rebuilt to its pre-war level and Egypt remains slightly below. This is essentially due to the pattern of arms transfers, with Israel receiving far more from the United States than Syria or Egypt from the Soviet Union. An additional though secondary factor has been

a number of improvements in the maintenance of combat readiness of Israeli forces, following widespread criticisms after the Yom Kippur war of their pre-war condition.

Not only is the military balance now clearly in Tel Aviv's favor, but Israel may be developing a capability adequate to launch a short, intense war which could overwhelm the Arab states on its borders without the need for re-supplies from the United States.⁷

This would be doubly dangerous. First, it could make Israel immune from immediate American pressures to halt a conflict. Second, it could tempt Israeli leaders into a preventive war designed to destroy and keep the Arab military forces weak for at least another five to ten years. Preventive war is not a totally unattractive option for the Israelis, much as they value the lives of their soldiers, especially if it is perceived as buying a new period of peace and security allowing for greater attention to economic development. One should consider the Arab perspective—that Israel benefited from the past two wars in that the territories under its control were expanded, the strength of its armed forces was subsequently greatly increased through the infusion of American arms, and the Arab states were themselves weakened. The possibility of a preventive war was an often-overlooked source of anxiety to Egyptians last autumn, and it most likely contributed to Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem.

Such speculation about a preventive war is not altogether fanciful; it is heard sotto voce throughout the Middle East today. To many, Israel's incursion into Lebanon up to the Litani River, thereby covering one-sixth of the country, was a retaliation whose severity was not in measure with the terrorist Al Fatah bus attack outside of Tel Aviv, and was indicative of what might be expected in the future from the Begin government.⁸

Yet Israel's current appearance of strength tends to mask some fundamental weaknesses. Thirty-six percent of Israel's gross national product is absorbed by defense needs (in comparison with less than 4 percent for Germany or France, and 6 percent for the United States). This is by far the highest in the world. If one adds repayment on debts which are mostly defense-related, the figure

7. An article to this effect by a recent senior Pentagon official has received wide attention in the Middle East. See Anthony H. Cordesman, "How Much is Enough?" *Armed Forces Journal International* October, 1977.

8. Speculations are rife in the Arab world about Begin's long-term intentions. Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan wonders if the long-term purpose of the settlements in the West Bank is not to encourage the Palestinians to leave for Jordan, thereby making room for a large Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Interview. Amman, February 12, 1978.

rises to an astounding 59 percent. (Before the 1967 war, only 10 percent of GNP was devoted to defense.) The manpower toll is also high; of a Jewish population of 3 million, close to 600,000 women and men have active or reserve status—again the highest proportion in the world. The psychological drain of constant military preparedness is unmeasurable but altogether real; it is underlined by the growing rate of emigration. Add to this long term factors such as Israel's proportionally declining population level in comparison to Arab growth, and the accumulating wealth of the oil-rich countries, and prospects for the future become less than bright.

Some of the danger points ahead are already visible. In the economic sphere the high inflation rate (42.5 percent in 1977) resulting from large defense expenditures is curtailing growth and greatly increasing Israel's exterior debt—thereby forcing successive devaluations and making Israel heavily dependent on American economic assistance. Expenditures on social welfare and education have been reduced and the standard of living is declining.

Considerations such as these raise questions about the extent to which Israel can, or should, attempt to rely upon the force of arms for its long-term security. For the present this remains Israel's instinct. When Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman went to Washington in March 1978 he asked for \$12.5 billion in U.S. arms over the next eight years. Among the new capabilities requested were KC-135 tankers for aerial refueling, which would have the effect of extending the reach of Israeli aircraft significantly beyond their present borders, as well as sufficient ammunition to fight an extensive Middle East war without being dependent on U.S. re-supplies. Yet the search for absolute security through arms is likely to be a will-o'-the-wisp, much as the Palestinian question is not resolved simply by occupying additional territories. A wiser course would be for Israel to reassess its longer term interests and goals, and give greater emphasis to political negotiations for achieving ultimate security.

Indigenous Arms Industries

The growth of an indigenous capability for manufacturing weapons in both Israel and the Arab countries is often believed to be leading toward an important structural change in the Middle East conflict, freeing the present recipients of dependency upon outside suppliers. This would, of course, have significant consequences for power relationships within the area.

The Israeli arms industry is indeed impressive, manufacturing a wide range of weapons including the Shafrir air-to-air missile, the Gabriel sea-launched

missile, and most notably the Kfir fighter; 40 percent of Israel's weapons are made at home; arms exports are estimated to have increased eight-fold since 1973 to \$500 million per annum.

At its origin the motivation for establishing Israel's own industry was clearly political, to enhance Israeli independence. Now it is evident that self-sufficiency cannot be reached. According to Dr. Zvi Sussman, Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Defense and in charge of the arms industry, the past growth in exports, upon which the expansion of the industry depends, will not be sustainable due to political constraints imposed by Arab pressures which impede many nations' willingness to purchase arms from Israel. In addition, more sophisticated arms will continue to require technology from the United States and this will, as in the case of the Kfir fighter, which has a General Electric engine made for the U.S. Phantom F-4, subject their export to outside veto⁹ (the Carter Administration refused to allow the sale of the Kfir fighter to Ecuador).

The current debate over the manufacture of the Arieh fighter is illustrative. This would be an advanced fighter for the mid-1980s, comparable to the F-16 or F-15. Its production was recommended in February by a subcommittee of the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on the grounds that it was "imperative to take into account situations where supply sources might be cut off for Israel which would deprive her of essential arms . . . for preserving military and political freedom of action."¹⁰ The arguments against the Arieh are that its research and development costs, now greatly underestimated at \$440 million, will be prohibitive and the unit price far higher than a comparable American plane, especially if there is no equivalent export market available. In addition, there will be no way to avoid dependence upon advanced technology from abroad entirely. Thus, the Arieh is unlikely to be built.

The comparable effort within the Arab world to develop an indigenous arms industry is more modest. In May 1975 the Arab Military Industries Organization (AMIO) was set up in Cairo by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates with a capital of \$1 billion. Motivated by the Soviet Unions' unreliability as a supplier to Egypt, its chief aim is to reduce military dependency on outside arms sources. With the Saudis as the principal bankers, the Egyptians have taken the lead in trying to develop coproduction arrangements with France and Britain which would provide for manufacture of Arab arms in Egypt. Plans

9. Interview, Tel Aviv, February 20, 1978. Other Israelis consulted included Shimon Peres and Abba Eban.

10. Ha'aretz, February 2, 1978.

for the production of the Mirage F-1 have now collapsed, underlining the technical and financial difficulties of such joint ventures. At this point more modest plans for equipment production are being discussed in Egypt. The one firm accord is with American Motors Corporation for a plant near Cairo that will produce 12,000 jeeps a year. A major obstacle is that Egypt lacks an adequate technological base for manufacturing weapons. In addition, the AMIO has been unable thus far to entice countries such as Syria and Libya which prefer to receive their arms from the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Arab arms industry is unlikely to have any significant impact on the Middle Eastern power equation for a decade or more.

Roles and Opportunities

The United States has never been in a stronger position in the Arab world than it is today—precarious as that position may be. This is the result of the twin-pillar policy followed by two administrations, constructing a new or improved relationship with several key Arab countries while maintaining close bonds with Israel. Current disagreements between the Carter Administration and the Begin government may strain these bonds, but will not basically alter relations between the two nations.

Paradoxical as it may seem, by becoming a supplier of arms for both sides, the United States can gain influence and thereby enhance the process of peace. This assumes, of course, maintaining in its weapons transfers a cautious policy of balance and restraint. One of the principal cleavages and sources of tension in the Middle East for over two decades has been its division into two camps, one supplied by the Soviet Union and the other by the West, principally the United States. A new American arms relationship with Egypt, made possible by Egypt's break with Moscow, would have a stabilizing effect within the region.¹¹ To deny it may have the opposite impact. The United States has now become a party to the negotiating process: accordingly, its arms transfer policies cannot be kept separate.

One must also consider the consequences of a weakening or collapse of the still fragile American position within the Arab world. Such a course of events would no doubt be accompanied by a deterioration of the position of moderate Arab regimes and political forces, leading to a radicalization of the Arab world

11. Even Syria, which depends totally on large quantities of Soviet weapons, has difficulties in its arms relationship with Moscow, and might be interested in diversifying its source of supply. Interviews, Damascus, January 21–25, 1978.

and a new opening for the Soviet Union. Given the turbulent history of the Middle East, this is far from inconceivable.

For Israel, the ever increasing accumulation of weaponry is not the best road to security. That can only be achieved through a negotiated peace settlement. The Begin government displays an unfortunate tendency to rely upon territorial gain and military strength. Israel's basic insecurities have deep roots in its experience and the history of its people; they are quite understandable. But the fact remains that the longer term trends are not in its favor. The policy of delay favored by some Israeli leaders will not succeed, for a new American administration will not come to very different conclusions than the present one, given the larger issues at play. Israel needs, therefore, to re-calculate its interests and take some risks towards achieving a permanent peace—risks for which it is sufficiently strong—before the present opportunity fades away.

The end point in the Middle East should be some framework of arms control. In retrospect, Henry Kissinger's opening of the floodgate which initially allowed the most sophisticated weaponry to stream into the region was a mistake. One must question whether the limited Sinai disengagement agreements could not have been reached without the original promises of arms which have exacerbated, and created, some of the present difficulties. The task ahead is to design a system of arms guarantees and restraints to accompany a political settlement. This should involve the Soviet Union and the West Europeans, as well as the United States. Given the symbiosis of arms and politics in the Middle East, only such a system of assurances might make a peace settlement acceptable. Only such a system of restraints might permit it to endure.

Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance

Herbert C. Kelman

Many observers of the Middle East conflict now regard the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as a promising long-run solution to the Palestinian problem. Such a state would live side by side with an independent Israel, based more or less within its pre-1967 boundaries. This solution envisages a Palestinian state that would be free to decide for itself what kinds of links, if any, it wants to establish with Jordan or with any other country. It further assumes that the state would offer opportunities for citizenship and leadership to Palestinians in the diaspora, including elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), provided they accept the principle of peaceful coexistence with Israel.

As of the moment, this two-state option is rejected both by the Israeli government and by the PLO. In Israel, the concept of an independent Palestinian state is considered unacceptable not only by the Begin government, but also by the Labor Party opposition. The Labor Party clearly differentiated itself from the Likud prior to the 1977 elections by declaring its readiness to withdraw from parts of the West Bank and Gaza, and it has continued to press this point while in opposition. However, it has consistently concurred with the Likud in rejecting the two-state option. The PLO, for its part, has never officially accepted this

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option, despite various hints that it was ready to do so. The resolutions of the 1977 Palestinian National Council (PNC) did show some movement in this direction by speaking for the first time of the Palestinians' right "to establish their national independent state on their national soil" without insisting on the *entire* national soil. At the same time, however, the PNC reaffirmed the official PLO position against acceptance of Israel. In a recent interview with Anthony Lewis,¹ Yasir Arafat repeated his hints that the PLO would agree to a Palestinian state alongside of Israel, but gave no clear indication of accepting the two-state option as a permanent solution.

The rejection of the two-state solution by both sides reflects their continuing reluctance to accept the other or to acknowledge the other's right to a national existence. Such acceptance is clearly required if negotiations are to produce a stable two-state solution (i.e., in effect, a partition of Palestine) or any other settlement that will meet the needs of the two parties. To be sure, a settlement could be imposed from the outside but, in the absence of mutual acceptance, it could not create a stable, peaceful relationship between the parties. This is not to say that mutual *diplomatic* recognition is necessary before negotiations can begin and other agreements can be worked out. Such recognition may well represent the end of the negotiation process rather than its beginning. At the psychological level, however, at least a minimal degree of mutual recognition is essential if Israelis and Palestinians are to enter into serious negotiations, with some confidence that these negotiations will ultimately lead to mutual recognition at the diplomatic level.

Starting with this assumption, this article explores the psychological conditions and processes that are necessary if each side is to accept the reality and legitimacy of the other's national existence. More specifically, it discusses the barriers to mutual acceptance, the meaning of acceptance to each side, and six psychological conditions that would have to be created in order to bring about mutual acceptance.

Dual Perspective

My analysis attempts to look at the problem of acceptance from the perspective of each of the two parties, asking how each perceives the issues. In a sense, then, it is what Ralph White has called "an exercise in empathy."² It starts with the as-

1. *New York Times*, 2 May 1978.

2. Ralph K. White, "Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the

sumption that a lasting and just settlement must be responsive to the needs and anxieties of both parties. It is essential, therefore, to understand the perspective that each party brings to the conflict and to enable their differing perspectives to confront each other.³

The formulations of the concerns and perceptions of the two sides presented here should be viewed as hypotheses, not as formal research findings. They are not based on standardized interviews with representative samples of Israelis and Palestinians, yielding percentage distributions of responses to specific questions. Rather, they are intended to provide a composite view, based on the conversations that my colleagues and I had with a variety of individuals and groups—including government officials, parliamentarians, community leaders, scholars, writers, and students—on both sides of the conflict. Our respondents are located along the entire spectrum of political opinion, although “moderates”—i.e., Israelis and Palestinians willing to consider an accommodation with each other—tend to be overrepresented. Our discussions were often intensive and many took place in problem-solving workshops and other situations in which Israelis and Palestinians were in fact interacting with each other. In those situations, I was able to hear not only what Israelis and Palestinians say to me, but also what they say to each other. Another unique feature of my experiences is that I have been working with a team of social scientists of both Arab and Jewish origin, who have been organizing workshops and other meetings together, traveling in the Middle East together, and jointly engaging in interviews and discussions with Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs. These activities have not only

U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,” in Herbert C. Kelman (Ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, 1965), p. 240. See also Ralph K. White, *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars*, Rev. ed. (New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1970).

3. Confrontation of conflicting perspectives is most instructive when the parties are able to interact directly in a setting that encourages them to express their own concerns openly, to listen to the concerns of the other, and to approach the issues analytically. Third parties can facilitate such direct interactions by arranging, for example, problem-solving workshops—an approach that served as the starting point for the project in which my colleagues and I are engaged (see acknowledgement at the beginning of this article). For a description of this approach, see Herbert C. Kelman, “The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution,” in Richard L. Merritt (Ed.), *Communication in International Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972); Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 1976, 13, 79–90; and Stephen P. Cohen, Herbert C. Kelman, Frederick D. Miller, and Bruce L. Smith, “Evolving Intergroup Techniques for Conflict Resolution: An Israeli-Palestinian Pilot Workshop,” *Journal of Social Issues*, 1977, 33(1), 165–189. Third parties can also contribute to indirect interactions between conflicting parties by systematic attempts to empathize with and juxtapose their different perspectives, as this article attempts to do.

given us access to unique data, but have also afforded us the opportunity to share each other's perspectives as we review our joint experiences and the insights we have derived from them.⁴

The analysis derived from these various experiences focuses to a large extent on parallelisms in the perceptions, the apprehensions, and the identity concerns of the two sides. There are many differences in the situations in which the two sides find themselves and there is certainly no perfect symmetry in their problems or resources. There are several reasons, however, for placing special emphasis on the parallels that do emerge.

First, the inherent dynamics of a conflict interaction have an impact on the way in which each party perceives itself, its adversary, and the conflict between them. As a result, many (though by no means all) of the images developed by the two parties tend to be mirror images of one another.⁵ We have found many examples of such mirror images in our conversations with Israelis and Palestinians. One interesting example is that each side describes the conflict as asymmetrical—to its own disadvantage. The Palestinians see the conflict as asymmetrical in that the Israelis hold all the cards: they are in possession of the land, while the Palestinians are trying to acquire it. The Israelis see the conflict as asymmetrical in that, in contrast to the Arabs (though not specifically to the Palestinians), the very existence of their state is at stake. Thus, one of the parallelisms we have found is that both sides insist that their situations are not parallel.

Second, one of the main points that the present analysis is designed to highlight is that—whatever differences there may be in their situations—both sides have genuine concerns and profound anxieties, including anxieties about their national existence. Both perceive themselves, for understandable reasons, as highly vulnerable and each sees great risk in accepting the other. The parallelisms at this fundamental level are at the heart of the analysis.

Finally, the emphasis on parallelisms is more consistent with the impartial approach that is crucial for the present analysis. I want to avoid any implication

4. It should also be noted that the experiences provided by all these activities are filtered through the special analytic orientation to conflict derived from my social-psychological background. For samples of the scholarly tradition that provides the context for the present analysis see Herbert C. Kelman (Ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, 1965); John W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations* (London: MacMillan, 1968); and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
 5. For social-psychological discussions of such mirror images, see Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," in *Journal of Social Issues*, 1961, 17(3), 45–56; and the writings of Ralph White, cited in Footnote 3.

that I am passing moral judgments or concluding that one side has a more valid case than the other. Thus, it seems better to err on the side of overstating parallelisms rather than differences, without pretending that the two sides are in identical positions.

In addition to the bias in favor of parallelism, the analysis is also marked by a bias in favor of optimistic scenarios. That is, it proceeds from the assumption that there is at least a possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The approach might be called a "best case analysis," in contrast to the "worst case analysis" that strategic thinkers customarily employ. The latter is justified when the analyst wants to avoid the danger of inadequate defense against any possible threat. In the search for a settlement, however, the dangers to be avoided are self-fulfilling prophecies that a satisfactory settlement is unattainable and failure to recognize when opportunities for peace present themselves. These are the dangers that a "best case analysis" is designed to minimize. By envisaging the positive outcomes that might occur under the most favorable circumstances, it encourages the parties to seek ways of creating those circumstances.

It is important to stress that the analysis is not intended to advocate any particular solution or to encourage either side to take any particular action. This does not mean that I pretend to be addressing these issues as a value-free social scientist. I have a strong commitment to the idea that it is better to search for a peaceful solution than to rely on continuing wars; to the importance of finding a solution that is responsive to the concerns for justice on both sides; and to dialogue as a means in the search for such solutions. I therefore do have certain value preferences—certain ideas about better and worse solutions, and better and worse procedures for attaining such solutions. At the same time, I feel that there may be a variety of specific arrangements congruent with the requirements of peace and justice.

My main reason for not advocating any particular solution is the strong conviction that solutions must emerge from the parties themselves. I am particularly cognizant of the fact that whatever actions are taken by either party entail real risks for it. I take very seriously the concerns of each side and thus I do not minimize the risks for Israel in accepting the PLO or the risks for the PLO in accepting Israel. Since they have to live with the consequences of their actions, they are the ones to decide what risks they are prepared to take. They must be reminded, however, that whatever action they take entails risks: There are risks involved not only in the decision to accept the other side, but also in the continuing refusal to do so.

The Current Situation: Mutual Denial of National Identity

We cannot understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unless we realize that we are dealing with two nationalist movements, each struggling for its right to national identity and to national existence. What is especially pronounced, if not unique, about this conflict is that it is marked by a principled non-recognition at a very basic level. Neither side fully recognizes the other's national identity and its right to exist. Indeed, the very peoplehood of the other has been at issue and, to varying degrees, continues to be so. Thus, the core element of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is mutual denial of the adversary's national identity.

On the Palestinian side, the PLO—which, as of now, is the only recognized representative of Palestinian nationhood—denies the legitimacy of Israel as a fundamental tenet of its ideology. One symbolic illustration of this denial is the total absence of the word "Israel" in the resolutions of last year's Palestinian National Council, presumably because the use of the word might imply acquiescence in the legitimacy of the Jewish state. But the rejection of Israel goes beyond the state; it encompasses the very concept of a Jewish nation. Thus, for example, the Palestinian National Covenant explicitly states that "Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nation. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own."

Since the very idea of Jewish nationhood is denied, there is no conception that Jewish nationalism might be the driving force behind Zionism, behind the creation of Israel, and behind the identification of world Jewry with Israel. Various conceptions of Zionism and Israel that are offered—such as those describing Zionism as a form of racism or Israel as a settler state or outpost of Western imperialism—evade the fact that Zionism is a nationalist movement and Israel the political expression of that movement.

The tendency to deny Jewish national identity is not unique to Palestinians, but is quite common in the Arab world. Among the many Arabs to whom I have spoken, including intellectuals and political officials, I have found very few who accepted the *right* of Israel to exist. There are many who, of course, accept Israel as a reality and stress that it is an established fact that must be acknowledged. There are some who go beyond this view to express sympathetic understanding of the Jews' search for a haven in response to their experience of persecution. They see this search, however, in humanitarian rather than in national terms—as the action of a group escaping from persecution, not that of a nation establishing its national homeland, i.e., a political state expressing its national identity. The rejection of Israel's right to exist is accompanied, on the part of

most Arabs to whom I have spoken, by great difficulty in conceiving of the Jews as a nation. The denial of Jewish nationhood is no doubt linked directly to political opposition to a Jewish state: If there is no Jewish nation, then the whole concept of a Jewish state—the basic assumption of Zionism—becomes irrelevant, artificial, and fraudulent. This view of the Jews is probably reinforced, however, by the historical experience of Arabs with Jews in the Arab world. They tend to see these as the “true Jews”—a religious minority who lived happily in the Arab world until the foreign and inauthentic intrusion of Zionism.

To Israelis—and indeed to most Jews around the world—the definition of Jews as a purely religious group constitutes a denial of an obvious reality, rooted in their personal experience and their national consciousness. They can see it only as a blatant effort to undermine the legitimacy of Israel as a state designed to give expression to Jewish national identity.

Turning now to the other side of the coin, Israeli recognition of Palestinian nationhood tends to be reluctant and half-hearted. Golda Meir’s statement some years ago, in which she rhetorically asked “Who are the Palestinians?” and in effect denied their existence as a national group, is often taken as an indication of Israeli views on the matter. Actually, there has been considerable change in Israeli thinking since the time of Meir’s statement. One concrete indicator of the change is that the term “Palestinians” is now used routinely in the Israeli press and broadcast media. The existence of a Palestinian people as such is no longer a matter of debate for large segments of the Israeli population, including most intellectuals and political elites. Indeed, the official policy of the Labor government acknowledged the force of Palestinian nationalism and the need for a solution that would provide for an expression of Palestinian identity.⁶ With the election of the Begin government, to be sure, the issue has again come to the fore. While Begin has acknowledged—since Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem—that there is a Palestinian problem, which he proposes to resolve through limited Palestinian self-rule, he persists in denying the reality of Palestinian nationhood. He refuses to speak of Palestinians as a people, insisting that there are only Palestinian Arabs, just as there are Palestinian Jews. Since Begin is Prime Minister, his views on the matter have obvious significance. Nevertheless, they are not widely shared within Israel and do not represent the mainstream of Israeli thinking.

Even those Israelis who acknowledge the force of Palestinian nationalism, how-

6. This position was reiterated by Shimon Peres, leader of the Labor Party, when he said, in his response to Sadat’s speech to the Knesset (November 20, 1977): “We are aware of the existence of the Palestinian identity. Every people has the right to decide its own identity and this does not depend on the authorization of another nation.”

ever, are generally unprepared to accept it on its own terms—a tendency reflected in the official position of the previous government. Attempts have been made to define Palestinian nationalism in terms more convenient to Israeli policy. Thus, for example, historical arguments and observations about the ethnic character of Palestinians have been used to support the idea of a Jordanian/Palestinian state as the appropriate vehicle to give expression to Palestinian national identity. These arguments may have a certain degree of logical validity, but they ignore some of the central dimensions of Palestinian nationalism, such as (1) the significance of political independence and sovereignty to the expression of Palestinian identity; (2) the need of Palestinians to differentiate themselves from other Arab states, based on the Palestinian experience in the Arab world since 1948; (3) the centrality of the territory of Palestine in forging Palestinian nationalism, which views return to that territory as an essential condition for the restoration of justice; and (4) the role of the PLO as the symbol and recognized agent of Palestinian nationalism and independence.

In sum, for both sides, psychological resistance to the idea that the adversary is a bona fide nation continues to be a powerful element in the conflict. To be sure, there has been some movement. Palestinians cannot totally ignore the phenomenon of Israel and the support for it among world Jewry. Similarly, Israelis cannot totally ignore the phenomenon of the PLO and the support for it among Palestinians (as well as others) around the world. Still, resistance to accepting the nationhood of the other remains very strong. Perhaps this formulation is too pat, but one might summarize the situation as follows: Palestinians (and certainly other Arabs) are increasingly accepting the *reality* of a Jewish state and hence—by implication—of a Jewish nation, but they have not accepted the *principle* of Jewish national identity. By contrast, Israelis (with the notable exception of Begin) are increasingly accepting the *principle* of Palestinian national identity, but not its *reality*—i.e., the concrete political forms in which this identity seeks to express itself. Each still regards the other's nationalism as in some sense unnatural, historically unjustified, and a fiction (or perhaps a fraud) promulgated by a fanatical minority.

Though it is not my purpose here to urge any particular policy or action on Israelis or Palestinians, I am prepared to argue that a realistic policy must proceed from an awareness by each side that its adversary has all the characteristics of a nation, expressing itself through a national movement with its own dynamic and its own political forms. A group becomes a nation once its members perceive themselves as such, and are ready to define their identities, to pursue their interests, and to engage in costly and self-sacrificial actions around that perception.

There are, of course, certain objective conditions that give rise to a national movement and if these conditions are not met the movement is unlikely to succeed. However, for outsiders to insist that a group lacks the formal characteristics or the historical justifications for nationhood—i.e., that it *ought* not to be a nation—is an exercise in futility. It is equally futile to downplay the authenticity of a nationalist movement by claiming that it is merely the handiwork of an aggressive elite that does not represent the population. All nationalist movements are in part acts of creation, in which an enterprising elite—in the pursuit of its own ideology and interests—takes the leadership in mobilizing national sentiments. Such an elite cannot succeed, however, unless there are national sentiments to be mobilized. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have amply demonstrated the existence and authenticity of such sentiments.

The resistance of each side to recognizing the nationhood of the other is rooted in the view that their respective national identities are inherently incompatible and that the fulfillment of one can be achieved only at the expense of the other. This view is a direct consequence of the fact that the two nationalist movements focus on the same land. For Palestinians, acknowledging Jewish nationhood implies acceptance of the right of Jews to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Many Palestinians see this as tantamount to qualifying or abandoning their own claim to Palestine and thus destroying the *raison d'être* of their national movement. For Israelis, acknowledging Palestinian nationhood implies acceptance of the right of Palestinians to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Many Israelis fear that such a state—particularly one that would carry the name "Palestine"—might suggest support of the Palestinians' claim to the whole of Palestine and thus cast doubt on the legitimacy of Israel.

Each side seems concerned, then—perhaps at a partly unconscious level—that acceptance of the other's nationhood would undermine the moral basis of its own claims. This is not to say that they are afraid the moral basis of their claims would be destroyed; each side is sufficiently convinced of its moral position to feel immune against that danger. What they may well be afraid of, however, is that their own moral claims would become more ambiguous, less self-evident, and more subject to debate if they recognized, even implicitly, that there may also be some moral basis to the claims of the other side.

Such ambiguities are particularly threatening because the stakes for each side are extremely high. They are not merely concerned about having a good case so that they can win debates or improve their bargaining postures. Rather, both sides are deeply afraid about their continuing national existence. Recognition of these genuine fears on both sides is essential to any understanding of this con-

flict. Due to a combination of historical traumata and current realities, each group perceives itself as particularly vulnerable and feels that its survival as a national group is in the balance. The anxiety about national survival is magnified by anxieties about personal survival, since the destruction of the nation is seen in the context of wholesale massacres. Each side, of course, tries to belittle the fears of the other. Often, they do not understand the basis of the other's fears. They take them as being groundless and hence inauthentic. When such fears are voiced by leaders on the other side they are viewed as propaganda ploys; when voiced by common citizens, they are viewed as products of the leaders' propaganda. These fears, however, though they may often be used for propaganda purposes, are very real—not only to the masses, but to the leaders as well.

Let me give an illustration of how these fears may manifest themselves. Golda Meir's statement about the Palestinians, mentioned above, is constantly reiterated by Palestinians and other Arabs. Even though the statement has not represented Israeli mainstream opinion for many years, it is brought up as an indicator of what Israelis really think about the Palestinians. A parallel on the other side can be found in Ahmad Shukairy's famous statement about driving the Jews into the sea. Again, this statement has not represented Palestinian or Arab policy for a long time, but is constantly brought up as an indicator of Arab intentions. Why do these statements persist so long in the consciousness of the two sides? In part, they are being reiterated because they make very good debating points. In large part, however, they persist because they articulate what each side believes to be the adversary's *real* intentions and thus touch off profound existential fears. The Israelis believe that destroying Israel and driving the Jews into the sea is precisely what the Palestinians really want to do and would indeed do if they ever had the opportunity. The Palestinians believe that destroying Palestinian identity—as well as Palestinian lives—is precisely what the Israelis want to do and are systematically preparing to do (and, moreover, that some of the Arab states may in their own ways be ready to cooperate in such a program).

In sum, fulfillment of the other's national identity is perceived by each side as equivalent to the destruction of its own identity. Under the circumstances, it is understandable that each is reluctant to accept the other's national identity and its right to a state expressing that identity. To do so, in their view, would be to participate in a process that directly imperils their own national existence. Thus, neither side can be expected to make a move to accept the other unless and until it develops a sense of assurance that its own existence is secure.

Even if one of the parties were prepared to make the first move in accepting the other, it is not at all clear that the other would reciprocate. In fact, each side is

on record as refusing to accept the other regardless of the other's actions. The Israeli government insists that it will not negotiate with the PLO even if the PLO accepts the existence of Israel; the PNC insists that, even if a Palestinian state were established in part of Palestine, this would not mean acceptance of Israel. In other words, non-recognition remains, for each side, a matter of basic principle and thus unconditional. Nevertheless, there is a reasonable possibility that acceptance by one side would set into motion a dynamic process conducive to reciprocation. Whether or not being accepted by the other is a *sufficient* condition for acceptance of the other, we must certainly assume that it is a *necessary* condition. That is, neither side will accept the other unless it has already been accepted by the other or is absolutely certain that its own initiative will be reciprocated.

The Psychological Meaning of Acceptance

It follows from the above analysis that neither side will engage in a process of negotiation, which implies acceptance of the other or looks to such acceptance as a hoped for outcome, unless (as a minimum) it feels assured that acceptance by the other is a likely prospect. What does acceptance by the other mean to each of the parties? What does each side want when it speaks of acceptance?

From the perspective of the Israelis, it is essential that not only their existence, but also their legitimacy be accepted by their neighbors. That is, they want Israel to be recognized as a permanent entity in the Middle East, a state with the same acknowledged right to existence as other states, rather than one whose neighbors are pledged to subvert it and ultimately destroy it. A corollary of this view is that the state must have normal relations with its neighbors, at the levels of diplomacy, commerce, scientific and cultural exchange, tourism, and so on.

Israelis have several reasons for attaching such importance to acceptance on these terms. First, I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the role of straight security concerns. In view of their genuine fears about national survival, Israelis feel that continuing non-acceptance of the legitimacy of their state and of its right to exist is an open invitation to military attacks by their neighbors, and a form of legitimization of such attacks. Even if they were convinced, however, that there was no serious threat to their security and that they could defend the state effectively against military attacks, Israelis would find continuing non-acceptance highly obnoxious. The status of Israel as a small state, surrounded by declared enemies with whom it has no interchange, creates a feeling of claus-

rophobia that has become increasingly disturbing to many Israelis. Aside from the realities of restricted movement, this situation provides too many reminders of the ghetto experience that characterized so much of Jewish history (despite obvious differences between the well-armed, independent Jewish state and the defenseless, disfranchised ghetto population). This sense of claustrophobia may contribute to the apparent increase in emigration from Israel. It may also account for the great enthusiasm Israelis have shown for open bridges and open borders. Quite apart from their propaganda value, these manifestations speak to the great need of Israelis for interchange with their neighbors.

Non-acceptance by its neighbors, now that it has spread to most Third World states, is also the root of Israel's political isolation in the international arena. Such isolation would be troubling to any nation; again, however, it may take on special meaning in the context of Jewish history. It is not too difficult to assimilate this isolation to the pariah status of the Jew, a central element of the Jewish historical experience with devastating consequences. Furthermore, many Israelis are concerned about the effect of continuing non-acceptance and isolation on Israeli society itself. They are afraid that Israel's international status may push its internal climate in the direction of a garrison state or a self-righteous enclave, thus endangering fundamental Jewish and Zionist values. Finally, acceptance of Israel's legitimacy is important to Israelis as a confirmation of the moral basis of their state.

For all of these reasons, the insistence on acceptance, from the Israeli perspective, is not merely a bargaining ploy. Rather, it must be understood as an expression of profound psychological concern.

From the perspective of the Palestinians, it is essential that they be accepted as a national group, entitled to its own independent state. Such a state, in their view, must be equal to other states, having the same degree of sovereignty that is granted to all recognized polities in the international system. They want to be free to choose their own government and to decide for themselves—like any other sovereign actor—whether or not they wish to federate, confederate, or link up in other ways with any other state or states. Palestinians generally assume that acceptance of their right to such an independent state presupposes acceptance of the PLO as the body that represents them and speaks for them.

Why is acceptance on these terms so important to the Palestinians? Again, we must start with the Palestinians' genuine concern about their national existence. They want a sovereign, independent state as an affirmation of their separate national identity—as explicit recognition that they are a *nation* rather than a mere collection of refugees. An independent state, under specifically Palestinian

rule, is of special significance to them because it contrasts with their bitter experience of decades of refugee status and second-class treatment in most of the Arab world. Independence from Jordan (while keeping open the possibility of some relationship, as long as they can enter into it as equals) is particularly important to many Palestinians because of their experiences with Amman, culminating in the events of 1970. The fact that a majority of Jordanians are Palestinians does not make a Jordanian/Palestinian state, under Hashemite rule, a satisfactory substitute for a Palestinian state. Not only does a Jordanian/Palestinian state fail to satisfy the quest for independence, but many Palestinians fear that they would be oppressed in such a state, and not free to express their Palestinian identity.

Furthermore, it is essential to Palestinians that their state be centered on Palestinian soil, because it is the loss of that homeland that is the mainspring of their national movement. The establishment of a state on Palestinian soil would address itself to the sense of injustice that pervades the Palestinian experience. It would represent at least a partial acknowledgement that an injustice has been done and is being rectified by the creation of an independent state. Finally, the central role assigned to the PLO by so many Palestinians in their view of national acceptance derives from the fact that the PLO is the only organized and acknowledged body that symbolizes, expresses, and promotes Palestinian nationhood and independence. This does not mean that all Palestinians—particularly among the West Bank and Gaza populations—are enthusiastic about the current PLO leadership. However, they see no alternative to the PLO as the carrier of Palestinian national independence.

For all these reasons, then, acceptance of their national rights, from the Palestinian perspective, cannot be divorced from the concept of an independent state on Palestinian soil or from the agency of the PLO.

Neither Israelis nor Palestinians see any indication in the pronouncements of the other side that acceptance, as they conceive it, is in the offing.

Israelis are often told that, under the proper circumstances, the PLO is ready to accept Israel. Yet, when they read the 1977 PNC resolutions, they see no sign of such readiness. The resolutions imply acceptance of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, but even in return for such a state (which is in itself much more than the Israeli government is prepared to give) they explicitly rule out acceptance of Israel and peace with it. It is difficult to persuade Israelis that their doubts about PLO intentions are unfounded. A strong minority within the PLO, which cannot be ignored, is against any kind of settlement with Israel. Even the

majority, though prepared to take a flexible stand, has not indicated a commitment to ending the struggle—including the military struggle—once a Palestinian state is established.

On the other hand, there is another minority within the PLO that seems committed to accepting Israel and ending the struggle in return for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Within these territories themselves, the population also seems to favor a settlement along these lines. How much weight these sentiments will ultimately have remains open to question, but there is at least some basis for arguing that acceptance of Israel by the PLO is a possible outcome if appropriate steps are taken and if the dynamics of the interaction are allowed to play themselves out. Assuming this is so, however, what would it take to assure the Israelis that acceptance (at least minimally in line with their own definition of it) is indeed a possibility, and thus to persuade them to enter into the process that would presumably bring it into effect?

The Palestinians, on their part, also see no indication of Israeli readiness to offer them the kind of acceptance they desire. Even the Labor government made it clear that it would not accept an independent Palestinian state was of the Jordan and that it would not negotiate with the PLO. Palestinians, understandably, take such statements at face value, just as Israelis take at face value the resolutions of the PNC. They are not inclined to gamble on the proposition that these statements might not represent the Israelis' last word. Their distrust of Israeli intentions has been magnified since the election of a Likud government.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Israeli position is more open than it seems. There is a minority—small, but not without influence—that favors the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. There are many others who are willing to consider different options—and their numbers as well as their flexibility may increase if it becomes clear that current policies stand in the way of negotiating an overall settlement. The frequent statement by Israelis that they are prepared to give a great deal in return for real peace should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. Israeli public opinion has been profoundly affected by Sadat's visit to Jerusalem last November, which for the first time created the widespread feeling that real peace is within the realm of possibility. There are clear indications that opposition to the Begin government's policies is crystallizing within Israel because these policies are seen as insufficiently responsive—particularly on the West Bank issue—to Sadat's initiative. To be sure, the Israeli public remains opposed to an independent Palestinian state. At the same time, polls have shown a majority to be in favor of dialogue with Palestinians. If Arafat were to associate

himself with Sadat's initiative, and if an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue were indeed to take place, it could conceivably alter the meaning of a Palestinian state and of the PLO in Israeli eyes.

I am not suggesting that PLO acceptance of Israel will automatically be reciprocated by the Israelis, just as I did not suggest that Israeli acceptance of Palestinian national rights would be automatically reciprocated by the PLO. However, there is at least some basis for arguing that acceptance of the Palestinians by Israel is a possible outcome if appropriate steps are taken and if the dynamics of the interaction are allowed to play themselves out. Assuming this is so, what would it take to assure the Palestinians that acceptance (at least minimally in line with their own definition of it) is indeed a possibility and thus to persuade them to enter into the process that would presumably bring it into effect?

This brings us to the question of the psychological conditions that might help to provide such assurances to both sides, thus allowing each to entertain the idea of accepting the other.

Psychological Prerequisites for Acceptance

The psychological prerequisites for acceptance cannot be brought about by mere manipulation of perceptions independent of the realities that these perceptions represent. It is impossible to divorce psychological conditions from the objective (political, military, diplomatic) conditions on which acceptance depends. Thus, for example, a central element in creating the psychological conditions for acceptance is the perception by each side that there have been significant changes in the other side, and that further changes are likely to occur in response to new events. Perception of change, however, is not independent of the reality of change: A fundamental requirement for the perception of change is that change has really occurred and that there is a demonstrable basis for predicting further changes. The psychological conditions cannot substitute for the objective ones, but must accompany them. The psychological question is: *If* changes have really occurred, and if there are sound reasons for anticipating further changes, how can the parties be persuaded of these facts? The question is far from trivial because the dynamics of conflict create a strong tendency to dismiss change on the part of the adversary, both because new information is assimilated to a rigidly held negative image of the adversary and because there is great fear of underestimating the adversary's hostile intentions and thus being caught off guard. In this connection, it is important to keep in mind that there are dangers not only in perceiving changes that have actually not occurred, but also in failing to per-

ceive changes that have in fact occurred. Moreover, the relationship between perception and reality is more complex than is often assumed, for perceptions not only represent realities, but often create them by way of self-fulfilling prophecies.

Six psychological conditions must be created if a process of acceptance is to be set into motion. Each requires actions by both parties that are complementary and actions that are reciprocal to those of the adversary. For example, the first condition requires of the Israelis to make an active effort at understanding the perspective of the Palestinians—not an easy task, since it calls for some degree of empathy with their adversary. This action requires *complementary* action on the part of the Palestinians, in that they must try to communicate their own perspective in such a way that the Israelis can more readily understand it—which again is difficult since it requires an attitude toward the adversary as someone to be persuaded rather than overpowered and out-manuevered. At the same time, the Israeli action requires *reciprocal* action on the part of the Palestinians, in that they in turn must make an active effort to understand the perspective of the Israelis. This Palestinian action, of course, also requires complementary action by the Israelis in communicating their own perspective in such a way that it will be understandable to the Palestinians. This interactional framework should be kept in mind as we examine each of the six prerequisites.

1. *Each side must acquire some insight into the perspective of the other.* Thus, for example, Israelis must come to understand why it is difficult, even for the most moderate Palestinians, to agree to the acceptance of Israel without having a clearer picture of what the Israelis are prepared to give them in return. Israelis must realize that acceptance of Israel represents the Palestinians' last and most valuable card. They see such acceptance as an irreversible step, by which they would be giving up a fundamental part of their struggle—thus, a step they are unwilling to take unless they are convinced that their minimum conditions will be met. At the moment, they do not feel at all convinced of that prospect. They are afraid that, whatever they do, Israel will not give up the West Bank and Gaza; that, even if it does, it will not permit the Palestinians to develop an independent existence within these territories; that it will pose continuing threats of military intervention and reoccupation of these territories; and that the expansionist dynamic of the Jewish state will eventually reverse the process by which a Palestinian state may be established.

Reciprocally, the Palestinians must come to understand that Israelis—not only the masses, but also their political leaders—are genuinely concerned about the security implications of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They are

satisfied that such a state will not be able to resist pressures from the Soviet Union to establish a military presence there; that it will not be able to resist pressures from such groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to use the state as a base for terrorist excursions across the border; and that it will be subject to internal conflict and instability conducive to a Lebanon-type civil war, whose effects could easily spill over the border into Israel. Israelis feel that an independent Palestinian state would not be consistent with the kinds of security arrangements that they consider essential. For example, demilitarization of the West Bank and Gaza could be negotiated if these territories were a part of a Jordanian/Palestinian state; if they constituted the entire state, however, demilitarization would represent an excessive infringement of that state's sovereignty. At the most profound level, most Israelis do not believe that a Palestinian state would be accepted by its leadership as a permanent solution. It would merely serve as a staging area for continuing the military struggle against Israel, whether by terrorist or conventional means. Thus, from the Israeli perspective, agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would mean giving up their trump card—withdrawal from occupied territories—without any assurance of real peace and security in return for that irreversible step.

Though each side may consider the other's concerns to be unfounded, it is important that it understand the perspective that gives rise to them. Only through such understanding will each side be able to make sense of the other's reluctance to accept it, and to identify the steps that it must take on its own part if progress toward acceptance is to be achieved.

2. *Each side must be persuaded that there is someone to talk to on the other side and something to talk about.* It has generally been assumed that there is no one to talk to on the other side; those who sound reasonable have tended to be dismissed as insincere or nonrepresentative. Questions have also been raised about their long-term "responsibility"—that is, their ability to maintain control and to deliver on any commitments they might make. Similarly, it has been assumed that there is nothing to talk about—the tendency has been to view the demands of the two sides as mutually exclusive and to think of the adversary as prepared to negotiate only your own surrender.

Acceptance of the idea that there is someone to talk to and something to talk about implies a differentiated view of the other side and a recognition that change has occurred. Both are difficult in a conflict relationship. The parties usually do not make the deliberate efforts that are needed if differences and changes in one side are to become apparent to the other side. In fact, because of

internal political considerations, the more moderate elements often find it necessary to play down new departures from a militant line. They wrongly assume, however, that the changes they prefer to keep quiet are completely obvious to the adversary. Approaching the matter entirely from their own perspective, they are painfully aware of how difficult the change has been, of the lengthy struggle that brought it about, and of the persistence of internal divisions over it, and they cannot imagine that such a controversial change would escape the adversary's notice. From the adversary's perspective, however, the change may appear negligible, since he evaluates it not in terms of the difficulty in achieving it, but in terms of the amount of movement toward his own preferred position.

For example, the changes reflected in the 1977 PNC resolutions were produced by a lengthy and difficult struggle within the PLO, and thus seemed considerable to those involved in the struggle.⁷ For Israelis, however, they represented imperceptible movement, constituting at best a tactical shift without any willingness to accept the existence of Israel. Conversely, the Israeli-American working paper of October 1977 on the resumption of the Geneva conference represented a significant and controversial departure in Israeli policy, in that it accepted the participation of Palestinians in Geneva in their own capacity rather than as part of the Jordanian delegation, and the separation of Palestinian political issues from the refugee problem.⁸ For Palestinians, however, these concessions were obscured by the document's continuing exclusion of PLO participation, and by its failure to contemplate an independent Palestinian state. The PLO leadership saw no evidence in this document of change in the Israeli position.⁹

Thus, if the two parties (or elements within them) are to persuade each other that there is someone to talk to and something to talk about, they must find ways of communicating more clearly and convincingly the differences that may exist within their respective communities and the changes in thinking that may have occurred, rather than rely on the unrealistic assumption that all of this is obvious to the other side. Moreover, these developments have to be seen in their larger context. For example, current positions of the PLO must be seen in the context of changes and realignments within the Arab world, to which Palestinians clear-

7. See, for example, Sabri Jiryis, "Towards an Independent Palestinian State—a Palestinian View," *New Outlook*, August 1977, 20(5), 43–50, 52 (translation of an article which originally appeared in *Shu'un Falastiniya*).

8. This analysis of the working paper is derived from a stimulating seminar presented by Mattityahu Peled at the Center for International Affairs on October 20, 1977.

9. See Marvine Howe, "P.L.O. Rejects U.S.—Israeli Plan for Peace Conference in Geneva," *New York Times*, 23 October 1977.

ly cannot be oblivious. Current positions of the Israeli government must be seen in the context of changes in Israeli thinking since 1967, which include a decisive shift away from the notion that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be ended by a military solution. And the positions of both sides must be seen in the context of changes in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

3. *Each side must be able to distinguish between the dreams and the operational programs of the other side.* For Israelis, the PLO's reiteration of its commitment to a united Palestine is an indication that acceptance of a West Bank-Gaza state is merely a tactical move and that the PLO hopes to use such a state as a staging area for the destruction of Israel. Israelis are often told that pronouncements about a united Palestine are not to be taken literally—that they represent a dream which Palestinians cannot be expected to abandon, even though they no longer anticipate that it will be turned into reality. Israelis do not find this reassuring. They take dreams seriously, because they know from the history of the Zionist movement—which began with the dream of a Jewish state—that dreams can become operational. If they are to be reassured, Israelis will have to be shown convincingly that the Palestinians make clear distinctions between dreams that merely represent verbal commitments to basic ideological principles and dreams that represent blueprints for programmatic efforts. Israelis will have to be persuaded that, while Palestinians are unlikely to abandon the dream of a united Palestine as a basic tenet of their ideology, they can nevertheless proceed with functional acceptance of Israel and arrangements for a stable peace. The argument that the dream does not represent an operational program can be made more persuasive to the extent that Palestinians can set out concretely what the main lines of their operational program actually are.

Palestinians, for their part, take very seriously the Zionist dream of the ingathering of the exiles. This dream nourishes what they see as the expansionist dynamic of Zionism, leading to policies of settlement and annexation of occupied territories. They are afraid that such policies might be pursued not only by an Israeli government dominated by the Likud, whose platform explicitly calls for incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza in Israel, but also by a government that expresses its willingness to withdraw from these territories. The Palestinians do not feel confident that, if they recognize Israel and accept a West Bank-Gaza state, the future of that state will be secure—i.e., that it will not be encroached upon by an Israel responding to the pressures of Jewish immigration. If Palestinians are to be reassured on this score, they must be shown convincingly that the Zionist dream of the ingathering of the exiles is not being translated into operational programs of mass immigration and Jewish settlement. Pales-

tinians will have to be persuaded that, while Israelis are unlikely to abandon such a basic tenet of Zionist ideology as the principle of open Jewish immigration to Israel (expressed through the Law of Return), this principle will not threaten the integrity of a Palestinian state. The argument can be made more persuasive if Israelis can show concretely that plans for Jewish immigration and settlement are predicated on an Israel living within its agreed-upon borders.

The distinction between dreams and operational programs becomes easier to draw when we realize how ideological changes typically come about. Change does not usually come about through the logical process of abandoning one set of beliefs and replacing it with an alternative set. Rather, new—and sometimes contradictory—ideological principles develop alongside of the old ones. The latter are not explicitly rejected and are often, in fact, ritualistically proclaimed, but they become increasingly nonoperational. It is not enough, of course, to understand that this is the typical course of change; each side must also see that the process of developing a new set of beliefs has in fact been set into motion on the other side.

4. *Each side must be persuaded that mutual concessions will create a new situation, setting a process of change into motion.* Parties in conflict tend to underestimate not only the amount of change that the adversary has undergone, but also the prospects for change in the future. They anticipate that the adversary's actions in the future will replicate his actions in the past, regardless of any new elements that might enter into the situation, including new actions on their own part. In short, they give little credence to the dynamics of a changing situation.

Thus, Israelis will have to be persuaded that the establishment of a Palestinian state is likely to alter the situation in significant ways, so that the bases for their current fears would be removed. According to this view, for example, the PLO, once charged with the responsibility of running an independent state, would not constitute a threat to Israeli security: they would be too occupied with internal problems to engage in external adventures; they would have a vested interest in maintaining peaceful relations with their neighbors; and, in any event, they would be restrained by the Arab states on whom the Palestinian state would be heavily dependent. To persuade Israelis of the validity of this analysis, it is not enough to insist that these changes will "obviously" take place with the establishment of a Palestinian state; it is not obvious to them. Rather, it is necessary to construct fairly specific scenarios, which envisage in detail the probable consequences of the creation of a Palestinian state under differing circumstances.

Similarly, Palestinians will have to be persuaded that, once they recognize

Israel and make it clear that they accept partition of Palestine as a permanent solution, a new dynamic process will be set into motion, assuring the establishment and security of a Palestinian state. According to this view, official Israeli pronouncements notwithstanding, a change in the PLO posture is likely to change Israeli perceptions of the PLO and of an independent Palestinian state, thus making the two-state option more acceptable to them. Again, however, to persuade Palestinians of the validity of this analysis, it is necessary to construct fairly specific scenarios, which envisage in detail the probable consequences of a change in PLO posture. The Palestinians, like the Israelis, have a very real need for reassurance that concessions will not place them in a position of irreversible disadvantage.

5. *Each side must be persuaded that structural changes, conducive to a stable peace, have taken place or will take place in the leadership of the other side.* This condition is closely related to those already discussed—particularly the second and fourth—in that it refers to the perception of change and of the prospects for future change. I am singling it out, however, because the perception of the other side's leadership is central to each party's assessment of the range of possibilities open to it and of the probable consequences of various moves. There is a tendency to assume that the leadership on the other side is static—that, aside from minor adjustments in personnel and tactics, it has not changed and is not likely to change. Evidence of structural change in the other side's leadership is therefore particularly important before each side is willing to risk a change in its own posture.

Thus, Israelis have to be reassured that, within the PLO, the moderate elements are in fact in control and likely to remain so. Though this may be assumed by knowledgeable observers, the evidence is not persuasive to most Israelis. They point to the hard-line positions taken by PLO spokesmen as well as in the PNC resolutions. Even if those positions represent compromises forced on the leadership by rejectionist elements, they raise the question among Israelis whether rejectionists have the power to exercise a veto over the leadership's actions—and whether they will continue to hold such power. Thus, Israelis will have to be persuaded not only that the leadership is moderate, but that—with movement toward a settlement—it will gain increasing control over the organization and will in fact be able to make its policies stick.

Israelis must also be persuaded that the PLO as an organization is undergoing a transformation. It can be argued that, as the PLO becomes the internationally recognized symbol and focus for Palestinian nationalism, it is being transformed from a guerrilla organization into a political organization with

many of the features of a government-in-exile. Thus, many Palestinians—and this is especially true for the increasingly important constituencies of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza—support the PLO not necessarily because they are particularly devoted to the organization or its leadership, but because they see it as the embodiment of Palestinian national identity and the vehicle for an independent state. This analysis suggests the possibility of significant change in the Palestinian posture, not through the replacement of the PLO by another agency, but through gradual transformation of the PLO itself. Among other things, for example, the local leadership of the West Bank and Gaza may be more heavily represented and take a more active leadership role within the PLO. To be persuaded of the validity of this analysis, Israelis would need concrete evidence of such a transformation process in the structure and behavior of PLO leadership. PLO actions in the wake of the Sadat initiative make Israelis even more skeptical in evaluating such evidence.

As for Palestinians' perception of Israeli leadership, the primary requirement at this point is reassurance that the present leadership and its particular program for settling the conflict are not permanent fixtures of the Israeli political scene. Some Palestinians may see the policy of the Begin government as merely a continuation, in more explicit and militant terms, of what has been Israeli policy all along; others may see the present government as representing a major shift toward a more hard-line policy, consistent with the opinion shifts in the Israeli electorate. In either conception, the present leadership is seen as representing a stable consensus and firmly entrenched in power. The election victory of the Likud thus confirmed the worst fears of many Palestinians and has increased their wariness about accepting Israel.

To be reassured, Palestinians will have to be persuaded that the hard-line postures of the present government are capable of transformation or that, failing such transformation, it will be replaced by a more moderate leadership. As evidence for the Begin government's capacity to act pragmatically, at the expense of ideological commitments, observers have cited its recognition of the existence of a Palestinian political problem, its willingness to leave open the question of sovereignty over the West Bank, its acceptance of some degree of Palestinian participation in the peace process, and its proposals for Palestinian self-rule. Palestinians will have to be convinced that these steps represent concessions at all and, if so, that they are not just tactical accommodations which leave the basic Israeli posture untouched. In particular they will have to be convinced that they themselves can help to accelerate a process of transformation in the Israeli posture by moving toward acceptance of Israel.

Palestinians must also be persuaded that there is a more moderate alternative leadership, with enough potential support in the Israeli public, that can replace the present leadership if it proves incapable of transforming itself in the face of new events. They will have to be shown in detail how such a prospect fits available information about the structure of public opinion and of political groupings within Israel. For example, they will want to know how firm the public support for the present government is, what evidence there is for fluidity in Israeli public opinion on settlement of the conflict, and what circumstances can be expected to produce what kinds of changes in public opinion. Similarly, they will want to know how the opposition parties in Israel are mobilizing their resources, what new political groupings are emerging, what alternative policy options are being generated, and by what scenarios a change in political leadership is expected to materialize. Beyond that, they need reassurance that, in or out of power, the hard-line elements in the electorate will not have the capacity to veto or reverse any future settlement that might be achieved. The political debate within Israel that has been generated by Sadat's initiative and Begin's response to it may provide some tests of these possibilities.

6. *Each side must sense a responsiveness to its human concerns and psychological needs on the part of the adversary.* The critical element here is an exchange of symbolic gestures that convey a recognition of the other's fundamental concerns. What constitutes meaningful gestures is far from obvious. Identification of such gestures often requires cooperative effort: Each party must be willing not only to offer gestures to the other, but also to communicate what gestures from the other it would find meaningful.

One type of gesture that would be particularly meaningful to Israelis is one that indicates that the adversary accepts them as fellow-human beings. For example, the refusal of most Arabs in diplomatic settings to shake hands with them is profoundly disturbing to Israelis. Some regard the Israeli preoccupation with handshakes as propagandistic or laughable; it is not. The refusal to shake hands symbolizes to Israelis their exclusion from the human category. A reversal of that custom may well have a significant psychological impact, as was evidenced by the profound Israeli reaction to Sadat's round of handshakes with Israeli officials upon arriving at Ben Gurion Airport.

For the Palestinians, a particularly important symbolic gesture would be an acknowledgement by Israelis that a historical injustice has been done to them. Such an acknowledgement would be greatly strengthened by a public indication of willingness to rectify the injustice—even if only in a partial or symbolic way. For example, some statement about the right of Palestinians to compensa-

tion or (under specified conditions) to return would fulfill this purpose. A different kind of symbolic gesture might take the form of some acknowledgement of the special position of Israeli Arabs. Gestures of this nature would be seen by Palestinians as Israeli recognition of their human needs and may serve as important indicators to them that Israel is serious in its commitment to peace.

The identification of specific gestures that would be meaningful to each party is a challenge to the seriousness and imagination of both.

Conclusion

It is clear that official, public recognition, when it comes, will have to be simultaneous, since neither side is prepared to take the first step in view of the risks that such a step would entail. Simultaneous recognition can come about only when each side has explored the implications of accepting the other and has assured itself that the risks are tolerable. Such assurance depends on creating the kinds of psychological conditions that I have been discussing.

There is a wide gap between listing the conditions and creating them. I have described some of the new insights and understandings that each party will have to gain, and some of the messages, signals, and assurances that each will have to convey to the other, before mutual acceptance becomes a serious possibility. But there are powerful reasons—both objective and subjective—why these understandings do not exist and these messages are not being exchanged. Indeed, a major function of this analysis has been to stress that—contrary to what is sometimes maintained—these conditions do not now exist. Each party is inclined to impute to the adversary greater knowledge than he possesses; for example, it is assumed that the adversary “knows very well” that there is someone to talk to or that concessions will create a new situation.

Listing a series of conditions that do not exist is in one sense discouraging, because it shows how great a distance remains to be covered—although discouragement about the possibilities for mutual acceptance between Israelis and Palestinians is hardly new. In another sense, the listing of necessary but nonexistent conditions may be encouraging, because it suggests that there may be something to be done—it outlines an agenda for action. The critical question is: *What* can be done? What procedures may help to create the conditions conducive to mutual acceptance?

These conditions can best be created through direct interaction between the parties, in which they confront their mutual concerns, play out various scenarios, experiment with possible gestures, and jointly look for ways of redefining areas of

conflict so that they can become amenable to resolution. These kinds of interaction cannot take place in an official context since, in the absence of mutual acceptance, the parties refuse to meet with each other. Moreover, even if they are willing to enter into discussions without prior recognition, official public negotiations do not provide a suitable framework for the kind of interaction proposed. What is needed, instead, is an opportunity for preparatory discussions, preceding and eventually accompanying official negotiations. These discussions should take place in a situation in which representatives of the two parties can interact unofficially, privately, with minimal risk, and without prior commitments. The norms of the situation must be conducive to new learning, to an analytical approach to the conflict, and to a cooperative problem-solving orientation. This would be the kind of situation in which the parties could listen to each other, could express their own concerns in the light of the concerns expressed by the other, and could give and receive signals.

I can say from experience that, despite the obstacles, interactions of this sort can be arranged. They can provide valuable opportunities for sharing of perspectives, for learning about the substance and depth of the other side's concerns, for gaining insight into the process of change, for specifying the range within which mutually acceptable solutions can be sought, and for identifying necessary and possible steps toward breaking the present impasse. Such interactions cannot substitute for the difficult, painful process of diplomatic negotiation, centering around the very real conflicts of interest that separate the two sides. They can, however, pave the way for negotiation by helping to create the psychological conditions required for mutual acceptance.

Observing Close Encounters in the Third World

Ever since Columbus opened the sealanes to the Americas and Vasco da Gama to Asia, "Northern" states with more advanced and efficient military, political and economic systems than their "Southern" contemporaries have been pursuing empire or ascendancy in the third worlds of their day. The objects have been commercial profits, propagation of faiths and, equally important, power and preemption vis-à-vis their "Northern" imperial rivals.

Superpower competition in the third world is not a new phenomenon. Today such competition—in deference to current realities such as the indigestibility of most third world states, or current morality such as equal rights and self-determination of peoples—has had to be conducted in an altruistic or libertarian guise. Its objects remain not unlike those of the earlier imperial process.

The style and Weltanschauung of today's two protagonists are, however, much more dissimilar than in previous centuries. The curious ebb and flow of superpower perceptions, ambitions and will is illustrated by the fact that, just as the United States after its expulsion from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975 became more reluctant to intervene militarily in the third world, the Soviet Union, perhaps emboldened by its rival's discomforture in Indochina, or perhaps exasperated by its rival's success in the Middle East, has become much bolder in its own interventions. It has followed, however, its traditional practice of employing surrogates whenever successful intervention seems to call for actual participation in combat. Now for the first time, the surrogates are not exclusively natives of the disputed nation or territory but rather Cubans, whose third world image and affiliations make the more acceptable than Russians would have been.

In assessing the national security interests of the Soviet Union, one would suppose the first would be protecting its frontiers, many of which are shared with third world countries.

Three hundred years of Czarist expansion, followed by that of the Soviet Empire after World War II, created and maintained the gravest fears among almost all its neighbors. Many acquired substantial weaponry from the United States and solicited an American military presence. These measures in turn created a feeling of threat and encirclement on the part of the Soviet Union which caused it, for example, to build up India militarily against Pakistan and Iraq against Iran.

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When reproached for its military presence in the Horn of Africa, one Soviet reply was to point out the much larger and longer lasting U.S. military presence in Iran, which is adjacent to a vulnerable Soviet frontier while the Horn is about as far from America as it could be. This riposte, while perfectly just and understandable, ignores the equally understandable apprehensions of Iran, which experienced a Russian sphere of influence in its northern provinces before World War I and a Soviet military occupation in 1941, only belatedly withdrawn under heavy U.S. pressure.

The legitimate Soviet concern with the protection of its boundaries therefore has to contend with a panoply of alliances against it, of which its own power, revolutionary rhetoric and strategic expansionism has been the principle cause. In East Asia, moreover, its encouragement of North Korean aggression in 1950 provoked a withdrawing America to remain in the Western Pacific and inspired U.S. alliances with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Clumsy Soviet treatment of China, moreover, transformed their alliance into violent animosity.

Another strand of perceived Soviet national interest in the third world has been that odd mixture of revolutionary ideology and great power appetite for prestige which caused it to support "socialist" or "progressive" regimes and "wars of national liberation" and to give the most extravagant and implausible definition to these terms to justify its intervention in particular cases. Since the revolutions it supported were more often national than socialist, and even those which claimed to be the latter were intensely jealous of their national independence, the Soviet Union derived little lasting profit from these ventures.

Despite lip service to the causes of the third world and the non-aligned, moreover, the Soviet Union was so patently indifferent, if not hostile, to many of their paramount aims, such as the New International Economic Order, and so little willing to contribute generously to their development, that it was never able to win from most of these nations more than occasional applause when Soviet and third world aims coincided.

Yet for these meager and transitory advantages in the third world, for substantiation of this ambivalent image of liberator, superpower and global gendarme, the Soviets seem in recent years to be increasingly sacrificing their real interests—stability in Europe, which they passionately sought in the Helsinki Accords, and detente with the United States, which they correctly perceived could alone bring real assurance of security in their immense and vulnerable empire.

Thus they seem to be slipping, as the Chinese so acidly claim, into the traditional role of an imperialist great power, using the rhetoric of Marx and Lenin only as revolutionary cover for their conventional designs. In the pursuit

of these Victorian fantasies they are steadily undermining the favorable status quo they so zealously defend at home and in Europe.

The United States, in turn, is in the fortunate position of having no present threat to its frontiers emanating from third world countries. It is possible that one day the mini-states of the Caribbean, with their unbalanced economies and unstable societies, or Mexico, with its population growth massively outstripping its capacity to provide employment, may come to constitute such a threat, but that is not now the case. And Cuba remains only an uncomfortable presence.

The perceived security threat to the United States following World War II was the fear that a hostile great power would gradually extend its sway over so much of the rest of the world that in time the United States would be reduced to a lonely island of democracy in a great sea of totalitarianism. That this fear was more fantasy than fact does not make it any less a domestic American political reality. However, the prospect that communism might prove to be "the wave of the future" or that the Soviet Union by supporting "wars of national liberation" might subvert the third world has substantially diminished. Most of the third world has become too autonomous, too tough, too diverse, too self-conscious to be converted or subverted more than momentarily.

The superpower competition in the third world has therefore shifted its focus and its rationale in two directions. On the one hand, it is primarily a competition for prestige and status. The United States, believing that the perceptions of its power among allies, neutrals and adversaries constitutes a significant element in the reality of that power, seeks to preserve the political and economic advantage it has enjoyed in most of the third world since World War II. The Soviet Union seeks, probably for much the same reasons, to challenge and undermine that advantage.

Far more important, however, in the real world of today and tomorrow is the need of the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan to continue to assure themselves of the essential supplies on which their economies and their prosperity depend. The Soviet Union is fortunate enough to have within its immense territories most of the raw materials it has thus far required. Its relatively closed economy, moreover, with all the grave shortcomings that entails, still exempts the Kremlin from some of the need to cultivate markets, friends, and stability in the third world.

Security of supply must be a primary object of the United States, particularly so long as it wastes materials as prodigally as it does. These are the reasons which give it a greater incentive to cultivate the third world constructively than the Soviet Union has. This dependence can be a source of weakness, but it can also

be a source of strength. It can be directed toward a fruitful mutual dependence with the third world, a reciprocally and progressively beneficial management of their interdependence, a patient and even-handed elaboration of a new international order from which developed and developing nations could profit equally.

By virtue of its material resources the Soviet Union is largely exempt from this source of weakness. But at the same time, burdened by its conservative political system and its exclusive and self-centered economy, it is also almost wholly lacking in this source of strength.

The overriding interest of the hundred or so third world nations has been national independence. That is now for the most part achieved, but so recently that it is still in many cases perceived to be threatened—by ambitious neighbors, by the economic “neocolonialism” of multinational corporations, and occasionally by superpower intrusion. Sovereignty in all its aspects is most jealously defended, even in those cases where some relaxation of independence would serve common economic third world interests.

So powerful is this feeling and so painful are the unforgotten lessons of history, that attempts to impose any form of domination on third world countries would at this stage not only prove extremely difficult politically and militarily, even for a superpower, but would evoke such universal anger among other third world countries that it could prove counterproductive. Only in cases where a third world country experienced or expects external attack, or where one internal faction asks external help in order to overcome its rivals, will it seek superpower military assistance. Even in such cases, once the need has passed or diminished, the superpower presence will be resented. If it is maintained too long, gratitude can quickly turn into hostility and the superpower may have to retire ignominiously from the scene where so shortly before it seemed to triumph.

The second major interest of third world countries has for the past two decades been economic development. They consider assistance in overcoming their poverty to be not only a paramount need but a moral obligation of the developed countries, most of whom they are convinced exploited them and are responsible for their backwardness. These convictions are the basis for the demand for the “New International Economic Order.”

Economic aid is demanded from the superpowers as a reparation to which the developing countries are morally entitled. Communist regimes, claiming that they have never engaged in colonial exploitation, rather paradoxically reject any obligation to assist the poor, but they are generous in cases where they believe generosity serves a political purpose. Superpowers still seek occasionally to use aid

for political advantage, but the nationalist sensitivity of the recipients now makes this subtler form of intervention unreliable and costly.

In pursuit of these two aims—preservation of national sovereignty and assistance in economic development—third world nations have banded together in combinations such as the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the Non-Aligned, the Group of 77, and OPEC. Although only OPEC has been notably effective, all have served to some degree to restrain or limit superpower pressure. But thus far third world solidarity has so often been eroded by conflicting interests and ideologies that it has not achieved the results that might have been expected and could, with concentration on common interests, have been achieved.

These, then, are the present third world realities: passionate attachment to national independence, varying degrees of economic and political underdevelopment, an environment of incipient political crisis whenever perceptions of that underdevelopment reach a critical mass, vast diversity of character and interests but a growing degree of moral and ideological solidarity, an emerging awareness that, in an interdependent world, their economic assets enable them to bargain more effectively with the developed countries. In such a novel and unpredictable environment, are the old-fashioned forms of great power competition, intervention and confrontation any longer in the interest of the two superpowers? It is doubtful.

A more rational assessment of fundamental superpower interests suggests that neither should seek to play the part of world policeman, that neither should respond unilaterally to pleas from third world countries for military presence, that neither should take sides through military assistance in any third world conflict, between or inside nations. In all these cases, when neither the parties themselves nor an appropriate regional organization is able to settle a conflict peacefully, the proper response is that which the two superpowers themselves devised when they drafted the United Nations Charter: a resort to the procedures for pacific settlement provided in Chapter VI and, if those fail, the measures to prevent or halt threats or breaches to the peace provided in Chapter VII, supplemented when necessary by those intermediate peacekeeping measures worked out during the past quarter century and successfully applied in the Middle East, the Congo and Cyprus.

Incomplete and uncertain as these measures have proved to be, they have the enormous merit of elevating superpower confrontation from the military to the political sphere, of cushioning it within an accepted multilateral framework, and even on occasion of evoking superpower collaboration in the settlement of con-

flicts through the UN which, if they had become separately involved, could have provoked the most hazardous confrontation between them. Looked at from the angle of their more fundamental interests—national security, stability in Europe, strategic arms reduction, access to essential materials and modern technologies, resolution of global environmental problems—this method of dealing with third world conflicts would be far more advantageous to both superpowers than would strategic or ideological gains. The latter, by aggravating fears of the other superpower, would jeopardize those fundamental interests and, given the fluidity of third world politics, are likely in any case to prove ephemeral.

Finally, it is worth recalling in this connection the Joint Declaration of Principles to guide Soviet-American relations signed in 1972 in Moscow by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. That Declaration stated *inter alia*: "The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation in their relations. . . . Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. . . . The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts and situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions."

The two superpowers committed themselves only six years ago to the observance of these and other similar principles to govern their relations, most of all to eschewing "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other." Whether these principles were at the time sincerely or merely rhetorically intended, they nevertheless constitute a solemn reciprocal commitment which cannot be ignored without calling into question the value of the bilateral agreements between them. The observance of these principles would be in the national interest of both superpowers. They would be well advised, therefore, to recall and apply them as they encounter now and in coming years temptations to behave otherwise in the Middle East, in the Horn of Africa, in Southern Africa and elsewhere in the third world.

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
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Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Power

Robert L. Paarlberg

It was fashionable several years ago to argue that both food and oil could be used as tools for coercion. International security, once defined and preserved by military might, had suddenly been threatened by the uncertain availability of critical economic resources. Nations seemed in a position to struggle for dominance over one another by offering or refusing access to increasingly scarce primary commodities and raw materials. In one view, the most dramatic aspect of this struggle was to occur between producers of food and oil. Food power was to be arrayed against oil power. The oil-starved industrial countries, some of which exported food, would confront food starved non-industrial countries, some of which exported oil.¹

This looming contest between "agripower" and "petropower" was not unwelcome to some in the United States who foresaw their own ultimate triumph, with what had come to be called the "food weapon." Having earlier identified food as "one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit," Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz predicted in 1975 that, "In the long run, agripower has to be more important than petropower." Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders warned in November 1974, at the time of the World Food Conference, that U.S. food power was a natural counter to Middle East oil power. He claimed that "The food producers' monopoly exceeds the oil producers' monopoly." Other State Department officials asserted in 1975 that "we could make OPEC look sick if we were just to use what our agriculture gives us." The Central Intelligence Agency published its speculation that food abundance might allow the United States to regain the primacy in world affairs which it had enjoyed at the close of the Second World War, when it was the only nation to possess nuclear weapons. Lester R. Brown concurred with these official assessments, observing that, "The issue is no longer whether food represents power, but how that power will be used."²

Yesterday's prophets of food power have today fallen silent. Exportable oil has

1. For an elaboration of this viewpoint, see Geoffrey Barraclough, "Wealth and Power: The Politics of Food and Oil," *The New York Review of Books* XXII, no. 13 (August 7, 1975), p. 23.

2. These predictions of food power are found in Earl L. Butz, "Food Power—A Major Weapon" (speech), Washington, D.C., 24 June 1974; "Food Power: The Ultimate Weapon in World Politics?" *Business Week*, 15 December 1975, pp. 54–60; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Political Research, *Potential Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate* (OPR 401), August 1974; and Lester R. Brown, "The Politics and Responsibility of the North American Breadbasket," World Watch Paper No. 2, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C., October 1975.

indeed become a prime ingredient of national power in the contemporary international system, but food has not. Since the effective wielding of their "oil weapon" in 1973-74, the Arab oil exporting nations have gained discernable leverage over the diplomatic behavior of oil importing countries in the industrial world. Even as the real price of oil now declines, amid predictions of an interlude of abundant world supplies, the threat of another Arab oil embargo remains sufficient to inspire, among oil importing countries, far more generous policies toward the Arab world than would otherwise be the case. Non-Arab oil exporting countries enjoy enhanced diplomatic leverage as well, merely by posing as "dependable" sources of supply. No parallel growth of food power has yet occurred. This is due in part to recent conditions of relative abundance in the world food market. Yet the failure of food power to emerge as a counterweight to oil power goes far beyond current market conditions. Whatever the changing condition of the market, food can never provide as much diplomatic leverage to an exporting nation as does oil.

Barriers to the Exercise of Resource Power

We define resource power as the ability of one nation to influence the behavior of another nation through the manipulation of international resource transfers. This definition excludes from consideration the export of resources such as food and oil for the sole purpose of earning foreign exchange, however beneficial such earnings may be in a commercial sense. To be worthy of its name, resource power must make possible more than the accumulation of wealth. It must enable the user to influence the behavior of other nation-states. Working from this definition, there will be at least three separate points at which any effort to wield resource power can meet frustration:

1. Within the domestic system of the subject nation (i.e., the nation seeking to exercise resource power). Here, for either practical or political reasons, foreign policy leaders may be unable to control the volume and the direction of their own external resource transfers.
2. Within the domestic system of the target nation. Here the threat or even the reality of resource trade manipulation may be inadequate or inappropriate to produce the desired modification of behavior.
3. Between the subject and the target nation, within the international resource market itself. Here options for control over supply may not exist, while low cost options to reduce dependence upon any one source of supply may abound.

If an attempt to exercise resource power fails at any one of these three points, it will fail altogether. For the Arab nations to enjoy oil power, their leaders must be able to manipulate oil exports at will, political authorities within target nations must be sufficiently affected by these manipulations to react in the desired fashion, and the international oil market must allow no low cost escape from oil trade dependence upon Arab sources of supply. All three of these rather strict conditions are simultaneously met under present conditions, and as a consequence oil has emerged as an exceptional source of resource power.

Not one of these three critical conditions can be met in the case of food. Political leaders in food exporting countries, such as the United States, are *not* capable of manipulating food exports at will. Even if they could, political authorities in target nations would *not* be sufficiently affected by food trade interruptions, or they would *not* be inclined to react in the direction of U.S. diplomatic preferences. And in any case, the world food trading system does *not* force target nations to accept food trade dependence upon any one source of supply, such as the United States. Let us consider each of these three points of probable food power failure in turn.

DIFFICULTY MANIPULATING FOOD EXPORTS

Food exports are far more difficult for national leaders to manipulate than oil exports. In the first instance, this is because the production of food is more difficult to adjust than the production of oil. Oil is a natural resource, available in uncertain quantities below the ground but in easily controlled quantities at the well-head. National political leaders seeking to exercise oil power abroad can strengthen their hand by manipulating rates of production at home. As an accompaniment to their 1973 embargo, the Arab oil exporting countries were able to agree upon a finely tuned schedule of punitive production cutbacks: in October a minimum 5 percent cutback from September production levels, to be followed by an additional 5 percent cutback each month thereafter. Political leaders seldom enjoy such power over food production. Food is not a natural resource. Its annual availability depends largely upon matters which defy political control. In the United States, for example, each year's food production depends primarily upon the weather, and secondarily upon many separate decisions made throughout the growing season by thousands of private business firms and millions of individual farmers. Political leaders may sometimes be able to influence a few of these decisions at the cost of multi-billion dollar price support and acreage control policies. They can do little or nothing about the weather.

Even when blessed with a desired level of domestic food production, political

leaders seeking to exercise international food power still must gain control over the volume and the direction of food exports. Both practical and political concerns complicate this task. By its very nature, food is far more difficult to withhold from the world market than oil. Oil withheld from the market, either in storage above ground or left untouched below ground, can increase in value. Food left too long in the ground, or held too long in expensive storage, loses whatever value it may have had. Hence the laughability of a sometimes imagined Central American "banana embargo." Political constraints are also important, particularly since the major food surplus nations, unlike the major oil surplus nations, adhere to procedures of representative democracy. Few political leaders in these food surplus democracies will wish to invite the hostile reaction of farm constituents to a termination or redirection of overseas food sales. To illustrate this point, recall the force of domestic opposition to President Ford's effort to exercise food power against the Soviet Union in August 1975.

American farmers had been encouraged by the Ford Administration early in 1975 to produce at full capacity, on the promise of an unrestricted commercial export policy. But in late summer that policy was altered, following a round of very large food purchases by the Soviet Union, which was suffering from its worst harvest setback in more than a decade. Amid fears of renewed food price inflation at home, President Ford placed a "voluntary" embargo on further sales to the Soviet Union. Once in place, the embargo tempted Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger into an exercise of food power. A negotiating team was sent to Moscow to ask for Soviet concessions on low priced oil sales to the United States, among other things, in return for a lifting of the food sale embargo—"food for crude."

This food power effort failed when domestic farm groups in the United States complained that the politically motivated embargo was costing them more than \$2 billion in the form of lower food prices at home and business lost to competitors abroad. The National Association of Wheatgrowers threatened a lawsuit to stop the Administration from interfering with food exports. President Ford had been counting upon these farm groups to form the nucleus of his upcoming 1976 election effort; their opposition to the embargo both weakened his nerve and diminished the leverage of his negotiating team in Moscow. The Russians had taken note of the President's political discomfort and sensed that time was on their side. They steadfastly refused any concession on low priced oil exports. Within two months the embargo was lifted without Soviet concessions on oil,³

3. A five year agreement setting lower and upper limits on Soviet purchases of U.S. grain was

and in the following year both presidential candidates, Ford and Carter, repeatedly promised American farmers that there would be "no more embargoes."

Political questions aside, a food embargo strategy may simply exceed the legal capabilities of the U.S. Government. The United States (unlike most of its export competitors) is not a state trading nation. Approximately 95 percent of U.S. food exports are not handled by the government at all, but rather by private food trading companies, several of which are based in other countries as well as in the U.S. Before the embarrassment of the 1972 Soviet grain purchase, the so-called "great grain robbery," national political leaders were not even notified in a timely fashion of when, or to whom, these sparsely regulated private firms were selling American food. The exporting companies must now report large sales promptly, but they are not constrained to seek prior government approval. In 1975 the House Committee on Agriculture conclusively rejected a proposal to place private grain sales under the control of an official export marketing board. This lack of national political control over food exports has been judged appropriate to the larger task of maintaining commercial incentives for abundant food production. If national political leaders in the United States were to opt for complete control over U.S. food exports, they might find themselves in a better position to exercise food power—but with less food. Oil exporting countries need not face this dilemma, since political control of oil exports does not affect the quantity of oil available for export.

Despite political and legal restrictions, the United States has, at times, blocked commercial food exports. In June 1973, for example, the government placed a brief but general embargo on soybean exports. Also, during the depths of the cold war commercial food sales were effectively blocked to the Soviet Union. Yet it would be inappropriate to cite either case as a successful exercise of food power. The 1973 soybean embargo (made possible by authority in the 1969 Export Administration Act to limit exports in the face of an excessive drain on domestic supplies) was undertaken not for the purpose of gaining diplomatic leverage over foreign food customers, but to control food price inflation for consumers at home. The State Department was not even invited to participate in the domestic policy debate which led up to the soybean embargo decision. If given a chance, those with foreign policy interests in mind would have strongly warned against suddenly interrupting soybean exports to trusting allies in Western Europe and Ja-

successfully negotiated in Moscow. Since the Soviet Union had been seeking such an understanding for some time, however, it could scarcely be called a victory for U.S. food power.

pan. Far from constituting a successful exercise of food power, the 1973 soybean embargo weakened the hand of U.S. foreign policy.

Nor did cold war restrictions on food sales to the Soviet Union constitute an effective exercise of food power. Quite the opposite. The 1949 Export Control Act had not prohibited commercial sale of foodstuffs to any country, but an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1961 did express Congressional objection to the subsidized sale of agricultural commodities to the Russians. This restriction carried very little meaning at the time, since the Soviet Union was still a net exporter of food. But in 1963, following a serious crop failure, the Russians turned to the world market to purchase wheat, and Congressional objections to U.S. sales suddenly began to have an effect—a painful, unwelcome effect. President Kennedy, eager to sell wheat to the Russians to advance the progress of détente, found himself unable to do so. In his effort to escape domestic objections to a Russian wheat deal, Kennedy was forced to yield to labor demands that half the grain be shipped in U.S. vessels, an expensive proposition which dampened Soviet interest in the sale. The International Longshoremen's Association signalled its determination to police this restriction by refusing at one point to load any grain at all on ships bound for the Soviet Union. All the while the grain sale scheme met effective resistance from those Republican partisans who opposed "trading with the enemy." One notable opponent of the sale was former Vice President Richard M. Nixon, who joined critics in Congress by arguing that a wheat sale to the Soviet Union might turn out to be "the major foreign policy mistake of this Administration, even more serious than fouling up the Bay of Pigs." In the end, internal opposition of one form or another held the final sale to less than half of its originally intended size.⁴

These restrictions on grain sales to Russia remained effective for another eight years, until 1971, when the Nixon White House, in its own early pursuit of détente, finally struck a bargain with the still reluctant maritime unions to permit larger food sales to the Soviet Union. Even then, however, food was destined to remain an elusive diplomatic tool. Nixon's 1972 grain sale so outraged American consumers that they demanded re-imposition of export controls. These controls brought forth, in turn, howls of indignation from American farmers who had grown accustomed to the Soviet market. On balance, efforts to manipulate U.S. food sales to the Soviet Union seem to have caused much more political discomfort in Washington than in Moscow.

4. See James Trager, *The Great Grain Robbery* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), pp. 14–16.

Food sales to the Soviet Union are even more difficult to manipulate today than they were during the passage from cold war to *détente*. Those sales are strictly governed by the terms of a five year bilateral agreement, signed in October 1975. This agreement gives substance to the promise of "no more embargoes." The Soviet Union is promised a six to eight million ton minimum annual purchase of wheat and corn, subject to revision only in the unlikely event that United States production falls below 225 million tons.

Commercial sales aside, U.S. foreign policy leaders no longer enjoy discretionary control over the disposition of their own food aid shipments. Ten years ago, when 60 percent of U.S. farm exports to poor countries took the form of official aid, such shipments were still a useful instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Other forms of economic assistance were under heavy Congressional attack, but with food aid the United States maintained an indirect means to extend considerable financial support, even to cold war neutrals unpopular with the Congress (including for a time Nasser in Egypt and Sukarno in Indonesia). Food aid also served as a convenient source of backdoor funding for military operations by friendly forces in Indochina. In recent years, however, U.S. food aid programs have been reduced in size and have fallen under Congressional restrictions designed to minimize diplomatic manipulation of these aid shipments. Today food aid constitutes only 20 percent of U.S. farm exports to poor countries, and the Foreign Assistance Act now specifies that 75 percent of this food aid must go to nations with per capita incomes under \$500, an effective limitation on political food aid to some more affluent recipients such as Israël, Jordan, South Korea, Lebanon, Syria, and Portugal. The practice of making "counterpart funds" (generated from the sale of U.S. food aid for local currency) available to local governments for defense expenditures was terminated in 1974. The Congress has also stipulated that food aid can no longer be sent to countries that consistently violate human rights, without guarantees that benefits from the aid will flow directly to needy people.

At this first point of comparison, within the domestic system of the nation seeking to exercise resource power, food exports prove far more resistant to willful political manipulation than oil exports.

INEFFECTIVE IMPACT WITHIN TARGET NATIONS

Food and oil further differ at a second point in the process of exercising resource power—at the point of impact within "target" nations. In the eyes of target nation leaders, food trade interruptions are usually far less threatening than oil trade interruptions.

First, imports of food usually satisfy a much smaller share of total domestic consumption than imports of oil. Oil importing countries typically rely upon the world market for almost all of the oil they consume, while food importing countries seldom import to satisfy more than 5 to 10 percent of their total food consumption. For example, during the recent 1973-76 period of unusually high world-wide food import demand, the major food importing nations of Western Europe relied upon the world market to satisfy only 9 percent of their total food calorie consumption. During the same period, these same nations relied upon imports to satisfy approximately 90 percent of their total oil consumption. Among the less developed countries during this same period, India and Brazil relied upon food imports to satisfy only 5 percent of their total domestic food consumption, while turning to the world market to satisfy approximately 70 percent of their respective oil needs. Even Japan, the world's largest single food importing nation, remained 55 percent self-sufficient in kilocalorie food supplies, but less than 1 percent self-sufficient in oil supplies.⁵

Among one very important group of food importing countries, those which also export oil, few have developed more than a modest dependence upon the world food market. The OPEC countries of North Africa and the Middle East have dramatically increased their food imports in recent years, but still produce enough at home to satisfy two thirds of their own total cereal consumption. Both Indonesia and Nigeria are more than 94 percent self-sufficient in cereal supplies. Mexico, a non-OPEC oil exporting country with substantial food import needs, nonetheless provides for more than three quarters of its own grain consumption. The Soviet Union, sometimes depicted as an oil surplus nation which is highly vulnerable to food trade interruptions, is still only modestly dependent upon the world food market. Over the period 1973-76, despite an unprecedented volume of food imports, the Soviets remained 97 percent self-sufficient in total kilocalorie supplies, and 94 percent self-sufficient in grain consumption.⁶ When food imports satisfy such a small share of total internal consumption, the impact of a food trade interruption can hardly be expected to match that of an oil trade interruption.

Second, food and oil shortages tend to produce pain at different points within target nations. Faced with an oil trade interruption, leaders in most industrial

5. USDA calorie self-sufficiency data, presented in Gary L. Seevers, "Food Markets and Their Regulation," Unpublished Manuscript, February 1977, pp. 10-11.

6. See "Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World," Research Report No. 1, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., February 1976. Also, USDA, Foreign Agriculture Circular, Grains, FG 1-76, 21 January 1976.

democracies may anticipate a simultaneous increase in both inflation and unemployment, followed by a chorus of competing demands from their most vocal and visible political constituents—business leaders deprived of production and sales, workers deprived of jobs, and citizens deprived of economical fuels for home and for transportation. By contrast, food shortages may present political leaders with a somewhat more manageable problem. In most poor countries, to begin with, food shortages can usually be allocated to politically powerless citizens living in the countryside. Food distribution systems in poor countries are frequently biased to provide first for the needs of small but politically active urban elites. Even under conditions of desperate overall scarcity, these politically powerful groups may not suffer, and pressures to comply with food power demands may not develop. Those who will suffer most from a food trade interruption will be the least visible, the least vocal, and the least powerful segment of the national population, the rural poor.⁷

Among industrial food importing nations, adjustment to a food trade interruption may prove politically manageable for quite a different reason. Industrial countries do not usually import large quantities of food to satisfy human needs directly. Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union, for example, together import nearly 85 percent of their grain in the form of coarse animal feed for livestock. When faced with a food trade interruption, these nations have the option of falling back to a more efficient means of feeding their people, relying upon abundant non-meat food supplies while reducing livestock herds. For those nations firmly committed to meeting consumer demand for increased meat consumption, including the Soviet Union and Japan, this may not be a particularly attractive option. But political elites in both Japan and the Soviet Union demonstrated an ability to accept significant reductions in feeding grain to livestock during the recent world food crisis. Between 1974 and 1975, a 10 percent livestock feeding cutback was implemented in Japan, while a 20 percent cutback was enforced in the USSR.⁸ In April 1976, as a further means of reducing its need for

7. Consider, for example, the experience of Bangladesh, as described by Donald F. McHenry and Kai Bird, "Food Bungle in Bangladesh," *Foreign Policy*, no. 27 (Summer 1977), 72–88. Food shortages are not so easily allocated to politically invisible segments of the population in all third world countries. Where a very large and politically active middle class may exist, as in Chile, food shortages will create a difficult dilemma for political leaders, as during the Allende period when food aid from the U.S. was discontinued. See data and discussion by Cheryl Christensen, "Food and National Security," in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 300.

8. U.S. Department of Agriculture, "World Agricultural Situation," WAS-10 (July 1976), Table 14, p. 21.

food imports, the Japanese government began to re-substitute rice for bread in school lunch diets. Comparable short-run cutback and substitution options may not exist at all for political leaders in most industrial and non-industrial countries facing the prospect of an oil trade interruption.

Because food trade interruptions tend to disrupt much smaller shares of internal consumption, and because that disruption tends to be allocated to the least visible extremities of the political system, efforts to exercise "food power" are unlikely to produce a sufficient impact within target nations to evoke the intended reaction. It is more likely that those efforts will produce either no effect or an entirely unintended effect within target nations. Consider, for example, a U.S. effort to exercise food power against the government of India, by putting India's food aid on "short tether" during the 1965-67 food crisis in South Asia.

President Lyndon Johnson's initial purpose for wielding food power against India was to force a change in India's farm policies. Johnson, together with Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman, believed that long term U.S. food aid programs, particularly during the Third Five Year Plan period (1961/62-1965/66), had allowed Indian government leaders to neglect essential tasks of agricultural development. In Freeman's words, "We had provided India with increasing food assistance and had insisted on very little progress in return."⁹ So in 1965, when a serious drought suddenly pushed India's food aid request up to 7 million tons, Johnson and Freeman decided to respond with a not so subtle exercise of food power. India's needs were to be satisfied, but not with long-term aid commitments as in the past. Instead, Johnson advised his staff that he wanted to judge India's food aid requirements month by month.

With great effort, President Johnson did manage in this instance to overcome the first barrier to the effective exercise of food power. He successfully resisted fierce opposition from Congress, the press, and from his own foreign aid bureaucracy, to his policy of withholding long-term food aid from India. But his short-tether policy nonetheless ran afoul of political realities within the government of India itself. The Indian Cabinet was divided on the question of agricultural development. One group, led by food minister Chidambaram Subramanian, favored priority efforts at agricultural modernization, and evidently welcomed U.S. pressure for new policies of "self-help." Subramanian met with Freeman in Rome in November 1965, where he agreed to a tightly conditioned food aid package, one

9. Orville L. Freeman, *World Without Hunger* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 153.

which was designed to strengthen his position in Delhi on matters of agricultural reform.¹⁰

But the Indian government as a whole remained resistant to Lyndon Johnson's short-tether policy, if only for the reason that it was Lyndon Johnson's policy. Despite the considerable vulnerability of its rural population to a possible U.S. food aid cutback, the Indian government felt strong enough to resist any appearance that its policies could be dictated from abroad. Unintentionally, advocates of agricultural reform in India may have even been harmed by Johnson's food power strategy. Mr. Subramanian, for example, was actually weakened at home by his visible role in the short-tether process. At one point in 1966, he was summoned to travel all the way from India to the LBJ Ranch, where he was to wait together with the assembled press for the President's answer on India's latest food aid request. The request was approved at the last minute, but Mr. Subramanian was made to appear a puppet of the American President. This unfortunate appearance contributed to his re-election defeat in India in the following year.¹¹

The Johnson policy also provoked unintended diplomatic difficulties with the Indian government. India's initial acceptance of U.S. grain under Johnson's "self-help" conditions inspired opposition charges that Mrs. Gandhi's government had sold out to the American imperialists. In part to protect herself from such charges, she became more outspoken in her opposition to Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam bombing policy, sending warm birthday greetings at one point to Ho Chi Minh. Johnson, failing to understand these necessary concessions to her difficult home audience, reacted with violent indignation, and shipments of wheat were further delayed. India's views on Vietnam continued to harden, the reform of Indian farm policy was made more difficult, and diplomatic relations between the two governments became increasingly antagonistic. Johnson's food power strategy had met frustration at the second point in the resource power process.

ESCAPE FROM DEPENDENCE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD MARKET

The final point at which food power proves inferior to oil power is within the international market, where large food exporting nations such as the United States

10. James W. Bjorkman, "Public Law 480 and the Policies of Self-Help and Short-Tether: Indo-American Relations, 1965-68." Found in *Report of Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, June 1975, Appendices in Seven Volumes, Case Studies: Economic Policy, pp. 192-209.

11. Bjorkman, "Public Law 480," p. 207.

enjoy fewer options to exercise monopoly or oligopoly power, and fewer opportunities to use that market power for political purposes.

At first glance, the world food market appears to be no less dominated by a few large sellers than the world oil market. The United States and Canada, together, have been in some years the source of up to 65 percent of the world's grain exports. The total OPEC share of world oil exports is higher at 85 percent, but within the thirteen nation OPEC group the share of the two largest exporting nations alone (Saudi Arabia and Iran) stands at only 38 percent, and the total Arab share of world oil exports stands at just 54 percent, less than the North American share of world grain exports.¹² Some observers have argued from this evidence that the U.S. and Canada, together, enjoy a power position in the world food market which more than matches the position of any two nations or of all Arab nations together within the world oil market. This popular comparison is flawed in several important respects.

First, the United States and Canada do not coordinate their food export policies in pursuit of any common purpose. They are, in fact, direct competitors. Canada irritates the United States when it produces for export at full capacity even during times of abundant supply, when the United States often seeks to support prices by restricting its own production. Tellingly, Canadian food sales to the Soviet Union continued during the brief U.S. effort in 1975 to enforce a "food power" embargo. The U.S., in turn, irritates Canada whenever it uses export subsidies, government credits, and "food aid" shipments to further enlarge its much greater share of the export market at Canada's expense. To speak of a "North American" monopoly on exportable grain supplies is to conclude too much from simple continental geography.

Second, dominance in the world food market counts for much less than dominance in the world oil market. The United States and Canada may account for two thirds of the world's wheat exports, but they account for less than one fifth of world wheat production. Most of the world's food production never enters the international market. More than 80 percent of the people in the world live in countries which are at least 95 percent self-sufficient in their total food calorie supply.¹³ The world's food system does not, in fact, consist of a single "interdependent" world market. It would be more accurate to describe that system as a

12. James W. Howe and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council, *The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action 1975* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 236.

13. J. P. O'Hagan, "National Self-Sufficiency in Food," *Food Policy*, vol. 1, no. 5 (November 1976), p. 355.

collection of many separate national food markets, frequently protected from one another by government policies specifically designed to prevent too much food trade interdependence. Most of the international food trade which does occur performs only a residual function. Nations typically turn to the international market to fill marginal needs not met by their own substantial domestic food production, or to find an outlet for an unwanted domestic surplus. To "control" even a large portion of this residual market is not to determine who gets food and who does not.

By contrast, the international oil market is the principal market from which most consumption must be satisfied. More than half of the world's oil consumption is satisfied through imports, compared to only one eighth of all consumption of the world's most traded food source, grain. A large export share in the world oil market is more likely, as a result, to translate into real political power.

Third, as well as performing its lesser role, the international food market remains far more competitive than the world oil market. This is true despite the fact that five large multinational grain trading firms handle 85 percent of all U.S. grain entering international trade. These five firms may appear to "control" U.S. exports, but (unlike the seven major international oil companies) they have never performed more than the restricted intermediate function of transporting and handling grain. They do not own farms, grain on farms, or the means of producing grain on farms. They do not determine the price, the volume, or the direction of exports.¹⁴ Most export prices continue to be set in an open market, through competitive bid, where foreign customers enjoy potential access to virtually the entire U.S. domestic grain supply. More than fifty private firms actually engage in the U.S. grain export business, assuring the competitive character of most contracts. While the world food system as a whole consists largely of politically regulated and non-competitive national markets, the smaller residual international market takes its character from the more open and competitive nature of the United States, the principal exporting nation in that market. The world oil market, by contrast, is less competitive, taking its character from the near-total regulation practiced within and among the principal oil exporting nations of the Middle East.

The world food market is also highly competitive in the sense that most food

14. See Gary L. Seevers, "Food Markets and Their Regulation." In the face of OPEC member nation demands for "participation" in ownership, and for control over pricing and production, the role of the major international oil companies now begins to resemble more nearly the rather modest middleman function of the international grain companies.

importing nations have ample means to escape dependence upon any one source of supply. Of the 120 or so food importing nations which make regular purchases in the market, few purchase in large enough quantities to make them truly dependent upon a single large supplier, such as the United States. Most of these nations can receive their very small individual shares of world imports from a half dozen or more eager suppliers—including not only surplus producers such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and France, but also a centrally planned food deficit state, the Soviet Union, which has been willing in the recent past to export small quantities of food for political purposes even while simultaneously importing food to meet its own domestic needs.

Even when a nation's import requirements may be very large, and even when supplies are very tight, the competitive character of the world food market tends to frustrate those seeking to exercise food power. Consider again the experience of the Soviet Union facing a U.S. food embargo in 1975. Even before U.S. sales were suspended, in late July, the Soviets had secured nearly 5 million tons of grain from sources outside the United States. Then during the months when the U.S. embargo remained in effect, the Soviets managed to obtain commitments elsewhere for an additional 8 to 10 million tons. The Soviets weathered the period of the U.S. embargo in fine fashion, by shifting contract delivery dates for American wheat forward, while arranging to take delivery in later months on Canadian wheat, and still later on supplies from Australia. In the end, the only effective constraint on Soviet food imports during the period of the U.S. embargo was the limited capacity of Soviet port and transportation systems, which could not easily handle an import volume greater than 2 million tons a month.

Also, it must be remembered that the high prices which accompany tight food supplies will quickly bring new producers into the world food market. New oil producers can also appear as prices increase, but not so quickly and not in so many varied locations. In 1973, following an increase in soybean prices, and following the momentary U.S. soybean embargo, Japan decided to place substantial new investments in Brazilian soybean production. By 1976, Brazil's share of world soybean exports had grown from 5 to 30 percent, and the U.S. share of Japan's feedgrain imports abruptly fell from 71 to 59 percent. This relative ease of increasing food production, particularly in response to the threat or reality of food power, can hardly be overstressed. Efforts to wield food power are self-defeating; they stimulate increased food production, thus diminishing import dependence.

Finally, the condition of the world food market, more often than not, is one of abundance rather than scarcity. Food may be scarce today in relation to nutritional needs, but it is once again abundant in relation to effective commercial and poli-

tical demand. In the early 1970s, when world food production (and oil production in the United States) suddenly and unexpectedly declined, food and oil simultaneously gained a popular reputation as scarce resources. United States oil production has continued to fall far behind consumption, and so the prospect of an oil crisis—and the reality of oil power—will persist. But in the past three years of good weather, world food production has more than recovered. The world food market has now returned to its more customary condition of abundance in relation to commercial demand.¹⁵ This condition of abundant supplies further adds to the difficulty of exercising monopoly control over those supplies, and is yet another barrier to the effective exercise of food power.

Qualifications and Conclusion

Food power is inferior to oil power at each critical point in the process of exercising coercive resource diplomacy: within the domestic system of the nation seeking to exercise resource power, within the domestic system of the target nation, and also within the larger realm of the international resource market. Formidable barriers to the successful exercise of food power exist at each of these three points, while comparable barriers to the exercise of oil power are presently absent. In combination, such barriers to the exercise of food power greatly diminish its value to the user.

Exceptions may be found to this general rule of food power failure. Recall, for example, the U.S. suspension of food aid to the Marxist government of Salvadore Allende in Chile. That government was subsequently weakened by middle class discontent over food shortages, among other things, and fell to a military coup in 1973. Within five days the new government received food aid credits to buy U.S. wheat. The appearance of food power in this case is deceptive. At best, food was only one of many instruments of power wielded against the Allende government, and alongside these other instruments of economic coercion, probably the least important.¹⁶ What is more, food power appears in this instance as a rather blunt

15. By 1977 a dramatic recovery in world carryover stocks of grain, and falling world prices (sometimes to levels below the long run cost of production, even for efficient producers in the U.S.), forced the U.S. Government to actually return to a policy of production control, requesting that wheat producers reduce plantings by 8–10 percent. The U.S. was not the only nation now adjusting its policy to a new food surplus. India, having experienced its third good monsoon in a row, reported grain production over 120 million tons, and a 25 million ton stock-pile available after the April-May 1978 harvest.

16. The Allende government was exceptionally unstable in any case; indigenous middle class resistance to Allende's brand of socialism might have been sufficient to bring about a collapse even in the absence of destabilizing foreign policy actions by the U.S.

instrument of diplomatic influence. It did not influence the Chilean government to alter its policies; instead, its contribution was to the downfall of that government, and to the emergence of a military regime which has become, in its own way, no less troublesome to United States foreign policy. Also, it was precisely this cynical use of food aid in Chile which inspired many of the detailed restrictions on food aid which now help to insure against any repetition of this episode. In this respect, the success of food power in Chile was not only dubious but self-terminating.

A second exception to the rule of food power failure might also be acknowledged. This was the successful use of promised food sales by President Nixon, in 1972, as one means to entice the Soviet Union into a more forthcoming diplomatic posture at the time of the first Moscow summit, amid a troublesome North Vietnamese Easter offensive, and during the final stages of the SALT I negotiations. In the end, however, this exercise of food power proved to be politically and commercially costly at home, and scarcely worth the increment of leverage gained abroad. As in the case of Chile, it was also a self-terminating use of food power. Once the initial 1972 grain sale to the Soviet Union had been made, leverage over the Soviet Union was immediately lost. American farmers, now exposed to a lucrative new export market, were not about to allow their government to manipulate that new market for diplomatic purposes. This is a dubious kind of food power that can be used once and only once.

Remember that this high probability of food power failure applies only to the realm of behavioral control. There is no doubt that exportable food supplies are a useful source of foreign exchange, and perhaps by that avenue they do constitute a derivative source of national strength or power. United States food exports, which in 1977 earned nearly \$25 billion in foreign exchange, make a critical contribution to whatever strength the U.S. economy presently enjoys in the international trading system. These export earnings from food do at least partially offset the \$45 billion annual cost to the U.S. economy of petroleum imports. Yet this continued use of commercial food exports to earn foreign exchange specifically requires that the United States forswear any lingering intention of interrupting foreign food sales to seek influence over behavior. Maximum food export earnings can continue only with minimal interference by those foreign policy leaders in search of coercive resource power.

One last food power claim remains to be considered. This is a claim that food abundance confers an even more derivative form of "structural power" upon U.S. policymakers. Even if the United States cannot use food to control discrete ac-

tions, it may be able to set the bounds within which some of those actions are taken, by virtue of its very large influence over the structure of the world food market. For example, by offering unrestricted commercial access to its own very large food supply, the United States can unilaterally maintain the semblance of an open world food trading system, regardless of restrictions which smaller nations place upon their exports in times of scarcity. Similarly, by holding large surplus food stocks in times of abundance, as in the years before 1972, the United States can unilaterally stabilize world food prices, protecting consumers and producers alike from disruptive price fluctuations. No other nation holds this sort of unilateral structuring power over the character of the world food market.

But in what sense is this structuring power a diplomatic asset? If anything, it may be a diplomatic liability. Since the United States can perform certain tasks alone, it is expected to do so—alone. The United States, which now ships up to one third of its annual harvest abroad, has grown heavily dependent upon an open and stable international food trading system. If system maintenance tasks are not performed, it has the most to lose. By shouldering the leadership burden alone, it may indeed exercise some “structural power” over the world food system, but this kind of power may actually be accompanied by commercial sacrifice and diplomatic constraint.

In conclusion, the power which food confers is much less than meets the eye. Agripower, in the long run as well as in the short run, is a much less promising source of diplomatic leverage than petropower. This lesson may disappoint those searching for a response in kind to the power now being wielded by those with exportable supplies of oil. To counter that power requires not a response in kind, not an exercise of food power, but a disciplined and deliberate response to oil power on its own terms, through reduced national vulnerability to a future oil trade interruption.

American Policy and the Trade-Growth Struggle

Robert O. Keohane

During its first 500 days in office, the foreign policies of the Carter Administration were characterized by activism, innovation and rhetoric about the best interests of humanity—as well as by indecision, inconsistency, and frustration. Policies to promote world economic growth and to regulate the flow of international trade were no exceptions. Good intentions may not quite have led to hell; but the landscape of unresolved dilemmas and discarded policies looked like a vision of purgatory. By the Administration's second summer, it was not yet clear what would emerge from the ordeal, but it was evident that the outcomes would not closely resemble the hopes and ambitions of January 1977.

This essay will discuss the Carter Administration's road to purgatory in two areas—global demand management policy ("growth policy") and international trade. Throughout the essay, I assume that foreign and domestic policies, and politics, are closely intertwined. Within countries, a struggle takes place between groups with different interests—for instance, unionized workers in import-competing industries *versus* consumers favoring cheap imports, or sometimes bankers *versus* industrialists. Although these differences are never finally resolved in a pluralistic society, a balance is struck by governments, who define "the national interest" in view of political pressures as well as their own calculations. At this point, the struggle becomes internationalized: since foreigners are usually not represented in domestic politics, the preferred policies of governments are almost invariably inconsistent with one another. Each state seeks to impose unwanted costs on others rather than inflicting them on its own citizens.

The key point is that the politics of foreign economic policy center around the question of which states will bear the major costs of adjusting to change. Foreign economic relationships are highly political. Controversies about economic policies are rarely issues of technique; on the contrary, real interests are at stake.

Any analysis of foreign economic policy must deal with issues of *motivation*. To what extent should one interpret policies as motivated by desires for power, or for wealth? Are these motivations contradictory or complementary, and where do the real choices lie? These issues are discussed in the following section. To understand the results of policy, it is also necessary to analyze *constraints*. What

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prevents the United States from achieving all of its objectives in foreign economic policy? If American policy is unsuccessful, must we conclude that the government was unwise—or could it just not have been strong enough to prevail? Before examining Carter Administration policies in detail, I will briefly consider these issues as well.

Power versus Wealth?

Even sophisticated observers, who accept close linkages between domestic and foreign policies, often draw a sharp contrast between “economic” and “political” motivations. Thunderous mock battles take place between analysts who believe that political motivations are primary and those who contend that the “real objectives” of policymakers are economic.¹ Yet for contemporary statesmen, as for the mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, power is a necessary condition for plenty.² This was true in the immediate postwar period and it is true now. In the late 1940s, the exercise of American power was required to build international economic arrangements consistent with the structure of American capitalism; conversely, United States military strength depended on the construction of international economic arrangements that securely tied Western Europe and Japan to the United States. Likewise, in the 1970s it is futile to ask, for instance, whether the United States proposed the International Energy Agency for the sake of coping with energy problems or because it wished to reinforce its political influence. Effective international action on energy questions was impossible without United States leadership; conversely, American influence and prestige would be increased by leading a successful energy effort. Insofar as power is a necessary means for the attainment of actors’ objectives in world politics, it attains, as Arnold Wolfers taught us, a status similar to that of an end in itself.³ Power and wealth are in the long run complementary goals.

1. Consider, for instance, the arguments between “orthodox” historians and “revisionists” about the origins of the Cold War. Orthodox historians often ignored underlying economic objectives; but the revisionists have often committed a similar monistic error (with a different factor considered crucial) by searching for “real” economic motivations behind every policy. For an example of the latter in an otherwise impressive work, see Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

2. For a classic statement of this argument, with reference to the 17th and 18th centuries, see Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *World Politics* 1, no. 1 (October 1948).

3. Arnold Wolfers, “Power and Influence: The Means of Foreign Policy,” and “The Power of

United States policymakers are therefore not required to make choices between power and wealth over the long term. Their challenge is different: to devise strategies in which economic gains reinforce political influence and *vice versa*. In the short run, this may mean bolstering one's power at the expense of particular economic objectives, or the reverse. But over the long run, wealth (at least in the form of a productive, thriving economy) is a source of power, and power, in a world without guarantees of order and justice, may be necessary to keep one's wealth secure.

The key tradeoff for the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as for mercantilist statesmen in the 18th century and American leaders in the late 1940s, is not between power and wealth but between the *long-term* power-wealth interests of the state, and *short-term* wealth interests, whether of the society as a whole or of individual merchants, workers, or manufacturers. The United States is not the only country that has been unable to formulate long-term goals without making concessions to short-term economic interests. Jacob Viner observes that in Holland during the 17th and 18th centuries, "where merchants to a large extent shared directly in government, major political considerations, including the very safety of the country or its success in wars in which it was actually participating, had repeatedly to give way to the cupidity of the merchants and their reluctance to contribute adequately to military finance."⁴ In Britain also, "the autonomy of business connections and traditions," according to Viner, cut across long-term state interests. During the Marshall Plan years, American administrators had to deal with the "special demands of the American business and agricultural community that expected direct and early profit from the program—and who were well-represented in Congress. . . . The general goals of multilateral trade were certainly in the interests of all these constituencies; yet they, unlike the State Department, were willing to undermine the achievement of the general aim for even the smallest immediate gain."⁵ Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, United States administrations have found it difficult to implement their designs for international economic regimes under American leadership, in the face of opposition from affected sections of the public with strong representation in Congress.

In theories of economic development, the conflict between short-run and long-

Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

4. Viner, "Power versus Plenty," p. 20.

5. Kolko and Kolko, *Limits of Power*, pp. 444–5.

run objectives arises in choices between consumption on the one hand and savings or investment on the other. When the economy underinvests, it is favoring the present over the future. One can use similar concepts in discussing power. A state *invests* in power resources when it binds allies to itself or creates international regimes in which it plays a central role. During the 1930s, Germany followed a "power approach" to trade questions, changing the structure of foreign trade so that its partners would be vulnerable to its own actions.⁶ After World War II, American policy had a broader geographical focus and was less coercive, but also involved power investment. The United States absorbed short-run economic costs, such as those imposed by discrimination in the early 1950s against American goods in Europe, for the sake of long-term political and economic gains. The United States established international governing arrangements (or "regimes") that revolved around Washington, and upon which its allies in Europe and Japan were highly dependent.

Power disinvestment may also take place: power can be consumed and not replaced. Governments faced with changes in the world economy may use their power to shift the costs of adjustment to change onto the inhabitants of weaker states, for example, by imposing tariffs or quotas on imports. In the short run, this may benefit certain groups at home (although others will suffer indirectly). In the long run, however, such actions are likely to weaken the economic base of the protectionist countries, by creating inefficient, high-cost industries. In such an event, power disinvestment has taken place.

The use of power by leading states to protect the immediate interests of some of their citizens may also reduce the incentives for weaker states to remain dependent on their powerful partners, as the following example will illustrate. United States administrations throughout most of the postwar period have sought to ensure that Japan remained a regular and major importer of American agricultural products. Not only was this beneficial to American farmers and the U.S. economy; the benefits that Japan derived from these arrangements, and its dependence on American food, served as potential sources of U.S. influence over Japanese policy. Yet in 1973 the United States temporarily restricted exports of soybeans to Japan, in an attempt to restrain inflation at home. This attempt to export inflation led the Japanese to begin to diversify their sources of supply by encouraging soy-

6. See Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945; reissued, 1969), p. 47. An interesting discussion of power investment and disinvestment appears in George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

bean production in Brazil; the result is likely to be some reduction in American economic power over Japan.

The question of whether to invest in additional power resources, or to consume some of those that one has accumulated, is a perennial issue of foreign policy, cutting across issue areas. United States influence in the international monetary system will depend to a great extent on maintenance of rough equilibrium on current account: even for the reserve-currency country, it is difficult to maintain one's power if one runs large and persistent current account deficits. Reducing the current account deficit to a manageable size implies some sacrifice of current consumption; maintaining a huge deficit requires a less obvious, but equally important, consumption of American power resources. In the energy area, the United States could continue to let its imports of petroleum grow rapidly, drawing on its international credit standing to finance them and on its influence over major OPEC countries to assure that the oil kept flowing. By this means, it could maintain current consumption patterns, at least for some time; but its power position vis à vis other major industrialized countries, as well as toward OPEC, would gradually erode. Power disinvestment would be taking place. In the trade field, the United States has traditionally invested in an open international trading regime by foregoing the temporary advantages (at least in one sector of the economy or another) to be gained by protectionist measures. Increasingly, however, the AFL-CIO and affected industries such as steel and textiles (where some protectionist measures were taken even in the 1960s) have demanded curbs on imports. Merely threatening such curbs might increase American influence abroad. Systematic implementation of them on a large scale, however, would be likely to reduce American influence over the world trade regime. In this respect, at least, such measures would also represent power disinvestment.

I conclude that every United States administration will have to fashion an economic policy that is simultaneously a "domestic" and a "foreign" policy, and that each administration will have to seek both power and plenty. The most important set of *choices* that any administration will face, across a range of policy areas, has to do with the relative weighting of the short run versus the long run, of consumption (of wealth or power) versus investment. Any analysis of foreign economic policy must assess the extent to which investments, in power as well as in production, are being made or dissipated.

Constraints on American Influence

Whatever its choices, any government (even that of the United States) will expe-

rience frustrations in attempting to implement its policies. Power rarely catches up with ambitions: the reach of governments almost always exceeds their grasp. Even in the immediate postwar years, the United States could not attain all its goals.

Some of the contemporary constraints on the American government derive from the growing independence and strength of states such as Germany and Japan. The United States remains the most important state on virtually every international economic question. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the American government can readily attain its foreign economic policy objectives. On certain issues, others have veto power.

Domestic politics provide another important constraint. Interest groups clash with each other as well as with the President. This is particularly true in the trade field, as well as in energy (omitted from consideration in this paper for reasons of space). The structure of the United States government, with a powerful Congress representing regional and sectoral interests, reinforces the impact of well-organized, even if relatively small, domestic interests on U.S. foreign economic policy.⁷

Also important are constraints imposed by the proliferation of issues in world politics, and by multiple linkages among issues. Policies adopted to attain one set of objectives, such as protection of jobs in the steel industry, may adversely affect other goals, such as non-inflationary economic growth or the maintenance of a liberal world trading system. To complicate matters, noneconomic issues, such as controversies arising over nonproliferation, NATO, or relations with China, may affect the success of foreign economic policy. The issues of growth and trade policy are never actually faced by policymakers in the relatively clear and simple form in which they are posed later in this article.

The last set of constraints is the least discussed, although nonetheless of considerable significance. United States policymakers face *cognitive constraints* in shaping foreign economic policy. No one sufficiently understands the complexities of international political economy to be able to predict accurately the effects of a given change of economic policy by the OECD countries as a whole, much less the effects of change in United States policy alone. To what extent will increases in domestic money supplies, or international liquidity, affect inflation

7. Stephen D. Krasner, "United States Foreign Economic Policy: Unravelling the paradox of external strength and internal weakness," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). This book was first published as Volume 31, No. 4 of *International Organization* (Fall 1977).

rates in the industrialized countries? Can stimulative policies be devised that will promote investment and growth without markedly increasing the rate of inflation—or is no such option available? Are “structural policies,” to reshape or reorganize certain industries through government action, necessary for the advanced industrial countries to resume their pattern of prosperity? How would democratic publics react to tightly disciplined governmental policies that reduced the rate of growth of government budgets, and government services, and that favored profits, and investments, over wage increases in allocating shares of the national product? Neither economists nor political scientists have adequately addressed these issues; and policymakers find themselves without informed guidance when they have to make decisions. This is particularly true of macroeconomic policies for noninflationary growth; but to some extent it applies to energy (where forecasts of energy supply and demand in the future vary considerably) and trade (where estimates of the viability of certain established industries, such as steel in the United States, also differ).

These constraints do not make the United States a “helpless giant” in foreign economic policy. But they do limit the ability of any administration to achieve its purposes; and a politically prudent administration will to some extent tailor its publicly announced objectives to these limitations on its power. In analyzing the Carter Administration’s foreign economic policy, therefore, it will be important to keep in mind both the interplay between American objectives and the balance between resources and constraints. For both growth policy and trade policy, I will first consider the *initial objectives* of the Carter Administration as defined within its first hundred days. Then I will examine the *constraints on policy implementation*—what made it difficult to attain the initial objectives—along with the resources available to mold events. This will lead to an examination of the *dilemmas* facing the United States in each area, in relation to American objectives of simultaneously maintaining prosperity in the United States and abroad and American influence over events.

The Carter Administration Growth Strategy

Throughout its tenure, the Administration of President Gerald Ford fought inflation as “public enemy number one.” During 1976, this emphasis was consistent with conventional wisdom among the advanced industrial states: In July, the *OECD Economic Outlook* warned that in the recovery then taking place, “the balance of the risks may well be on the side of a stronger expansion than forecast,”

with inflationary consequences.⁸ By the beginning of 1977, however, economic observers were becoming more concerned about sluggishness than about excessive expansion. The December issue of the *Outlook* asked the strong countries of the OECD (particularly Germany, Japan, and the United States) to "bear in mind the fact that world demand movements are on the low side."⁹

The Carter Administration was responsive to this advice, both at home and in its foreign economic policy. Within its first two weeks in office, the Administration proposed an economic stimulus program, whose key element was a \$50 tax rebate to virtually every American. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal, presenting this program before a House committee, emphasized the "international economic context in which this program should be viewed." After reviewing the unemployment and growth problems of industrial countries, Secretary Blumenthal explicitly coupled domestic U.S. economic policy with its foreign economic policy:

In solving these problems, all countries must work together. The Carter Administration believes strongly in such collaboration and will strive to foster it. Today, for example, it is important that those stronger countries, like the United States, Germany, and Japan, work together to expand as rapidly as is consistent with sustained growth and the control of inflation.

By adopting this stimulus program, the United States will be asserting leadership and providing a better international economic climate. We will then ask the stronger countries abroad to follow suit. This program itself implicitly calls on them to undertake stimulus efforts of proportionately similar amounts to ours.¹⁰

The Carter Administration economic stimulus package was in domestic political trouble from the start, opposed by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Arthur F. Burns, by much of U.S. business, and by a large number of Congressmen. During the winter and early spring, economic indicators in the United States turned upward and economic growth appeared to be resuming, furnishing further arguments for opponents of the plan. It was withdrawn by the Carter Administration before the end of April.¹¹

8. *OECD Economic Outlook*, no. 19 (July 1976), p. 9. For a statement of the Ford Administration view, see Secretary of State Kissinger's speech to the OECD, June 21, 1976 (Dept. of State Press Release, 21 June 1976).

9. *OECD Economic Outlook*, no. 20 (December 1976), p. 12.

10. *Conduct of Monetary Policy*. Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, first session, 2 February 1977, p. 9.

11. Burns' views appear in *ibid.*, p. 93. Discussions of reasons for the demise of Carter's economic stimulus package can be found in the *New York Times*, 1 May 1977, Section III (1:1) and Section IV (2:3).

Blumenthal's statement asserted that adoption of the stimulus program would put the United States in a strong position to exert influence on other industrial countries. Conversely, failure of the Carter Administration to secure support for the plan weakened the international position of the United States. At the London Economic Summit Conference, in May, Germany and Japan nominally agreed to take measures to expand their economies along with the United States; but it soon became evident that these targets would not be met. Germany promised to attain 5 percent economic growth, and Japan, 6.7 percent, during 1977: in the end, the German growth rate was only about 2.5 percent and the Japanese rate about 5 percent. In contrast, the United States approximately met its 5.8 percent target. The ineffectiveness of U.S. pressure was also suggested by the trends of growth rates during the year. German and Japanese growth fell sharply as 1977 wore on. Furthermore, Germany continued to run a small current account surplus of about \$2 billion, while the Japanese were amassing a huge surplus of over \$10 billion. Meanwhile, the United States had a \$20 billion deficit.¹² By the end of the year, it was clear that the "locomotive strategy" of the Carter Administration—by which the strong economies would pull the world out of recession—had failed. In February, the OECD Economic Policy Committee agreed on a "convoy" approach, according to which "convalescent" economies, such as those of Britain, France, and Italy, were to expand their economies faster along with the United States, Germany, and Japan. Yet in view of the reluctance of the German and Japanese governments to take strong expansionary measures, the new program—formally labeled the Coordinated Reflation Action Program—could cynically be regarded as no better than its acronym.¹³

The crucial constraints on American policy in this affair were found in the resistance of the German and Japanese governments to American interference in what they regarded as their domestic economic affairs. This resistance was apparent early, although it was expressed very differently by the two governments, reflecting Germany's less vulnerable political-economic position and its more forthright national style.

The Germans expressed their resistance and resentment consistently, from the very beginning. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt declared in January 1977 that Ger-

12. For most of these figures, see the *Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers*, January 1978 (published with the *Economic Report of The President* (Washington: GPO, 1978), tables 15, 16, and 18 (pp. 106, 107, and 117). For final figures on the U.S. current account deficit, see the *Wall Street Journal*, 23 March 1978.

13. A discussion of this Economic Policy Committee meeting appears in the *New York Times*, 28 February 1978.

many could not do any more to expand and that all countries should be asked to expand cautiously together, rather than following the OECD's and Carter Administration's "locomotive" strategy, by which the stronger countries would pull the rest along. Chancellor Schmidt argued that since German economic performance—on both unemployment and inflation—was better than that of the United States, Germany required no lectures on economic policy from the American government.¹⁴ Germany rejected American pleas at a March meeting of the OECD's Economic Policy Committee, and later that month a U.S. Senate staff report advised that "to the extent that U.S. economic strategy is premised upon a coordinated economic expansion of the strong economies of the United States, West Germany and Japan as a means of pulling up the weaker European economies, it is probably mistaken."¹⁵ According to the report, high German officials saw the problems of weaker OECD economies, such as Britain, France, and Italy, as being caused primarily by domestic conditions that other countries could not correct. The German government did adopt some mild stimulative policies during the year, but they were small and did not prevent the growth rate from continuing to decline. By late 1977, German spokesmen had become more biting in their characterizations of the Carter Administration strategy: Germany's chief delegate to an OECD meeting in November characterized the locomotive theory as "naive," and Chancellor Schmidt warned his Common Market colleagues that prosperity could not be restored by printing money, but required thrift and hard work.¹⁶ If anything, pressures from the United States seem to have hardened the German stand.

The Japanese followed similar policies, but without the didactic rhetoric favored by Chancellor Schmidt and members of his government. The Japanese government committed itself to aim for a 6.7 percent growth rate in 1977, and took some relatively minor and quite ineffective steps to stimulate its domestic econo-

14. *New York Times*, 20 and 24 January 1977. The U.S.-German difference on questions of inflation was by no means new. West German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard told President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1958 that "Whereas the Germans, because of their history, always worried about inflation, the Americans, because of their history, always worried about depression. The resulting danger was that America would overrespond to threats of recession and cause serious inflation in the long run." Herbert Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 340.

15. *U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Issues: The United Kingdom, France, and West Germany*, a Staff Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. The quoted passage appears on p. 31. For an account of the Economic Policy Committee meeting, see the *New York Times*, 3 March 1977.

16. *New York Times*, 22 November and 7 December 1977. Reports of German economic stimulus packages appear in the *New York Times*, 23 March 1977, and 15 September 1977.

my and reduce its balance of trade surplus. As late as the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund on September 26-30, the Japanese Minister of Finance said that the 6.7 percent growth target was appropriate for 1977—although it appeared clear already that this would not be attained. Japan sought to appear cooperative, while following a more conservative path than the United States or the OECD would have liked.¹⁷

By the end of 1977, the failure of the Carter Administration's "locomotive" strategy had exposed a difficult dilemma for American foreign economic policy. In the absence of effective coordination among the advanced industrialized countries, expansionary economic policies in the United States would contribute to large American current account deficits without necessarily assuring prosperity abroad. Even if the United States could finance its deficits indefinitely without creating grave monetary instability, it would be acquiring external liabilities—thus engaging in power disinvestment—without achieving its objective of world prosperity or acquiring countervailing external assets. It would not even necessarily secure political "goodwill" for its economic sacrifices, and it would be in a weak position to cope with future adversity. No prudent American government could complacently accept such a prospect.

Since financing a huge deficit indefinitely would be politically unwise, it was necessary either for the United States to adjust to world economic conditions, or for other states to adjust to the United States. This is essentially what the "locomotive" debate was about: the United States wanted Germany and Japan to make the most painful adjustments, while the governments of those countries sought to impose the costs of adjustment on the United States. In international economic relations, power often manifests itself as the ability to force others to bear costs of adjustment to change.¹⁸

When it became clear in the fall of 1977 that Germany and Japan could not be persuaded to follow expansionary policies, the United States took actions, or failed to take actions, that had the effect of forcing some costs onto its partners:

17. For reports of the Japanese position, see, for instance: *New York Times*, 21 January and 5 August 1977; *IMF Survey*, 10 October 1977; *Economist*, 1 October 1977, pp. 85-87.

18. These costs of adjustment are not purely objective: they depend on policymakers' values and interests as well as on economic facts. Within a country, certain groups may benefit by changes that are viewed by others, or by governmental leaders, as costs: Japanese consumers, for instance, would benefit as consumers from reductions of import barriers on cheap agricultural products from the United States. For the purposes of this analysis, however, policymakers' utility functions are taken as the standards by which costs are assessed. If a government resists a policy change, imposition of it is regarded as a cost to that government, even though some of its citizens might benefit thereby.

it began a well-publicized campaign to reduce the Japanese current account surplus, and it allowed the dollar to depreciate on world financial markets.

In November, an American mission to Tokyo reportedly demanded that Japan, within three weeks, publicly announce commitments to reduce its current account surplus; and about three weeks later, Japan sent a delegation to Washington with a package of concessions drawn up by a cabinet that had been reshuffled in the wake of the American ultimatum.¹⁹ United States officials claim that this move reflected American concern for the health of the international economic system, which was jeopardized by Japan's huge surplus, as well as domestic pressures within the United States. They also assert that the negotiations were quite amicable. Japanese officials and observers, however, express surprise and concern that the huge United States should put so much pressure on Japan, which considers itself to be only a relatively small, vulnerable country struggling to maintain its economy in adverse circumstances. They emphasize the failure of American exporters to concentrate seriously on the Japanese market, and the structural difficulties (such as those in agriculture) that make it impossible for Japan to liberalize its policies as rapidly as the United States desires. The Carter Administration policy may have been handled in a more conciliatory way than the "Nixon shocks" of 1970-71, but like the controversies over textiles and exchange rates in those years, the United States was exercising its superior power over the highly vulnerable Japanese.²⁰ In both cases, it appeared to United States officials that the power investments it had made for years—supporting Japan politically, militarily and economically, while making it asymmetrically dependent on the United States—should pay dividends in this time of economic need. Thus in both cases, when economic losses to the United States (or certain sectors of the U.S. population) became significant political issues domestically, and when Japanese policies seemed to destabilize the international economy, the American administration was willing to draw on its power resources.

American actions carried certain long-term political risks. If Japan should attempt to change the structure of its production and foreign trade, and its political ties, to become less dependent on the United States in the long run—and if it could successfully do so—United States influence over Japanese policy would

19. *New York Times*, 22 November and 7 December 1977.

20. My sources for these statements are interviews and conversations in Washington and Tokyo during March of 1978. For a discussion of the 1969-71 period, see I. M. Destler, Priscilla Clapp, Hideo Sato and Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976).

decline in the future. Thus it was important from the U.S. perspective not to make the threat too harsh. On the other hand, effective persuasion could have political as well as economic rewards, domestically and in Europe. From a political perspective, American actions could be seen as an attempt to use some "excess power" vis à vis Japan both to serve short-term domestic objectives and to strengthen the international economic system, thereby reinforcing the position of relatively conservative regimes, with which the United States had strong ties, in economically weak countries such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

The second major way by which costs could be forced onto others would be to let the dollar depreciate by following a policy of "benign neglect" of the dollar in world financial markets. By making exports cheaper in foreign currency, and imports into the United States more expensive in dollar terms, such a depreciation would tend, over a period of time, to reduce the U.S. deficit while reducing export surpluses of strong currency countries. Of course, it would also have the negative consequences of increasing the U.S. inflation rate and worsening the terms of trade. During the summer and fall of 1977, it appeared that the Carter Administration was following this course; Treasury Secretary Blumenthal was even accused of "talking the dollar down." Responding to fierce criticisms during the winter from European governments and Japan, United States officials professed greater concern about the dollar's decline, and in early January the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board announced that they would intervene from time to time on foreign exchange markets in support of the dollar.²¹ It quickly became evident, however, that the United States was not prepared to support the dollar at any given level, only, as the Council of Economic Advisors put it, "to act forcefully when market conditions become disorderly." An agreement between the United States and Germany in March—announced after a long buildup—had a similarly limited purpose. The Administration did "not believe it is appropriate to maintain any particular value for the dollar."²²

It is not surprising that the markets were reported to be asking, "Does the United States really mean to support the dollar, or is it just going through the motions?"²³ A good case could be made that the policy of the Carter Administration was really one of "disguised benign neglect." The Administration believed that supporting the dollar at a certain level would be extremely costly and would

21. *New York Times*, 5 January 1978, p. 1.

22. *Report of the Council of Economic Advisors*, 1978, p. 124.

23. See Leonard Silk, "The U.S.-German Action: Markets are Unconvinced," *New York Times*, 14 March 1978, pp. 47, 59.

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probably fail; but it was no longer politic to view the dollar's decline with equanimity or to express disdain for European and Japanese fears that they would be hurt by exchange rate changes. Thus the United States continued to require Europe and Japan (and OPEC, since OPEC assets were largely in dollars and the price of oil was dollar-denominated) to bear the burden of adjustment—while the rhetoric changed. Sugar coating was put on the pill.²⁴

A policy of continued economic expansion at home, plus "benign neglect" on the foreign exchange markets, could only have been sustained if American leaders were willing to accept both higher inflation rates domestically (as a result of expansionary policies coupled with the falling exchange rate) and conflict with U.S. allies. The latter may have been acceptable; the former, however, became unacceptable as inflation rates in the spring of 1978 rose above double-digit annual levels. Domestic fiscal and monetary policy turned toward greater restraint: the proposed tax cut was reduced in size, and interest rates rose. Correspondingly, the United States now abandoned its high-growth alliance with the OECD secretariat. In late May, the United States opposed a secretariat plan for coordinated stimulation of world economic growth, with the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors arguing that rising inflation and the huge American trade deficit made it impossible for the United States to expand its rate of growth further.²⁵ Not only was the locomotive policy now dead—the leading locomotive had applied its brakes.

The international debates and negotiations over macroeconomic policy during 1977–78 illustrate the potential for conflict hidden in Secretary Blumenthal's call for international economic collaboration previously quoted. Since the interests of the major countries (as perceived by their governments) diverged, no conflict-free solution was possible. The problem was not simply one of "educating" the Germans and Japanese to their "true interests" as defined by liberal, neo-Keynesian economists of the OECD and the United States. On the contrary, for there to be agreement, power would have to be successfully exercised.

Yet it was difficult for the United States to exert its power successfully. Apply-

24. It is impossible to confirm whether these were the "real motivations" of policymakers, so the argument for this point of view remains speculative. It should also be noted that policymakers' views sometimes change: reports in the spring of 1978 suggest that Secretary Blumenthal, in particular, became more worried about the effects of the dollar's decline in the late winter of that year. Some of these reports ascribed this heightened concern to moves by central banks to sell dollars in large quantities, and to complaints from Saudi Arabia. See the *Economist*, 1 April 1978.

25. *New York Times*, 1 June 1978, p. 47.

ing pressure threatened to intensify international economic conflict and strain relations with close allies. The ultimate weapon of pressure—depreciation of the dollar—exacerbated conflict, increased risks of protectionist actions abroad, and threatened to accelerate American inflation. By early June 1978, it appeared that the United States was no longer trying to force adjustments onto others, but that it was emphasizing the fight against inflation at home. But essentially uncoordinated policies of restraint by all three major powers would, if earlier forecasts by American officials proved correct, lead to a recession that could have been avoided by coordinated action. The exercise of power may have been costly and dangerous; but the failure effectively to exercise power would have serious consequences as well.

The United States could conceivably attempt to solve its macroeconomic problems by adopting protectionist trade measures. These would have to be accompanied by an effective energy policy (since it is unlikely that a protectionist United States would be allowed by other countries to run trade and capital surpluses sufficient to finance \$45 billion worth of oil imports). Few economists or high officials in the Carter Administration regarded protectionism as an effective response to macroeconomic difficulties. Yet ongoing changes in the structure of foreign trade were causing dislocations, with serious domestic political consequences. Thus the pressure to “do something” was strong. It is to the area of trade that we now turn.

The Carter Administration and the Politics of Trade

When President Carter came into office in January of 1977, foreign trade had already become the focus of some of the hardest-fought battles in Washington. Since 1934, American presidents had consistently promoted lower tariffs and freer trade. Protectionist sentiment was persistent, particularly in Congress; yet forces favoring freer trade continued to gain support between 1934 and the early 1960s. These political changes, aided by American economic successes in the first two postwar decades, culminated in the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1967. Yet just as the liberal traders were successful, important U.S. industries such as iron and steel, textiles, and footwear were coming under pressure from imports, and protectionist sentiment began to increase. Indeed, textiles had already been exempted from the liberal provisions of the 1962 Trade Act. The AFL-CIO changed from an anti-protectionist to a protectionist stance during the late 1960s. In 1971, in conjunction with his international monetary measures,

President Nixon imposed a temporary 10 percent surcharge on American imports. Although the Congress in 1974 passed a trade act authorizing the President to make large reductions in tariffs, this legislation contained a number of relatively restrictive provisions that had been absent from the 1962 act. Legislators were clearly laboring under intensive cross-pressures on trade issues.²⁶ The direct effects of particular trade measures were highly visible and specific, and could be readily perceived by industrialists, union officials, and members of the general public. Unlike international monetary politics, trade was not perceived as an esoteric issue area that had to be interpreted by squabbling bands of arcane economists. Whether for these or other reasons, it attracted more domestic controversy than issues of exchange rates and the international monetary system, even though the latter may have been more important for the economy as a whole.²⁷

The initial policy pronouncements and actions of the Carter Administration in the trade field were consistent with the liberalism of previous presidents. Under Carter, the United States continued to press for further reductions in trade barriers at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva. In March, Under Secretary of State-Designate Richard N. Cooper cautioned Congress against taking a protectionist path:

Imports are a natural scapegoat for what is basically deficient total demand. Import restrictions, however, will never work collectively—unemployment will only be exported. Thus far Governments have generally followed prudent trade policies, but the possibility of protectionism is real. Trade restrictions would spread in the current environment, and it could easily take another decade to get back to where we are today.²⁸

In April, Carter rejected recommendations by the international Tariff Commission to impose restrictions on imports of color television sets and shoes, incurring the wrath of President George Meany of the AFL-CIO.²⁹

The need to make concessions to protectionist forces was evident from the reac-

26. For a lucid recent account, see Krasner, "U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness." For a classic analysis of the politics of foreign trade in the 1950s, see Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1963).

27. See Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 121 and footnote 53, p. 253, and references cited therein.

28. Statement of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs-Designate Richard N. Cooper, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 18, 1977 (Department of State Press Release, p. 3).

29. *New York Times*, 7 April 1977.

tions to these early Carter decisions. Over the next few months, his special trade representative, Robert Strauss (former chairman of the Democratic National Committee), developed a policy of "free but fair trade," in which Orderly Marketing Agreements (quotas disguised as "voluntary" agreements) would be used to help politically influential industries hardest hit by imports. Under an Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA), the United States arranges with its major suppliers for them to limit their exports, and the agreement is then filed under the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For instance, since most recent growth in shoe imports has come from Taiwan and South Korea, the United States decided to negotiate an OMA with these nations instead of ordering general import restrictions. A similar agreement was made with Japan covering color television sets.³⁰

During the past decade, certain less developed countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil, have been increasingly successful exporters to the United States and other industrialized countries. This pattern is no longer confined to items of peripheral importance, but extends to basic industrial products such as steel. Structural changes in world trade and production patterns account for many of the disruptions felt in industrialized countries; and the effects of these changes on particular industries are exacerbated by the low level of aggregate demand in the advanced industrial states.³¹ Thus pressures for increasing protectionism are by no means likely to be temporary. As long as manufacturing industries continue to develop in the third world, these pressures are likely to continue, if not increase.

The difficulties confronting proponents of a liberal trade policy were illustrated graphically by events in the steel industry during last summer and fall, 1977. Bethlehem steel announced a quarterly loss of \$477 million in August; in September, steel firms announced layoffs of thousands of workers, including 5000 workers at one plant near Youngstown, Ohio.³² Officials of the steel industry, union leaders, and congressmen from affected areas immediately called for restrictions on imports and other protection for the industry. U.S. Steel Corporation filed an "anti-dumping complaint" against virtually the entire Japanese steel industry, charging that it sold steel below cost in the United States.

Critics of the industry argued that many of its troubles were its own fault, and

30. *New York Times*, 13 June 1977.

31. See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., *World Financial Markets*, September 1977 and January 1978; *New York Times*, 24 September 1977; "The U.S. Trade Balance and American Competitiveness in the World Economy," remarks by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury C. Fred Bergsten, June 5, 1978 (Department of the Treasury Press Release, Washington).

32. *New York Times*, 21 September 1977; *Wall Street Journal*, 27 October 1977.

that the timing of the layoffs reflected industry efforts to reduce long-term costs as well as problems of weak demand and import competition. They could also point out that imports of steel were not growing dramatically; indeed, during the first eight months of 1977, imports accounted for under 16 percent of the U.S. market, less than their percentage in 1968. In 1968, however, the U.S. economy was still benefitting from the long boom of the 1960s; and heavy industry received an additional boost from the Vietnam War. By 1977, on the contrary, unemployment and unused capacity were much higher. The costs of imports to workers and industrialists were correspondingly more severe. Regardless of the merits of various arguments, the key political fact was that industry and union leaders, many congressmen, and much of the public identified imports as the key problem.³³

Under strong pressure, the Carter Administration hastily developed a plan to protect the industry—defending it, not on the grounds that it was good in itself, but that it was less harmful than the feasible alternatives—in particular, import quotas. The key point in the plan was to establish a “reference price” for steel, based on the cost of production in Japan, the most efficient foreign producer. An accelerated anti-dumping investigation will be initiated immediately if imported steel is sold in the United States below the reference price. Reference prices were set at about 5.7 percent below the average price of comparable American steel products in the Eastern United States. By April 1978, actual prices for steel in the United States had risen about 15 percent, and talks were under way among the United States, European Community, and Japan to produce a “world steel agreement.” Steelmakers from less developed countries were excluded from these negotiations.³⁴ Under intense pressure, the Carter Administration had retreated from its liberal stand of the winter and spring to a “defense of liberalism through moderate protectionism.” It was attempting, in its dealings with the European and Japanese steel industries and governments, as well as in the Orderly Marketing Agreements, to do what Undersecretary Cooper said in March 1977, was not possible: to make import restrictions “work collectively”.

33. For figures on imports as a percentage of consumption, see *New York Times*, 17 October 1977. For a discussion of factors other than imports that influenced the timing of layoffs, see the 1978 *Report of the Council of Economic Advisers*, p. 136. Reports on contentions of “dumping” can be found in the *New York Times*, 14 October 1977; and the *Wall Street Journal*, 25 November 1977.

34. For the reference pricing system, see *Report of the Council of Economic Advisers*, 1978, p. 137; and *New York Times*, 4 January 1978, p. A1. For a discussion of the trilateral discussions on a steel agreement, see “Towards a world steel cartel,” *Economist* 29 April 1978, p. 95.

We saw that in the area of macroeconomic, or growth, policy, the Carter Administration was caught between its desire for sustained and relatively rapid economic growth and the resistance of foreign governments to its plans for attaining that objective consistent with international financial equilibrium. A similar dilemma loomed on the trade side, although in this case, the affected industries, both in the United States and abroad, were more directly involved. Domestic pressure for protection was vociferous: advocates of erecting barriers to imports specifically criticized foreign governments and industries. Thus in December, AFL-CIO President George Meany argued:

Foreign trade is the guerilla warfare of economics—and right now the United States economy is being ambushed. Free trade is a joke and a myth. And a Government trade policy predicated on old ideas of free trade is worse than a joke—it is a prescription for disaster. The answer is fair trade, do unto others as they do unto us—barrier for barrier—closed door for closed door.

Meany also implied that the costs of allowing free trade in steel would not be limited to wealth, but would extend to power as well. Like the mercantilists of the 17th and 18th centuries, he perceived that being materially dependent on a potential adversary would weaken one's autonomy and power. He argued that imported steel is cheaper

because foreign countries subsidize their steel industries so they can undercut United States companies. Of course, when the United States steel industry is destroyed, the United States would become dependent on foreign sources, and without a steel industry of our own, the foreign countries could charge whatever they want.³⁵

On the monetary-macroeconomic-growth side, the principal focus of debate was domestic, with international problems seen as indirect although powerful constraints on domestic policy in the long run. On the trade side, by contrast, foreign economic policy questions were at the forefront of attention. Furthermore, the growth policy debate was dominated by economists; all were in favor, in principle, of an open world economy. Arguments over trade policy, by contrast, were conducted primarily by industry and union officials and congressmen, not by economists. These people were much less reticent than the economists about expressing clearly protectionist sentiments.

In part, the arguments about trade policy had to do with whether protectionism would serve the goal of national prosperity. The AFL-CIO and industries such as

35. Both quotations are from the *New York Times*, 9 December 1977.

steel said it would, while neo-classical economists and administration spokesmen such as Richard Cooper and Robert Strauss argued that protectionism would damage prosperity by leading to retaliation against American exports and inefficiency at home. The policy debate, however, also rested to some extent on the *relative priority* that should be given to competing foreign policy objectives—in particular, to national prosperity in the short run versus world order; with its implications for long-run prosperity. One could believe that protectionism would bring economic gains, at least in the short run, without favoring such a course of action—if one thought that such a step would undermine the American-centered structure of world order and eventually, therefore, bring economic as well as political trouble to the United States. According to this argument, protectionist policies would decisively damage U.S. relations with developing countries as well as jeopardizing U.S. ties with its allies in the OECD. The long-run political and economic arguments could be used to counter the protectionists' short-run emphasis on jobs.

Yet the implications of a long-run argument were not that simple. A sophisticated neo-mercantilist version of the protectionist argument could be constructed. According to this view, imports of steel would eventually weaken the American steel industry, to a point at which the industrial base of the United States would be undermined and its power in the world eroded. A United States that had become merely an affluent service economy, an economy of hamburger chains and investment banks, would indeed be a "pitiful, helpless giant" in a competitive and conflict-ridden world political economy. Although advocates of protectionism generally stressed the short-term, focusing on jobs and profits, they could also make a long-term political argument for their position.

Thus the economic controversies over the effects of liberal trade in a world of highly organized government-supported industry were not the only issues behind the dilemmas of American policy. There were also two different, although implicit, answers to the question: what is a secure base of political influence in contemporary world politics? Administration spokesmen and their allies outside government argued that United States autonomy and influence could only be secured within a structure of world order, and that particular sacrifices should be made to assure that such a structure were developed. "World order politics" should be the guiding motif of American policy.³⁶ To the neo-mercantilists,

36. See Stanley Hoffmann, "The Uses of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, (October 1977), pp. 28–48. For a critique of the Carter Administration's first year, see Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," *Foreign Policy* no. 29 (Winter 1977–78), pp. 3–26.

however, international politics remains a realm of self-help politics, and *national* power in a traditional, material sense is a *sine qua non* for security and influence.

The interesting thing about this debate is that both sides may be right, under different conditions. World order has the quality of a self-reinforcing equilibrium, or self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as governments, and other significant actors, believe that order will be maintained—and in particular, that the major power or powers upholding it are willing to make the necessary sacrifices to maintain it—strong measures to discipline violators will be unnecessary. “Investments in world order”—providing orderly regimes for interaction, and incentives for participation by major governments—will be more productive than investments in national material bases of power. It will make more sense to buy South Korean steel and Saudi Arabian oil than to protect one’s own steel industry or develop expensive sources of domestic petroleum. Since liberal economists *assume* that a structure of world order exists, they naturally favor this open course of action; and as long as that assumption is sensible, or sufficiently self-reinforcing, they are wise to do so.

Yet, when the fabric of world order becomes frayed, it can unravel quickly. At this point, national material sources of power become more important—as they did during the 1930s—and confidence placed in international regimes seems increasingly empty. Governments that “insured themselves” against this eventuality by reducing their dependence on others are then in a better position than those who did not. The irony is that by protecting themselves against the consequences of a world collapse (for instance, by protectionist measures), they may have helped to bring on the demise of the benign international regime. Even they may therefore be in worse positions than if they had supported the system.

The dilemmas posed by these potential dynamics are most difficult for great powers, for they have both the most choice and the greatest effects on the system. If the United States decided that the structures of world order created after World War II were collapsing and acted accordingly, those structures would assuredly break down. Whether the analysis had been correct or not, it would be (if accompanied by action) self-fulfilling. From a long-term political standpoint, therefore, a turn toward full-fledged protectionism (as opposed to concessions to protectionist sentiment here and there within the context of a liberal world economy) could very well be a decisive and irrevocable step, with broad implications for political and security issues as well as for international economic relations.

Conclusion

The problems of the Carter Administration during its first 500 days illustrate what happens when intentions (however good) meet reality in foreign economic policy. To some extent the Carter Administration created problems for itself by proclaiming expansionary macroeconomic policies that it could not implement at the international level. Yet most of the major difficulties faced by the Administration were not the results of its own blunders, but were inherent in the nature of American political institutions and the position of the United States in the world. They are therefore likely to persist in the future.

It will continue to be hard for the United States to maintain prosperity at home and abroad. In part this is due to difficulties of coordinating policies among advanced industrial states, which have been discussed in this chapter. Yet other forces are also at work. The advanced industrial countries are now being required to pay more attention to events outside their own sphere, and in some ways to adjust to these changes rather than always being able to impose the costs of adjustment on others. The oil price rises of 1973–74, and the impact of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on world politics, provide the most obvious examples. Of comparable importance, but less noticed, is the shift in comparative advantage in certain major industrial sectors—textiles, steel, and some areas of electronics—toward the more-advanced third world countries. This phenomenon will increasingly affect not only “North-South relations” but the industrial structure of the North itself. The reaction of the industrialized countries may well be defensive, protectionist, and discriminatory against poorer countries that have successfully followed the advice of Harvard or Chicago-trained economists. Yet the key point is that there will have to be a reaction.

Internal tensions within capitalist countries are also important. Contemporary capitalism coexists uneasily with democratic institutions: it is difficult to make capitalism run smoothly and still achieve the levels of social welfare and equity of income distribution that democratic publics expect. Tensions and contradictions abound; and will continue to manifest themselves in “political” as well as “economic” ways. Thus important constraints will be imposed by domestic politics, as well as by conflicting state policies, the existence of multiple, competing issues, and cognitive limitations of decisionmakers.

Conflicts will continue to exist among objectives. As the economists are fond of saying, there is no “free lunch”—although politicians are adept at creating il-

lusions that such a feast can be provided (with payment at least deferred until after the next election). Even when we adopt a national, or "public interest" point of view, conflicts arise among objectives. Even if we agree that it does not make sense to choose between power and wealth, in the long run, we may disagree on how much preference to give to the immediate over the distant future: in economists' terms, personal and national "discount rates" may differ. Keynes' reminder, that "in the long run we are all dead," reminds us that there should probably be *some* discount rate, but it hardly tells us what it should be. Even if we should agree on this, different policy prescriptions would follow from different estimates of the long run costs of various policies. For instance, would aggressive U.S. pressure on Japan to reduce its trade surplus undermine world order, U.S. influence, and prosperity in the long run? Would protectionism help or hinder attempts to maintain national prosperity? Would such protectionism increase U.S. influence in the future by protecting the American industrial base, or would it reduce U.S. influence by undermining the structure of world order that America now dominates?

These problems are simple in comparison with the issues that arise when we no longer assume that all political actors analyze foreign policy issues in terms of a known "national interest." People look at foreign economic policy issues, like other issues, in terms of their own interests, and often interpret "the national interest" in these terms. Thus it is not surprising that members of the foreign policy elite usually care more about long-term foreign policy questions, and less about jobs in Ohio, than steelworkers in Youngstown. Nor is it difficult to understand why positions taken on President Carter's energy policy so often follow the lines of class, industrial, and regional interest.

This brings us to a restatement of the key theme of this essay: the politics of foreign economic policy (both domestic and international) involves contention over who will bear the costs of adjusting to change. We can only attain our "thick description" of events by looking beyond the pious statements and universalistic rhetoric to the interests that are served by policy. We have seen that policy disputes between advanced capitalist countries, on monetary and trade issues, reflect struggles by governments to force the costs of adjustment onto others. In domestic political controversies, such as those on trade, tangible interests are also at stake—in these cases, of competing groups rather than of governments. In both situations we will only be misled if we believe that the arguments are essentially disputes over doctrine, principle, or ideology, or that the central problem is how to interpret world interests. On the contrary, conflicts of interests, as perceived by the participants, are at the heart of the political struggle. These interests combine

aspirations to power and wealth. They are in some areas, and at some times, complementary to one another. Thus coalitions are formed and agreements are made. But the interests of autonomous actors never completely coincide: hence, there is always some political contention, even in harmonious relationships.

In the 1980s, the United States will continue to be subject to adverse foreign economic pressures. These pressures—whether the result of slow growth abroad, export campaigns aimed at the American market, or high energy prices—will have political repercussions at home. Domestic groups will demand that other governments adjust their policies to American needs. Although the United States is powerful, it is not all-powerful, and forcing such adjustments onto others will be difficult. Whether successful or not, attempts to do so will lead to tough negotiations, verbal recriminations, and a certain amount of international bad feeling. Thus attempts at policy coordination—close cooperation on behalf of important common interests—will lead to conflict. American foreign economic policy under President Carter, and his successors, will be judged according to its success in keeping international conflict manageable while retaining domestic political support—and maintaining United States influence as well as fostering prosperity at home and abroad. The foreign economic policy kitchen will be hot; success will come to those who can turn out the goodies without setting off an explosion.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978

The materials, technologies, equipment, and facilities associated with civilian nuclear power programs could be of use in the production of nuclear weapons. It is generally accepted that, for this reason, the global spread of nuclear power adds to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. But views differ strongly on the magnitude and significance of this incremental risk, and on whether it outweighs or is outweighed by the benefits of various kinds of nuclear power programs.

Much of the United States' policy for dealing with the linkage between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation is embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Because the United States is a leading supplier of equipment and services in the nuclear field, this legislation will affect directly or indirectly most of the nuclear power programs in the non-communist world.

In the four essays which follow, the nonproliferation policies reflected in the Act are described and analyzed by an American author and reacted to by contributors from the Federal Republic of Germany, India, and Japan.

—The Editors

The United States Congress and Nonproliferation

Frederick Williams

One of the most significant recent assertions of Congressional power over U.S. foreign policy culminated on March 10, 1978 in the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.¹ This new law, primarily intended by Congress to reform U.S. nuclear export practice, carries with it severe restrictions on the civil nuclear programs of other countries.

Provisions of the Law

As it emerged from a lengthy process of negotiation, compromise, and amendment in the U.S. Congress, the Nonproliferation Act represents an uncertain composite of two very different approaches to the nuclear proliferation problem: 1) the *internationalist* approach which commits the U.S. to negotiations and international initiatives, relying heavily upon incentives for cooperative effort; and 2) the *unilateralist* approach, relying heavily on U.S. intervention and control through export restrictions. Unfortunately, despite considerable attention to international cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle, the real heart of the new law lies in its restrictive, unilateralist export control provisions.

The law defines four major mechanisms for the control of nuclear exports.² The first of these codifies and upgrades requirements for newly negotiated Agreements for Cooperation—bilateral intergovernmental agreements which are the basic vehicle of international nuclear commerce with the United States. In accordance with preexisting practice, new Agreements must be submitted for approval to Congress, which may veto by majorities of both chambers within 60 days. In a change from past practice, the second mechanism requires *existing* Agreements for Cooperation to be renegotiated to comply with the statutory criteria for new Agreements. Third, the Act creates a procedurally bewildering scheme for the issuance of Export Licenses for individual exports of nuclear items and commodities pursuant to Agreements for Cooperation. Finally, the Act establishes procedures for obtaining U.S. assent, which will be required by Agreements for Cooperation

1. Public Law No. 95-242 (March 10, 1978). Referred to hereafter as the Act or the Non-Proliferation Act.

2. These mechanisms are amendments to the existing Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law No. 83-703 (1954) (as amended) which already governs nuclear exports.

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and Export Licenses, for certain recipient country activities with exported fuel, including further enrichment, reprocessing, retransfer to third parties, physical security measures, and safeguards arrangements. These required permissions are to be known as "subsequent arrangements."

Nonproliferation Criteria

Agreements for Cooperation and Export Licenses must conform to two nearly identical sets of substantive criteria which embody the Congressional statement of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Ostensibly the criteria apply immediately to Agreements for Cooperation, and of course new Agreements will observe them as negotiated, but it will be some time before renegotiation can bring existing Agreements into line with the criteria. For Export Licenses the criteria apply in two phases, the first phase effective immediately and the second in two years. The main difference between the two sets of criteria are that those applied to Agreements for Cooperation attach prior approval requirements to all nuclear fuel and material covered by the Agreement *and* to all nuclear fuel and material, whether of U.S. origin or not, used in or acquired by means of U.S. supplied equipment, whereas corresponding requirements for Export Licenses attach *only* to nuclear fuel and material specifically covered by the license.³

In shorthand form, the new export criteria are as follows:

Applicable to Both Agreements for Cooperation and Export Licenses

PHASE I⁴

1. Prohibition of uses of exports for explosive devices;
2. Application of safeguards to all exports;
3. Provision of adequate physical security;
4. Application of criteria to subsequent generations of material or equipment generated from exported sensitive nuclear technology;

PHASE II

5. Application of full-scope safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapons state recipients;

3. Two requirements, because of their generality, apply only to Agreements for Cooperation, and one is applied to all U.S. uranium exports immediately, independent of Agreements and Licenses.

4. As noted in the text, Phase I and II criteria both apply immediately to Agreements for Cooperation.

6. Prohibition of reprocessing without U.S. approval;
7. Prohibition of third-party retransfer without U.S. approval;⁵

Applicable to Agreements for Cooperation Only

8. Requirement for return of all exports in case of breach of nonproliferation commitment or safeguards agreement;
9. Prohibition of storage of separated plutonium derived from U.S. supplied material in any facility not approved in advance by the U.S.;

Additional Requirement

10. Prohibition of further enrichment of U.S. supplied uranium without prior U.S. approval.

Clearly the "Phase II" criteria (numbers 5, 6 and 7) are at the core of the difficulty recipient nations will experience with this new law, and for Europe and Japan numbers 6 and 7 (reprocessing and retransfer) are particularly troublesome. The phase I criteria largely codify what is already required in current Agreements, and the final three, while significant, do not create any immediate major problems. Within the Phase II criteria, the requirement for full scope safeguards as a precondition for U.S. exports really affects only five nations: India, Israel, Egypt, Argentina and South Africa,⁶ all of which do create proliferation concern. Further, the precondition does not apply for two years⁷ and the President can waive it from year to year thereafter if majorities of both Houses of Congress concur.

Criteria 6 and 7, on the other hand, which require U.S. permission for reprocessing and retransfer, will create major stumbling blocks for Euratom countries. Full implementation of the Criterion 7 requirement of U.S. permission for third-party retransfers will give the U.S. control, for example, over sales of Windscale and La Hague reprocessing services to such non-Community countries as Switzerland, Japan and Spain.⁸ Thus last year's Franco-Japanese arrangement for reprocessing of 1,600 tonnes of Japanese fuel at La Hague beginning in 1985 will be called into question because of the fuel's American origin.⁹ The added

5. The Euratom Agreement for Cooperation already contains this restriction.

6. Joseph S. Nye, "Nonproliferation: A Long Term Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 56 (April 1978), pp. 601-623, p. 612.

7. Two years to date of export, eighteen months to date of application for license.

8. Some Agreements, including the Euratom Agreement, already contain retransfer restrictions. However, the requirement will become universal and more uniform and will be more strictly enforced under the "subsequent arrangements" regime.

9. "Paris-Tokyo Nuclear Reprocessing Pact is Viewed as a Blow to Carter," *New York Times*, 8 October 1977, p. 13.

imposition of Criterion 6 (reprocessing) on Euratom through Export Licenses and a renegotiated Agreement for Cooperation will give the U.S. a virtual veto power over commercial operations at Windscale and La Hague for years to come, since the fraction of nuclear fuel in use in Euratom and elsewhere which is of U.S. origin will remain for some time even if there are strenuous efforts to reduce dependence.

As with the full-scope safeguards requirement, Criteria 6 and 7 can be waived for Export Licenses, but only for Euratom¹⁰ and only if Euratom agrees promptly to renegotiate its Agreement for Cooperation. Thus it is technically easier for India to escape the full-scope safeguards provision than it is for Euratom to escape the reprocessing restriction, a disturbing anomaly which exemplifies the inverted priorities of this statute. Though it can be extended by the President with Congressional concurrence, this waiver provides initially for a grace period of only two years and extensions are not favored. Regarding this extension possibility, the Senate Committees which reviewed the legislation prior to enactment stated in their Report that "the committees deem 24 months to be a realistic amount of time to reach agreement. Hence, while there is a provision for extensions, we hope that they will not become necessary."¹¹ Of course Euratom countries may escape these restrictions after two years by simply not purchasing any more U.S. uranium or enrichment services and allowing the renegotiation to continue desultorily for an indefinite period. This solution may prove too draconian because of uranium supply problems and lack of enrichment capacity and because other major suppliers, Canada and Australia, may apply similar restrictions. Still, diversification of supply will probably be the most effective remedy for Europe's difficulties with this new law.

Renegotiation of the Euratom Agreement

The most recent amendments to the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Euratom entered into force in early 1973. The Agreement is to remain in effect until the end of 1995 and would not normally be subject to alteration during that time period except as mutually agreeable. Provisions of the Agreement, however, implicitly subordinate it to applicable U.S. law, and the U.S. position will likely be that "applicable law" includes the new statutory renegotia-

10. The IAEA also falls under this provision because U.S. exports to Mexico and Yugoslavia funnel through the Agency, but is unlikely to require waiver.

11. U.S. Congress, Committee on Government Affairs, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and Committee on Foreign Relations, "Report, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977," Report No. 95-467, 95th Congress, 1st Session, October 3, 1977, p. 10.

tion requirement and criteria. This argument would be legal sophistry, for neither in domestic legal doctrine nor in international practice is it legitimate to rewrite major portions of agreements under the guise of making changes in the governing internal law of one party.

There is no formal time limit on achievement of renegotiation of existing Agreements, but the law requires the President to begin immediate efforts toward bringing existing Agreements into line with the criteria. As noted, however, Export License Criteria 6 and 7 (reprocessing and retransfer) link the two year waiver to renegotiation and thus create some pressure for its expeditious accomplishment.

Export Licenses

The main regulatory tier of the bill, the export licensing regime, enacts a byzantine procedure for obtaining an export license for individual nuclear exports. Export licenses are issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an independent regulatory agency which has licensing jurisdiction over all nuclear matters. Initially the Secretary of State must notify the Commission that the proposed export will not be "inimical to the common defense and security." Without such a notification the licensing process comes to an abrupt halt. Next, the Commission must find, based on a *reasonable judgment* of the facts presented to it, using information provided by the Secretary of State and other agencies of the executive branch, or through public hearings if it deems those appropriate, that the applicable export criteria are met and that all other legal requirements are fulfilled.

If the Commission so finds, the license would be subject to the normal court review procedure under standards applicable to such administrative decisions. If, however, the Commission is unable to approve the license application because it is unable to find that one or more of the Act's statutory criteria are met, it must report this negative result to the President, who may nevertheless approve the export by Executive Order. In order for it to become effective, however, the order must be submitted to Congress for a period of sixty continuous session days during which majorities of both houses of the Congress may disapprove the export license. Despite the law's explicit mandate in these sections for expeditious procedures, the opportunity for bureaucratic obstruction and delay in the handling of license applications is enormous.

Subsequent Arrangements

The criteria which give the United States rights of prior approval through

Export Licenses and Agreements are to be enforced by the mechanism of subsequent arrangements. These are informal intergovernmental agreements governing specific treatment of material or equipment which has already been exported. The subjects of these agreements would encompass enrichment services, approvals for reprocessing or retransfer of material or equipment, approval of physical security measures, storage or disposition of spent fuel, applications of safeguards, and other subsidiary matters. The most controversial subsequent arrangements will of course be those for approval of spent fuel retransfer and reprocessing.

The Secretary of Energy has the primary responsibility to approve such subsequent arrangements, but with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and after consultation with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of State retains responsibility for negotiations with other countries.

Other subsections of the law impose severe restrictions on the latitude of the Secretary of Energy to grant approvals for subsequent arrangements for reprocessing. A subsequent arrangement for reprocessing, retransfer to the third parties for reprocessing, or subsequent retransfer of significant quantities of separated plutonium may not be approved by the Secretary without notification of the Congressional Committees with jurisdiction over foreign affairs of the reasons for his decision. Then the Secretary must wait fifteen days for their reaction prior to the normal fifteen day public notice period required for any approved subsequent arrangement to become effective.

While there is no explicit Congressional override provision, the consequences of Congressional disapproval are predictable. Moreover, the Secretary is enjoined from approving reprocessing in any facility which has not, prior to the enactment of this law, reprocessed power reactor fuel or at least obtained U.S. approval for reprocessing, unless he and the Secretary of State concur that such reprocessing "will not result in a significant increase in the risk of proliferation" beyond that already existing. Certain existing facilities are in effect legitimized by this clause: Marcoule and La Hague in France; Windscale in the U.K.; Mol (Eurochemic) in Belgium; Tokai Mura in Japan; and WAK, a small reprocessing plant in the Federal Republic of Germany. For new reprocessing plants the principal, though by no means the sole, factor in the assessment of increase in risk of proliferation is to be whether timely warning of diversion could be maintained. New European plants should have no trouble meeting this standard because of the application of Euratom safeguards, but automatic approval cannot be counted on.

A German Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

Gunter Hildenbrand

As an aid in understanding the views of a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on U.S. nonproliferation policy, it is useful at the outset to review the energy situation in the FRG, which in many respects is representative of the situation in other European countries.

Nuclear energy plays an important part in this country's endeavors to reduce dependence on oil imports, to diversify sources of supply, and to generate electrical power as economically as possible. Two constraints apply: (1) because the FRG has no significant uranium resources at its disposal but is fully dependent upon imports from non-European countries, it must use reactor systems and fuel cycles permitting maximum utilization of fuel; and (2) the disposal of power plant waste, including spent fuel assemblies, must be effected in a permanent and environmentally acceptable manner. The Government, public opinion, and the courts are making their approval of further development of nuclear energy conditional on a satisfactory long-term solution to the waste management problem. This solution, which also satisfies the first of the above constraints, consists of closing the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle by reprocessing the spent fuel assemblies and manufacturing new mixed oxide fuel assemblies for use in light water or fast breeder reactors; that is, the deliberate development of a plutonium economy.¹

The German nuclear fuel cycle center, which is in the project planning stage, will satisfy both of the constraints mentioned above and will also do much to serve the aims of nonproliferation. As all systems are concentrated at one site, the transportation of nuclear fuels is minimized; since the plutonium made available by reprocessing is immediately made up into new fuel assemblies, the amount of free, explosive-grade fissile material is kept as small as possible; by recycling into reactors, the plutonium is conveyed to safe and well-protected locations where it is transformed into non-fissile material by nuclear fission; and international surveillance of the nuclear fuel center will ensure timely discovery of any plutonium diversion.

Nuclear energy is also one of the Federal Republic's crucial exports. Even in the fossil-fueled sector, the German electrical industry is highly dependent upon exports in order to ensure the full utilization of its engineering and manufacturing

1. H.-H. Haunschild, "Nuclear Energy Policy—A view from Western Europe." AIE Annual Conference, San Francisco, 27 November 1977, pp. 6-7.

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capacities. In a situation where the manufacture of simple products is migrating continually to developing countries with which German manufacturing industries can simply no longer compete, the remaining export potential automatically tends to concentrate more and more on highly sophisticated technologies including, of course, nuclear energy. An export market about equal to the domestic market for Germany's nuclear industry is needed to establish and maintain both the manufacturing facilities for large generating units and the research and development for the improvement of present and the evolution of future reactor systems. The construction of a large nuclear power plant creates work for about 700 firms and generates employment, both directly and indirectly, equivalent to about 50,000 man-years.

These export endeavors also help a country poor in natural resources to import needed raw materials, including the nuclear fuel uranium. The export of nuclear power plants will necessarily transform the traditional purchaser-supplier relationship more and more into a form of long-term cooperation, which is essential for the technology transfer which the export of nuclear power plants entails. This technology transfer involves more than exporting know-how; it includes personnel training, establishing licensing criteria and standards, introducing quality control standards, and creating development capacities and manufacturing industries in the importing country itself.

An importing country, like an exporter, will insist upon safe, reliable and economical power generation. Any country which opts for nuclear energy on a long-term basis, with an underlying transfer of technology from an exporting country, will reasonably expect this technology transfer to cover nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including enrichment and reprocessing plants, if the construction of these is justified by the scope of the planned nuclear energy program and is considered necessary for assuring fuel procurement and waste management. The facilities in question must be amenable to surveillance in accordance with the latest technology; this surveillance and the appropriate physical protection measures must be accepted and maintained, and these measures must be equally affirmed and accepted by exporters and importers in the vital interests of nonproliferation. The mutual interdependence and channeling of interests, freely accepted as part of a long-term cooperative effort, creates in contrast to a unilaterally imposed state of dependence a measure of confidence and stability which promotes nonproliferation.

The question as to whether nuclear energy encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons is as old as the peaceful use of nuclear energy itself. The answers given have been numerous and have caused official reaction to alternate between secrecy, which involves depriving potential users of this technology, and

making this technology completely available while remaining fully committed to the aim that it should be used for peaceful purposes exclusively.

After many years of a liberal policy centering on the Atoms-for-Peace Program and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a change in U.S. attitudes became apparent during the Presidential campaign of 1976, and was officially expressed by President Carter on April 7 and 27, 1977. The President decided, *inter alia*: to defer indefinitely commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium; to defer commercialization of breeder reactors; to accelerate research on nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve direct access to materials useable in nuclear weapons; to continue the export embargo on equipment or technology in the enrichment and reprocessing fields; and to seek international solutions that will permit all nations to achieve their energy objectives while reducing the spread of nuclear explosives capability.

At a summit meeting in May 1977 in London, it was decided to set up an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) program to make headway towards the twin aims of energy assurance and nonproliferation. It was understood by all parties that during the two-year duration of this study, no new measures were to be undertaken which would jeopardize either programs already under way or existing agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite this, the United States established new export policies by passing the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978" (NNPA 1978). It is difficult to understand why the attempt to gain international consensus has been upset by unilateral stipulation beforehand. Although the U.S. wants to modify the fundamental rules governing access to nuclear energy, it has failed to see that drastic alterations of the system which are not underwritten by the parties concerned can do nothing to advance the cause of nonproliferation, and may actually undermine it.²

One danger of the U.S. position on nuclear energy and nonproliferation is that this overemphasis—although no doubt made with the best of intentions—on the proliferation risk presumed to attend nuclear energy will cause the search for solutions to the highly political proliferation problem to focus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Another danger is that by over-emphasizing the need to introduce a new nonproliferation regime, the existing regime will be devaluated. The emphasis on a new regime and on alternative reactor systems will be used to justify deferring the plutonium economy and refusing to make available "sensitive" fuel cycle equipment or technology.

2. Karl Kaiser, "Auf der Suche nach einer Welt-Nuklearordnung." *Europa-Archiv* 33 Folge 6/1978, pp. 170-171.

On the other hand, NNPA 1978 features a number of positive concepts: assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program; a statement of intention to speed up the processing of export license applications; and cooperation with developing countries in research into alternative energy sources (so long as this is not misused to influence the energy policies of these countries with a view to postponing the introduction of nuclear energy). Although these points are to be welcomed, they are of secondary importance compared to the counterproductive elements mentioned above.

NNPA 1978 is open to criticism in that it is designed to maintain the dependence of the importing countries on the United States through a combined strategy of denying technology and increasing influence over the importing countries' nuclear fuel procurement and waste management programs. Considerable pressure is being applied to achieve these ends through renegotiation of existing agreements for nuclear cooperation. This strategy of withholding access and maintaining dependence is evidenced by the NNPA definition of sensitive technologies to include some (e.g., heavy water production) which do not provide direct access to fissile material. Additional evidence includes: the sanction against an importing country if it makes its own reprocessing technology available to another importing country without an involvement of the U.S.; the requirement that the benefits of fuel services from the suggested international nuclear fuel authority shall be available to non-nuclear weapon states only if they do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities under their own control; and the continued export embargo on uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology.

Since developing countries are much more dependent upon the assistance of the industrialized countries in developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses than they would be for military purposes, there is a great risk that a strategy of withholding know-how and maintaining dependence could bring about the opposite of what is intended; namely, political disintegration and nuclear self-sufficiency outside the worldwide nonproliferation system. Such a policy will at least encourage the trend to nuclear autarky and to establishment of plutonium economy, including fast breeder reactors, to guarantee a large measure of independence in power generation. Even—or precisely—those countries which have willingly accepted discrimination as non-members of the nuclear weapons club (by being non-weapon NPT members) because they fully support nonproliferation, will regard a second discriminatory measure restricting access to and utilization of uranium-plutonium fuel cycle technologies as an incentive to make themselves self-sufficient in nuclear fuel procurement and waste management. In the view of

an importer, the risk of misuse of dependence by an exporter is much greater than the danger of breaking an international safeguards agreement which no one has yet done.³

Confidence in the United States as a leader into the nuclear energy age and as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel has been shaken, and this mistrust is also being transferred to other exporting countries. The way in which present policy, as expressed in NNPA 1978, sees fit to work towards nonproliferation by interfering in existing bilateral agreements and in the relations between the United States and its customer countries, and between these customers and the countries they supply in turn, is not the best way to remove this mistrust. The same applies to the setting up of an international nuclear fuel authority; for if this body were to have a worldwide supply monopoly, it would mark the end of free market activities in the fuel cycle field. The services rendered by an international nuclear fuel authority under acceptable, nondiscriminatory conditions could well be useful for newcomers or in case of emergencies; but, as a means for keeping customer countries dependent via supply conditions involving renunciation of self-sufficiency or special veto rights, such authority would cause more problems than it would solve.

Several factors related to the implementation of NNPA 1978 raise doubts as to how the declared intention of creating criteria for reliable prediction of export licenses can be realized. These include: the procedural and intrinsic complexity of the processing sequence; the integration with the criteria, still in force, of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954⁴; the unknown criteria for possible future American consent to enrichment and reprocessing of American-supplied nuclear fuel; the unpredictable use of special Presidential powers against refusal of an export license by other authorities; the possibility of a veto by both Houses of Congress against decisions of the President; and the possibility of modification of existing export criteria as well as addition of new ones, with the two Houses concurring in both cases.

It is clear that the implementation of this Act will be highly dependent upon the U.S. domestic political situation. As there is little prospect of NNPA 1978 being amended in the near future, we can only hope that it will be implemented

3. Bertrand Goldschmidt, "A Historical Survey of Nonproliferation Policies." *International Security*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Summer 1977), p. 75.

4. W. O. Doub, "An update on U.S. export legislation." International Conference on "Regulating Nuclear Energy", Brussels, 18 May 1978, p. 12.

as flexibly as possible so that the effects of the counterproductive elements in its overall concept can be minimized. Since there is no guarantee that this will in fact be the case, the countries affected will have to prepare for the worst case.

Acceptance of the sovereignty of countries in dealing with energy policy problems means that the United States' decision to defer the plutonium economy must be respected. However, this does not exclude the right to level criticism and to point out that present nuclear technologies and those of several decades to come all involve the use of plutonium. It must therefore be one of INFCE's most important objectives to promote nonproliferation with full use being made of a closed uranium-plutonium fuel cycle.

NNPA 1978 demonstrates how difficult it is for an exporting country to put itself in the place of importing countries, even when these are long-standing allies. In principle the members of the European Community could modify their fuel procurement practices and ride out a U.S. embargo on enriched uranium without seriously jeopardizing operation of their nuclear power plants. Whether they would welcome this political confrontation is another matter; but, in any event, the issue is joined by the NNPA 1978 requirement for renegotiation of the U.S.-Euratom agreement for nuclear cooperation. Another adverse (though unintentional) effect relates specifically to the Federal Republic of Germany. The new sources of insecurity in the nuclear fuel supply situation, the United States' deferment of the plutonium economy and its desire for others to do the same, and the fact that the plutonium economy is a cornerstone of the German concept for optimum fuel utilization and waste management, in combination have served the elements of opposition to nuclear energy in the FRG.

By declaring itself to be the policeman on the worldwide beat of nonproliferation, the United States risks its influence in the field of international nuclear commerce unless it implements its export legislation wisely and cautiously.⁵ Perhaps other importing countries which are also engaged in nuclear exports could help by making clear their own attitudes. It must be borne in mind that to prevent proliferation, pragmatism and flexibility can be more useful than rigid universal principles.⁶

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

6. Kaiser, "Auf der Suche nach einer Welt-Nuklearordnung," p. 171.

An Indian Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

P. R. Chari

Two events of global significance have molded U.S. nonproliferation policies. First, the increase in crude oil prices made nuclear power economical; simultaneously, export of nuclear power plants and nuclear technology became commercially attractive. The dispersal of nuclear power plants is perceived by the United States as creating the technological infrastructure for the weapons option. Second, the Indian nuclear test of May 18, 1974 heightened American anxieties that a proliferation chain-reaction would follow. Although initial official statements were muted, Henry Kissinger stated a year later: "The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew the spectre of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust."¹

Early U.S. policies in the post-1974 period focused upon strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) was directed to study alternative fuel cycles for satisfying energy needs without recourse to breeder technology or reactors recycling plutonium. Other stratagems were also employed. President Nixon agreed in 1974 to supply nuclear reactors to Egypt and Israel. The intention could have been initially to obtain ingress and, later, control over the Egyptian and Israeli nuclear programs. In 1976, Pakistan was offered the sale of 110 A-7 aircraft to dissuade her from buying a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. Pakistan's conventional capabilities were sought to be thereby enhanced sufficiently to wean her away from acquiring sensitive technology.

President Carter assumed office with a strong personal commitment to non-proliferation. This is evident from his nuclear power policy statement on April 7, 1977 in which he perceived "the risk that components of the nuclear power process will be turned to providing atomic weapons." The elements of an American nonproliferation strategy are embodied in the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA 1978). The emphasis therein on denials of sensitive nuclear technologies and materials, and on constraints on nuclear exports through safeguards, is clear. No exports, for instance, of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and sensitive nuclear technologies would be made unless the recipient non-nuclear weapon state accepts IAEA safe-

1. *Department of State Bulletin* no. 1875 (2 June 1975), p. 707.

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guards on all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under its control. An elaborate procedure has been laid down for processing export requests wherein the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the President, and the Congress have specified roles. The President can overrule an NRC decision, but Congress may overrule the President.

Besides making nonproliferation a central concern in its foreign policy, the United States has played a leading role in establishing the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. The emphasis on constraining exports is evident in the "Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers" published by the Group in January 1978. Export of a large number of trigger list items would be made only under IAEA safeguards. Suppliers are urged to obtain assurances from recipients that trigger list items would not be retransferred, and to desist from transferring sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons usable materials.

India's views on U.S. nuclear energy and nonproliferation policies are colored by existing nuclear collaboration arrangements involving India and the United States. These relate to enriched uranium supplies for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS), which operates two light water reactors (with a total rated capacity of 400 electrical megawatts). The present controversy merits discussion because it is a crucial element in the total matrix of Indo-American relations.

The agreement for construction and operation of TAPS was signed on August 8, 1963, and went into force on October 25, 1963. It was to be operative for 30 years. During this period, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission agreed to sell all requirements of enriched uranium to TAPS, which was to be operated only with uranium supplied by the U.S. Commission. The parties also decided to enter into a trilateral agreement with IAEA for implementing the safeguards agreement, and such a tripartite agreement was inaugurated on January 27, 1971. The TAPS Agreement, incidentally, can be suspended or terminated by the U.S. in the event of non-compliance with its provisions.

The responsibility of the U.S. Government to ensure supplies of enriched uranium during the thirty year period of the Agreement is clear. But consignments since 1974 have been received after delays and with increasing difficulties. NNPA 1978 stipulates that eighteen months after its coming into force enriched uranium supplies to India would be stopped, unless India agrees to accept full-scope safeguards. The implications for India are that all nuclear facilities, including those indigenously established and under autonomous control, should be placed under international inspection. So should India's future nuclear energy program, which is predicated on thorium breeder technology. Besides, NNPA 1978 directs the President to negotiate arrangements for bringing uranium enrich-

ment and plutonium reprocessing under multinational and IAEA control. Further, these services would be available only to nations accepting full-scope safeguards.

It needs mention that India's long-term nuclear energy plans are based on thorium breeder technology because she possesses 70 percent of the world's thorium reserves; India's reserves of uranium and oil are limited. Although India cannot halt her breeder program, like the United States, she has actively joined the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) discussion to identify safer technologies. In effect, the operative provisions of the NNPA 1978 seek unilaterally to modify the existing TAPS Agreement, which is in the nature of a Treaty, by imposing fresh constraints.

Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a bilateral treaty may be terminated or suspended, in part or in whole, by one party should a material breach in its terms be committed by the other party. Further, Article 27 of the Convention expressly prohibits a party to a Treaty from invoking the provisions of its internal laws as an excuse for failure to perform treaty obligations.² The U.S. insistence on seeking additional undertakings to supply enriched uranium, under threat to abrogate the TAPS agreement, is legally untenable.

Quite evidently, moreover, a contract establishes rights and casts liabilities on both supplier and recipient. These rights or liabilities cannot, in equity, be rescinded, added to, or modified without the consent of both parties. Neither West Germany nor France have withdrawn from their nuclear cooperation agreements contracted with Brazil and Pakistan respectively. No doubt, they are concerned with their credibility as reliable exporters of advanced technology. Insistence on renegotiating the TAPS Agreement, to satisfy domestic legislation requirements, would surely erode the image of the United States as a reliable trading partner.

The situation is, however, not without its ironies. For the TAPS Agreement permits the United States to purchase *excess* plutonium on a first option basis, and to allow indigenous reprocessing upon a "joint determination" by the Parties. Should the TAPS Agreement abate, the title to the accumulated plutonium would become unclear.

It may be argued that U.S. nonproliferation objectives are impelled by larger considerations of establishing a stable international system. An increase in the number of nuclear powers increases the statistical probability of a nuclear war either by accident, miscalculation, misperception, or irresponsible leadership

2. See I. M. Sinclair, *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (Manchester: The University Press, 1975), pp. 54, 103-105.

behavior. Besides, the bipolar nuclear order would yield to complex patterns of deterrence. Nuclear stability would, thereby, become increasingly difficult. All these arguments are valid. But they highlight a vital question: what have been the credible measures taken to reduce the equal risk from vertical proliferation? Despite SALT I the number of deliverable strategic nuclear warheads has since risen by around 1000 every year. Qualitative improvements to enhance the accuracy and lethality of nuclear weaponry continue. Advances in military nuclear technology exacerbate verification problems, and make nuclear war more probable. Advances in anti-satellite weaponry threaten the "national technical means" available to provide reassurance that existing arms control agreements are being adhered to.

These developments are no less threatening to world peace than horizontal proliferation. But, apart from declaratory policies, negotiations towards achieving meaningful arms control measures move at a glacial pace. Nuclear weapons testing proceeds briskly despite the protracted negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Horizontal proliferation is, however, being countered with a moral fervor which is absent in attempts to decelerate vertical proliferation. In this situation, the zeal with which NNPA 1978 is being sought to be implemented strengthens beliefs regarding the essentially discriminatory nature of such nonproliferation postures.

A more prescient criticism against U.S. nonproliferation policies is that they seek a "technological fix" of the problem. The possibility of plutonium being clandestinely removed from safeguarded reprocessing plants, or the feasibility of establishing such plants secretly, is accepted. The likelihood of a truly determined nation abrogating safeguards agreements at a time deemed opportune or necessary is also accepted. With the achievement of higher, general technological levels, the probability of nations establishing nuclear facilities independently, or with minimal external assistance, also cannot be ignored.

The imperative need exists, therefore, to create a psychological atmosphere that nuclear weapons, being unusable, do not serve the ends of either prestige or security. In other words, the mystique of nuclear weapons needs to be demystified. This draws further attention to the urgency of credible measures to halt and reverse the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This entire question can be examined in a radical way. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act makes no distinction between different recipient states. Table I displays the important, autonomous, facilities in India to which full-scope safeguards would extend. It should be apparent that India has achieved considerable progress in nuclear technology.

Table 1
Indian Nuclear Facilities

Facility	Indigenous or Imported	First Year of Operation
Apsara Research Reactor	Indigenous	1956
Circus Research Reactor	Imported (Canada/U.S.A.)	1960
Purnima Research Reactor	Indigenous	1972
Fuel Fabrication plant at Trombay	Indigenous	1960
Fuel Fabrication plant at Hyderabad	Indigenous	1977
Reprocessing plant at Trombay	Indigenous	1964
Reprocessing plant at Tarapur	Indigenous	1977

Source: *SIPPI Yearbook 1977* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiskell, 1978), Table 2.5, p. 33.

It would be instructive to speculate on whether the United States could have addressed the issues arising from the Indian nuclear explosion differently. Accepting the contention that the test was for peaceful purposes, India might have been persuaded, for instance, to enter an international regime specifically accommodating peaceful nuclear explosives. The question is academic now because Morarji Desai has unilaterally declared that India would not conduct any more nuclear explosions. It is unrealistic to believe that India could have been coopted into the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, as this would prejudice her position in the developing world, but she might have joined less formal arrangements to address the horizontal proliferation problem.

But these speculations are idle. The main thrust of U.S. nonproliferation policies is to segregate the issues of vertical and horizontal proliferation, and direct herculean efforts against the latter. No differentiation has been attempted between different non-nuclear weapon states in appreciation of their differing nuclear technological levels. Perhaps the United States cannot follow a differentiated approach. A global power needs to pursue a global policy. A doubt would, however, persist, whether an inflexible nonproliferation policy is realistic.

A Japanese Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

Ryukicki Imai

If ever it was believed that global behavior could be predicted, that time has passed. Uncertainty is now recognized as an ever present factor in foreign affairs. Yet the U.S. nonproliferation policy seems devoid of this recognition, not so much in its principles as in its implementation. For as far as the principle is concerned, the world should be properly grateful for the rude but forceful reminder about the grave significance of the nonproliferation issue.

The current nonproliferation debate focuses on some important issues; e.g., the nature and extent of future supplies of and demands for uranium, the need for plutonium fuels, and the feasibility and acceptability of alternative international mechanisms for guaranteeing fuel supplies and for enhancing resistance to proliferation. Views differ on each of these issues. While I am critical of some aspects of the alleged "U.S. views," I do not claim a monopoly on nonproliferation truth. What bothers me is the manner in which the U.S. version of the truth is forcefully presented to the world, including unilateral changes in multilateral accords such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This concern is strongly related to my belief that the U.S. views the world in overly simple terms and, because it does not comprehend the complexities of reality or the extent of uncertainties involved in very long lead-time and heavily technology-oriented policy decisions, it is unable to implement solutions to the real problems of proliferation. I do not mean to imply that other countries are better able to deal with these issues; rather, my criticism is directed at U.S. policies because the United States has been at the vanguard of the nonproliferation effort. In my view, U.S. nonproliferation policies reflect deficiencies of analytical precision in the areas of modeling, politics, economics, technology, social values, and linkage between domestic and foreign policies. It lacks the recognition that the current version of nonproliferation concern is a reflection of U.S. (and many other countries') national interest, but not of the universal moral principle of banning all nuclear weapons.

Simplified Models

The major elements of international politics—resources, technology, information, and capital—can be defined only within broad bands of uncertainty, and are

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related through a complex pattern of global interdependence. Take, for example, the case of oil supply and demand in the decade ahead. Among the many diverse factors of influence are: rates and patterns of growth in the industrialized and developing countries, degrees of success in energy conservation and in development of new energy technologies, the future of Chinese and Mexican hydrocarbon resources, production incentives and political stability in Iran and Saudi Arabia, domestic pricing of American coal and gas, and arms sales to the Middle East. Because the future of nuclear power is related to the supply and demand for other energy resources, it too is dependent upon all of these factors.

Analytical models for use in policy formulation cannot cope with this degree of complexity and uncertainty. Simplification is required, and is accomplished by means of severe assumptions (such as the separability of important variables) and mathematical approximations. These techniques are commonplace in the physical sciences. Physicists, however, are trained always to be mindful of the shortcomings of these procedures, and constantly to reexamine them. While a good deal of mathematical thinking has entered the domain of the social and political sciences, the exacting discipline of simplification has not been successfully transferred. Policy analysts too often accept far-from-perfect models as representative of truth.

Political Semi-Realities

The United States no longer can impose upon the world its own version of the truth; but, by attempting to do so, it can cause enormous disturbances. The industrialized countries are preoccupied with maintaining "order," while the less developed countries (LDCs) are insisting upon "just changes." In this context, the U.S. nonproliferation policies seem to have done more harm than good to the industrialized world by disrupting its delicate and sometimes precarious system of order, without offering a politically acceptable alternative system.

The current emphasis of U.S. nonproliferation policy is to restrain severely uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and fast breeder reactor commercialization. Those hardest hit by such restraints are the advanced industrialized countries with significant nuclear power programs—namely, the major allies of the United States. (The Soviet bloc is unaffected by these American policies.) Most of the LDCs will suffer little if any inconvenience, but they can exploit the "just changes" theme by denouncing "the new industrial colonialism." When one reflects upon which of these two groups—the major U.S. allies or the LDCs—

constitutes the more serious proliferation risk, the effect of the U.S. policy is extremely disturbing.

Foreclosing Options

Forecasts of energy supply and demand have been and will continue to be subjects of extensive and active debate. The concern of policy makers is not with the very long term balance, for there is no doubt that eventually there will be a more than adequate supply of energy. Rather, the policymakers' concern is to identify and overcome the obstacles to meeting energy demand continuously. Actions to be taken include major investment decisions, domestic and foreign political negotiations, research and development on alternative technologies, and restructuring of markets for distribution of energy resources. Such programs of action typically require ten, twenty, or more years for full implementation, and are subject continuously to readjustment to reflect changing priorities.

Keeping open as many sensible options as possible seems to be the favored approach to making policy in this age of uncertainty. To be deprived of this right through outside pressure is often regarded as a most serious challenge to national sovereignty. The notion of foreclosing those options involving a plutonium economy in favor of hypothetical scenarios based upon the use by the year 2020 of fusion power or solar power is simply unacceptable.

Good and Evil Technologies

The military and civilian nuclear technologies often intersect at plutonium, which, in the latest nonproliferation jargon, is a weapons-usable material. But just as plutonium is a weapons-usable material, so modern high speed computers are weapons-usable instruments of equal significance, microelectronic components are ingredients of weapons-usable precision guidance systems, and new materials are the basis of all weapons technologies, nuclear and otherwise.

The links between military and civilian technologies are not simple ones, and their elimination will not be an easy task. On the contrary, this difficult problem will be with us for decades to come. Picking the case of plutonium and offering simplistic solutions does not do justice to the magnitude of this fundamental problem.

Stagnant Values

There is a continuing erosion of confidence in the ability of high technology to promote human happiness. Widespread public concern about environmental quality and safety illustrate that the value of technology is seriously in doubt.

Political values also are in transition. The growing military strength of the Soviet Union creates uneasiness in the Western alliances. There is growing potential for conflict in Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in East Asia. Changing patterns of international monetary flow are creating problems unforeseen just five or six years ago. Cries for a "new economic order" shake the foundations of an aging structure of social values.

Where all these changes may lead is not yet known, and few phenomena are less welcome than uncertainty. In such an environment, it is not surprising that one may feel a strong sense of urgency to do something; however, hasty and forceful actions without benefit of clear vision to the end of the process may well produce unwanted results.

Domestic and Foreign Policies

In the field of energy, in particular, domestic policy and foreign policy are inseparable. It has often been pointed out that because the United States is so richly endowed with energy resources, it fails to appreciate the long-term energy problems of other countries. Similarly, it can be argued that American sensitivity to threats of diversion of nuclear materials and unauthorized manufacture of nuclear explosives stems largely from the domestic spread of nuclear materials and know-how which accompanied the enormous growth of the U.S. nuclear energy and nuclear weapons establishments—a growth unparalleled in any other country (with the possible exception of the Soviet Union).

Rivalry between the President and the Congress contributes to the difficulties in comprehending American policies. From an outsider's point of view, the Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 reflects a curious mixture of the strengths of the two sources of power. For example, the very detailed policy instructions given by the Congress to the President can be overridden by him if, in his judgment, to do otherwise would seriously prejudice U.S. nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize the common defense and security. But even then, the Congress could within sixty days overturn the President's decision. Other countries find it difficult to figure out with which entity—the Congress or the President—they would be expected

to deal. A process by which the United States threatens Euratom with termination of nuclear fuel shipments, while it ships the same material to India, is more than just intriguing. The fact that the United States believes that it can influence other countries' policies or create new international organizations by first passing domestic legislation is surprising.

Conclusion

Some time ago, I was asked by an American for my view of what was wrong with U.S. nonproliferation policy. "Lack of a sense of history" was my reply then, and I would offer the same reply today.

In this short essay, I have avoided discussion of the merits and demerits of particular U.S. positions and specific U.S. proposals. Opinions on such matters differ, partly because the views of human beings reflect their different backgrounds and circumstances. There can be many versions of the truth.

Recognizing that we live in a period of major transition of social values, it would be wise to be guided by a sense of history rather than by trying to shape the world as if its future were predictable by analysis. Finally, I would like to add that instead of just offering criticism of U.S. policies and approaches, Japan is in the process of preparing a nonproliferation scheme which, in my view, would avoid most of the difficulties discussed here.

Conflict in Southern Africa: A Debate

Kenneth Adelman
and
Gerald J. Bender

For more than a decade the United States has anguished over worsening racial turmoil in southern Africa. The fuse of the proverbial powder keg is burning more swiftly, and it is highly uncertain whether any U.S. decisions can ameliorate, let alone prevent, the tragedies that many believe are inevitable.

Despite a current near-preoccupation with alternative southern African futures in writings on U.S. foreign policy, a general ignorance remains about aspirations and politics within the region. Earlier this autumn we therefore asked two well-known authorities on African affairs to discuss their often contradictory views. We believe that the resultant debate presented here illustrates well the abstractions, dangers, contradictions, and policy dilemmas that have come to characterize the increasingly violent confrontation in southern Africa.

—The Editors

International Security:

Precisely how important are the ongoing events in Rhodesia to the United States?

Gerald Bender:

Given Rhodesia's minimal strategic importance and her relatively small share of American foreign investment, the significance to the United States of ongoing events in this southern African country is primarily diplomatic. In other words, how the United States conducts itself during this volatile transitional period will strongly influence future relations with Zimbabwe. If the United States can resist its propensity to choose sides in local third world conflicts, then it almost certainly will play a role in an independent Zimbabwe no matter who comes to power. Concretely, this suggests that the United States should continue its refusal to recognize the internal settlement.

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In addition to publishing many academic articles, Messrs. Adelman and Bender have contributed a large number of articles on southern Africa to major newspapers.

Short of sending troops or massive arms supplies, the United States lacks sufficient leverage to play a determinate role in the present power struggle in Rhodesia. We should be careful, therefore, not to throw our "weight" behind one side—especially a side which includes Ian Smith. Nothing would undermine Carter's volte-face toward Africa more than to commit the United States to a regime characterized by white domination. The Anglo-American Plan allows the United States to avoid precisely this fatal error which has flawed American policy toward Africa for more than a decade.

Kenneth Adelman:

Though Rhodesia has been a festering world sore-spot for eighty years and one in the world spotlight for a decade, the Carter Administration took office determined to set Rhodesia right. The new rambunctious team devised grandiose schemes for an ultimate settlement in the modest-sized, land-locked country which has marginal United States investment, few American citizens and no real strategic importance. No matter. Rhodesia was elevated to the top of Washington's foreign policy initiatives because of its real symbolic value and imagined threat to our own domestic tranquility.

The Rhodesian conflict is no longer solely, a "racial conflict" at all, as the Administration would present. Black guerrillas battle mostly black Rhodesians. Some 80 percent of the Rhodesian Army is black, fighting on behalf of the interim government led by three blacks (Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau) and one white (Ian Smith). The 9,000 deaths of the five-year Rhodesian conflict have been nearly all black.

Such losses are lamentable to those deeply concerned about black Africa. So are the more than 10,000 murders at the hands of the Ethiopian Marxist regime. So are Idi Amin's more than 100,000 slayings and the thousands of black Africans slain by Cuban soldiers in Angola and Ethiopia.

Some African spokesmen and Western moralists have overlooked or perversely justified these reigns of terror. But prime time has been devoted to the less costly but more sensational conflict in Rhodesia, with its vast symbolic significance due to the racial element and the interest of other African countries. To an Administration high on symbolism, such factors carry great weight. Hence the endless hours of the President and Secretary of State, and the nearly all-consuming attention of the United Nations Ambassador and Policy Planning Staff members to Rhodesia.

Prudent foreign policy demands clear enumeration of priorities. While it is commendable to attempt daring rescues in troubled waters, ours is a stormy world with unceasing waves of injustice and problems. With the outcome of the final

Panama Canal treaties then in doubt and the vote imminent, the Secretary of State did not need to embark on a doomed voyage to Rhodesia. With prime allies in Asia and Europe upset by Administration policies on economic and security matters—particularly troop withdrawals from Korea and wavering on the neutron bomb—the crucial Middle East diplomacy at an impasse, the energy bill still stalled after a year and a half, SALT chancy at best, and Executive relations with Congress at their lowest ebb in a generation, the President and his top advisors have troubles galore without adding Rhodesia as a top priority.

Bender:

It is a mistake to assume that the Carter Administration is somehow responsible for making Rhodesia a priority in American foreign policy. Rhodesia became a major domestic issue during the Republican primaries in early 1976 when Reagan and Ford tried to out-hawk each other over the issue of the potential entrance of Cubans into the Rhodesian conflict and the appropriate American response to avert such an occurrence. (It should be remembered that both Ford and Reagan backed off on this issue when it became evident that the logic of their position was to throw American support behind Ian Smith and his South African backers.) The fact is that Rhodesia probably occupied more of Kissinger's attention during his last nine months in office than any other foreign policy issue. Less than a week after Carter was sworn into office, Kissinger's precariously arranged Geneva conference on Rhodesia collapsed. At this point Carter had no choice but to attempt to come up with another policy toward Rhodesia. While it is true that top Carter officials such as United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake entered office determined to move American support away from Kissinger's reliance on Ian Smith, it is a testament to their foresight rather than an example of public officials riding private hobby horses at the nation's expense (as Brzezinski has done with the issue of the "Soviet threat" in Africa).

International Security:

Do you believe that what is seen as increased racial conflict in southern Africa could threaten United States domestic tranquility?

Adelman:

President Carter stated "Our attitude towards majority rule" in Rhodesia "has a direct bearing on the strength of American society." His top African advisors—Ambassador Young and Anthony Lake—have clarified the nature of this "direct bearing." Imagine the "possible impact on our society if a racial conflict in south-

ern Africa were to escalate dramatically," Mr. Lake wrote in his book on Rhodesia, *The Tar Baby Option*, if "televised reports of black and white bloodshed" were to enter "American livingrooms" as happened during the Vietnam War. Ambassador Young leaves nothing to the imagination, noting in July 1977: "If there is a race war in South Africa, there will be a race conflict in the United States. That's the frightening thing about Rhodesia." How would this begin? "You start getting white reaction against the blacks . . . It would start with whites attacking the blacks" in the United States.

I have trouble envisioning Buffalo, New York going up in flames because Bulawayo, Rhodesia smolders. Harlem remained tranquil while Soweto erupted in 1976, just as Soweto survived unaffected by the 1963 turmoil in Selma. Local tensions respond to local provocations, not to those in different cultures continents away. Inflammatory rhetoric from high United States officials about American whites attacking American blacks is more provocative than television news shorts originating from Rhodesia.

Bender:

How the United States *reacts* to increased racial conflict in southern Africa could have very serious domestic consequences. If the United States were, in any way, to support militarily a side which is backed by South Africa—as it did in Angola—American blacks, joined by a substantial number of whites, would not only threaten domestic tranquility but actually disrupt it. Black protest in the United States does not have to take the form of burning down American cities. It can, and most likely will, take other forms. Large scale black resignations from the Carter Administration would not be out of the question and this could not only be a fatal political blow to Carter but would brand the United States in the eyes of the world as the racist society so many suspect us of being. If American blacks were to perceive American policy as supporting the cause of white domination in Africa, it is conceivable that some black officials and citizens would conclude that our government is their "enemy" to be subverted by all possible means.

One should not underestimate the significant upsurge of interest and activity among American blacks on issues relating to southern Africa. Ironically, the most significant catalyst for this dramatic rise in interest was United States collaboration with South Africa during the Angolan civil war. John Stockwell's fascinating book (*In Search of Enemies*) reveals how ethnocentric and racist attitudes within the CIA and other federal agencies guided American policy during the Angolan war. In the brief period of one month between the time the Ford Administration acknowledged the presence of South African troops in Angola (on the same side

as the United States) and the Congressional cutoff of CIA funds for further covert intervention, there was unprecedented mobilization in the black community to oppose United States intervention in Angola. Not only did national black organizations, such as the NAACP and Operation Push, which normally limit their activities to domestic issues, speak out, but so did traditionally conservative black church leaders, e.g., some African Methodist Episcopal (AME) bishops.

This year, for the first time in its long history, the NAACP has developed an institutional structure to make recommendations on international (read: southern African) affairs. Transafrica, recently established in Washington, D.C. under the chairmanship of Richard Hatcher (who turned down an offer to become Assistant to the President in order to remain as Transafrica's chairman), represents the first organization created by black Americans to address (and lobby on) African issues. An outgrowth of the congressional Black Caucus, Transafrica intends to alert black organizations throughout the country to the importance of southern African issues in order to more effectively mobilize black opinion on these issues. If white America does not begin to understand this growing black awareness and mobilization over southern African issues, we not only risk following the myopic and dangerous recommendations of those like James Potts, CIA African Division Chief who has favored close collaboration with South Africa's political and military moves in southern Africa, but it virtually assures that our country will be racked by serious domestic conflict.

Adelman:

If Dr. Bender can promise that a top-level "black resignation from the Carter Administration"—one at the United Nations—might take place given certain policies, then surely the popularity of those policies would instantly soar. At present, however, there seems little domestic pressure to spotlight Rhodesia since few Americans share the Administration's urgency on the issue. American blacks are becoming increasingly concerned, but not nearly to the extent often portrayed. As Mr. Lake accurately wrote, their involvement is "still modest in scope and effect." The American public at large is marching in the opposite direction from its leaders. Harris polls reveal that the public supported by 62—12 percent "black majority rule" in southern Africa in May 1976 during the Ford Administration. By June 1977, after the Carter Administration had been in office several months, such support had dwindled to 46—25 percent. In the most recent poll of August 1977, when the Carter Administration's initiatives were in full swing, the American people *opposed* by 53—41 percent the President's policy of "advocating that Rhodesian whites turn their government over to the black majority."

Perhaps the public, more than the Administration, realizes that Rhodesia is a problem primarily for the British and Africans to resolve. Very few substantive—as opposed to symbolic—American interests are involved. Given the Administration's real foreign policy problems involving vital national interests, Rhodesia should be relegated to its rightful place—on the third or fourth tier of American concerns.

International Security:

What consequence would a Rhodesian civil war have for Pretoria and why should this be an American problem?

Bender:

Since the April 1976 withdrawal of South African troops fighting in Rhodesia, Prime Minister Vorster has attempted to eschew direct military involvement in the Rhodesian imbroglio. Instead, Pretoria has pressured Ian Smith to pursue a peaceful settlement which would obviate the need for South Africa to send troops and more importantly, establish the precedent that moderate African leaders can emerge through peaceful negotiations (in contrast to the Marxist parties in Angola and Mozambique which came to power through armed struggle).

After the militant student campaign erupted in Soweto in June of 1976, it became increasingly clear that South Africa could not easily fight major external and internal wars at the same time. The weakening of the Republic's military machine through a major intervention in Rhodesia would be an open invitation to blacks in the Republic to step up their militancy. It should be recalled here that the Soweto protests came only three months after South Africa had halted its intervention in the Angolan civil war. Moreover, while South Africa's intervention in Angola was modest compared to what would be required in Rhodesia, it nevertheless had grave consequences for the troubled South African economy.

These and other troublesome realities militate against South African participation in a Rhodesian civil war. Increasingly South Africans have come to believe that the "stand" to protect white domination should be made in the Republic itself rather than for a losing cause in Rhodesia (where, after all, most South African whites see a society totally unlike their own).

There are, however, some circumstances which could arise in Rhodesia which might make it difficult, if not impossible, for Botha to resist intervention. For example, if there were to be a massive slaughter of whites in Rhodesia, strong white pressures in the Republic would be exerted to intervene. Similarly, if there were to be a significant Cuban force involved in the civil war, hard-line military

leaders (e.g., P.W. Botha) would almost certainly advocate intervention. Some South African generals would relish the opportunity to meet the Cubans again (outside the Republic) in order to establish once and for all their claimed military superiority which has been doubted since the Cuban-South African confrontation in Angola.

Finally, South African intervention in a civil war in Rhodesia would become an "American problem" in that it would paralyze all American initiatives and options. The United States would have to withdraw on all fronts in order to avoid participation in what would become a "no-win" war for Washington. The United States could not afford the political ramifications which would result from military intervention either on the same side as South Africa or on the opposite side. To join South Africa, as we did in Angola, would certainly result in a devastating diplomatic blow to Carter's foreign policy. On the other hand, for American troops to participate in the killing of white South African troops could provoke serious domestic problems for the President. One clear lesson from the Angolan war is that there is no winning side for the United States in an African conflict which involves South African troops.

Adelman:

I of course agree that the two states are quite distinct. South Africa was granted independence; Rhodesia illegally broke from England. Consequently, states around the world recognize South Africa, but not a single nation officially recognizes Rhodesia. Contrary to South Africa's exclusion of all blacks from power as a matter of race, Rhodesia has given some educational, political, economic and social rights—though on a grossly limited basis—to blacks. At present, in fact, Rhodesia's main governmental body, the Executive Council, is composed of three blacks and one white. This stands in stark contrast both to the exclusively white Pretorian government and to those like Dr. Bender who persist in saying the current Rhodesian government is "characterized by white domination."

Afrikaners have been in South Africa for nearly 325 years while the bulk of white Rhodesians arrived after World War II. Rhodesian whites total a miniscule 240,000, those in South Africa 4.3 million (over twice the total white population throughout Africa even at the height of colonialism). Most importantly, the Rhodesian whites can always move to a Commonwealth country or South Africa. The Afrikaners, as their name indicates, are wedded to the continent. They have nowhere else to go to perpetuate their unique culture; their trek has ended.

South Africa has not cherished its affiliation with the world's ultimate pariah. In 1965 it advised Ian Smith against undertaking the Unilateral Declaration of

Independence (UDI); in 1974 it pressured him to release black nationalists and start negotiations; in 1975 it withdrew its paramilitary aid; and today it pressures Smith to proceed quickly on the internal settlement.

Rhodesia's transition to black rule may be over within a few years; South Africa's transition will not occur for decades, if ever. It is an infinitely tougher nut to crack. Far from helping bring the Republic down, black rule in Rhodesia may help prop it up. With a moderate regime in Zimbabwe, Pretoria might conceivably breathe new life into its deceased policy of detente with black Africa. A multi-racial, Western-leaning and free enterprise system in Zimbabwe might conceivably encourage greater power sharing in the Republic.

On the other hand, prolonged fighting in Rhodesia would frighten whites and reinforce their intransigence in South Africa. With a full-scale civil war next door, Pretoria would be able to buy time—a commodity now more precious to South Africa than its gold. During those battles, it would expand its already awesome military force and brace itself for oncoming trauma.

In short, I agree that peaceful power transfer in Rhodesia might ease the way for accommodation in South Africa. This is important, given the substantial web of Western economic, political, and security interests in South Africa, and the worldwide repugnance of its current racist system. Widespread warfare in Rhodesia would endanger Western interests in a South Africa determined to preserve order, and resist change—and this means reinforce white supremacy—in a region of turmoil.

International Security:

Insofar as majority opinion can be determined in Rhodesia, how is it reflected in generally tranquil internal conditions?

Adelman:

Writing from Washington, Mr. Lake maintained in his book that Rhodesia's "restrictive measures and policies" reveal the same mentality that brought about the "massacres of Indians by American settlers who, upon arriving on these shores, 'fell first on their knees and then on the aborigines.' " Writing from Salisbury—which he regularly visits—John Burns of the *New York Times* has described the "widespread" misunderstanding of "the mood of blacks inside the country. Far from the seething, resentful mass bent on punishing whites, they are on the whole remarkably moderate, better disposed towards whites than in many black-ruled states." Most Rhodesian blacks, he reports, want whites to stay and if asked, they "readily agree that the minority should get the guarantees necessary to keep them in the country."

As the guerrilla campaign quickens on Rhodesia's border, internal conditions in the cities have by and large remained tranquil. There has been a general absence of regular urban terrorism and internal protest over the past decade, in marked contrast to the situation in South Africa. Salisbury police, like the British bobbies, still normally go about their business unarmed.

This extent of internal tranquility may possibly have masked seething black resentment. A tiny number of whites—the total population of Rockford, Illinois or Erie, Pennsylvania—has ruled over the 96 percent of Rhodesians who are black for the past eighty years. The average income of whites is ten times that of blacks; political detentions of blacks have been quite common; and political rights for blacks in the past totally insufficient.

On the other hand, the overall internal tranquility (which has been declining of late, due primarily to the terrorism of the so-called Patriotic Front) may also have been a reflection of real economic opportunities and, above all, hope for full political participation—conditions notably lacking among South African blacks. For all its considerable sins, the Smith regime has tripled funds for black education since UDI in 1965. Two thirds of the undergraduates now attending the University of Rhodesia are blacks on government scholarships. More than 10,000 black Rhodesians hold university degrees, far more than any black country at independence and than most African states today. Over half the 42,000 civil servants are black, though whites fill most top positions.

Average per capita income for blacks has increased sixfold over the past decade and is now three times that found in Tanzania, twice that in Kenya, and one and a half times that even in oil-endowed Nigeria. The regime has done more in the past year to aid black advancement than in the previous fifteen years. There are now black officers and a black magistrate; black prosecutors operate in the courts at most levels. Dr. L. H. Gann, a longtime scholar and frequent visitor to Rhodesia, wrote that anyone returning after some years "cannot help but be struck by the enormous . . . advancement of Africans into sales, managerial and even professional positions . . . and by the shift in purchasing power that fills the Salisbury shops with well-turned out black customers."

Bender:

It is difficult to discuss meaningfully the impact of "tranquil internal conditions" on majority opinions because the vast majority of Africans in Rhodesia do not enjoy tranquility. Clearly there has been no tranquility for the more than 500 thousand Africans who have been forced into strategic hamlets, euphemistically called "protective villages," nor for the approximately 100 thousand who have fled to neighboring countries. Moreover, Rhodesian officials estimated in July that

over half a million Africans have flocked into the two largest cities of Salisbury and Bulawayo. The closing of over 800 schools (affecting over a quarter million students) is only one sign that the civil administration is collapsing. It is apparent that the entire fabric of rural society is breaking down and there is little or nothing the Salisbury government can do to prevent it. Church sources in Salisbury say that at least three quarters of the rural population (who comprise 60 percent of the country's total population) have been affected directly by the war. The spreading of the guerrilla war combined with the counter-terror perpetrated by the Rhodesian army now means that most rural dwellers have been cut off from commercial centers and thus are unable to obtain basic commodities.

Nor has life been tranquil for the hundreds of university students and others who have been beaten and jailed for opposing the internal settlement signed on March 3 of this year. Nor for the nearly two dozen individuals whose lives are claimed by the war every day. The question, therefore, should not be the impact of tranquility but that of the near chaos on the opinions of the majority of Zimbabweans.

It is impossible to estimate what the opinions are of the majority of Zimbabweans in the rural areas. Significantly, there is no provision to submit the internal settlement to the African population for approval. This failure to follow the principle, ironically first enunciated by Ian Smith in 1964, of assuring that any agreement is "acceptable to the people of the country as a whole" (which later became the British "fifth principle" for settlement) is a calculated move by the Executive Council to prevent their internal settlement from being rejected by the majority of Africans. Thus, there is no way to prove their claim that the overwhelming majority of the country is behind the settlement.

No doubt this refusal to submit the internal settlement to the African electorate stems in part from the major setback Smith suffered in 1971. Smith and his colleagues were confident that Africans would support the compromise worked out between himself and Edward Heath in November 1971. Rhodesian whites, Coloureds (mulattoes) and Indians accepted the agreement by a large margin of 14 to 1. To the shock and embarrassment of the many whites who had predicted African support, however, Africans rejected it by the staggering margin of 36 to 1! One should be careful in 1978, therefore, when Smith again assures us that he and his colleagues have the support of the rural population.

One should also be highly skeptical of conjecture about how Africans feel toward the internal settlement based on comparative statistics of university graduates and civil servants between Zimbabwe and other African countries. In the first place this comparison only touches a small privileged sector of the African

population—less than one percent—who will undoubtedly provide the backbone of the Zimbabwe bureaucracy regardless of who takes over the government. Secondly, it is wrong to assume that middle class Rhodesian Africans are content because their conditions compare favorably with their counterparts in other African countries. The assumption ignores the fact that they suffer gross discrimination in comparison with their white counterparts in their own country.

Adelman:

It is undeniable that conditions in the countryside are deteriorating as the Patriotic Front butchers innocent persons serving the rural poor (such as the thirteen British Pentecostal missionaries and their children axed to death in Uumba) and as the Front terrorizes the black rural population—all with arms from the communist nations and political backing from Washington and London. Still many Rhodesian blacks are determined to resist the seizure of power by the Front. As stated, some 80 percent of the Rhodesian Army and police force are black, willing if not eager to preserve the interim government against guerrilla incursions. In February, more than 7,000 blacks volunteered for 400 openings in the Rhodesian African Rifles, a crack security unit on the frontlines of the war.

It is certain that virtually all Rhodesian blacks insist on transition from white to black rule very soon. It is most probable that Rhodesian blacks overwhelmingly support the interim government and the peaceful transition of power, but precise opinion polls on this score are obviously lacking. It is quite remote that a majority or even a substantial number of blacks endorse the Patriotic Front. All indications are that they do not, and for quite good reason.

Bender:

Until we have better evidence of the actual opinion of Rhodesian blacks concerning the internal settlement, it is irresponsible to assert that "it is most probable that Rhodesian blacks overwhelmingly support the interim government." It may be true that the majority of rural blacks do not endorse the Patriotic Front, but this does not necessarily mean that they accept the internal settlement. Until the Executive Council is confident enough to submit its agreement to a vote of all the people in the country (instead of only the whites), it should be assumed that there are strong possibilities that the majority of Africans do not support it.

Adelman:

It is not at all irresponsible to allege that most Rhodesian blacks support the interim government since various polls point to that direction, though Dr. Bender is correct in saying that no one knows for sure either now or when the elections

take place, if they do so as planned. It is more certain to say that: a) the internal settlement has specific provisions whereby black Rhodesians can indicate the public acceptability of the settlement by voting for various parliamentary candidates, and b) the Patriotic Front makes no such promise until it has been given "full power," as its leaders describe their goal. Sure they would accept "elections," but only after they have installed themselves through violence so they can hold a plebiscite and tout their 99+ percent backing, as do totalitarian nations around the world.

International Security:

Is "majority rule" in Rhodesia an attainable goal within the next five years? Indeed, what is meant by "majority rule?"

Bender:

If "majority rule" simply means the transfer of political power from whites to blacks, there will be majority rule in 1979. Whether this transfer of political power will be accompanied by a concomitant transfer of economic power and equal opportunity for advancement for Africans will be determined by which African leaders take over.

No government in the world is truly representative of all its constituent groups and interests and Zimbabwe shows no signs of being the first exception. Each of the contending leaders represents different constituencies. Some of these constituencies will undoubtedly be overrepresented and others underrepresented or excluded in a "majority ruled" government, depending upon who comes out on top. "Rational" cases are now being made in favor of each of the leaders based on why his particular constituency should be overrepresented (i.e., wield power). For example, the present internal settlement significantly overrepresents whites in a variety of ways beyond the fact that while they constitute only 3-4 percent of the population they will receive 28 percent of the seats in parliament—enough to block all fundamental change for ten years. Arguments supporting this disproportional role for whites generally point to their alleged superior skills or their past efforts and investments in building the country. Others argue that the Patriotic Front guerrillas (who are excluded in the internal settlement) should hold power because they are responsible for forcing Smith to finally concede majority rule. Still others attempt to evaluate the representative question in terms of ethnicity. For example, Nkomo (who is Shona) is frequently dismissed as unimportant because his main appeal is allegedly to the Ndebele people, who comprise less than 20 percent of the population. The ethnic dimension, like all others,

is tricky especially because of the importance of the various subgroups among the Shona, who make up almost 80 percent of the population.

The United States should not attempt to determine for Zimbabwe which constituencies should dominate the future government. The Anglo-American Plan allows the United States to deal with all parties during the transition—which is what our policy should remain until it is clear who will govern Zimbabwe.

Americans should not delude themselves into believing that there is a leader or plan which could guarantee representative and democratic government in independent Zimbabwe. All one can hope for is that whoever may rule the country will establish a regime that is at least more representative than Ian Smith's—which after all represented less than 5 percent of the population. It should also be hoped that the new government will not exceed the number of executions and imprisonments of political opponents registered by Smith. Finally, it should be hoped that whatever black "majority" takes over, it will attempt to respond to the needs and desires of the majority rural population rather than punish them as enemies by herding them into economically and socially unviable "keeps" (hamlets).

Adelman:

One blurs fundamental distinctions when blandly saying that no government is truly representative of constituencies. Are there not totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic regimes in the world? Can one equate Cambodia with Thailand? Uganda with Kenya? Or Cuba with Bolivia? Certainly the fact that communist regimes are always, everywhere, and flagrantly totalitarian and that totalitarian regimes always, everywhere, and flagrantly abuse basic human rights should not be blurred, nor ever forgotten.

Still, there are no sure bets in politics, least of all in political forecasting. Predicting democratic prospects of newly independent states is chancy at best. In the early 1960s many specialists spun out long treatises on how the new African states would meld the parliamentary systems of their colonial parents with their own cultures. Instead most abandoned them outright and became tight one-man regimes.

Having demonstrated the futility of political predictions, I will now predict: in a Zimbabwe under the Patriotic Front, democracy would have scant chance; in a Zimbabwe under the black nationalists within the country, it would have a fair chance.

When visiting Nigeria last April, President Carter proclaimed, "We in America welcome the real progress that is being made in human rights in Africa." Those

surveying the continent find it difficult to discern such "real progress." Most black-ruled states have authoritarian regimes and are not in the process of dismantling them. Freedom House, which rates political and civil freedoms around the world, reports that more than two thirds of black states are "not free" and less than one third "partially free." Some 90 percent of African countries have one-party systems or military dictatorships; more than three fourths of the governments own and control the local media. Only Gambia and Botswana are considered truly "free" by the New York research organization.

Mr. Carter also said he was "gratified" that the "organization of African states" had condemned "black leaders" who "deprive persons of human rights." Again one must be baffled since the Organization for African Unity (OAU) summit meeting in Gabon in the summer of 1977 gave Idi Amin a rousing, foot-stomping ovation; not even a passing mention was made of his nor others' invidious conduct.

Africa's dismal human rights record does not predestine Zimbabwe's fate before its birth. Indeed one hopes Zimbabwe will be different and stand out as a beacon of liberty. But given the general environment on the continent and in the southern region in particular, one's optimism must be most circumspect.

The overdone cry for "majority rule" when applied to Rhodesia by Dr. Bender and others can only mean "black rule"—not its more traditional definition of free elections in a democratic system. African states most diplomatically entrenched in Rhodesian affairs—Nigeria and the Frontline States—do not themselves practice the lofty ideals so pompously proclaimed for Rhodesia.

The recent United States-Nigerian communiqué denounced Rhodesia's internal settlement as "unacceptable as it does not guarantee a genuine transfer of power to the majority." President Carter unabashedly co-signed the document with Lt. Gen. Obasanjo, a military strongman who, though promising civilian rule in 1979, currently bans all "political activities" of any kind in Nigeria and governs via military edict. The sonorous communiqué was signed in a country which endured three coups and an assassination since independence, one which does not, nor ever has "guaranteed" that its own power is shared "by the majority" in any manner.

Bender:

Of course none of the leading African contenders for power in Rhodesia can be considered as anything remotely "democratic" based on their past records. Sithole, Muzorewa, Nkomo, Mugabe, Chirau, Chikerema, et al. have been accused on occasion by their own followers of being autocratic. Each has run his respective party with an iron hand and has shown little tolerance for opposition within the ranks, let alone opposition from those outside the ranks. Clearly this does not bode well

for the future of a western-styled democracy in Zimbabwe. The country has not experienced representative democracy during this century under white tutelege; it is unlikely that it will experience such democracy during the remainder of the century.

Adelman:

Again, crucial distinctions are blurred. Muzorewa has not ruled with an "iron hand" at all; his political organization seems chaotic and disorganized which raise serious questions on his political—as opposed to theological—skills. Sithole has practically no organization to rule with an "iron hand." It is the Patriotic Front leaders who have shown their "iron hand" and authoritarian tendencies. They are in good company from their backers in the Frontline States. Three of the five—Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola—allow fewer civil and political liberties than either Rhodesia or South Africa according to Freedom House. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere condemned the Rhodesian interim government's proposed elections since they "will not be regarded by Africa as free elections." So spoketh a leader consistently running without opposition, in 1975 gaining a Kremlin-like victory of 95 percent of the vote and one who holds an estimated 2,000 political prisoners. Even the timid U.S. State Department acknowledges the appalling hypocrisy. Its 1978 *Human Rights Report to the Congress* says President Nyerere "has consistently called for majority rule in Africa." But "in contrast to its stance on violations of human rights in other countries, Tanzania tends to ignore, or at best justify . . . most violations of human rights. Torture has occurred on occasion . . . Basic civil rights are subordinated . . . Local press, media, and educational institutions present a single propagandistic point of view. Public dissent with basic policies and ideology is not permitted. Opposition parties are not permitted."

Zambia is slightly better—having fewer political prisoners languishing behind bars and some, though guarded, civil and political liberties. Yet its top officials recently warned potential opponents of President Kaunda in this year's elections to "forget their intentions" since they would be "playing with fire" to contest his office. Angola and Mozambique are far worse, receiving the rock-bottom human rights score reserved for other Marxist and totalitarian entities as North Korea, Cambodia, Uganda and Guinea-Bissau.

International Security

Is the Patriotic Front a desirable vehicle for pursuing such principles? What is their position for forcing change?

Bender:

Since majority rule means many things to many people, the relevance of the Patriotic Front depends on one's conception of the term. If one is satisfied by the mere fact that most of the political leaders of independent Zimbabwe will be black instead of white as in Rhodesia today, then the Front is irrelevant. This change is clearly possible under Muzorewa and/or Sithole. The relevancy of the Front enters when one moves beyond the question of the color of the leaders to the substance of their policies. Nkomo and Mugabe reject the internal settlement for a number of reasons including the fact that it violates the traditional African nationalist goal of non-racialism by granting whites 28 percent of the seats in parliament—sufficient to block fundamental change for ten years. Both Front leaders have appealed to whites to remain in Zimbabwe as equals, not as a privileged minority. Actually, they have been prepared to offer whites some special privileges but they argue that under the terms of the internal settlement Muzorewa and Sithole went too far by guaranteeing white economic and social domination for at least a decade. One does not have to be a Marxist, Communist or even a black militant to agree with this important objection.

The Patriotic Front advocates the establishment of a socialist state in Zimbabwe, although it is not clear what kind of socialism would emerge from a government shared by the Marxist Mugabe and the non-Marxist Nkomo. Minimally, of the more than 50 percent of the country's land which was confiscated and monopolized by whites, their socialist state would include some free land distribution instead of the demand that land be bought as under the internal settlement. Again, one does not have to be a Marxist to agree that Africans should not be forced to pay for farmland which was stolen from them or their families in order to assure the survival of an orderly capitalist system in the country.

While there are many perspectives one can use to judge the Patriotic Front and its potential appeal, one dimension must include the fact that it represents the only opposition to the internal settlement and its many flaws. Thus the Front can be expected to appeal to many Africans who hope for more egalitarian conditions than what is offered by the internal settlement. Whether they represent a majority of the population can only be guessed; therefore it is presently impossible to know whom the majority of Africans would support in an open and free election. Thus far the Patriotic Front has been more receptive than the leaders of the internal settlement to precisely this kind of election, called for under the Anglo-American Plan. The latter have made it clear that they will stand in elections against the Patriotic Front only if the Patriotic Front first accepts the internal settlement plan for the future and agrees to have the present Rhodesian army and police supervise

the election rather than the United Nations. Under these conditions it is almost certain that there will never be an electoral test of which alternative the majority of Zimbabweans favor.

The Front enjoys support beyond its opposition to the settlement, especially from the traditional followers of ZAPU (led by Nkomo) and ZANU (under Mugabe). In addition, each of these nationalist organizations continues to appeal to specific ethnic groups in Rhodesia, regardless of their ideology, as is the case with Sithole and Muzorewa. It is impossible to know just how extensive the Front's internal backing may be given the danger which Africans face for openly expressing support for the Front's rejection of the internal settlement. How does one determine, for example, what the hundreds of thousands of Africans confined in hamlets think about the choice between the Patriotic Front and the internal settlement?

Adelman:

It is no "mere fact" that leaders of Zimbabwe are black instead of white. This is the very heart of the matter, the very reason why the international community became involved in Rhodesia, and no incidental feature at all. Dr. Bender is correct that the policies of the black factions are also important, which is precisely why the Patriotic Front is so repugnant to many Americans. Its values are fundamentally opposed to ours. Reverend Sithole—himself detained by the Smith regime for ten years—stated that the West is giving the "unfortunate impression that you subordinate the democratic principle to the military principle." One tragedy of Rhodesia is that the black leaders with the guns do not have the votes and those with the votes lack the guns.

Despite international backing all the way from Washington to Moscow, from the United Nations to the Frontline States, the Patriotic Front turns out to be only a "front" for conflicting factions—Mugabe's ZANU, Nkomo's ZAPU—dependent on Communist-supplied arms and training, professing many policies at odds with Western principles, and gaining little support (according to the best available information) among Rhodesian blacks.

Dr. Bender may not be sure of the type of government under the Patriotic Front, but the Front's leaders seem quite sure. Robert Mugabe has openly expressed his disdain for "majority rule" in its classical sense. After meeting Secretary Vance in April, Mugabe said he had "nothing to hide" about advocating a one-party, Marxist state. "We sincerely believe that the multiparty system . . . is a luxury in a state which should concentrate on the transformation of society." He and his cohorts embraced "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thoughts" as ZANU's offi-

cial ideology in September 1977 and pledged confiscation of private property and an end to free enterprise. Could they be more explicit?

Dr. Bender also says the Front has "appealed to whites to remain in Zimbabwe." Such "appeal" is made in a most peculiar manner by the Front leaders. "If we find Smith alive when we take power," Mugabe said in March 1978, "he would be tried by a people's court and will be shot." This reveals, not only his views on Smith, but also his conception of justice and the role of an independent judiciary under a Patriotic Front regime. He earlier pledged that the Patriotic Front would conduct "the biggest trial since Nuremberg." On trial will be *all* members, past and present, of the illegal regime, "senior members" of Smith's political party, and "certain members of the terrorist regime's forces." They will be tried for "crimes of genocide, murder, detention," and the sin of "landholding." Mercy is unthinkable. "There can be no question of amnesty for these heinous crimes against humanity." Why? Because Smith is a "fascist belonging to the same group as Hitler and Mussolini."

On international issues, Mugabe espouses the radical rhetoric so offensive to most Americans. The Palestinians and Zimbabweans, Mugabe told an interviewer in February, were "struggling against their common enemy, Zionism and racism, which are two sides of the same coin." Whom did Mugabe find most inspiring? Libya's Revolutionary Council Chairman Col. Mu'Ammar Quadhafi who provides "the guidelines to oppose foreign intervention on the continent," though Quadhafi in fact trains and sponsors terrorists around the world when he is not busy invading one of his neighbors (Egypt or Chad).

Joshua Nkomo is, thankfully, more rational (at least in tone). He does not profess Marxism, though his support is nearly entirely from the Communist states. His plans do not call for total elimination of private property, though they resemble the line commonly spewed by leftist revolutionaries: "We need power in order to revolutionize the entire life of the people of Zimbabwe . . . The soil will belong to the people and not to individual persons . . . The government will take care of every family, of education, training, health, transport, and housing construction." Nkomo rejects protection for minorities—the basis of the U.S. civil rights drive to assure black rights—just as do many of the Front's backers when denouncing protection for the rights of Zimbabwe's minority, the whites. Nkomo too seems to favor trials and punishment for the Smith regime, the black leaders in the interim government, and the predominantly black Rhodesian Army. "Smith and the others are criminals." So goes his "appeal to whites to remain in Zimbabwe."

Bender:

The Patriotic Front must also be viewed within the perspective of its external

support. It is misleading to characterize that support simply as "communist" since the issue is far more complex. Politically, the Front is supported not only by the Frontline States and Nigeria but also by most other countries in the OAU. Militarily ZAPU has received most of its arms and training from the Soviet Union whereas ZANU has relied more heavily on Chinese assistance. With the Sino-Soviet competition in Africa heating up again, it makes no more sense to view support from these two superpowers as constituting a single communist threat in Zimbabwe than it did in Southeast Asia. Mugabe and Moscow appear to be mutually suspicious and distrustful while Nkomo has had practically no contact with the Chinese. Moreover, it would be a serious mistake to equate Nkomo's ideology with the source of his arms supply or military instructors. Throughout his quarter-century of nationalist politics, Joshua Nkomo has generally been identified with the conservative wing of nationalist politics. As recently as 1976, following his futile negotiations with Ian Smith and his infamous meeting with Henry Kissinger, Nkomo was condemned by none other than Muzorewa and Sithole as being a stooge of the west.

It is also a mistake to attempt to dismiss the Patriotic Front on the basis of selected quotes by the leaders indicating a propensity toward dictatorship. No one can say with certainty that Nkomo would be more autocratic than Sithole, or that Mugabe would be less tolerant of his opposition than Muzorewa. As noted before, none promises to be a model democrat; beyond that everything must remain speculative.

Adelman:

The Patriotic Front's rhetoric is frequently dismissed by apologists or optimists. Similar dismissals were made by members of the German elite, including Jewish entrepreneurs, when denying that *Mein Kampf* was a reflection of Hitler's real plans, and by Westerners when denying that Cambodian and Soviet rhetoric was or is a reflection of their real designs. The presumption of international analysts should be to take words of actual or potential leaders seriously, while still recognizing their context, rather than to dismiss them outright.

The main point is that the *actual setting* of a Patriotic Front-led Zimbabwe would make democracy practically if not totally impossible. Neither Mugabe nor Nkomo has substantial public backing, as both recognized when rejecting the proposed internationally-supervised election during a British-led transition period (contrary to what some state, they have opposed a free and open election during any transition). Both have to depend on the bullet rather than the ballot, since only military victory can launch them into power. Given their support from the Communist nations, Mugabe's lack of any substantial number of followers outside

his own guerrilla forces, and Nkomo's personally dominated organization, the rule of either over Zimbabwe would almost inevitably be a strictly one-man affair.

Last February, Ambassador Young called the internal settlement "not a settlement addressing itself to the issues for which some 40,000 guerrillas are fighting." In this one statement—perhaps inadvertently—he was correct. Nkomo has said quite plainly, "We want to have full power." He and Mugabe, for once agreeing, earlier proclaimed that their "objective is full power—physical and political power." This is precisely why the guerrillas oppose the interim government—in the words of Bishop Muzorewa—"because they, their friends, their cousins, their race, or their tribe will not be in power."

Though by chance making some accurate assessments, Ambassador Young and his Western colleagues have overlooked one crucial distinction: between a *change of leadership* in Rhodesia—from white to black rule possibly in a democratic, free-enterprise, multiracial, Western-leaning state—and a *change of system*—to a non-democratic, radical perhaps Marxist, Communist-backed or even Communist-aligned state. The former envisions a state based on traditional humanitarian values, the latter a state based on those values free-thinking men have long opposed. The Patriotic Front clearly wants a *change of system* while the majority of Rhodesians seem to favor a *change of leadership*. Reverend Sithole explained why he is "strongly opposed to the Patriotic Front, because it is externally based and because it thinks all power should be handed to it . . . They cannot be allowed to get away with it, namely that because they have the guns, therefore they must necessarily be the leaders of Zimbabwe."

One last point: by saying that the Front is communist-backed, I am not ignoring the fact that both Russia and China are involved. The term is relevant in that communist forces of whatever stripe share their practice of totalitarianism and denial of human rights, free-enterprise and moderate (non-violent) solutions to international problems. They deserved to be lumped together in their opposition to our humanitarian values.

Bender:

The most important dimension of the Patriotic Front which must be considered by all is the fact that between the ZAPU and ZANU armies it has amassed a considerable military force which can not be ignored. These armies, principally based in Mozambique and Zambia, are not going to disappear at independence no matter how often the internal settlement leaders may proclaim it. The war is presently costing the government over \$1 million a day and it can be expected to become considerably more costly in the future. The Front is estimated to have approxi-

mately 8,000 guerrillas operating inside the country today with an estimated 20-40,000 based outside. No settlement can bring peace to the country until some accommodation is reached with these forces. This is precisely the goal of the Anglo-American Plan, which seeks to join these guerrillas and the internal settlement leaders.

International Security:

What influence does the group known as the Frontline States have on any conflict in southern Africa?

Adelman:

The neighboring states of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola have considerable influence. This is true partly because of the historic network of political, economic and cultural ties existing in that region; partly because they were recognized by the OAU as being on the forefront of Rhodesian independence; and partly because London and Washington elevated their importance beyond their wildest expectations. As the *Manchester Guardian* correctly apprised on April 2, 1978: "The U.S. view is that Britain and Washington should do nothing of which Nigeria and the Frontline States presidents do not approve. Dr. Owen, the Foreign Secretary, has been a reluctant convert to this policy." The Carter Administration has considered accommodation to the Frontline States an effective way of dealing with the disparate black groups.

A cursory glance at a map, however, reveals that neither Tanzania nor Angola are "front-line" to Rhodesia at all. The pro-West states of Malawi and Zaire are closer to Rhodesia but have not been included. The Frontline States, though claiming to be united, encompass a vast array of policies, goals, and interests ranging from the pro-West Botswana (closely tied to South Africa by necessity) to the radical regimes Angola and Mozambique (closely tied to Cuba and the Soviet Union by choice). Like states around the world, each hopes that Zimbabwe will largely reflect its own particular orientation. They back different factions: Zambia clearly favors Nkomo; Mozambique hosts Mugabe as it expects a prolonged armed struggle to bring about "scientific socialism"; Tanzania lends support to Mugabe but seems open to any black fairly elected; and Botswana urges support for an internal settlement which includes Nkomo and Mugabe.

Neighboring countries or not, unified or not, one can question the value of the five becoming so deeply involved in deciding the means of choosing the future leadership of Zimbabwe. Bishop Muzorewa accused the Frontline States of having "no respect" for the right of the "Rhodesian masses to choose their own leader-

ship." It is, after all, these "masses" and not the Frontline States, the Nigerians, the United States or Britain who must live under the system devised.

The benefits of the United States working so closely with the Frontline States are rather obscure. Recently Secretary Vance made a grueling trip to Rhodesia, apparently assured that the Frontline States would maneuver Nkomo and Mugabe into accepting an all-parties conference to adopt the Anglo-American Plan. "We have delivered our clients, and now it is up to you to deliver yours," the *Washington Post* reported President Nyerere as in effect telling Ambassador Young. As it turned out, Nyerere's so-called "clients" actually upped the ante—demanding a "predominant role" in the transition period and making the new Zimbabwean Army, "our army, pure and simple." Vance and the somewhat baffled Frontline leaders admitted that Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe suddenly demanded new and "fundamental changes" in the Anglo-American Plan. So much for the "deliverance" theory.

Bender:

Since its inception the OAU has tried, usually unsuccessfully, to resolve divisions among competing nationalist organizations on the continent. Generally the OAU has worked through a small committee of member states whose composition (and name) has changed over the years. Since the mid-1970s the "Frontline States" have been designated by the OAU to coordinate the Organization's initiatives in assisting the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. It is noteworthy that the Frontline States have mediated disputes in Namibia and Zimbabwe more successfully than their predecessors; nevertheless they have failed to achieve what Zimbabweans themselves also seem incapable of establishing—namely, a united nationalist leadership and program. In the case of Namibia, the Frontline States (with Nigeria) have had far more success. It is widely agreed that SWAPO's acceptance in July of the proposals put forward by the Western contact group (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Canada) for the transition to independence was directly attributable to pressure by the Frontline States and Nigeria. Ironically, Angola was credited with being the most cooperative by the contact group for pressuring SWAPO to agree to the proposals which appeared moribund in May. At that time there were calls within the Carter Administration to covertly intervene in Angola and following South Africa's savage attack on a SWAPO camp in Angola, killing almost 1000 Namibians.

In December 1974 the Frontline presidents met in Lusaka, Zambia, with Sithole, Nkomo, Chikerema and Muzorewa and formed an umbrella organization under the banner of ANC. The purpose of this move was to join a broadly based group

of nationalists into a single organization to negotiate with Ian Smith. Although the negotiations (which took place in a railroad car on a bridge across the Zambezi River separating Zambia and Rhodesia) failed, the Frontline States showed that they were able to assist peace efforts by organizing the divided African leaders and urging them into negotiations. They performed this important role again in late 1976, assisting Kissinger in his efforts to hold the abortive Geneva Conference, and have tried numerous times to unite the divided Zimbabwean leaders under the Anglo-American Plan. Without the vital assistance of these Frontline States, none of the international efforts to pursue an orderly transition to majority rule would have been possible. The fact that all of these efforts have failed thus far can not be blamed on the Frontline States or on the OAU itself. Ultimate responsibility rests with the people of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe themselves. The Frontline States' inability to resolve Rhodesia's internal disputes is about on par with the record of any international organization (e.g., OAU, UN, OAS, NATO, EEC) to resolve internal conflicts in member states.

Currently, the Frontline States are the moving force behind the tenuous alignment of ZAPU and ZANU in the Patriotic Front. While all five Frontline presidents have expressed support for a negotiated settlement, none, including Botswana's Seretse Khama, is prepared to accept a solution along the lines of the internal settlement. Their strategy of support for the Patriotic Front is intended to bring sufficient pressure on the internal settlement leaders to engender some important systemic changes in addition to the color of the new leadership. While it is true that the Frontline presidents are divided themselves over the changes they would like to see made, none has tried to impose a blueprint for a new system.

The close cooperation between Ian Smith and South Africa over the past decade and a half illustrates how long neighboring countries have played a vital role in determining the outcome of Rhodesia's future. Within this perspective it is to be expected that other bordering countries such as Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana would also play a role. This is especially true for Mozambique and Zambia which have suffered annual losses of well over \$100 million as a result of observing UN sanctions against Smith's rebel regime. Therefore, any outside country such as the United States which desires to have a mediating influence in this delicate transition period would, of necessity, have to work with these states whether or not they were officially organized as an OAU committee. In fact, since most Zimbabwean guerrillas are based in Mozambique and Zambia, neither nation could be ignored.

Henry Kissinger showed us in Angola how futile and costly it is for the United States to attempt to resolve unilaterally an internal African problem. There is also

no guarantee that the United States and Great Britain will succeed today by working closely with the Frontline States, but if we fail, at least we do so without alienating important African nations in the process. An orderly transition to majority rule may be unattainable for either the United States or the Frontline States and therefore it is important that the means we pursue do not cause more diplomatic problems than necessary. The best means at our disposal today are to work closely with both South Africa and the Frontline States while avoiding open endorsement of either of their respective choices—the internal settlement or the Patriotic Front.

Adelman:

Who could object to the Frontline States mediating disputes in volatile southern Africa? Indeed if Honduras can help solve problems there peacefully, it should by all means be encouraged to do so. Objections to the Frontline States are on other grounds completely. First, the group has become a participant rather than a mediator in the conflict by fully endorsing the Patriotic Front and harshly condemning leaders in the interim government (who are just as black and every bit as Rhodesian as Front leaders) and giving the Front arms, camps, sanctuaries, money, training, etc. Second, the group has cajoled or seduced the United States into tying our policies to theirs; the shortcomings of the United States working so closely with the Frontline States are indeed evident. Marching in step with these Parties countenances outside pressure and could bring about a solution opposed by the majority of Rhodesians; this is clearly the present direction of events. Tying U.S. policy to this diverse group also risks being pressured to conform to its most radical elements a veto over U.S. moves. This situation is comparable to that of U.S. Middle Eastern diplomacy. The Administration's former desire for actual negotiations in the Geneva Conference risked the United States being manipulated to accommodate the wishes of the PLO, radical Arab states, or the Soviet Union, and giving these more radical elements a veto over the proceedings.

International Security:

Are there other instruments of coercion besides military—economic leverage for example—that might enforce international opinion vis-à-vis Rhodesia and South Africa?

Bender:

The dual pressures of the guerrilla war and the increasingly desperate condition of the Rhodesian economy—including a 7 percent drop in the country's gross

national product last year—were what finally brought Ian Smith to his knees. While it took a decade rather than a month for sanctions to finally take their predicted toll, they have nevertheless left Smith no choice but to try to strike a bargain with Africans, which he hopes will result in the lifting of sanctions. In fact, it was precisely the untenable economic situation of the country which convinced Henry Kissinger that he could persuade Smith to give up his resistance to majority rule. A Rhodesian businessman was recently quoted, for example, arguing that “militarily we are holding our own and could continue for some time but in economic terms things are almost desperate.” The key to Rhodesia’s economic recovery is the lifting of sanctions.

Those who believe that Smith has not gone far enough (e.g., the supporters of the Anglo-American Plan) argue that sanctions must be maintained or strengthened to force the concessions necessary for a compromise with the Patriotic Front. As of mid-1978 the internal settlement’s Executive Council rigidly rejects any further negotiations with the Patriotic Front under the Anglo-American Plan or any other format.

Further economic pressure could be exerted on the Rhodesian government by closing some important loopholes in the U.N. sanctions program. American multinational subsidiaries in South Africa have helped supply Rhodesia’s essential petroleum needs. One possible step would be to amend U.S. Treasury regulations to conform with those employed under trading-with-the-enemy-laws used to enforce boycotts of Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and apply them to all subsidiaries of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa.

A number of prominent Americans (e.g., George Ball) have suggested that economic and political pressure against South Africa will not only fail but be counter-productive by making whites more defiant and thus drive them further into the laager. Superficially, this argument has a certain seductive appeal, for it does appear to be true that South African whites are more united today in their support of apartheid than at any other time in their history. Some of this support can be traced directly to outside pressures. Yet this view ignores the fact that virtually all of the changes, however cosmetic, toward more equitable racial relations (i.e., in the areas of employment, sports, housing, hotel accommodations, etc.) during the 1970s have resulted from outside pressures on Pretoria. It also ignores the inescapable fact that in the absence of outside pressure, South African whites have never shown the slightest inclination to move away from apartheid. On the contrary, they have demonstrated time and again throughout this century, when most of the world ignored conditions in the Republic or preferred to look the other

way, that nothing would deter them from continuing and strengthening the hated system which extends to the white minority—only 16 percent of the population—control over 87 percent of the land.

Now that the United States has embargoed the sale of all forms of military support for South Africa and has declared in unequivocal terms that the country's political institutions and practices are unacceptable to the American people, attention is focusing on the one sector in which the United States still has leverage—the economy. Increasingly, public pressure is bearing down on American corporations in South Africa (comprising a total investment of \$1.7 billion) either to withdraw or to adopt fair employment practices for all employees.

There are persuasive economic, as well as political, reasons for the United States to begin to alter its economic relations with the Botha government. Whereas South Africa accounted for 39 percent of total U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa in 1960, its share fell to only 20 percent in 1976. U.S. trade with (and investment in) Nigeria alone is greater now than that with South Africa.

In today's political world it is not possible for the United States to provide South Africa with "just a little bit" of military and economic assistance without being considered a full supporter of the apartheid government. Politically, morally, and economically, the United States can not afford to be closely associated with this type of regime, whose demise is only a question of time.

Adelman:

Since the United Nations in 1966 justifiably clamped on total economic, military, and political sanctions against Rhodesia, little remains to coerce Salisbury and there is little need now to coerce Salisbury in any case.

The sanctions far from decimated the white regime. Celebrating the 12th Anniversary of UDI last November, a huge crowd sang Rhodesia's national anthem, "Ode to Joy." Smith then rose to say: "Against all odds and most predictions, we have prospered where we might have failed and grown stronger where we might have fallen into decline."

Indeed the regime's endurance has defied prediction. Just one month after UDI, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson said, 'We'll bring them to their knees in weeks rather than months.' Despite a Royal Naval blockade of the entry port for oil and complete UN sanctions, Rhodesia's GNP more than doubled over the following decade. They were not brought to their knees in weeks, months, or years.

Smith often sermonized visitors on how the bravery of his little band contrasts with the moral weakness of the West. The *Rhodesian Herald* proudly called its country "the last undiseased branch of the old English oak." Scholars like Dr. Gann

foresee the possibility that "the green and white flag of the unrecognized Rhodesian Republic might yet fly over Salisbury's Government House for a long time to come," due to such pride and stamina.

One may ask why further coercion—even if the possibility of such existed—would now be employed against Rhodesia. Britain's historic interest—and that of the international community at large—has long been one of ending the white racist regime and proceeding to black rule. Contrary to some statements, the international community has had no interest in fostering fundamental transformation of the state's social and economic systems, only in ending white rule. The instruments for this white to black leadership transition have now been laid. Given half a chance, this transition could proceed. Neither Britain nor the United States nor Nigeria should determine *which* black ruler gains power, only that *some* genuine nationalist leader—preferably with the backing of the majority of Rhodesian blacks—takes office with the least amount of turmoil.

In terms of South Africa, a host of options is available to coerce that regime. One commonly discussed measure is an oil boycott against South Africa, which imports its total needs of approximately 250,000 barrels a day. Washington could pressure Mobil and Shell—who (with BP and Caltex) control 75 percent of South Africa's internal petroleum market—to suspend their refineries, but this move is most unlikely.

International pressure might be brought on Iran, too, which sells over 70 percent of South Africa's crude oil. Here again, though, actions are unlikely for several reasons. Iran resists the political use of oil as a matter of principle; it resists a boycott of South Africa as a matter of economics and sentiment. Not only does Iran own nearly a fifth of the NATREF refinery in Sasolburg, South Africa and purchase over \$700 million worth of South Africa's uranium, but the independent-minded Shah also has a particular fondness for the country, which welcomed his father in exile after being deposed by Churchill during World War II.

South Africa could withstand an oil embargo for years since it has been stockpiling oil, primarily in old mine shafts. According to the Minister of Planning, Dr. Van der Merwe, the current oil supply should cushion the economy until 1981 when the new oil-from-coal plant in the eastern Transvaal comes into production.

Foreign governments are unlikely to undertake more complete economic sanctions, in part because of the ineffectiveness of such measures to bring about real reform. In any case, the South African economy is well cushioned for any such action; it is totally self-sufficient in major food products (in fact exporting \$750 million worth annually) and produces its own textiles, construction materials, and manufactured goods. One comprehensive study undertaken by an academic team

even asserted that South Africa's economy would undergo an "exuberant phase" of import substitution should sanctions be applied.

While others disagree with this conclusion, such a move would undeniably worsen the plight of South African blacks and injure major trading partners. The British Association of Industries, for example, estimates that a trade boycott of South Africa would increase British unemployment by 70,000 and wipe out an export market worth nearly \$1 billion per year—neither of which the rather depressed British economy could readily afford.

International sanctions most probably would prove counter-productive by hardening the Afrikaners' resistance. U.S. verbal opposition to the regime has already had this effect, as witnessed by Prime Minister Vorster's landslide win in the November 1977 elections. Since then, he has said that South Africans "should be prepared to resist the pressure from wherever and in whatever form it comes with all the resources available to us, however small we might be when measured by world standards."

When all is said and done, however, observers are probably correct in maintaining that *without* outside pressure, South Africa would not dismantle apartheid. But even *with* such pressure, the regime would not dismantle apartheid. Frustrating as it may be, Westerners must realize their impotence to erase evil from the political and social systems of South Africa, as well as those of the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Iran and indeed scores of nations depriving citizens of what we consider God-given rights.

International Security:

Is there hope for the success of an "internal settlement" in Rhodesia?

Adelman:

There is a sliver of hope for the internal settlement *if* American and British diplomats cease their egregious if not unconscionable policies and *if* the admittedly brittle agreement can somehow unfold as promised.

First, to the merits of the "internal settlement" itself. Bishop Muzorewa correctly stated that London and Washington "have no moral reason for rejecting the agreement. Even more so because we have been adhering to all the principles . . . which have been set up by the various British governments." The internal settlement fully implements five of the six principles which have shaped British policy over the past decade. The remaining principle—that the agreement be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia—could be tested later this year with the scheduled general elections.

The most objectionable provisions of the agreement reserve twenty-eight parliamentary seats for whites who would be able, for ten years, to block changes in the entrenched clauses of the constitution. Rhodesia is not alone in reserving white seats after independence; Zambia and Botswana had similar provisions. Besides, twenty-eight seats would allow Rhodesian whites only a minor moderating role on most matters. The blocking mechanism is only as objectionable as are the entrenched clauses themselves. These provide for an independent judiciary and civil service, freedom of security forces from political interference, and payment for seizure of property—provisions frequently adopted by non-Communist governments around the world. The terms of the internal agreement are precisely those Mr. Nkomo was seeking from Ian Smith two years back.

Bender:

How can the internal settlement succeed in its present form when it is fraught with so many contradictions and its leaders face so many irreconcilable differences? As it stands today, the settlement signed on March 3 ostensibly paves the way to majority rule. Yet at the same time it maintains white privilege and dominance even after independence. As the *New York Times* astutely editorialized (5 March 1978): "The agreement would let the white settler community block any measures that threaten its economic privileges for at least 10 years and probably longer . . . 'Majority rule' so hobbled by minority rights means no real transfer of power, no matter how many blacks acquire ministerial trappings." Since the economy, judicial system, civil service, military and police will remain essentially intact, little fundamental change will occur until whites lose (after a decade) their important blocking percentage (28 percent) of the seats in parliament.

Adelman:

The fact remains that other black-ruled African states had similar white-reserved seats after their independence (to which the *New York Times* never objected). Besides, many if not most African states have a large number of whites now (Gabon has as high a percentage as Rhodesia)—as they have had since independence—who also dominate the economy. Neither in this respect would an independent Zimbabwe via the internal settlement be unique. The same standards applicable to other black African nations should be applied in this case.

The agreement can best be evaluated by those most knowledgeable and with the most at stake—the black nationalists of Rhodesia. It is quite patronizing for outsiders, like ourselves or senior State Department officials, to nit-pick and condemn an agreement acceptable to such leaders who are intelligent, perceptive

individuals. Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole are certainly not Uncle Toms dazzled by Smith's legerdemain. Both are highly educated clergymen—Sithole a graduate of Andover-Newton Seminary in Massachusetts—and both have a long history of opposing Smith on behalf of the nationalist movement. Bishop Muzorewa denounced Smith's 1971 deal with the British and effectively mobilized the blacks to kill it. Reverend Sithole was detained for ten years and in exile for two because of his firm defiance of white rule.

Granted, these two black Africans affirm their support for democratic principles, preservation of minority rights, and retention of a free-enterprise, Western leaning system. Such beliefs, however, do not make them any *less black* or *less African*, though members of the Carter Administration—some so tantalized by the radical rhetoric of Angola and Mozambique—consequently consider them suspect.

In short, Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole are themselves quite capable of judging the internal settlement. Both consider the terms acceptable. Muzorewa publicly said that the arrangement is not the ideal one, just as Smith has said that, from his perspective, it was far from ideal. Politics offers few if any ideal arrangements. All too often it presents a choice "between the disagreeable and the intolerable," as Edmund Burke said.

Bender:

Given the grim prospect for Africans to share fully the fruits of independence, why did the three African members of the Executive Council (Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau) agree to what is clearly little more than a Rhodesian-style Potemkin village? In Chirau's case, the answer is relatively simple—lacking any discernible African constituency and having served Smith faithfully as an appointed token black in parliament, the chief could do little but follow his patron's lead. Muzorewa and Sithole, on the other hand, seem to be playing a more complex game. Indeed, their participation in the transitional government may simply be a way of buying time until they have an opportunity to seize the process and wrest power from Smith.

Moreover, both Muzorewa and Sithole are painfully aware that they currently lack the very thing that has made the Patriotic Front such a force to reckon with—armed troops. However, if either of the so-called "moderate" leaders were somehow able to gain control of the transitional government, they would have at their disposal not only the organs of power, but also their foundation—the well-trained and equipped Rhodesian army.

All of this makes some tactical sense, but sooner or later both Muzorewa and Sithole will have to prove to Rhodesia's African majority that independence does,

indeed, mean an end to white domination. That, of course, entails direct confrontation with Smith. But such a struggle carries its own risks: If the African leaders wait too long to challenge the white prime minister, they risk losing whatever black support they now command; if they move too soon, Smith could crush them.

In the long run, however, it is likely that the internal settlement will transfer real power to Muzorewa and Sithole. Americans, however, should understand that such an event is no guarantee of stability. In fact, the two African leaders are bitter rivals, who spend most of their time undercutting each other rather than opposing Smith. Thus, the probability that Muzorewa and Sithole will ever divide power and cooperate as the leaders of a peaceful Zimbabwe is very slim. (A similar situation prevails in the Patriotic Front, where Mugabe and Nkomo are frequently in conflict.)

All of this makes the personal rivalry between Muzorewa and Sithole vitally important, though at the moment the former seems to command the greater African support. At one time, Sithole was considered the most radical of the Zimbabwean nationalists, but his position was seriously eroded when his ZANU guerrillas defected to Mugabe. Moreover, Sithole has lost most of his internal African support during the past fifteen years, most of which he spent in prison or exile.

Muzorewa has been the major beneficiary of Sithole's plummet from popularity. Still, if the bishop is to emerge from this transitional period as the first prime minister of Zimbabwe, he will have to walk a tightrope that would challenge a skilled acrobat. On the one hand, he must maintain his nationalist credentials among his fellow Africans; on the other hand, he must avoid antagonizing Smith until after he has gained control of the government and army.

The delicacy of Muzorewa's position was dramatized by the firing of Byron Hove, who had been appointed by Muzorewa as the transitional government's African Co-Minister of Justice, Law, and Order. Hove served in the Cabinet only two weeks before he was fired for refusing to retract his (and Muzorewa's) call for "positive discrimination" in favor of African policemen and judges. To support his demand, he cited not only the small number of Africans in such positions, but also previously unreleased statistics revealing that white Rhodesian civil servants receive average salaries ten times the size of those paid their African counterparts. Muzorewa's threat to resign from the Executive Council unless Hove were reinstated was ignored by his co-executives, prompting him to observe to the *New York Times* (7 May 1978) that "we have been terribly humiliated [by the Hove affair], but I wouldn't say destroyed." Muzorewa's subsequent refusal to appear in public with his three colleagues further underscores the fragility of

the internal settlement. If the Hove case is any guide, accepting the settlement constitutes, in Smith's eyes, a pledge of silence concerning the status quo.

Such maneuvers may serve as temporary diversions, but they can not forever forestall Muzorewa's or Sithole's inevitable challenge to Smith's attempt to preserve white privilege in Zimbabwe. And once that challenge occurs the house of cards that is the internal settlement will come crashing down.

Adelman:

I could not agree more than Muzorewa and Sithole are walking a tightrope. All the more reason for the United States and Great Britain to stop denouncing their attempt to bring about an orderly transfer of power to black rule, to stop placing yet more obstacles along their already steep and thorny path.

I also agree that economic and political opportunities must be vastly expanded. But this does not mean that Muzorewa or Sithole or any other blacks must summarily expel whites, deprive them of property, or boot them from all areas of responsibility. These steps would indeed bring the internal settlement "crashing down," as it would the entire Rhodesian economy—to the detriment of blacks and whites alike.

So far, at least, this has been avoided. While the record of the interim government has disappointed many of us, it has reaped some fruits: a) the release of more than 700 of the 900 political detainees; b) an end to executions of convicted terrorists; c) the appointment of an all-party multiracial commission to draft a detailed constitution; d) agreement to hold elections via the proportional representation "party list" system; and e) removal of the long-standing ban on the two original guerrilla movements. Not all one would like but not trivial either in but four months of operations. Bishop Muzorewa well realizes the interim government's limited success but said in June, "What do people expect? They expect us to act like a popularly-elected government. This is only a coalition, almost a caretaker government leading to [black-ruled] government that should be expected to do things."

Back to the original question: Will the internal settlement succeed? Hope springs eternal and one can fervently hope that the settlement or some variant thereof (which is even preferable) will succeed. But the crystal ball is now filled with darkness and gloom—after months of flickering brightness—and I must reluctantly return to my prediction in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1977) that "the country is in for a revolutionary change in government and social system, rather than a change of leadership within the existing system. The whites seem destined for an inglorious retreat, much like the medieval abandonment of a fortified city-state."

International Security:

Given your respective disagreements, how would you recommend U.S. policy carry on from here?

Bender:

The United States currently has four choices in Rhodesia: 1) It can do nothing; 2) It can support the Patriotic Front; 3) It can back the internal settlement; 4) It can continue pushing the Anglo-American Plan.

Since there is little domestic support for either of the former two, the choice is really between the latter pair of options. It should be realized, however, that neither choice guarantees a peaceful transition to majority rule, nor a democratic Zimbabwe. Moreover, given all the parties' recalcitrance, the odds are great that the Anglo-American Plan will fail. Yet it is the course which most African leaders favor and which, therefore, offers the best hope for preserving whatever influence America has in the region.

Indeed, it is important to recognize that the Soviet Union will not necessarily exert primary influence over independent Zimbabwe. Thus far, neither Nkomo nor Mugabe can reasonably be considered a Soviet pawn—or even in the Soviets' debt. After all, Mugabe and the Soviets have rarely been on good terms and Nkomo is not even a Marxist.

This could all change quickly, however, if there is an all-out war, forcing the Patriotic Front to turn to the Soviets for massive military support. And nothing would hasten this eventuality more than American endorsement of the internal settlement at this time. To do so would once again, as in Angola, put the United States on the side of South Africa and this time, of Ian Smith.

Adelman:

American and British officials cling to their quixotic and ill-conceived Anglo-American Plan as a rebuked adolescent clings to a remembrance of a former flame. The Plan is dead while the internal settlement, though quite ill, still gasps for breath. Unfortunately the Western diplomats have judged the internal agreement not on its acceptability to black nationalists nor its adherence to past British principles but on its acceptability to the guerrilla leaders. Such Western views are important because only Britain—the legal colonial power—can grant formal independence to Zimbabwe and only the United Nations—surely with Western backing—can lift the total sanctions against the state.

Speaking in Lusaka, Zambia last March, Ambassador Young had the appalling audacity to assert, "The American people consider the Salisbury Agreement as being far too short of the genuine ingredients of lasting peace and independence."

I was unaware that the American people had been queried on the question. I would be amazed if, after learning about the situation, "the American people" would oppose black rule possibly in a democratic, Western-leaning, free-enterprise system supported by the majority of black Rhodesians, rather than possibly in a Marxist, authoritarian regime come to power by armed conflict.

Last spring the United States abstained from a United Nations resolution declaring the internal settlement "illegal and unacceptable." The American Ambassador should have vetoed the resolution, proclaiming unapologetically that *any* settlement legal and acceptable to the majority of Rhodesians would be quite legal and acceptable to the United States.

The State Department denounced the proposed one-man, one-vote elections in Rhodesia as not being "perceived by the international opinion as being conducted in a demonstrably fair manner." Can Washington officials or anyone else know how the elections, now planned for several months off, will be conducted? Rather than applaud the idea of one-man, one-vote competitive elections—so scarce as to be nearly unheard of in Africa—the Administration condemned them before the electoral process had even begun.

The American-British team opposes the internal settlement primarily because it does not include the guerrilla leaders. They prefer a settlement in which all the parties are involved. This is commendable enough, but thus far totally impractical. The interim government has invited Messrs. Mugabe and Nkomo to join the internal settlement if they terminate the warfare, but they have refused to do so. The *Manchester Guardian* (12 March 1978) states that "as a set of constitutional proposals," the internal agreement "is perfectly proper; that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe have not signed it or improved it to their satisfaction is, unhappily, nobody's fault but their own."

Why have they refused? Because they have almost no chance of gaining power in a fair and open election of all Rhodesians. After the interim government was established, a prominent black Rhodesian called it "an African government supported by 90 percent of the black population." Whether it has 90 percent support or not, no one yet knows. But the best guess is that the guerrilla leaders together could muster between 10-20 percent of the popular black vote and that over 80 percent would support the internal settlement.

Holding no reasonable prospect of giving them power, Nkomo and Mugabe have, quite naturally, denounced the interim government and the scheduled elections. This is entirely their affair. It becomes our affair, however, when Anglo-American negotiators refuse to recognize the internal settlement because the guerrilla leaders have chosen to stay out. As C. J. Bapiro, a black Rhodesian now

living in America, pungently asked, "Why should the United States stick up for a fellow who will not play ball if he is not made captain of the team—regardless of how much screaming and kicking the fellow can muster?"

How should the Anglo-American team proceed from here? Perhaps by heeding Talleyrand's counsel to a young, inexperienced diplomat: *Surtout, pas trop de zèle*—above all, not too much zeal. The Administration should halt the frantic efforts to revive the long-dead and originally ill-conceived Anglo-American Plan. It should cease the frenzy to assemble all the various Rhodesian parties together in what would surely be an unproductive if not rambunctious session. The Secretary of State keeps reiterating his goal of an all-parties conference even though no one has any idea of what the agenda would be. The idea is as foolish here as an all-parties Middle East conference in Geneva would have been.

Rather, American diplomats should catch their breath and allow the internal settlement to percolate until it shows its true flavor. Should it prove a smoke-screen for prolonged white supremacy rule—as many of us fear—then Muzorewa and/or Sithole would probably not stand for it. The internal settlement would then be wrecked with the United States roundly blasting yet another of Smith's intolerable tactics and maintaining the international sanctions.

If, however, the internal settlement proves an effective device for an orderly transfer to black rule, with Zimbabwe's leader chosen by universal suffrage in a fair election (as fair as any election in time of warfare), then the United States should immediately lift the international sanctions and formally recognize the new regime. Washington should then denounce the guerrilla warfare as a battle for sheer personal power at the cost of hundreds or thousands of additional black lives and of decimating the country. Then the guerrillas could not be fighting for black rule, since a black ruler would already be in place, but just for the treasures of office.

While the internal settlement is unfolding, the United States and Britain would be wise to support those working for an orderly transfer to black power within the country. For this reason, the Senate would have been wise last July to have adopted the Danforth Amendment (narrowly defeated by 54-42) which would have lifted economic sanctions against Rhodesia for the last three months of 1978. This measure would have provided relief for the Rhodesian economy while election arrangements were being made and realized. If elections and the transfer to black rule unfolded as promised, then the Congress could have permanently removed the sanctions early in 1979. If not, the imposition of sanctions would have returned without further actions by the U.S. Congress. With or without such legislative moves Washington and London should stop subverting the termination

of white minority rule on terms Britain has historically favored and the black nationalists support. Members of the Administration would do well to reread such statements of Mr. Carter during the 1976 campaign as: "The moral heart of our international appeal—as a country which stands for self-determination and free choice—has been weakened. It is obviously un-American to interfere in the free political process of another nation."

Bender:

The Senate rejection in July of the two amendments introduced by that well known champion of black rights, North Carolina's conservative Republican Jesse Helms, helped avert a serious diplomatic disaster for the United States. Nothing could be more harmful to diplomatic efforts over Rhodesia than for the United States to lift sanctions before the Anglo-American Plan has run its course. The Helms Amendment to lift sanctions during the second half of 1978 would have essentially hardened a fluid situation and almost certainly have guaranteed the very thing the United States has tried to avoid—the entry of Cuban troops. Further, the lifting of sanctions at a time when the internal settlement leaders refused to negotiate with the Front would remove all incentive for future discussions with the guerrillas. The merit of the competing Case-Javits Amendment (which the Senate passed 59-36) is that it asks the President not to lift sanctions until after free and internationally supervised elections are held *and* after the Salisbury government has indicated a willingness to negotiate the terms of independence with the Patriotic Front. In other words, it stimulated the negotiating process rather than froze it.

The Helms Amendment also came dangerously close to committing the United States to one side in the struggle. While Senator Helms, Dr. Adelman, William Buckley, and others might be happy if the United States did make this commitment to the internal settlement, Americans should not be fooled that this would commit us to the "democratic side." None of the four members of the executive council nor their cabinet was elected by the people of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Smith was elected by a small minority representing only 3-4 percent of the population, while Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau never stood for national office.

International Security:

Assuming change is desirable, how can South Africa be pressured to support majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia while at the same time enduring criticism of its own policies?

Bender:

The dilemma posed in the question actually ceased being a major problem a year ago when South Africa finally recognized the inevitability of independence and majority rule in both Namibia and Rhodesia. In this regard differences between the United States and South Africa today relate more to their respective preferences for the potential leaders and form of government in the two independent countries and whether these preferences are viable. This was the central problem with South Africa's Turnhalle Plan for Namibia, for example. The United States pressured South Africa for more than a year to drop the plan. Ultimately, however, South Africa would have had to abandon the Turnhalle Plan anyway, with or without American pressure, because it simply was not viable and could not have been implemented successfully.

The same situation prevails today with respect to the internal settlement in Rhodesia. Vorster has given strong verbal support to the internal settlement, yet he must know what the British and American governments have realized since the collapse of the Geneva Conference—that there is no way to avert civil war unless compromises can be reached which would include the Patriotic Front. Since a civil war in Rhodesia represents an infinitely greater threat to Pretoria than to Washington, Vorster has every reason to be as realistic as possible about Rhodesia's future government.

In sum, differences between the United States and South Africa over Rhodesia and Namibia are likely to revolve around varying perceptions of reality and around details, rather than around the more fundamental question of whether or not majority rule should be attained, which troubled relations in the past.

One important ramification of this evolution in South Africa's policy toward Rhodesia and Namibia is the latitude it provides the American government to exert pressure on the Republic with respect to its domestic situation. The questions become, therefore, what kind of pressure to exert and how far should it be pushed? In answering these questions, two dimensions must be considered: (1) Will a given policy actually engender the desired specific changes? and (2) What impact will that policy have on our overall foreign policy objectives, irrespective of its effect on South Africa's internal conditions? For example, the U.S. government and American corporations should subscribe to the principles of equal job opportunities and working conditions for all races in South Africa—even if they lack the leverage to bring this about. Failing to subscribe to such principles would be tantamount to announcing to the world that we believe non-whites in South Africa should continue to suffer under the oppressive system of white domina-

tion. This could hardly enhance our overall foreign policy objectives, especially in Africa.

Adelman:

South Africa does not need to "be pressured to support majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia" at all. As explained previously, Pretoria has spurred on the dawdling Smith for years and will maintain the pressure—with whatever political leverage it actually has—for the success of the internal settlement. South Africa has pledged the Namibian independence for the coming year in accordance with the prescription of the Contact Group, the five Western powers.

The Carter Administration's criticism of South Africa's internal racism was most welcomed. The United States and the West in general overlooked or whispered about the gross injustices of that system for too long. But the way in which the Administration lodged its criticism was abysmal. Vice-President Mondale's public call for one-man, one-vote in South Africa jolted the long-enduring white South African reformers. They had hoped the new Administration would boost their cause. Instead they were tossed in the waiting arms of Prime Minister Vorster and had to join him in denouncing such a scheme. Opposition leader Colin Eglin called the Administration's handling of South Africa "appalling" and said: "Without facing up to the realities of the situation, without giving mature consideration to the options for change, the Carter Administration rushed in where angels would have feared to tread. Its statements have given the impression that it is more concerned with posturing than reform." Much to his credit, Mr. Mondale has subsequently retracted his statement.

Bender:

Few Americans object to applying general pressure on Pretoria to make fundamental changes in the economic and social spheres. Difficulties arise, however, when the question moves to the political realm. Many have argued, for example, that it was an error for the Vice-President of the United States to have answered "yes" to a reporter's question whether U.S. support of full political participation in South Africa meant support of the principle of one-man, one-vote. They suggest that this jolting call for political equality in South Africa has undercut South African white reformers and merely bolsters Vorster's white support for apartheid. Both statements are undoubtedly true, but the question is—how important is that in comparison with the negative ramifications had the Vice-President answered "no."

Realists who support fundamental change in South Africa had given up on white reformers long before the United States began to exert pressure. If they

have been undercut by pronouncements from the Carter Administration, this could only mean a curtailment in their moving and eloquent statements which, while frequently quoted in the western press, have not moved the National Party away from its commitment to separate development. Clearly, white reformers such as Donald Woods, Beyers Naude and Theo Kotze have been undercut infinitely more by the brutal killings and repressive practices of the Vorster regime against moderate reformers.

If Mr. Mondale had answered the reporter's question with a "no," he might have placated the politically impotent white reformers but he would have seriously alienated virtually all of South Africa's non-whites who, after all, constitute over 80 percent of the country's population. Fortunately, the Vice President has not retracted his stated commitment to the principle of full political participation for all South Africans, with its corollary of one-man, one-vote, although he may have qualified the time period and method of attaining this goal.

Henry Kissinger demonstrated the futility of attempting to ignore the issue of political equality in South Africa while at the same time trying to convince key African leaders that he could be an honest broker in attaining a peaceful transition in Rhodesia and Namibia. Africans deeply resent white nations which consider them anything less than politically equal with whites in Africa. The Soviet Union has reaped considerable benefits for its indefatigable support for racial equality in Africa. If the United States hopes to compete meaningfully with the Soviets in Africa, it must start with a firm commitment to accept nothing less in South Africa than we ask of ourselves in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to our own constitution.

Adelman:

One would hope that the United States would have a Vice-President intelligent enough to avoid a simple "yes" or "no" answer to a complex question. One-man one-vote in a unity system (like that of France, for example) would be as unacceptable in South Africa as it would in Canada, Lebanon, Cyprus, Northern Ireland or other plural societies with divergent ethnic groups.

If those supporting "fundamental change in South Africa" have "given up on white reformers," as Dr. Bender states and presumably has, then he is even more pessimistic than am I. For if one gives up on white reformers, then there is virtually no hope of justice ever in South Africa short of military victory and virtual genocide of Afrikaners. Such a scenario of "fundamental change" is even less appealing and certainly more morally repugnant than the present situation, offensive as it is.

International Security:

Can you comment on the balance of forces in southern Africa, and what role military capability will play in future political change? How might this balance change in the coming years?

Adelman:

Two balances of forces exist in southern Africa, one involving Rhodesia the other South Africa.

The forces of the Patriotic Front are split. Those of Mugabe, headquartered in Mozambique, consist of some 6-8,000 troops who always seem in a state of disarray and are often decimated by Rhodesian Army forays. Nkomo, working out of Zambia, has some 5-7,000 men who are far better trained, disciplined and equipped. Until the present, they have adroitly dodged the Rhodesian forces; Nkomo has surely been holding them back for the big battle—not against Smith, but against any black gaining power including (or particularly) his comrade-in-arms, Mugabe.

Opposing the Front is the Rhodesian Army, some 12-15,000 strong with 80 percent black but mostly white officers, whose forces operate in small units capable of impressive flexibility and mobility. Their rate of loss remains smaller than the annual murder rate in New York City. Since the war began five years ago, casualty rates have been at about a ten to one ratio in favor of the Rhodesian Army.

Regardless of the precise ratio, the conflict is tragically taking a heavy toll of black lives on both sides, besides hurting Rhodesia's economy and prospects for a multiracial state.

Bender:

The actual number of trained soldiers in the various armies fighting in Rhodesia is a matter of considerable speculation. *The Washington Post* (24 February 1978) estimates Nkomo's ZAPU army at 8,000. Western intelligence sources cited by the *Los Angeles Times* (19 March 1978) indicate that Mugabe's ZANU forces number about 17,000. If we accept these numbers, it would appear that the combined forces of the Patriotic Front outnumber the Rhodesian army by a ratio of roughly 2 to 1. This does not augur well for the Rhodesian army in a protracted guerrilla war if there is any truth to the American and Portuguese counterinsurgency manuals which argued that counterinsurgency forces must outnumber the guerrillas by a ratio of approximately 10 to 1.

While it is clear that some of the guerrillas would join the government army if majority rule were achieved under the internal settlement, it is equally clear

that at the same time some Africans in the present Rhodesian army would join the guerrillas. Nobody can be sure which side would benefit the most from the expected mutual trading of uniforms (i.e. sides).

As Americans assess the comparative military and political strengths of the competing forces in Rhodesia, I hope that some of the fundamental mistakes of the past can be avoided. At the top of the list should be the "tar baby mentality" demonstrated by Henry Kissinger in his infamous 1970 review of southern Africa (NSSM 39). The former Secretary of State preferred option two (which called for the United States to "maintain public opposition to racial repression, but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states") partly because he considered the insurgent movements in southern Africa to be ineffectual and "not realistic or supportable" alternatives to the white regimes. Kissinger questioned the "depth and permanence of black resolve" which led him to dismiss the possibility of a "black victory at any stage." The events in Portugal four years later underscored what a fatal error it was not to have also questioned white resolve and effectiveness.

Nothing could be more dangerous for U.S. policy toward Rhodesia than the adoption of this myopic and ethnocentric perspective of the "guerrillas" which dominated the thinking of Americans and Portuguese during their respective wars in Southeast Asia and Africa. The Portuguese army compared favorably with African nationalist armies in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau in terms of number of troops, equipment, cohesiveness, etc., yet this did not spell victory. The same was true for both France and the United States in southeast Asia. It is not enough to say that the Zimbabwean guerrillas may well end up fighting it out between themselves (i.e., ZAPU vs ZANU) because this ignores the probability of such a predicted showdown occurring only after the internal settlement forces have been defeated. In fact, for the past 18 months, despite some recrimination between Mugabe and Nkomo, the ZAPU and ZANU armies have focused their attacks against their mutual enemy in Salisbury, not against each other.

Volumes could be written about all of the divisive problems not only between ZAPU and ZANU but within each of these organizations. The same ethnic, personal, and ideological rivalries which plague the internal settlement have raised havoc in both ZAPU and ZANU. In fact, it is highly doubtful that if Mugabe and/or Nkomo were to join the internal settlement (or even an Anglo-American settlement) they could carry all or even a majority of their "followers." Nevertheless, their combined guerrilla forces have managed to greatly expand their spheres of operation within Rhodesia over the past two years. Today approximately two-thirds of the rural areas of the country are considered to be combat

zones. By July of this year attacks occurred not only in Bulawayo but in the capital itself. Moreover, given the recent intensified training which the guerrillas have received in the use of heavy weapons and urban warfare, they are certain to be able to escalate the war, which is already costing the Salisbury government over \$1 million a day. Obviously, the Patriotic Front must be considered as a military force capable of preventing the successful implementation of the internal settlement.

Adelman:

Given the present balance of forces, guerrilla military victory and the political changes that it would bring are years away, provided that the Rhodesian interim government does not totally collapse with whites rapidly fleeing. Continuing warfare would certainly consume thousands of additional black lives and ravage the country. Precisely for this reason, those sincerely interested in the fate of black Africans—as opposed to particular black Africans gaining power—should push an orderly transfer to black rule and not bank on the Patriotic Front's military conquest.

The Rhodesian balance of forces might be altered: (a) by an influx of Cuban forces fighting for the Patriotic Front—which is quite unlikely, for reasons given below—or (b) by a decline in the guerrilla forces—which is more likely if the internal settlement works out as hoped. There are undoubtedly dedicated Zimbabweans fighting with the guerrilla forces to end white-rule. They may well return when the cause for which they were fighting—if indeed black rule rather than personal power—no longer exists. Some may be enticed by promises of amnesty and land opportunities now being discussed by the interim government.

The military balance to the south shows the overwhelming power of South Africa. Tanzanian President Nyerere correctly stated, "Not a single African country is really a military threat to South Africa. No combination of African countries can really be a threat to South Africa." Nigeria has the only substantial army (besides Rhodesia) in the sub-Sahara and its forces actually pale in any type of comparison with those of Pretoria.

A land attack against South Africa is of the remotest possibility, given Pretoria's extensive economic ties with its neighbors and awesome army. More possible, though still far-fetched, would be an attack at sea, one designed to strangle South Africa rather than defeat it by direct attack. Continued Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean, along with the use of facilities in Mozambique, could enable Communist forces to interdict ships bound for South Africa. They would be most careful not to interfere with ships heading for the West and might in fact need

Western acquiescence for such an operation. If successful, this could cripple the South African economy as over 40 percent of its gross domestic product depends on foreign trade.

However, a successful naval maneuver could not be managed without considerable cost, given South Africa's own naval and air capabilities. Its 5,500-man Navy includes three Daphne-class submarines, a destroyer, three frigates, and minesweepers. France's recent cancellation of additional naval vessels has disrupted South Africa's plans but could not be regarded as debilitating. The 8,500-man Air Force includes two squadrons with thirty-two Mirage F-1A, a fighter/reconnaissance and interceptor squadrons. Such forces could discourage Soviet-allied interference with shipping to South Africa but could not totally deter such an attack. The Communists would have to demonstrate a substantially higher level of commitment and capability than presently exists to cripple South Africa in this manner.

Any such scenario, or one involving guerrilla forces on South Africa's borders, could not in the foreseeable future hasten the prospects for justice in that troubled land. Reform must come, not by force of increased conflict, but by force of increased awareness by the Afrikaner rulers that racism is intolerable in today's world and apartheid must be dismantled forthwith.

Bender:

If we limit our consideration of the balance of forces in South Africa strictly to the military arena, there is no question that the Botha regime enjoys virtual dominance. Yet the survival of apartheid or separate development in South Africa is not likely to be determined by the number or type of weapons possessed by the competing sides. How useful, for example, were the mirages, submarines, frigates, etc. against the unarmed students in Soweto? Would an atom bomb be used to stop the next African strike in Durban or Port Elizabeth? How relevant was the mighty South African military machine (which now costs over \$2 billion a year) during the work stoppages which paralyzed Johannesburg for days in 1976 and 1977?

South Africa may be well-endowed with sophisticated weapons and precious minerals but the lack of certain strategic resources renders the Republic extremely vulnerable. Oil clearly heads the list. South Africa must import all of its oil; in fact, 70 percent of the oil refined in the Republic comes from a single source—Iran. While it is highly improbable that the Shah would ever use oil as a weapon against Pretoria, who knows what position the Shah's successor will take on this issue. Although South Africa has stockpiled oil, the size of these stockpiles has

been greatly exaggerated, according to some intelligence sources. One American oil company executive (whose company is heavily involved in South Africa) confided that no matter how large the South African stockpiles may be, an oil boycott would bring the economy to its knees in a very short time.

Water is another scarce resource. There are no navigable rivers in the country and the lack of water needed for power has slowed uranium production. Pretoria's solution was to invest heavily in hydro-electric schemes in Mozambique (Cabora Bassa) and Angola (Cunene River Basin), yet neither can be counted on in a time of crisis.

Perhaps the Republic's greatest resource vulnerability, however, is its dependence upon black labor. Blacks today represent over 70 percent of the entire labor force. In the critical areas their numbers are even more striking: blacks provide 80 percent of the labor in manufacturing and agriculture and 90 percent in the mining industries. Last year there were over 100 strikes in the Republic by black workers. If black workers can become organized sufficiently to withhold their labor from key economic sectors, all of the Republic's missiles, jet fighters, tanks, or nuclear bombs could not do a thing about it!

International Security:

What is the likelihood of southern Africa becoming a focal point for superpower confrontation? Do you see Nkomo and others turning to the Soviet Union (and Cuba) if U.S. backing is not received?

Adelman:

Africa has become a focal point for superpower confrontation, whether Washington recognizes it or not. President Carter heralded the end of America's "inordinate fear" of Communism last year. Members of his Administration believe they can best respond to aggressive Communist actions by ignoring them, or at least discounting their importance.

Ambassador Young has waxed eloquent on how Marxism is irrelevant to Africans. Mr. Lake cautioned in a speech that when we "look at African questions as East-West rather than African in their essential character, we are prone to act more on the basis of abstract geopolitical theorizing than with due regard for local realities."

Downplaying Soviet and Cuban adventurism would certainly please African leaders closest to the Carter Administration—those in Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola. It would certainly *not* please those traditionally close to the West—the leaders of Zaire, Kenya, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Botswana

and others. They continually harp upon expanding Soviet and Cuban presence on their continent. President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast recently said, "Russia will take advantage of any confusion in Africa to infiltrate the continent. This may go under the guise of aid to so-called liberators but, once inside, the 'benefactors' will be just another occupation force." Nineteen African heads of state met in Dakar in April 1977 and top officials of *over half* of all African states met in Paris in May 1978 to voice similar concerns. The former President of the Organization of African States, Gabon's leader Omar Bongo, said the Cubans "should stick to cutting sugar cane and leave us in peace." The *Nairobi Standard* editorialized, "We unreservedly condemn the revolutionary fanaticism of Cuba . . . If this continues, Cuba will be the most potent source of violence and threat to world peace." One of the most brilliant and astute of all African leaders, President Senghor of Senegal, said in June 1978, "At the moment, the problem facing a country like mine is how to remain independent and free . . . It is the East which is launching an offensive in Africa and the East uses effective, ultramodern means to attain specific objectives . . . The East is drawn by a vacuum and, when the West moves out, it fills the gap. Nobody tried to stop this happening in Angola. I feel that the first phase of World War II took place in Angola."

These Africans recognize important events happening before their very eyes. They appreciate the significance of Castro's recent remark that Cubans journeyed to Africa to speed the demise of Western imperialism—not only the white-ruled countries in southern Africa, but the remaining pro-Western black states as well. They know that Moscow regularly condemns diplomatic efforts for a peaceful settlement in southern Africa; that Cuba has bolstered its occupation army to prop up an unpopular regime in Angola and in Ethiopia; that the Soviets are supplying arms all across the continent by which Africans are slaying one another; that the Kremlin delivered more than \$1 billion of military equipment to Ethiopia, *over twice as much* as the U.S. provided to that country during a quarter-century; that more than 1,000 Soviet and 16,000 Cuban advisors and combat troops entered Ethiopia; and that the number of Soviet and Eastern European military advisors in 1976 rose most dramatically in Angola, Libya, and Uganda—three nations which are not working overtime to preserve human rights, to pursue moderate international policies, and to curb the madness of terrorism. One wonders whether such African leaders, alarmed by those developments, can learn from Mr. Lake to stop their "abstract geopolitical theorizing" and begin to realize the "local realities" on their continent.

As a lamentable sign of the times, in late 1977 Dr. Owen trotted off to brief the Kremlin on the Anglo-America Plan on Rhodesia. Years ago, before their military

prowess had expanded around the world, the Soviets could be ignored in southern Africa; today they have the power to disrupt any initiative. Upon returning home, Dr. Owen triumphantly announced that Russia's intentions toward Rhodesia were identical to those of the West. This says more about changes in Washington and London than in Moscow. Owen and Young apparently cared little about the Communist ties to the Patriotic Front or the professed views of members of the Front itself; they avoided any "inordinate fears" along those lines.

As mentioned, Nkomo's forces depend almost entirely on the Soviet Union for equipment and training. As Nkomo stated last March, "We approached the socialist countries, in particular the Soviet Union . . . They have become our allies. We have been fighting with them side by side." Hence the Soviets are already heavily involved on the side of the Patriotic Front. The Kremlin surely believes such assistance will further its own ends. In March, Radio Moscow assured its listeners that the Patriotic Front would "inevitably" form an "anti-imperialistic government in Zimbabwe and strengthen the progressive tendencies in the south of the African continent."

Bender:

Whether or not a superpower confrontation occurs in southern Africa will be determined as much by American responses to unfolding events as it will by any actions initiated by the Soviet Union. This is why it is so important for Americans to understand fully the implications of viewing events in Africa through a global perspective versus a perspective which reflects African realities.* Up to now, our misreading of African realities may have contributed as much if not more to a superpower confrontation than has the Soviet Union, even with its greatly increased involvement in Africa over the past three years. In fact, if the policies advocated by Brzezinski this year (e.g. repeal of the Clark Amendment, greatly expanded military aid to Zaire and Somalia) are followed by the President, a superpower confrontation is almost certain.

During the Angolan civil war, our insistence on focusing on presumed Soviet activity, rather than on Angolan realities, accomplished precisely the opposite of what was intended. Through covert military intervention our government sought to minimize or negate Soviet influence in an independent Angola. At the time that policy was implemented, relations between the MPLA and the Soviet Union were far from cordial. (Throughout most of 1974, in fact, the Soviets had actually withheld their support of the MPLA.) Yet, during the war the American, Chinese,

* I have discussed the futility of a globalist perspective toward Africa more fully elsewhere; see "Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, no. 30 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-30.

South African, and other support for the MPLA's rivals forced Neto and his Party to depend increasingly on the Soviet Union, which ultimately magnified the Soviets' influence far beyond their most optimistic expectations.

For those still unconvinced about the boomerang effect of American policy during the Angolan war, John Stockwell's previously mentioned book must be read. Stockwell, who was the Chief of the CIA Angola Task Force, demonstrates how our policy was actually responsible for the introduction of a large number of Cuban combat troops. In the early summer of 1975, when the Ford Administration greatly escalated American intervention, the MPLA dominated twelve of the sixteen provinces in the country and there were only 260 Cubans in all of Angola. Hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of lives later, we see that the MPLA still dominates most of Angola, but now there over 20,000 Cubans in the country. Interestingly, however, a careful study of the Neto regime's policies toward the Middle East, the war in the Horn, the western contact group's plan for transition to independence in Namibia, or the Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia shows anything but a knee-jerk pro-Soviet response.

Adelman:

Many Americans know the revisionist line, namely that the United States is primarily to blame for most evil in the world and particularly for leading the peace-loving Soviet Union into sin from time to time. This line originated with revisionist interpretations that the warm and human "Uncle Joe" Stalin reacted—much as any such leader would have had to react—to the aggressive actions of Harry Truman intent on instigating the Cold War. The neo-revisionist Paul Warnke compared the two superpowers, in more modern times to "two apes on a treadmill." Actually he claimed in spring 1975 that one ape (the United States) was teaching the other (the Soviet Union) its dastardly ways. "As its only living superpower model," he wrote, "our words and actions are admirably calculated to inspire the Soviet Union to spend its substance on military manpower and weaponry." Left unexplained by this colorful anthropological analysis was exactly how the Soviet Union was "inspired" to *increase* its defense spending by more than 40 percent in real terms since 1964 by "our words and actions" which left FY 1977 U.S. defense spending 12 percent *below* its 1964 level in real terms.

Now we are told that "our misreading of African realities may have contributed as much if not more to a superpower confrontation than has the Soviet Union." Left unexplained is exactly how American provisions of twenty or so millions of dollars of assistance to the rag-tag lot of FNLA in Angola induced the Soviet provision of two hundred or so millions of dollars of weaponry and more than 15,000 crack Cuban combat troops. More interesting yet would be an explanation of why

the Soviets first armed the Somalis to the teeth—giving them the weapons to attempt their age-old goal of assimilating the Ogaden—and then later poured in more than \$1 billion worth of weapons, 16,000 Cuban combat troops and over 1,000 Soviet generals to direct ground operations in Ethiopia—all in order to slaughter its onetime allies. Imaginative minds, I am sure, would somehow blame the United States—which, along with other Western powers did virtually nothing in the Horn—for this tragedy as well.

Also interesting might be the explanation of how the United States was to blame for inspiring the hapless Soviet-armed, Cuban-trained Katangans to invade Zaire twice, contrary to the sacred African principle of territorial integrity. No doubt many have thought of ways to blame us more than the Soviets and Cubans, but still the train of thought would prove fascinating.

Regardless of any convoluted analyses, the facts are evident and indisputable: the Soviets are supplying arms by which Africans are killing one another all across the continent. Without any historic political or economic interests, Moscow is now providing 75 percent of all arms reaching Africa. Between 1972 and 1976, Soviet military deliveries to the third world nearly doubled but those to Africa increased 2000 percent.

While arming groups in Africa, the Soviet Union does virtually nothing to improve the daily lives of Africans. Both the United States and China spend ten times more on economic than military assistance to Africa, while the Soviet Union spends more than 80 percent if all its aid there for weapons. Even Dr. Owen had to admit last April, "The value of Soviet aid to developing countries has declined since 1973-74 and debt service payments to the Soviet Union now *exceed* new disbursements to the least-developed countries."

How can anyone—especially those deeply concerned with the fate of African peoples—possibly ignore or rationalize such facts? Sadly, many do, even in high levels of American government. They shrug off talk of these unpleasant realities as remnants of a cold war mentality. The West, they maintain, has nothing to fear from Communist incursions in Africa for two reasons: (a) Moscow cannot possibly render the amount of assistance needed by Africans to alleviate their dire poverty; therefore African states will eventually return to the Western fold, where technology and wealth are available for real development efforts; and (b) African alliances with outside powers, i.e., the Soviet Union, are quite temporary by nature.

The first line of argument—nicknamed "economism"—may be superficial. It presumes African leaders are as interested in economic development as Westerners or Asians. From years of living and working in Africa, many seasoned observers

cannot totally share this view. Though there are a handful of exceptions, most African leaders have made no real attempt at economic development. The two decades of independence for states in Africa show many of them declining economically, due to political instability or poor leadership, continual military coups, and lack of sustained, dedicated efforts to boost living conditions for any but the elite.

The second line of argument has some historical basis. Soviet alliances with the established regimes of Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia were indeed temporary. However, ties with regimes the Soviet Union has militarily helped place or preserved in power—those of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia—have not proven temporary at all. They seem, on the contrary, quite durable. Even where the Soviet presence has been temporary, nonetheless, it has been devastating. During less than two decades of Soviet involvement in Egypt, the Middle East suffered three large-scale and tragic wars. During less than one decade of Soviet involvement in Somalia, it spurned the Ogaden invasion with tragic consequences for both Somalia and Ethiopia. Such “temporary” Soviet presence in southern Africa would be just as unappealing.

Bender:

At the moment, the prospects for Cuban troops becoming combatants in Rhodesia are extremely low. As the possibility of a civil war and South African intervention increases, however, so does the possibility of Cuban involvement. All American efforts, therefore, should be focused on averting a civil war and the best instrument we have for doing this at present is the Anglo-American Plan.

The success of the Anglo-American Plan greatly depends on the cooperation of the Frontline states. Thus far, they have been surprisingly supportive of British and American efforts in this regard, in part because Carter has been able to convince them that they are dealing with a new American policy toward Africa which they can trust. (However, that trust was being sorely tested last spring by America’s overreaction to events surrounding the second Shaba invasion.)

Adelman:

I agree that a massive infusion of Cuban forces, à la Angola and Ethiopia, seems most improbable now, due to Cuba’s already heavy commitment on the continent—nearly one fifth of Cuba’s entire army now being stationed in Africa—and their military prudence. Cuban troops made no headway whatsoever against well-trained Latin American forces but found easy victory against poorly trained, equipped, and led troops in Angola and Ethiopia. The Rhodesian Army, as explained, is a small but crack mobile force with impressive esprit de corps, training,

and flexibility. The Cubans would be wary of tangling in Africa with this formidable foe. The South Africans taught them a lesson during the Angolan Civil War; though armed with superior equipment, and out-numbering the South African troops three to one, the Cubans were mauled in December 1975. Castro can retain his *macho* image and military prowess only by engaging lesser powers. He is too prudent to lose his cherished image in Rhodesia and risk even greater disaster by inviting in the South Africans, who would love an opportunity to smash their despised Communist arch-enemies.

Bender:

It should be patently clear to any serious observer of southern Africa that American support for the internal settlement at this time will carry with it the obligation to assist the Rhodesian army against the Patriotic Front guerrillas. This would not only make the United States an automatic enemy of the Patriotic Front but of Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, etc. as well. There is very little in the background of Joshua Nkomo's decades of nationalist politics which suggests that he is an enemy of the United States or a potential pawn of the Soviets. There is equally little evidence in Mugabe's past which suggests that he would become a willing pawn of the Soviet Union (or China). Yet the best assurances of turning cold war phobias into self-fulfilling prophecies would be to recognize and assist the internal settlement at this time.

Unless there are some fundamental changes in the internal settlement signed March 3, American assistance to the present Salisbury government would amount to the United States helping to preserve white privileges for at least the next decade. The combination of the United States, Ian Smith, and South Africa on the same side would clearly place the United States in an even more untenable position than when it found itself in Angola on the same side as South Africa (but without Smith). The internal settlement does not strike me as the ideal side to back in southern Africa in mid-1978, but then Americans have not been especially particular about the sides they back in third world conflicts as long as they perceive "communists" on the "other" side.

Superpower competition in Africa is not new and ironically the main competitors are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and Britain have been competing for economic and/or political influence in Africa for the past two decades. All five use essentially the same means to compete—they range from training and equipping armies, to extending economic loans and aid, to participating in covert plots to undermine one or another African government. Not only have these superpowers

armed, trained and financially aided legitimate governments and illegitimate movements, but all have been guilty of "attempting to take unilateral advantage of local African conflicts." None of the five has been an angel in Africa and all have cynically manipulated Africans to advance their own self interests.

If there is any thing unique about this pattern of superpower competition today, it is that the means have included a large increase not only in the number and sophistication of arms but in the number of military personnel stationed in Africa. Predictably, there has also been a dramatic increase in the number of Africans who have been killed in the superpower cross-fire from Angola to Eritrea and from Biafra to Shaba. History guaranteed that all four locations would be trouble-spots, but the actions of the five permanent members of the Security Council have ensured that the cost in human lives would be high.

Adelman:

Again, crucial distinctions have been blurred. By lumping together all five Security Council members, Dr. Bender seems to imply that the British are as guilty of outside intervention in Africa as the Chinese, the Americans as the French, etc. The fact remains and cannot be overemphasized: it is the Soviets and the Cubans who are nearly *entirely* responsible for the increased African deaths through conflict. The brilliant President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, said it best: "In less than two years" the Cubans "have killed thousands of Angolans—our African brothers, murdered in cold blood. More victims fell in this short period than in the fifteen years of guerrilla war against Portugese colonialism. Yet the West rarely notes this gruesome reality."

International Security:

In sum, what is your prognosis for the foreseeable future?

Adelman:

Unfortunately the warfare in Rhodesia is likely to continue for some time. The Patriotic Front and their Communist backers have too much invested and too much at stake to halt operations.

Mugabe said the Front "will not go down in history as the group who started the struggle only to lose it at the last minute." He has called the internal settlement "a treacherous deal entered into by reactionary forces . . . a conspiratorial deal of no consequence." The arrangement brings Sithole and Muzorewa "clearly into the enemy camp and accordingly transforms them . . . into principal enemies alongside Smith." The Patriotic Front has frankly admitted its objective: "full power—

physical and political power." Some leaders of the Frontline States seem disinclined to reduce their support to the Front for the time being.

The interim government is likely to continue its deliberate process to full black rule. Smith has pledged, as never before, to abide by the agreement; the pressures of South Africa, the continuing warfare, and Western diplomacy will keep him on course regardless of any lingering tendencies to swerve back. Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole have banked everything on the transfer of power actually occurring. Should Smith squander this last, best hope and revert to his old, sly tricks, they would bitterly denounce his ploy and walk off.

These two tracks—diplomatic maneuvers within and military engagements without—are thus likely to proceed on present courses. But this could change dramatically should something concrete arise out of the Nkomo-Smith talks recently leaked to the press. It is too early to predict results here, though both old hands have somewhat disengaged themselves from former colleagues (Smith from the black nationalists and Nkomo from Mugabe and some of the Frontline State leaders) by even initiating the talks in the first place. But middle ground seems slight since Nkomo presumably would accept nothing short of predominance in Zimbabwean affairs and supremacy for his troops, items Smith would be unwilling or even unable to accept.

Bender:

The time has come for the United States to curb its apparently irrepressible propensity to view events in Africa through inappropriate global theories. It is also time to take a dispassionate look at the position of the Soviet Union in Africa after three years of its attempting, in the words of both Kissinger and Brzezinski, "to take unilateral advantage of local African conflicts." We need to recognize that Soviet actions have not been "unilateral" as asserted, unless one discounts the activities of the United States, South Africa, France and China.

Before the Angolan civil war, the most likely superpower confrontation was Sino-Soviet, not Soviet-American. Colin Legum has persuasively argued (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1976) that the key to understanding the "bold Soviet decision" to escalate its support of the MPLA in Angola "lay above all in the Chinese factor." Today again, after a three year period of quiescence in Africa, following their own debacle in Angola, the Chinese are becoming actively involved on the continent from Zaire to Zimbabwe. American policymakers must not repeat Kissinger's mistake of misperceiving Soviet moves in Africa which are aimed at the Chinese as necessarily also aimed at the United States—unless we assume that our interests in Africa are coterminous with those of the Chinese.

If we do consider any Soviet move aimed against China in Africa to be aimed also at the United States, then it clearly makes no sense to lump the Chinese and Soviet supported movements in Zimbabwe (ZAPU and ZANU) under the single rubric of "communist-backed." This is as helpful in advancing our understanding of the future of Zimbabwe as it was several years ago for predicting the political constellation of post-war southeast Asia.

A dispassionate look should also reveal what a mixed blessing French policy in Africa represents for the United States. Over 200,000 French nationals are now living and working in Africa and over 11,000 French troops are stationed throughout the continent, engaged in wars in Chad and Mauritania as well as in Zaire. In fact, the role of the French military in Africa is indistinguishable in kind from that of the Cubans which has drawn so much fire from the Carter Administration and others. One obvious difference noted by many Africans is that Cuba apparently seeks no direct economic stake in Africa's future. By contrast French interests control over 50 percent of the modern economic sector of the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Gabon (the very countries frequently cited as supporters of French intervention in Zaire and condemnation of the Cubans in Angola and elsewhere). Therefore, American castigation of the Cubans at the same time that we condone and even assist the French not only strains American credibility in Africa but leaves our fledgling African policy vulnerable to the charge that the Carter Administration is primarily interested in assisting French neocolonialism.

Adelman:

The French have strong historic cultural ties in Africa, which the Soviets and Cubans obviously lack. Most fundamentally, their network of friends is generally composed of states respecting human rights. The Soviets and Cubans, in contrast, back the savage regimes in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea and Libya—all of which oppress their fellow citizens via anything from genocide to butchery to jailing thousands of political prisoners.

But back to Rhodesia: the most probable path to modify U.S. policy in the ways I urge goes through London. An oncoming storm of protest over Anglo-American policies may be just over the horizon. Lord Douglas-Home, former Conservative Prime Minister who reached the abortive accord with Smith in 1971, has already come foursquare in support of the internal settlement, saying that the basic principles laid down by successive British governments have been met therein. Lord Carrington, a prominent foreign affairs expert, called rejection of the internal settlement "disastrous." Other Conservative Party members have made similar statements. Some hold financial investments in Rhodesia and retain a feeling of

comraderie with fellow countrymen. They lack the deep hostility towards Smith of those in the Labor Party, whom he deeply embarrassed with UDI. The British may be moving toward national elections this fall, which the Conservatives have a 50-50 chance of winning. Their victory would tilt British policy towards the internal settlement rather than towards the guerrillas, as at present.

Some though less dramatic changes are taking place on the other side of the aisle. Former Labor Prime Minister Harold Wilson, surely most chagrined at Smith's rebellion against the Crown, said in April that he was becoming "rather tired" of Andrew Young's "tripe" about the internal settlement. If black and white Rhodesians accept the settlement, he added, it was fine with him.

Such political rumblings in London are likely to rebound in Washington. U.S. officials are determined to keep in step with the British, the legal colonial power of Rhodesia. Should British policy swerve due to such internal political factors, the United States could not comfortably stand alone.

Bender:

If one takes a broad historical view of this superpower competition in Africa, it is immediately apparent that the Soviet Union neither has an enviable record of successes nor does it presently hold a particularly enviable hand. Currently the Soviets exercise a dominant influence (i.e. no serious competition from another superpower) in only four sub-Saharan countries: Ethiopia, Angola, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea. The latter two are among the bloodiest regimes known in the twentieth century and are clearly not coveted by any of the other superpowers. It is even doubtful whether Ethiopia and Angola are or should be considered enviable "prizes." Clearly the Soviets appear to be having as much difficulty in providing the rulers in Addis Ababa with the military means to eradicate their Eritrean and Ogaden "problems" as did the United States when it sent hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons and thousands of military advisors to help the previous regime in Addis accomplish the same goals. Finally, given Angola's divisive past it was inevitable that no matter which side won the civil war, one or more of the superpowers would be faced with the need to provide considerable military assistance to the Luanda regime to help it "unify" the country and to help fill the gap left by the departure of 300,000 Portuguese. The enormity of the task is likely to burden, frustrate and tax any country attempting it. This reality should be understood by all Americans who have had a hand in helping the Mobutu regime try to unify divided Zaire.

Moreover, relations between the Soviets and the Ugandans, Ethiopians and Angolans are not free of strain. Amin has publicly denounced the Soviets on a

number of occasions, including their role in the Angolan civil war when he served as chairman of the OAU. Since May of this year there has been serious friction between Ethiopia's ruling dergue and both the Soviets and Cubans over the war against the Eritreans and support for (anti-Derge) Marxist political parties. The situation was far more critical in Angola when the Soviets and some other Eastern Europeans assisted an extremist faction in the MPLA which tried to overthrow Neto in May 1977.

Adelman:

While some realize that the Soviets sidle up to the totalitarian and barbaric regimes in Africa as elsewhere around the world, this fact—along with their massive arms shipments to Africa—should incense all of us who care deeply about African dignity and welfare, quite apart from any more global, strategic factors of super-power relations or overall balance of forces in the world (as terribly important as I consider these).

That the Soviets have headaches along the way is small consolation for those of us who realize the devastation they have wrought.

Bender:

After decades of competition and despite the "unprecedented military thrust into Africa" in tandem with the Cubans, which seems to have the United States so panicked in 1978, we see that the Soviet record is not impressive nor seriously threatening to the strategic or economic interests of the other superpowers. In fact, Soviet dominance in only four countries does not even begin to compare with the number of countries where Western powers are dominant. In the remainder of Africa's fifty countries the traditional competition for influence continues to ebb and flow, with special plaudits awarded by an African government to those countries providing it with the assistance it needs at the moment.

A long-term look at this superpower competition reveals that the Soviets appear to compete best when the game involves military solutions to African problems rather than diplomatic or economic solutions. This should suggest that when faced with the choice of pursuing a diplomatic course of action vs. a military one (as Kissinger faced in Angola in 1975), the diplomatic route should be followed until all hope fails. The successful diplomacy over Namibia which occurred among the Western contact group, the Frontline States, South Africa and SWAPO should encourage Americans to continue the pursuit of a diplomatic solution in Rhodesia.

Finally, all five superpowers have stumbled in Africa whenever they ignored the importance of racism, nationalism, or ethnicity in African conflicts. Any super-

power which deludes itself that its ideology of communism or anti-communism will eclipse the importance of these other three factors in Africa is inviting trouble and a "set-back." All of the superpowers make this mistake when they focus their attention more on the capitals of their traditional rivals than on local African realities.

Adelman:

How can a diplomatic solution in Rhodesia remain possible when the Patriotic Front—with communist-supplied weapons and Western diplomatic support—is determined to seize power via the bullet because it could not win via the ballot? Now and over the coming year, as the horrors multiply in Rhodesia, both American and British officials must face the penetrating point made by Robert Conquest: "It is clear that the mass of black Rhodesians do not want an Angola-type regime any more than the Angolans do. If the moderates were given firm encouragement, they could speak out and act out too. While Britain, their supposed protector, gives respectability to their enemies, they are at a loss."

Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage

Thomas R. Wheelock

Misconceptions surround the American-Israeli arms relation. As the United States seeks to bridge negotiating gaps between Israel and Arab states, some commentators and Arab leaders maintain that American leverage should be used to force Israeli concessions. In arguing this course of action, they assume that such leverage would be sufficient to obtain concessions. They further maintain that American unwillingness to exert such leverage stems primarily from domestic political constraints.¹

Upon close examination the question of leverage is more complicated. This inquiry seeks to determine the extent and efficacy of past American leverage against Israel. It then suggests a modest role for the arms relation in the Carter Administration's attempts to modulate Israeli policy. Despite significant movement toward peace at the Camp David summit, discussion of American leverage is appropriate given the formidable negotiating tasks that lie ahead in implementing the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and constructing treaties with remaining Arab states.

Modes of Leverage

Leverage is defined as manipulation of the arms transfer relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient-state to conform its policy or actions to the desires of the supplier-state. Coercion involves the denial of ongoing or future aid while inducement depends upon the promise of increased aid. Many acts may be arrayed to form gradations of leverage. In ascending order of coercive impact (and presumably effectiveness), a supplier-state in a given situation could: deny requests for the most sophisticated items of weaponry; deny requested increases in military aid; suspend delivery of selected supplies and/or weaponry; suspend all deliveries of supplies and/or weaponry; reduce the current level of military aid; or terminate all such aid. On the other hand, leverage by inducement becomes more effective as the amount of promised aid increases.

In practice, the distinction between coercion and inducement is often blurred.

1. President Sadat repeatedly calls for American use of its substantial leverage against Israel. Domestic advocates arguing for American pressure have been George Ball, "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," *Foreign Affairs* 55, no. 3 (April 1977); and Anthony Cordesman, "How Much is Too Much?" *Armed Forces Journal* 114, no. 14 (October 1977).

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Whereas coercive measures may be used without accompanying inducements, rarely are inducements offered without being preceded or accompanied by coercive measures. Such leverage combines pressures and assurances—for instance, withholding some aid while promising future increases contingent upon specified behavior of the recipient. In these cases the terms coercion and inducement apply according to the degree by which one or the other dominates the supplier's actions.

Given this wide range of leverage, the potential ability of a supplier to impose its will appears impressive. However, constraints on coercive leverage may emanate from domestic political influences or from policy objectives and diplomatic strategy which the arms relation is intended to support. With respect to inducement, resource considerations and the recipient-state's perception of need likewise produce constraints. These constraints reduce a supplier's effectiveness in imposing its will as demonstrated by the American-Israeli arms relation.

Constraints on American Leverage

The ability of the United States to exert coercive leverage on Israel has diminished since 1970; inducement has been more successfully and frequently used. Constraints imposed by foreign policy considerations explain this trend.² First, the Mideast crisis of August 1970 showed why the involvement of other states limited U.S. coercion against Israel. Secondly, the October 1973 War precipitated a series of policy maneuvers and affirmations for which increased arms transfers assumed a symbolic value regarding political commitments to Israel. The enhanced importance of arms transfers for interstate relations restricted the United States from exerting coercive leverage. Simultaneously the United States turned to inducements in order to modulate Israeli policy.

In the first two years of the Nixon Administration the flow of arms to Israel was restrained. This policy resulted from a combination of objectives and diplomatic strategy that was best served by holding "in abeyance" decisions to supply Israel during the first half of 1970. The United States sought to retain good relations with friendly Arab regimes and to seek tacit superpower restraint on arms transfers to the region. The American strategy for peace centered on an Israel

2. During crises in American-Israeli relations, American presidents (Nixon in 1970 and Ford in 1975) used coercion despite subsequent domestic opposition. Having incurred the domestic political costs in pressuring Israel, U.S. leaders still demonstrated restraint in the degree of coercion employed. This suggests that factors other than domestic politics constrained policy-makers in their use of coercive leverage.

strong enough militarily to deter Arab attack yet sufficiently dependent in the short run on American arms supplies so that leverage could effect Israeli concessions.

This policy permitted coercive leverage when differences arose between the United States and Israel over the Rogers Peace Plan and acceptance of the American-sponsored cease-fire in the summer of 1970.³ Upon Israeli acceptance of the cease-fire in July, "... those in the American Government who had advocated a balanced diplomatic approach ... and restraint in arming Israel saw their efforts rewarded."⁴ However, this policy of restraint had endangered policy objectives vis-à-vis nations other than Israel. American restraint had not induced reciprocity from the Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet involvement in Egypt had escalated to the point that Russian pilots engaged Israeli jets over the Suez Canal during July 1970. Soviet acquiescence in the cease-fire violations of August 1970 and complicity in the Syrian invasion of Jordan the following month climaxed this period of Soviet adventurism and marked a turning point in the Administration's thinking regarding the linkage between arms for Israel and policy toward the Soviet Union.

A militarily strong Israel was now viewed by the President as an asset for U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, especially after successful American-Israeli cooperation during the Syrian invasion of Jordan led to withdrawal of Syrian forces. This view, in conjunction with national security advisor Kissinger's intention to counter Soviet probes, led to a plethora of arms transfers as rectification of the military balance and as a reprimand to the Soviet Union for its irresponsible actions in the Middle East.⁵ In short, a strong degree of American coercion had possibly encouraged Soviet mischief; consequently arms transfers to Israel

3. American leverage in July 1970 is termed "coercive" because U.S. restraint on arms transfers dominated perceptions of Israeli leaders and created fears of U.S. arms curtailments, especially of F-4 Phantom jets. Promises of U.S. arms deliveries did eventually accompany Israel's acceptance of Rogers Plan B. Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 487-496. Also *New York Times*, 4 September 1970, and 22 September 1970.

4. William Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-1971," *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1971).

5. While the question remains unanswered whether U.S. restraint in arming Israel directly led to the Soviet Union's taking advantage of a perceived American weakness, this hypothesis is certainly one possible explanation of Soviet behavior. Quandt, former member of the NSC, offers it as such. See William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decision* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), p. 109. Certainly Kissinger perceived that the Soviet Union had not reacted responsibly, and arms for Israel assumed greater importance in deterring Soviet moves in the Middle East.

wound up supporting a global policy of detente by raising the costs to the Soviet Union of initiating risky maneuvers in the Middle East.

During the first week of the October War, Secretary of State Kissinger delayed initiation of American arms supplies in order to gain Israeli acceptance of a cease-fire in place. Pressure on Israel in the form of withholding arms was again not accompanied by Soviet restraint in arming Arab states. The subsequent large-scale American airlift was designed in part to punish the Russians and demonstrate to Arab states that the United States would not permit Soviet arms to determine the war's outcome.⁶

The preceding examples illustrate that at some point coercive leverage against Israel entails costs to American policy objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Coercion on Israel invites Soviet attempts to gain influence with Arab states by altering the military balance. Periods of conflict or high tension offer the Soviets greater likelihood of success in pursuing this course of action. Unfortunately, such times are also the most conducive for exerting American coercion on Israel.

The second source of constraint upon American coercion originated in 1971 with the Sisco-Kissinger strategy for a Mideast peace. This strategy assumed that an Israel confident of its physical security would be amenable to concessions necessary for a settlement. The degree of Israel's confidence depended upon two factors: military strength relative to its adversaries and perceptions of the credibility of American commitments to its security.

Military capabilities were strengthened by increased arms transfers as annual military aid to Israel jumped over tenfold from the \$30 million level of FY 1970 to \$545 million in FY 1971 and leveled off at \$300 million by FY 1973. The October War marked another watershed in military aid in response to improved Arab capabilities as the United States supplied \$2.483 billion of military aid to Israel.⁷

More importantly, credibility of the political commitment was strengthened by changes in the arms relation. Credibility depends upon the strength of the bilateral political bond. The arms relation itself presupposes existence of a substantial political bond; its magnitude and other characteristics will both affect and symbolize the strength of that bond. The Nixon Administration's actions in 1971 and 1972—increasing the volume of arms transfers and for the first time placing the transfer of fighter aircraft on a long-term basis—strengthened the political bond and hence the commitment to Israel's security.

6. Edward R. F. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976), p. 34, and Quandt, *Decade of Decision*, pp. 179–184.

7. U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, 1975.

The October War marked an important turning point for the United States in the Middle East. American diplomacy used its special position with Israel to create for itself an unrivaled role as intermediary between the belligerents; this special position centered upon the political bond with Israel. Arab states accepted American mediation in part because it was the only power with sufficient influence over Israel to possibly promote a satisfactory settlement. And a necessary condition for maintaining this influence was the continued strength of the U.S.-Israeli political bond. On the other hand, maintaining influence with Arab states depended upon Israeli concessions during negotiations. Concessions would not be forthcoming unless Israel had confidence in security commitments from the United States.

The symbolism surrounding the arms relationship therefore assumed an important role. During the October War, American arms supplies were unprecedented in both scope and magnitude (emergency assistance totaled \$2.183 billion and included weapons of the latest technology such as TOW missiles). These acts further strengthened the credibility of the American commitment, and the arms relation grew in importance as measure of the strengthened bond.⁸

Because of the arms relation's increased significance, the ability of the United States to exert coercive leverage through the arms relation was severely limited. Only those actions which did not jeopardize the bond and credibility of the security commitment could be used without undermining the position of the United States in the Middle East. As a result, application of American leverage turned to the use of inducements in order to modulate Israeli policy.

American leverage through inducement was exercised in many ways. One of Kissinger's major arguments with the Israeli government was that "... the scope of future American commitments to Israel would be determined by Israel's willingness to rise above narrow military advantages and take risks for political reasons."⁹ The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Accord of January 1974 was accompanied by a Memorandum of Understanding from the United States to Israel stating that "... the United States will make every effort to be fully responsive on a continuing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment requirements."¹⁰ This vague promise of long-term military assistance assumed more concrete form in the aftermath of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement in May 1974. Kissinger

8. Quandt reports that Kissinger sought the large amount of military assistance in order to enhance American credibility with Israel in the post-war period. Quandt, *Decade of Decision*, p. 188.

9. Sheehan, *Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, p. 118.

10. Sheehan, *Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, p. 111.

stated, "We agreed on a process for multi-year arms programs for Israel rather than do it on a year-by-year basis."¹¹ This was a significant departure from previous modes of American assistance that had limited long-term agreements to specific weapons systems. In 1975 during negotiations on the second disengagement pact between Israel and Egypt (Sinai II), the United States promised Israel a \$1.5 billion military aid package, the supply of advanced and sophisticated weaponry, and placement of arms deliveries on an ongoing and long-term basis.¹²

More importantly, it must be recognized that these inducements were only part of a growing web of American-Israeli relations emanating from the disengagement accords. The fact that these deeper military commitments were interwoven with American political and economic pledges to Israel further reduced the likelihood that American restraints on arms deliveries would be used as levers against Israeli policy. To do so would have only raised doubts about the credibility of these accompanying guarantees.¹³

The importance of the arms relation in maintaining the political bond with Israel has assumed new importance for the Carter Administration. American policy still presumes that an Israel confident of its security will make concessions for a settlement. In the face of continuing and profound differences over substantive issues, American political support for Israel will certainly be questioned. In this context, it is imperative that acts of coercive leverage not further weaken the already strained political bond.

In 1977 the American Jewish community, reflecting similar apprehension in Israel, expressed concern over the Administration's commitment to Israel in the face of mounting bilateral differences over Mideast peace issues. The Administration responded wisely by disavowing use of the ongoing aid relationship to force Israeli concessions. Vice President Mondale stated in June 1977 that, "We do not intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel. If we have differences over

11. *New York Times*, 8 June 1974.

12. Reproduction of the Sinai II agreements and American commitments to Israel are found in Sheehan, *Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, pp. 245-257.

13. During the initial Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement of January 1974, the United States assured Israel that UN troops could be withdrawn from the Sinai only with the consent of both Israel and Egypt and that the United States regarded Bab el Mandeb as an international waterway. See *The New York Times*, 22 January 1974. The 1975 Sinai II disengagement was accompanied by a comprehensive set of separate political, military, and economic agreements between the United States and Israel. Among other guarantees, the United States promised to meet Israel's oil needs in case of emergency and to consult with Israel in case of world power intervention in the Middle East. See Sheehan, *Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, pp. 245-257, for details.

military aid . . . it will be on military grounds."¹⁴ This statement demonstrated to American Jews, and by extension to Israel, the strength of the bilateral bond.

However, the Carter Administration has not excluded all forms of coercive leverage. In the context of Zbigniew Brzezinski's comment that the United States had the "legitimate right to exercise its own leverage," White House clarifications that this was not a threat to withhold military aid¹⁵ left open the possibility that future considerations for increased aid would be linked to Israeli concessions. Indeed, some U.S. officials have linked "greater Israeli flexibility in Mideast peace negotiations and potential actions on pending military requests."¹⁶ In addition to inducements, mild degrees of coercion centering on denial or partial fulfillment of Israeli requests for new weaponry and increased aid comprise the available tools of leverage for American Mideast policy.

The Efficacy of American Leverage

Given these constraints, what is the efficacy of leverage that the United States may reasonably exert upon Israel? The Ford Administration's 1975 "reassessment" of Mideast policy provides some striking answers.

In early 1975 the United States sought to secure a second disengagement accord between Israel and Egypt (i.e., Israeli withdrawal from the Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Abu Rudeis oil fields). Yet negotiations stalled over three issues: the extent of Israeli withdrawal from the passes, the presence of Israeli listening posts, and the form of nonbelligerency Egypt had to proclaim.

In an effort to make Israel accept the Egyptian position, President Ford sent a telegram to Prime Minister Rabin on 21 March stating American policy would be reassessed if flexibility were not forthcoming. Implicit in this threat from the Israeli point of view was suspension of American military and economic aid.¹⁷ If executed, this would have clearly been a profound change in the American commitment. Instead of producing concessions, however, the threat only coalesced

14. *New York Times*, 18 June 1977. Also Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal informed Israeli officials that American aid would not be used as leverage against Israel. *New York Times*, 25 October 1977. American actions in 1977 with respect to forbidding the transfer of certain weapons to Israel (infrared devices and cluster bombs) and the sale of Kfir jets to Ecuador were not seen by Israeli officials as pressures against Israel. Indeed, these were the results of Carter's policies on limiting arms transfers in general and were seen in that context.

15. *New York Times*, 4 October 1977.

16. *Baltimore Sun*, 9 March 1978.

17. *New York Times*, 25 March 1975.

the Israeli cabinet and hardened its resistance. In a meeting that evening the Israeli Government rejected the Egyptian proposals, and with that the negotiations collapsed.

Two points explain the short-term ineffectiveness of American coercion. First, the incompatibility between American roles as both mediator between two adversaries and as special friend to only one created strong incentives for Israel to resist U.S. coercion. Israel feared the possibility that the United States as mediator would close a negotiating gap by pressuring the only party over which it had sufficient influence—Israel. Moreover, Israel did not want Arab states to rely upon U.S. coercion to obtain goals for which they would otherwise have to yield concessions. Therefore, in order to dissuade both Arab and American leaders from pursuing such a strategy, Israel resisted American coercion.¹⁸ In short, under these circumstances the very conditions enabling the United States to exercise coercion created obstacles to its effectiveness. This lesson is also pertinent to American leverage today.

The second point is that American coercion may not be sufficient to modulate Israeli policy in a given economic and military context. Israel's economy in early 1975 was suffering from the effects of enormous defense expenditures, a world recession, and dramatically higher oil prices. Beginning in November 1974, the government had adopted a series of austerity measures to counter the loss of foreign exchange and revive the economy. But, during the March 1975 negotiations the economic situation had not become an issue warranting immediate concern over the prospect of not receiving the additional \$2.2 billion of U.S. assistance requested by Israel in January 1975.

In the military context, two factors reduced the impact of the American threat. First, Israel was no longer in a position of short-term dependency upon American arms, spare parts, or ammunition deliveries; the arms relation was of a "long-leash" nature,¹⁹ and the government could afford to resist American demands without immediately endangering its military posture. Secondly, no military threat seemed imminent because Egypt was in poor position to resume hostilities. Israel could not be compelled in this military context to conform to American desires.

Having dispelled any presumption of coercion's immediate effect, can the con-

18. Nadav Safran, *Israel—The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 552.

19. Israeli forces were reported to have enough supplies on hand to preclude another American emergency air resupply. *New York Times*, 25 April 1975.

strained nature of U.S. pressure be sufficient to modulate Israeli policy over the long term? Analysis of the American "reassessment" from April to June 1975 demonstrates a third point: Combined with other American pressures, coercion may indirectly affect Israeli leaders but its efficacy dissipates as countervailing domestic influences mount within the United States.²⁰

Having been rebuffed by Israel in March 1975, the Ford Administration's subsequent coercive measures demonstrated a reluctance to seriously undermine the political bond. These actions tangentially affected the ongoing arms relationship and focused instead upon denial of increased future aid. As such, they represented the milder degrees of possible coercion. Deliveries of a previously promised weapons system, the Lance missile, were suspended. A visit by Israeli defense officials to negotiate purchase of the F-15 fighter plane was postponed. Otherwise, previously committed aid in the amount of \$100 million continued to flow during the reassessment.²¹ With respect to future aid, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated that the United States "... would be 'reluctant' to enter into any new arms commitments to Israel" during the reassessment.²² Despite its pique the Administration was nonetheless cautious in applying coercion.

In conjunction with private statements blaming Israel for the impasse, this coercion shattered Israeli hopes for American pressure on Egypt to close the negotiating gap. Its effect was to unleash internal Israeli political forces advocating new negotiating strategies.²³ But the final outcome—Israel's desire to return to step-by-step diplomacy—was due principally to an evaluation of diplomatic alternatives.

To Prime Minister Rabin, the option of reconvening the Geneva Peace Conference held no attraction. A new conference would undermine Israel's strategy of delay that sought to buy time until the United States, hopefully less dependent on foreign oil supplies, would not so stringently demand Israeli concessions. The Geneva option also presented the spectre of PLO participation in addition to

20. The May 1978 Senate vote on the Carter Administration's jet package for the Middle East cannot be taken as evidence that Congressional resistance to overt pressure on Israel has diminished. The issues surrounding the vote were formulated in terms of supporting American policy with respect to moderate Arab states and not of deflecting Administration pressure against Israel.

21. *New York Times*, 6 August 1975.

22. *New York Times*, 1 April 1975.

23. Whereas right-wing pressure on Rabin had been dominant in March, left-wing calls for a comprehensive settlement mounted in April from the Mapam Party and liberal politicians. Moshe Dayan also called upon Rabin to present new proposals before the Ford-Sadat meeting in Austria in early June 1975 and castigated Israel's adamant position during the March talks.

opening many other sensitive political issues that Israel would find divisive. Unable to secure U.S. pressure on Egypt for concessions and unwilling to reopen Geneva negotiations, Rabin opted to resume step-by-step diplomacy with different goals in mind. Israel would meet its security needs by obtaining large-scale American aid instead of Egyptian concessions and would resume negotiations if American assurances on aid were forthcoming.

Simultaneously, the deteriorating economic situation increased the awareness of some Israeli officials that the large increment of military and economic aid being withheld by the United States would soon be needed. Minister of the Treasury Rabinowitz was advocating this position within the cabinet. Indeed, the first six months of 1975 were severe for the Israeli economy: inflation was 23 percent; GNP had fallen 6 percent; defense expenditures consumed 32 percent of GNP; and most importantly, reserves of foreign exchange had fallen to dangerously low levels.²⁴ This situation enhanced the value of increased aid which the Administration was withholding.

The Israeli desire to resume negotiations was chiefly determined by reassessing available options. It seems likely that Israel's participation would have occurred even without the needs generated by a deteriorating economy. The economic considerations only reinforced the decision to return to step-by-step diplomacy. No change occurred in the internal or external military context that would have made Israel's leaders more susceptible to pressures of the Ford Administration. But by helping to cause Israel's own reassessment, American coercive leverage at best had indirect influence in determining this decision.

Meanwhile, domestic political pressure mounted against the Ford Administration. The effects were to weaken the credibility of the Administration's coercive campaign and lead it to emphasize inducements in order to modulate Israeli policy. From the beginning of reassessment, American Jewish leaders and Israeli officials attempted to counter the Administration's pressure. While Moshe Dayan, Aba Eban, and Yigal Allon toured the United States, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee heavily lobbied members of Congress. The counterattack climaxed in late May 1975 as seventy-six senators stated to the President that "... they expected the Administration to submit a foreign aid request to Congress that will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs."²⁵ In the

24. Testimony of Secretary of State Kissinger, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976, Part IV*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.

25. *New York Times*, 22 May 1975. Sheehan, *Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, p. 176, terms the

face of such overwhelming pro-Israeli support, the Ford Administration's coercive leverage seemed increasingly ineffective.

Soon thereafter, American leverage shifted from coercion to inducement. This leads to the fourth point concerning leverage: Inducement with aid offerings is more effective as an instrument of diplomacy than the limited degree of coercion allowed by policy considerations, yet it alone may not be sufficient to modulate Israeli policy. This is evident from analyzing Israel's return to negotiations and its concessions to Egypt for the second Sinai disengagement agreement.

Shortly after the Senate's expression of support for Israel, Administration sources intimated that Lance missile deliveries would commence and the F-15 fighter sale would be approved once reassessment was completed. Israel hinted that a flexible stance would be taken if assurances were received that its aid requirements would be met. During his June visit to the United States, Rabin additionally sought an understanding of American policy after reassessment and a coordinated approach on subsequent diplomacy regardless of whether an interim agreement was obtained.²⁶

President Ford promised Rabin that Israel would not be let down in its aid request if a new stance permitted the negotiations a chance of success.²⁷ In getting Israel back to negotiations, the United States was committed in principle to granting large increases of aid from the ongoing annual level of \$300 million. The degree to which the United States would meet Israel's \$2.5 billion military aid request of January 1975 depended upon progress in negotiations.²⁸ The alternative to resuming these negotiations was starkly depicted: The United States would sponsor a return to Geneva regardless of American domestic opposition and, it was implied, favor substantial restitution of the 1967 borders. With this alternative President Ford tried to take advantage of one of Israel's greatest fears—rebirth of the Rogers Peace Plan and possible imposition of a dictated settlement. But Yitzak Rabin had already heard his cue. Once assured of American aid, Israel accepted renewed step-by-step diplomacy.

Senate Letter of May 21 "a stunning triumph for the lobby" and states that it "helped kill reassessment." Later the Senate voted 68 to 22 to extend the authorization for credits to Israel by an additional twelve months; this again demonstrated congressional support for Israel at a critical time before Prime Minister Rabin's visit to Washington on June 11, 1975. *New York Times*, 7 June 1975.

26. *New York Times*, 27 May 1975 and 11 June 1975.

27. Safran, *Israel—The Embattled Ally*, p. 554.

28. Kissinger stated that the marginal cost to the United States of securing this agreement was "less than \$1 billion" out of the \$2.3 billion aid package that emerged from Sinai II. *New York Times*, 5 September 1975.

However, American inducements did not automatically ensure the necessary Israeli concessions on key issues that had blocked agreement in March 1975. The Israeli plan submitted to Washington in mid-June did not include withdrawal from the passes. A brief period of severe strain between patron and client ensued. During the last week of June, Ford admonished Ambassador Dinitz that Israel should generate new ideas to break the deadlock or face an American call to reconvene Geneva within two to three weeks. Note the absence of leverage involving the American arms relation.

Within Israel, Ford's actions were perceived as a threat of serious confrontation with the United States but not one of weakened commitment to Israel's security. Recognition mounted that any break with the United States would be worse than withdrawal from the passes. Several cabinet ministers, including Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, sought to avoid any confrontation. The degree of the promised aid increase and its relation to Israeli compromise must have been an important consideration. Israeli resignation to withdrawal from the passes was probably accepted in the cabinet meeting on June 29. A few days later Ambassador Dinitz visited Kissinger in the Virgin Islands and presented the outline of concessions that became the basis for an interim agreement. After two months spent developing details of the settlement, American political commitments, and aid package, agreement was finally reached on September 4, 1975.

The accompanying set of accords between the United States and Israel established a web of relations and promises that is perhaps unparalleled in American foreign policy by anything short of a formal defense treaty. The Memorandum of Agreements (so titled as being more binding than previous commitments) shows that the arms connection played a role that was far from dominant. The agreement affirmed and strengthened the military relationship that had steadily developed since 1972. Greater importance should be attached to new political commitments granted Israel, especially that which dealt with possible Soviet intervention. Changes in the economic relation that bound Israel's emergency energy needs to American aid were also of great importance. Increased military aid was, therefore, but one inducement and in comparison a less significant one in the total package of aid and commitments arising from the Sinai II accord.

Prospects for Leverage

The American-Israeli arms relation is a much more complicated and self-binding phenomenon than it first appears, and its potential for modulating Israeli policy has been overstated.

Constraints imposed by policy objectives and diplomatic strategy limit the degree of coercion that American policymakers may exercise. Moreover, in the context of no military conflict and the "long-leash" nature of the present arms relation, this leverage has little compelling force to ensure immediate Israeli compliance with American desires. Additionally, substantial U.S. coercion will catalyze Israeli cohesion and resistance to American pressure. Coercion's effectiveness is even less significant over time as countervailing domestic pressures mount to negate its impact.

On the other hand, American inducements, as complements to each major disengagement accord, have proven more successful in effecting policy change. Yet any assertion that these inducements involving the arms relation have been sufficient for U.S. purposes exaggerates their importance.

What role, then, can the arms relation play in American Mideast diplomacy? First, American leverage should take advantage of its indirect impact upon internal Israeli politics. As evidenced by Israel's compromise in late June 1975, the state of U.S. relations is a significant issue for Israeli decision-makers. Politicians who highly value this relation must be able to encourage policy changes without the encumbrance of heavy American coercion. Subtle pressure—refusal to supply all of Israel's new military requests or to increase the level of military aid—can communicate U.S. displeasure concerning Israel's stance yet not cause its leaders to coalesce around extreme positions. In conjunction with other forms of pressure such as diplomatic notes or public statements, these acts may prompt internal political forces to change Israel's policy.

Matmon-C, Israel's latest request for American aid, offers the United States an opportunity to exercise this form of leverage. Matmon-C asks for \$13.5 billion in military aid over a nine-year period; if met in full, annual military aid appropriations for Israel would increase 50 percent from the present \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion.²⁹ To apply subtle pressure, aid appropriations could continue at the current rate, decisions on new requests for advanced-technology systems could be held in abeyance, and requests for co-production rights on important weapons systems such as the F-16 could be denied. At those times when arms aid announcements are required, approved sales should be limited to non-offensive systems such as the FLIR (forward looking infrared radar) night vision devices and observation helicopters offered Israel during Prime Minister Begin's March 1978 visit to the United States. Prior to the Camp David summit, such actions indicated

29. *Baltimore Sun*, 9 March 1978. This program also seeks the most advanced radar, infrared, and other high-technology items.

American displeasure with Israeli policies. If substantial American-Israeli differences occur in the future, leverage should be confined to these limited measures.

Linking U.S. arms sales to Israel with those to Arab states is yet another form of pressure on Israel. However, it entails undesirable consequences for the American-Israeli political bond. The package sale of jets to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia established a precedent that placed arms sales to Israel outside the boundaries of the historic, special arms relationship. As such it suggested a weakened political bond to some observers; accordingly, the Carter Administration quickly reemphasized the American commitment to Israel's security. Israel's objections to the arms package centered as much upon the "linkage" concept (which placed conditions upon the September 1975 commitment to supply these aircraft) as with the military implications of F-15 jets in Saudi Arabia. While the package concept may have served a tactical purpose for the Carter Administration's policy toward Saudi Arabia, it did not enhance American influence over Israeli policy. In fact, the Israeli Minister of Transportation Meir Amit, a political moderate, claimed that the Senate vote against Israel weakened his ability to urge a flexible policy within the Begin Government.³⁰ To preclude adverse connotations for U.S. security commitments and the American-Israeli bond, this linkage should be avoided in the future.

While these provisions cannot insure the narrowing of negotiating gaps, inducements likewise are insufficient of themselves to elicit Israeli compromise. Inducements that would accompany major steps in the peace process should nonetheless be offered Israel in advance of a negotiating breakthrough. American strategy should center on establishing necessary conditions for internal political forces to effect change in Israeli policy.

Public American promises concerning the future arms relation would comprise part of a prospective security framework for Israel; proponents of flexible Israeli positions could then support alternative policies with less uncertainty and political unease in regard to externally guaranteed provisions for Israel's security. American guarantees were privately discussed with Mr. Begin in March 1978; however, little public debate of promised American commitments has since occurred within Israel. One inducement would be to promise formalization of the arms relationship if an American-Israeli security pact were to accompany a settlement. Treaty commitments concerning provision of high-technology items and the long-term nature of weapons supply would be incorporated into such a pact. Another induce-

30. *New York Times*, 17 May 1978.

ment would focus on Matmon-C with the Carter Administration agreeing to increased military assistance for Israel. In the aftermath of Camp David, Secretary Brown's visit to the Middle East in early 1979 probably will lead to fulfillment of many Matmon-C requests and higher levels of military aid for Israel.

Due to constraints imposed by policy considerations, modulation of Israeli policy is more likely to be achieved by avoiding changes in the ongoing arms relation that would cause Israel to coalesce around extreme positions; by forestalling increases in aid levels as an indication of American displeasure; and by offering future increments of aid, and formalization of the arms relation, in conjunction with significant movement toward peace.

Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought

Fritz W. Ermarth

Ware having trouble with Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet thinking about strategy and nuclear war differs in significant ways from our own. To the extent one should care about this—and that extent is a matter of debate—we do not like the way the Soviets seem to think. Before 1972, appreciation of differences between Soviet and American strategic thinking was limited to a small number of specialists. Those who held it a matter of high concern for policy were fewer still. Since that time, concern about the nature, origins, and consequences of these differences is considerably more widespread, in large measure as a result of worry about the Soviet strategic arms buildup and the continued frustrations of achieving a real breakthrough in SALT.

Heightened attention to the way the other side thinks about strategic nuclear power is timely and proper. The nature of the Soviet buildup and some of our own previous choices have locked us out of pure “hardware solutions” to our emerging strategic security problems that are independent of the other side’s values and perceptions. Whatever one thinks about the wisdom or folly of the manner in which we have pursued SALT so far, it is desirable that management of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship have a place for an explicit dialogue. That dialogue should include more attention to strategic concepts than we have seen in past SALT negotiations. Moreover, whatever the role of SALT in the future, the existence of “rough parity” or worse almost by definition means that we cannot limit strategic policy to contending merely with the opponent’s forces. In the cause of deterrence, crisis management, and, if need be, war, we must thwart his strategy. That requires understanding that opponent better.

The Need to Understand Strategic Doctrine

Let us define “strategic doctrine” as a set of operative beliefs, values, and assertions that in a significant way guide official behavior with respect to strategic research and development (R&D), weapons choice, forces, operational plans, arms control, etc. The essence of U.S. “doctrine” is to deter central nuclear war at relatively low levels of arms effort (“arms race stability”) and strategic anxiety (“crisis stability”) through the credible threat of catastrophic damage to the enemy

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should deterrence fail. In that event, this doctrine says it should be the aim and ability of U.S. power to inflict maximum misery on the enemy in his homeland. Making the world following the outbreak of nuclear war more tolerable for the United States is, at best, a lesser concern. Soviet strategic doctrine stipulates that Soviet strategic forces and plans should strive in all available ways to enhance the prospect that the Soviet Union could survive as a nation and, in some politically and militarily meaningful way, defeat the main enemy should deterrence fail—and by this striving help deter or prevent nuclear war, along with the attainment of other strategic and foreign policy goals.

These characterizations of U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine and the differences between them are valid and important. Had U.S. strategic policy been more sensitive over the last ten years to the asymmetry they express, we might not find ourselves in so awkward a present situation. We would have been less sanguine than we were about prospects that the Soviets would settle for an easily defined, non-threatening form of strategic parity. We would not have believed as uncritically as we did that the SALT process was progressing toward a common explication of already tacitly accepted norms of strategic stability.

It is, if anything, even more important that these asymmetries be fully appreciated today. They are a crucial starting point for strategic diagnosis and therapy. But they are only a starting point. The constellations of thought, value, and action that we call, respectively, U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine or policy are much more complicated, qualified, and contradictory than the above characterizations admit by themselves. To be aware of these other ramifications without fully understanding them could lead to dangerous discounting, on one hand, or distorting, on the other, the real differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking.

Comparative Strategic Doctrine

The following discussion is intended only to suggest some of the contrasts that exist between U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking. The issues raised are not treated exhaustively, and the list itself is not exhaustive. Our appreciation of these matters is not adequate to the critical times in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship we are facing. It would be highly desirable to develop the intellectual discipline of comparative military doctrine, especially in the strategic sphere. Systematic comparative studies of strategic doctrine could serve to clarify what we think and how we ourselves differ on these matters, as well as to organize what we know about Soviet strategic thinking.

Although many have and express views on how both the United States and the

Soviet Union deal with strategic problems, there is in fact little systematic comparison of the conceptual and behavioral foundations of our respective strategic activity. In this area, more than other comparative inquiries into communist and non-communist politics, there are the obstacles of secrecy in the path of research. Perhaps as vital, neither government nor academic institutions appear to have cultivated many people with the necessary interdisciplinary skills and experience.

The most influential factor that has inhibited lucid comparisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking has been the uncritically held assumption that they had to be very similar, or at least converging with time. Many of us have been quite insensitive to the possibility that two very different political systems could deal very differently with what is, in some respects, a common problem. We understood the problem of keeping the strategic peace on equitable and economical terms—or so we thought. As reasonable men the Soviets, too, would come to understand it our way.

Explaining this particular expression of our cultural self-centeredness is itself a fascinating field for speculation. I think it goes beyond the American habit of value projection. It may result from the fact that post-war developments in U.S. strategy were an institutional and intellectual offspring of the natural sciences that spawned modern weapons. Scientific truth is transnational, not culturally determined. But, unfortunately, strategy is more like *politics* than like science.

The next five to ten years of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship could well be characterized by mounting U.S. anxieties about the adequacy of our deterrent forces and our strategic doctrine. There seems to be little real prospect that the SALT process, as we have been conducting it, will substantially alleviate these anxieties. Even if a more promising state of affairs emerges, however, it is hard to see us managing it with calm and confidence unless we develop a more thorough appreciation of the differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking. Things have progressed beyond the point where it is useful to have the three familiar schools of thought on Soviet doctrine arguing past each other: one saying "Whatever they say, they think as we do;" the second insisting, "Whatever they say, it does not matter;" and the third contending, "They think what they say, and are therefore out for superiority over us."

Comparative strategic doctrine studies should address systematically a series of questions:

—What are the central decisions about strategy, force posture, and force employment or operations that doctrine is supposed to resolve for the sides examined?

—What are the prevailing categories, concepts, beliefs, and assertions that appear to constitute the body of strategic thought and doctrine in question?

—What are the hedges and qualifications introduced to modify the main theses of official thinking?

—What are the “non-strategic,” e.g., propagandistic, purposes that might motivate doctrinal pronouncements? Does the doctrinal system recognize a distinction between what ideally ought to be, and what practically is (a serious problem in the Soviet case)?

—In what actions, e.g., force posture, does apparent doctrine have practical effect? Where does it lie dormant?

—To what extent are doctrinal pronouncements the subject of or the guise for policy dispute?

—What perceptions does one side entertain as to the doctrinal system of the other side? With what effect?

Answering these questions for both the United States and the Soviet Union is admittedly no easy matter, especially in a highly politicized environment in which many participants have already made up their minds how they want the answers to come out with respect to assumed impact on U.S. strategic policy. But we have the data to do a good deal better than we have to date.

U.S. and Soviet Doctrine Contrasted

What is U.S. strategic doctrine and policy? What is Soviet strategic doctrine and policy? The Soviets provide definitions of doctrine (*doktrina*) and policy (*politika*) that state they are official principles, guidance, and instructions from the highest governing authorities to provide for the building of the armed forces and for their employment in war.

The most useful thing about these definitions is that they remind us—or should—that we do not have direct and literal access to Soviet strategic doctrine and policy through the most commonly available sources, i.e., Soviet military literature and various pronouncements of authoritative political and military figures. Our insight into Soviet strategic policy is derived by inference from such sources along with inferences from observed R&D and force procurement behavior, what we manage to learn about peacetime force operations and exercises, and occasional direct statements in more privileged settings, such as SALT, by varyingly persuasive spokesmen.

The value of all these sources is constrained by the limitations of our perceptive apparatus, technical and intellectual, and the fact that Soviet communications on strategic subjects serve many purposes other than conveying official policy, such as foreign and domestic propaganda. For all that, we have gained over the years

a substantial degree of understanding of the content of Soviet strategic thinking, of the values, standards, objectives, and calculations that underlie Soviet decisions. It is this total body of thinking and its bearing on action that are of concern here.

Where lack of access complicates understanding of Soviet strategic doctrine, an overabundance of data confuses understanding of the American side, a point that Soviets make with some justice when berated with the evils of Soviet secrecy. If, in the case of the United States, one is concerned about the body of thinking that underlies strategic action it is clearly insufficient to rely on official statements or documents at any level of classification or authority. Such sources may, for one reason or another, not tell the whole story or paper over serious differences of purpose behind some action.

One of the difficulties in determining the concepts or beliefs that underlie U.S. strategic action is that strategic policy is a composite of behavior taking place in at least three distinguishable, but overlapping arenas. The smallest, most secretive, and least significant over the long-term, assuming deterrence does not fail, is the arena of operational or war planning. The second arena is that of system and force acquisition; it is much larger and more complex than the first. The most disorganized and largest, but most important for the longer-term course of U.S. strategic behavior is the arena of largely public debate over basic strategic principles and objectives. Its participants range from the most highly placed executive authorities to influential private elites, and occasionally the public at large. Strategy-making is a relatively democratic process in the United States.

To be sure, many areas of public policymaking can be assessed in terms of these overlapping circles of players and constituents. But the realm of U.S. strategic policy may be unusual in the degree to which different rules, data, concerns, and participants dominate the different arenas. These differences make it difficult to state with authority what U.S. strategic policy is on an issue that cuts across the arenas. For example, public U.S. policy may state a clear desire to avoid counter-silo capabilities on stability grounds. The weapons acquisition community may, for a variety of reasons, simultaneously be seeking a weapons characteristic vital to counter-silo capability, improved ballistic missile accuracy. As best they can with weapons available, meanwhile, force operators may be required by the logic of their task to target enemy missile silos as a high priority.

Despite these complexities, however, it is possible to generalize a body of policy concepts and values that govern U.S. strategic behavior. There are strong tendencies that dominate U.S. strategic behavior in the areas of declaratory policy, force

acquisition, and arms control policy. Again, the case of U.S. counter-silo capabilities may be cited. Today, the United States lacks high confidence capabilities against Soviet missile silos; it may continue to lack them for some time or indefinitely. This is in part the result of technological choice, the early selection of small ICBMs and the deployment of low-yield MIRV weapons. It is also the result of Soviet efforts to improve silo hardness. But the main reason for this lack is that we have abided by a conscious judgment that a serious counter-silo capability, because it threatens strategic stability, is a bad thing for the United States to possess.

The situation seems more straightforward, if secretive, on the Soviet side. Soviet strategic policymaking takes place in a far more vertical and closed system. Expertise is monopolized by the military and a subset of the top political leadership. Although elites external to this group can bid for its scarce resources to some extent, they cannot seriously challenge its values and judgments. Matters of doctrine, force acquisition, and war planning are much more intimately connected within this decision group than in the United States. Policy arguments are indeed possible. Public evidence suggests a series of major Soviet debates on nuclear strategy from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, although identification of issues, alternatives, and parameters in these debates must be somewhat speculative.

These considerations make difficult, but not impossible, the comparative treatment of U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems and concepts. One may describe with some confidence how the two very different decision systems deal with certain concerns central to the strategic nuclear predicament of both sides. Much about U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems can be captured by exploring how they treat five central issues: (1) the consequences of an all-out strategic nuclear war, (2) the phenomenon of deterrence, (3) stability, (4) distinctions and relationships between intercontinental and regional strategic security concerns, and (5) strategic conflict limitation.

CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR

For a generation, the relevant elites of both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed that an unlimited strategic nuclear war would be a sociopolitical disaster of immense proportions. Knowing the experiences of the peoples of the Soviet Union with warfare in this century and with nuclear inferiority since 1945, one sometimes suspects that the human dimensions of such a catastrophe are more real to Russians, high and low, than to Americans, for whom the prospect is vague and unreal, if certainly forbidding.

For many years the prevailing U.S. concept of nuclear war's consequences has been such as to preclude belief in any military or politically meaningful form of victory. Serious effort on the part of the state to enhance the prospect for national survival seemed quixotic, even dangerous. Hence stems our relative disinterest in air defenses and civil defenses over the last fifteen years, and our genuine fear that ballistic missile defenses would be severely destabilizing. Growth of Soviet nuclear power has certainly clinched this view of nuclear conflict among critical elements of the U.S. elite. But even when the United States enjoyed massive superiority, when the Soviet Union could inflict much less societal damage on the United States, and then only in a first strike (through the early 1960s), the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons had deprived actual war with these weapons of much of its strategic meaning for the United States.

The Soviet system has, however, in the worst of times, clung tenaciously to the belief that nuclear war cannot—indeed, must not—be deprived of strategic meaning, i.e., some rational relationship to the interests of the state. It has insisted that, however awful, nuclear war must be survivable and some kind of meaningful victory attainable. As most are aware, this issue was debated in various ways at the beginning and end of the Khrushchev era, with Khrushchev on both sides of the issue. But the system decided it *had* to believe in survival and victory of some form. Not so to believe would mean that the most basic processes of history, on which Soviet ideology and political legitimacy are founded, could be derailed by the technological works of man and the caprice of an historically doomed opponent. Moreover, as the defenders of doctrinal rectitude continued to point out, failure to believe in the “manageability” of nuclear disaster would lead to pacifism, defeatism, and lassitude in the Soviet military effort. This should not be read as the triumph of ideological will over objective science and practical reason. From the Soviet point of view, nuclear war with a powerful and hostile America was a real danger. Could the state merely give up on its traditional responsibilities to defend itself and survive in that event? Their negative answer hardly strikes one as unreasonable. Their puzzlement, alternating between contemptuous and suspicious, over U.S. insistence on a positive answer is not surprising.

In recent years the changing strategic balance has had the effect of strengthening rather than weakening the asymmetry of the two sides' convictions on this matter. Dubious when the United States enjoyed relative advantage, strategic victory and survival in nuclear conflict have become the more incredible to the United States as the strategic power of the Russians has grown. For the Soviets, however, the progress of arms and war-survival programs has transformed what was in large measure an ideological imperative into a more plausible strategic potential. For reasons to be examined below, Soviet leaders possibly believe that, under favor-

able operational conditions, the Soviet Union could win a central strategic war today. Notwithstanding strategic parity or essential equivalence of force, they may also believe they could lose such a conflict under some conditions.

DETERRENCE

The concept of deterrence early became a central element of both U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems. For both sides the concept had extended or regional dimensions, and a good deal of political content. There has, in short, been some functional symmetry between the deterrence thinking of the two sides: restraint of hostile action across a spectrum of violence by the threat of punishing consequences in war. Over time and with shifts in the overall military balance, latent asymmetries of thinking have become more pronounced. For the United States, strategic deterrence has tended to become the only meaningful objective of strategic policy, and it has become progressively decoupled from regional security. For the Soviets, deterrence—or war prevention—was the first, but not the only and not the last objective of strategy. Deterrence also meant the protection of a foreign policy that had both offensive and defensive goals. And it was never counterposed against the ultimate objective of being able to manage a nuclear war successfully should deterrence fail. The Soviet concept of deterrence has evolved as the strategic balance has improved for the Soviet Union from primary emphasis on defensive themes of war prevention and protection of prior political gains to more emphasis on themes that include the protection of dynamic processes favoring Soviet international interests. Repetition of the refrain that detente is a product of Soviet strategic power, among other things, displays this evolution.

STABILITY

Strategic stability is a concept that is very difficult to treat in a comparative manner because it is so vital to U.S. strategic thinking, but hardly identifiable in Soviet strategic writings. In U.S. thinking, strategic stability has meant a condition in which incentives inherent in the arms balance to initiate the use of strategic nuclear forces and, closely related, to acquire new or additional forces are weak or absent. In an environment dominated by powerful offensive capabilities and comparatively vulnerable ultimate values, i.e., societies, stability was thought to be achievable on the basis of a contract of mutually vulnerable societies and survivable offensive forces. Emphasis on force survivability followed, as did relative uninterest in counterforce, active, and passive defenses.

Soviet failure to embrace these notions is sufficiently evident not to require much elaboration. One may argue about Soviet ability to overturn stability in U.S. terms, but not about Soviet disinclination to accept the idea as a governing principle of strategic behavior. Soviet acceptance of the ABM agreement in 1972 is still frequently cited as testimony to some acceptance of this principle. It is much more probable, however, that the agreement was attractive to Moscow because superior U.S. ABM technology plus superior U.S. ABM penetrating technology would have given the United States a major advantage during the mid- to late 1970s. In a unilateral sense, the Soviets saw the ABM agreement as stabilizing a process of strategic catch-up against a serious risk of reversal. But it did not mean acceptance of the U.S. stability principle.

The United States has always been relatively sensitive to the potential of technology to jeopardize specific formulae for achieving stability, although it has been relatively slow to perceive the pace and extent to which comparative advantage has shifted from passive survivability to counterforce technologies. The Soviets have also been sensitive to destabilizing technologies. But they have tended to accept the destabilizing dynamism of technology as an intrinsic aspect of the strategic dialectic, the underlying engine of which is a political competition not susceptible to stabilization. For the Soviets, arms control negotiations are part of this competitive process. Such negotiation can help keep risks within bounds and also, by working on the U.S. political process, restrain U.S. competitiveness.

Soviet failure to embrace U.S. strategic stability notions as strategic norms does not mean, as a practical matter, that the Soviets fail to see certain constellations of weapons technology and forces as having an intrinsic stability, in that they make the acquisition of major advantages very difficult. What they reject is the notion that, in the political and technical world as they see it, those constellations can be frozen and the strategic competition dimension thereby factored out of the East-West struggle permanently or for long periods.

INTERCONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL POWER

Defining the boundary line between strategic and non-strategic forces has been a troubling feature of SALT from the beginning. It is one of diplomacy's minor ironies that forward capabilities the United States has long regarded as part of the general purpose forces we have been hard pressed to keep out of the negotiations. But peripheral strike forces the Soviets have systematically defined and managed as strategic seem very difficult to bring into the picture.

Geography imparted an intercontinental meaning to the term strategic for the United States. The same geography dictated that, for the Soviet Union, strategic

concern began at the doorstep. Soviet concern about the military capabilities in the hands of and on the territory of its neighbors is genuine, although Soviet arguments for getting the United States to legitimize and pay for those concerns at SALT in terms of its own central force allowances have been a bit contrived. They are tantamount to penalizing the United States for having friends, while rewarding the Soviet Union for conducting itself in a manner that has left it mostly vassals and opponents on its borders.

Underlying these definitional problems are more fundamental differences between U.S. and Soviet doctrines on what is generally called "coupling." It has long been U.S. policy to assure that U.S. strategic nuclear forces are seen by the Soviets and our NATO allies as tightly coupled to European security. Along with conventional and theater nuclear forces, U.S. strategic nuclear forces constitute an element of the NATO "triad." The good health of the alliance politically and the viability of deterrence in Europe have been seen to require a very credible threat to engage U.S. strategic nuclear forces once nuclear weapons come into play above the level of quite limited use. For more than twenty years NATO's official policy has had to struggle against doubts that this coupling could be credible in the absence of clear U.S. strategic superiority. Yet the vocabulary we commonly employ itself tends to strain this linkage in that theater nuclear forces are distinguished from strategic. Ironically, the struggle to keep so-called Forward Based Systems out of SALT, because we could not find a good way to bring in comparable Soviet systems, tended to underline the distinction. In our thinking about the actual prosecution of a strategic conflict, once conflict at that level begins we tend to forget about what might be the local outcome of the regional conflict that probably precipitated the strategic exchange.

The Soviets, on the other hand, appear to take a more comprehensive view of strategy and the strategic balance. Both in peacetime political competition and in the ultimate test of a central conflict, they tend to see all force elements as contributing to a unified strategic purpose, national survival and the elimination or containment of enemies on their periphery. The U.S.S.R. tends to see intercontinental forces, and strategic forces more generally, as a means to help it win an all-out conflict in its most crucial theater, Europe. Both institutionally and operationally, Soviet intercontinental strike forces are an outgrowth and extension of forces initially developed to cover peripheral targets. Land combat forces, including conventional forces, are carefully trained and equipped to fight in nuclear conditions. In the last decade, the emergence of a hostile and potentially powerful China has more firmly riveted the "rimland" of Eurasia into the Soviet strategic perspective.

Whatever the consequence of a central U.S.-Soviet nuclear conflict for their re-

spective homelands, it could well have the effect of eliminating U.S. power and influence on the Eurasian landmass for a long time. If, by virtue of its active and passive damage-limitation measures, the Soviet Union suffered measurably less damage than did the United States, and it managed to intimidate China or destroy Chinese military power, the resultant Soviet domination of Eurasia could represent a crucial element of "strategic victory" in Soviet eyes. In any case, regional conflict outcomes seem not to lose their significance in Soviet strategy once strategic nuclear conflict begins.

CONFLICT LIMITATION

Nuclear conflict limitation is a theme on which influential American opinion is divided. After much thought and argument, the previous administration adopted a more explicit endorsement of limited strategic nuclear options as a hedge against the failings of a strategy solely reliant on all-out war plans for deterrence or response in the event of deterrent failure. The present administration has appeared more doubtful about the value of limited nuclear options because it appears generally to doubt the viability of nuclear conflict limitations. It may also share the fear of some critics that limited options could seem to make nuclear use more tolerable and therefore detract from deterrence.

Theories of nuclear conflict limitation entertained in the United States tend to rest on concepts of risk management and bargaining with the opponent. We are interested in limited options because they are more credible than unlimited ones in response to limited provocation. Whether or not they can be controlled is uncertain; hence their credible presence enhances the risk faced by the initiator of conflict. Should conflict come about, then limited options might be used to change the risk, cost, and benefit calculus of the opponent in the direction of some more or less tolerable war termination. This would not be a sure thing, but better have the limited options than not.

How the Soviets view the matter of nuclear conflict limitations is obscure. The least one can say is that they do not see it in the manner described above. From the early 1960s, after McNamara's famed Ann Arbor speech, Soviet propagandists have denounced limited nuclear war concepts as U.S. contrivances to make nuclear weapons use more "acceptable" and to rationalize the quest for counterforce advantages. They have replayed the criticism that such concepts weaken deterrence and cannot prevent nuclear war from becoming unlimited.

To some degree, Soviet propaganda on this theme is suspect for being aimed at undermining U.S. strategy innovations that detract from the political benefits of Soviet strategic force improvement. Given differences of view in the United States

on this subject, moreover, the Soviets could hardly resist the temptation to fuel the U.S. argument. There are several reasons why Soviet public pronouncements should not be taken as entirely reflecting the content of operative Soviet strategic thinking and planning regarding limited nuclear use. For one thing, qualified acceptance in doctrine and posture of a non-nuclear scenario, or at least a non-nuclear phase, in theater conflict displays some Soviet willingness to embrace conflict limitation notions previously rejected. Soviet strategic nuclear force growth and modernization, in addition, have given Soviet operational planners a broader array of employment options than they had in the 1960s and may have imparted some confidence in Soviet ability to *enforce* conflict limitations. It would not be surprising, therefore, to find some Soviet contingency planning for various kinds of limited nuclear options at the theater and, perhaps, at the strategic level.

One may seriously doubt, however, whether Soviet planners would approach the problem of contingency planning for limited nuclear options with the conceptual baggage the U.S. system carries. It would seem contrary to the style of Soviet doctrinal thinking to emphasize bargaining and risk management. Rather the presence of limited options planning in the Soviet system would seem likely to rest on more traditional military concepts of economizing on force use, controlling actions and their consequences, reserving options, and leaving time to learn what is possible in the course of a campaign. The Soviet limited options planner would seem likely to approach his task with a more strictly unilateral set of concerns than his American counterpart.

Methods of Assessing the Strategic Balance

Comparative study of U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine should give attention to a closely related matter: how we perceive and measure force balances. Allusion has already been made to asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet definitions of strategic forces, what should be counted in SALT, etc. This is by no means the heart of the matter. U.S. and Soviet methodologies for measuring military strength appear to differ significantly.

Many rather amateurish and misleading beliefs about the way the Soviets measure and value military strength prevail; for example, that the Soviets have some atavistic devotion to mass and size. Mass they do believe in because both experience and analysis show that mass counts. They can be quite choosy about size, however, as a look at their tank and fighter designs reveals. Within the limits of their technological potential, they have been quite sensitive and in no way primitive in their thinking about quality/quantity tradeoffs.

Another widespread notion is that the Soviets have an unusual propensity for worst-case planning or military overinsurance. This is hard to demonstrate convincingly in Soviet behavior. The Soviet theory of war in central Europe, for example, is daring, not conservative. Despite much rhetoric on the danger of surprise and the need for high combat readiness, Soviet strategic planning has not accorded nearly the importance to "bolt-from-the-blue" surprise attack that the United States has. This does not look like overinsurance.

The problem of measuring strength goes more deeply to differing appreciations of the processes of conflict and how they bear on force measurement. U.S. measures of the overall strategic balance tend to be of two general types. First come the so-called static measures of delivery vehicles, weapons, megatonnage and equivalent megatonnage, throwweight, and, perhaps, some measure of hard-target kill potential (such as weapon numbers times a scaled yield factor divided by the square of Circular Error Probability). Comparisons of this type can display some interesting things about differing forces. But they say very little about how those forces, much less the nations that employ them, will fare in war. By themselves, static measures can be dangerously misleading.

We then move on to the second, or quasi-dynamic, class of measures. Here the analyst is out to capture the essential features of a "real war" in terms general enough to allow parametric application, frequent reiteration of the analysis with varying assumptions, and easy swamping of operational and technical details which he may not be able to quantify or of which he may be ignorant. Typically, certain gross attributes of the war "scenario" will be determined, e.g., levels of alert, who goes first, and very general targeting priorities. Then specified "planning factor" performance characteristics are attributed to weapons. Because it is relatively easy (and fun), a more or less elaborate version of the ICBM duel is frequently conducted. The much more subtle and complicated, but crucial, engagement of air and sea-based forces is usually handled by gross assumption, e.g., n percent of bomber weapons get to target, all SSBNs at sea survive. Regional conflicts and forces are typically ignored. Of course, all command/control/communications systems are assumed to work as planned—otherwise the forces, and even worse, the analyst would be out of business. Finally, "residuals" of surviving forces, fatality levels, and industrial damage are totaled up. A popular variant is to run a counter military war in these terms and then see whether residual forces are sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" on cities. If so, then deterrence is intact according to some. Others point to grossly asymmetric levels of surviving forces to document an emerging strategic imbalance.

Most specialists agree and explicitly admit that this kind of analysis does not

capture the known, much less the unknown complexities, uncertainties, and fortuities of a real strategic nuclear conflict of any dimension. Such liturgical admissions are usually offered to gain absolution from their obvious consequences, namely that the analysis in question could be, not illuminating, but quite wrong. However, more heroic analytic attempts at capturing the real complexity and operational detail of a major nuclear exchange are usually not made because they are: a) usually beyond the expertise of single analysts or small groups, b) not readily susceptible to varied and parametric application, and c) *still* laden by manifold uncertainties and unknowns that are very hard to quantify. Hence they are very hard to apply to the tasks of assessing strategic force balances or the value of this or that force improvement. The more simplistic analysis is more convenient. The analyst can conduct it many times, and talk over his results with other analysts who do the same thing. The whole methodology thereby acquires a reality and persuasiveness of its own.

The influence of this kind of analysis in our strategic decision system has many explanations. It has sociological origins in the dominance of economists and engineers over soldiers in the conduct of our strategic affairs. It conforms with the needs of a flat and argumentative policy process in which there are many and varied participants, from generals to graduate students. They need a common idiom that does not soak up too much computer time and can be unclassified. And finally, in part because of the first explanation cited, when it comes to nuclear strategy, we do not believe much in "real" nuclear war anyway. We are after a standard of sufficiency that is adequate and persuasive in a peacetime setting.

Two things about this style of strategic analysis merit stating in the context of this paper. First, on the face of it, the value of simplistic, operationally-insensitive methodologies is assuredly less in the present strategic environment than it was when the United States enjoyed massive superiority. Not only are weapons, force mixes, and scenarios more complicated than these methodologies can properly illuminate, but the relative equality of the two sides going into the conflict makes the subtleties, complexities, and uncertainties all the more important for how they come out. Second, the Soviets do not appear to do their balance measuring in this manner.

One can gain a fair insight into the manner of Soviet force balance analysis from public sources, particularly Soviet military literature. Additional inferences can be drawn from the organization and professional composition of the Soviet defense decision system, and from some of the results of Soviet decisions. On the whole it appears that Soviet planners and force balance assessors are much more sensitive than we are to the subtleties and uncertainties—what we sometimes call "scenario

dependencies"—of strategic conflict seen from a very operational perspective. The timing and scale of attack initiation, tactical deception and surprise, uncertainties about weapons effects, the actual character of operational plans and targeting, timely adjustment of plans to new information, and, most important, the continued viability of command and control—these factors appear to loom large in Soviet calculations of conflict outcomes.

The important point, however, is a conceptual one: Unlike the typical U.S. planner, the Soviet planner does not appear to see the *force* balance prior to conflict as a kind of physical reification of the war outcome and therefore as a measure of strategic strength by itself. Rather he seems to see the force balance, the "correlation of military forces," as one input to a complex combat process in which other factors of great significance will play, and the chief aim of which is a new, more favorable balance of forces. The sum of these factors is strategy, and strategy is a significant variable to the Soviet planner.

As a generalization, then, the Soviet planner is very sensitive to operational details and uncertainties. Because these factors can swing widely, even wildly, in different directions, a second generalization about Soviet force analysis emerges: a given force balance in peacetime can yield widely varying outcomes to war depending on the details and uncertainties of combat. Some of those outcomes could be relatively good for the Soviet Union, others relatively bad. The planner's task is to improve the going-in force balance, to be sure. But it is also to develop and pursue ways of waging war that tend to push the outcome in favorable directions.

This kind of thinking occasions two very unpleasant features in Soviet military doctrine: a strong tendency to preempt and a determination to suppress the enemy's command and control system at all costs. The Soviets tend to see any decision to go to nuclear war as being imposed on them by a course of events that tells them "war is coming," a situation they bungled memorably in June 1941. It makes no difference whose misbehavior started events on that course. Should they find themselves on it, their operational perspective on the factors that drive war outcomes places a high premium on seizing the initiative and imposing the maximum disruptive effects on the enemy's forces *and* war plans. By going first, and especially disrupting command and control, the highest likelihood of limiting damage and coming out of the war with intact forces and a surviving nation is achieved, virtually independent of the force balance.

This leads to a final generalization. We tend rather casually to assume that, when we talk about parity and "essential equivalence" and the Soviets about "equal security," we are talking about the same thing: functional strategic stability. We

are not. The Soviets are talking about a going-in force balance in which they have an equal or better chance of winning a central war, if they can orchestrate the right scenario and take advantage of lucky breaks. It is the job of the high command to see that they can. If it fails to do so, the Soviet Union could possibly lose the war. This is not stability in our terms.

Again, this is not to argue that the Soviets do not foresee appalling destruction as the result of any strategic exchange under the best of conditions. In a crisis, Soviet leaders would probably take any tolerable and even some not-very-tolerable exits from the risk of such a war. But their image of strategic crisis is one in which these exits are closing up, and the "war is coming." They see the ultimate task of strategy to be the provision of forces and options for preempting that situation. This then leads them to choose strategies that, from a U.S. point of view, seem not particularly helpful in keeping the exits open, and even likely to close them off.

It is frequently argued—more frequently as we become more anxious about the emerging force balance—that the Soviets could not have confidence in launching a strategic attack and achieving the specific objectives that theoretical analysis might suggest to be possible, such as destruction of Minuteman. Particularly because they are highly sensitive to operational uncertainties they would not, in one of the more noteworthy phrases of the latest Defense Department posture statement, gamble national survival on a "single cosmic throw of the dice." This construction of the problem obscures the high likelihood that decisions to go to strategic war will be made under great pressure and in the face of severe perceived penalty if the decision is not made and the war comes anyway. They are not likely to come about in a situation in which the choice is an uncertain war or a comfortable peace. It also obscures the fact that the heavy weight of uncertainty will also rest on the shoulders of U.S. decisionmakers in a crisis.

Dangers of Misunderstanding

In sum, there are fundamental differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking, both at the level of value and at the level of method. The existence of these differences and, even more, our failure to recognize them have had dangerous consequences for the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

One such might be called the "hawk's lament." Failing to appreciate the character of Soviet strategic thinking in relation to our own views, we have underestimated the competitiveness of Soviet strategic policy and the need for competitive

responsiveness on our part. This is evident in both our SALT and our strategic force modernization behavior.

A second negative effect might be termed the "dove's lament." By projecting our views onto the Soviets, and failing to appreciate their real motives and perceptions, we have underestimated the difficulties of achieving genuine strategic stability through SALT and over-sold the value of what we have achieved. This has, in turn, set us up for profound, perhaps even hysterical, disillusionment in the years ahead, in which the very idea of negotiated arms control could be politically discredited. If present strategic trends continue, it is not hard to imagine a future political environment in which it would be difficult to argue for arms control negotiations even of a very hard-nosed sort.

The third and most dangerous consequence of our misunderstanding of Soviet strategy involves excessive confidence in strategic stability. U.S. strategic behavior, in its broadest sense, has helped to ease the Soviet Union onto a course of more assertive international action. This has, in turn, increased the probability of a major East-West confrontation, arising not necessarily by Soviet design, in which the United States must forcefully resist a Soviet advance or face collapse of its global position, while the Soviet Union cannot easily retreat or compromise because it has newly acquired global power status to defend and the matter at issue could be vital. In such conditions, it is all too easy to imagine a "war is coming" situation in which the abstract technical factors on which we rest our confidence in stability, such as expected force survival levels and "unacceptable damage," could crumble away. The strategic case for "waiting to see what happens," for conceding the operational initiative to the other side—which is what crisis stability is all about—could look very weak. Each side could see the great operational virtues of preemption, be convinced that the other side sees them too, and be hourly more determined that the other side not have them. This, in any case, could be the Soviet way of perceiving things. Given the relative translucence of U.S. versus Soviet strategic decision processes, however, our actual ability to preempt is likely to be less than the Soviets', quite apart from the character of the force balance. Add to that the problem of a vulnerable Minuteman ICBM force and you have a potentially very nasty situation.

What we know about the nature of our own strategic thinking and that of the Soviet Union is not at all comforting at this juncture. The Soviets approach the problem of managing strategic nuclear power with highly competitive and combative instincts. Some have argued that these instincts are largely fearful and defensive, others that they are avaricious and confident. My own reading of

Russian and Soviet history is that they are both, and, for that, the more difficult to handle.

The United States and the Soviet Union share two awesome problems in common, the creation of viable industrial societies and the management of nuclear weapons. Despite much that is superficially common to our heritages, however, these two societies have fundamentally different political cultures that determine how they handle these problems. The stamp of a legal, commercial, and democratic society is clearly seen in the way the United States has approached the task of managing nuclear security. Soviet styles of managing this problem bear the stamp of an imperial, bureaucratic, and autocratic political tradition. While the United States is willing to see safety in a compact of "live and let live" under admittedly unpleasant conditions, the Soviet Union operates from a political tradition that suspects the viability of such deals, and expects them, at best, to mark the progress of historically ordained forces to ascendancy.

It is not going to be easy to stabilize the strategic competition on this foundation of political traditions. But if we understand the situation clearly, there should be no grounds for fatalism. Along with a very uncomfortable degree of competitiveness, Soviet strategic policy contains a strong element of professionalism and military rationalism with which we can do business in the interest of a common safety if we enhance those qualities in ourselves. The Soviets respect military power and they take warfare very seriously. When the propaganda and polemics are pared away, they sometimes wonder if we do. We can make a healthy contribution to our own future, and theirs, by rectifying this uncertainty.

SALT and Soviet-American Relations

One of the most pressing current policy questions is "After SALT II, What?"—a question indicative of the change in Soviet-American relations. Not only has a SALT II agreement not been signed, but if and when it is, divisive debate is guaranteed; there is at least some chance the agreement will be defeated. Indeed, the key current question relates less to substance than political timing. Some of the reasons for this doleful state of Soviet-American relations have to do with SALT as such. But there are other reasons that should be examined first.

The Decline and Fall of Detente

The high point of Soviet-American relations in recent years, and perhaps in the entire post-war period, was from the German treaty of 1970 through mid-1973. It is worth recalling that in June 1973 Brezhnev visited this country in an atmosphere that was almost cordial. A leading American Sovietologist, Marshal Shulman, wrote that it was clear relations had entered a "new state," and that future fluctuation would occur within narrower margins. (*Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1973) The Nixon Administration stated in February 1973 ". . . we have now taken that essential first step in freeing both of our countries from perpetual confrontation . . . we are now in a new period, but we have only witnessed its initial phase."

Brezhnev, for his part, told American Senators and businessmen that he wanted to give relations maximum stability and make the improvement in relations "irreversible." What was happening was not so much that the participants were becoming euphoric, but that both sides had put themselves in a position of requiring an almost impossible series of successes to demonstrate the validity of their rhetoric claims. This is not to say that the change in public relations was in the realm of public relations; it rested on the Berlin agreement as well as on SALT. Nevertheless, in the period that followed, the cumulative effect of events was to

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reinforce critics and skeptics. Disaffection might have been containable, were it not for the fortuitous events of Watergate and the disastrous weakening of the Presidency.

The following are some of the manifestations of the decline in Soviet-American relations:

—first, the reaction to the initial SALT agreements revealed an underlying disquiet that was to grow as a follow-on agreement failed to take shape; certain Soviet weapons programs, even though anticipated, were ominously interpreted.

—as a consequence more was expected of SALT than was realistically likely (e.g. equal MIRVed throw weight was a favorite solution, which would give the Soviet Union about 200 MIRVed ICBMs).

—second, U.S. Congressional reaction to the economic phase of detente—the settlement of lend lease debts and the prospective extension of credits—led to an unexpected linkage between Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy; the significance of this was it revealed the strong residual antagonism from earlier periods, i.e., that the aim of a relaxation of tension was a change inside the Soviet Union; while perhaps a long term goal, its immediate achievement, was quixotic;

—third, the clash over the Middle East in 1973 and later over Angola revealed geopolitical limits of “detente,” which was more and more of an European policy than a global commitment;

—fourth, the Vladivostok agreement, conceived as a stop-gap at a time of domestic uncertainty, actually accelerated the anti-SALT debate;

—fifth, the Helsinki Conference, though now represented as the platform for calling the Soviet Union to account, was at the time attacked as a sell out;

Finally, the American election campaign, especially the Republican primaries, elevated the whole question of Soviet-American relations as an issue, leading to the deferral of SALT, and the official abolishment of the word “detente.” The formation of the Committee on the Present Danger, was symbolic of the change in political perceptions within 4 years: “Our country is in a period of danger and the danger is increasing . . . The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup.” (“Common Sense and the Common Danger”)

It is interesting that the Soviets date the U.S. “counterattack” to the Vladivostok-Helsinki aftermath:

But the situation became different after the agreement in Vladivostok . . . and after the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki. Called into question was everything accustomed to by those who had risen, gained strength and fattened considerably

on the "cold war" policy. They launched a counterattack in an attempt to take their revenge for the forced retreat, for their suffered losses. (*Pravda*, June 17, 1978)

The approach adopted by the new American Administration accelerated the decline, though this was certainly not the intention. Three elements have to be highlighted: (1) the human rights policy, (2) the new complications of SALT and (3) the conflict in Africa. Proclaiming a continuing right to speak out in defense of Soviet dissidents could only be regarded by the Soviet leaders as a challenge; while repression of Soviet dissidents was inevitable, and precedes the Carter Administration, the new U.S. approach had the effect of turning it into a test of strength, which the United States could only lose.

Similarly, the initial approach to SALT suggested that past commitments at Vladivostok, or the previous negotiating history, should be set aside. The problem was not so much the substance of initial U.S. proposals in March 1977 which, after all, were a collection of elements already introduced in SALT at various times, but that the Soviets interpreted them as a still further manifestation of U.S. unreliability. In their view, Nixon had failed on his economic commitments; Ford had failed on his Vladivostok commitments, and it then appeared that Carter would embark a further revision. Added to this were opportunities in Africa that no Soviet leader could resist. Finally, there is some reason to believe that the Soviets came to see U.S. policy as badly confused and divided, so that risks of Soviet action were quite tolerable. Some observers would go as far to describe Soviet policy as contemptuous (cf. Oswald Johnston, *Los Angeles Times*, July 16, 1978)

Of course, there are strong underlying causes on the Soviet side. Over this whole period there was a growing anxiety in the United States about the Soviet military build up. New intelligence estimates indicated a much larger commitment of resources to the military sector; the rate of growth of the military budget, and its percentage of the entire economy were revised drastically upward. Comparisons with the United States inevitably showed a widening gap in a broad range of indicators. A related phenomenon was the belated discovery of Soviet military doctrine which interpreters not surprisingly found to contain a war winning philosophy.

Soviet intervention in Angola, in Ethiopia, and the invasion of Shaba province strengthened a view of Soviet policy as fundamentally expansionist, and increasingly bolder with lessening fears of American reaction, or at least no undue concern about the reaction.

At present it is reasonable to say that both sides had left themselves the options

of far harsher policies while not closing the door to a return to a more conciliatory relationship. It is still not clear whether the cooperative or confrontational aspects will prevail. Much may now rest on SALT, which unfortunately seems destined to carry an increasingly heavy burden for determining the basic direction of Soviet-American relations.

Salt

If SALT must now carry the main burden of "detente" it may prove to be a frail vehicle. While still under negotiation, its main elements are well publicized. In general it represents a cross between Vladivostok and the proposal of March 1977. It is clearly a compromise. For reference the following are some of the main provisions in a treaty lasting to 1985:

- overall aggregates of ICBMs, submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLBMs), heavy bombers, including Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) carriers, would be limited to 2400 and then reduced to 2250;

- a subceiling of 1320 would be placed on all MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, plus ALCM carriers;

- a further subceiling of 1200 would be placed on all MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs; (both sides could have more than the implied 120 ALCM carriers, but not more than 1200 MIRVed missiles);

- a final subceiling of 820 would be placed on land based ICBM launchers capable of launching MIRVed missiles;

In addition, there will be a protocol probably ending late 1980 or mid 1981.

- land and sea based cruise missiles with a range over 600 km could not be deployed for the period, but testing could continue;

- testing and deployment of "new" ICBMs would be limited in some manner; this is still open and obviously a critical point;

- mobile ICBM launchers would *not* be deployed; but testing of a U.S. launcher could proceed; (*note*: the main treaty apparently is written to *permit* land mobile launchers, but how to count and verify them is still open);

Finally, there will be a statement of principles to govern SALT III.

What is accomplished? On the positive side, there are the requirements for Soviet reductions from about 2550 to 2400 and then 2250; they would probably be accomplished by first reducing older bombers (Bison) and older SLBMs (H-class); this would amount to about 65 units, thus leaving 235 to be reduced in some combination of Y-Class SLBM or ICBMs or TU-95s; in short some "first line" units will inevitably have to be dismantled.

—the ICBM-MIRV subceiling seems to be about 100 or so short of what has been estimated as a feasible Soviet program; the probable composition of the Soviet MIRVed force is likely to include 300 SS-18s, and some combination of 500 SS-19s and SS-17s;

—The United States would be affected mainly by the 1200 subceiling on MIRVed missiles. Depending on Trident launch rates sometime in the early 1980s the U.S. MIRV total will exceed 1200; a full Trident program of 240 would require U.S. MIRV reductions of 86; if more than 120 ALCM carriers are deployed the MIRV reductions would be correspondingly greater.

The protocol is obviously much more contentious:

—first, the United States is moving in the direction of a ban on SLCMs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs); an often heard charge against the protocol is that it will not expire; certainly the Soviet position will be to press for a continuation of the SLCM and GLCM restrictions;

—the provision on mobile ICBMs could prove to be a nightmare! if the United States does in fact require some form of mobility, then the protocol sets up at least a tentative barrier, but when and if it expires it is not at all clear what would be permitted; a major wrangle over the Multiple-Aim Points (MAPS) concept is guaranteed;

—finally, the testing and deployment constraints on ICBMs will be controversial; if testing and deployment of one ICBM is permitted, then what has been critically accomplished?

The main point is that the original theory of a temporary protocol may be put in doubt. Initially, the idea was that the United States would meet Soviet concerns about cruise missiles while the Soviet Union, in turn, would meet American concerns about new generations of ICBMs; if the latter restraint is weakened, what is the rationale for restricting American advantages? This particular aspect will become all the more contentious when the infamous Backfire issue is raised. If U.S. cruise missiles are indeed "grey," then so is the Backfire, the argument runs. But Backfire is entirely outside the agreement, for political reasons, while cruise missiles are tied directly to SALT.

The main criticism of SALT II, however, is likely to be that it fails to make a dent on the problem of ICBM survivability. Indeed, the current rationale is that SALT cannot really be expected to cope with the problem. Secretary Brown stated: "In short Minuteman vulnerability was not a problem created by SALT, nor is it a problem we can solve with a SALT II agreement." Thus critics will almost certainly charge that a SALT agreement that does not address a critical

strategic instability may be worse than no agreement, particularly if U.S. options to take steps to remedy the vulnerability problem are constrained in the treaty and protocol provision on mobiles and new ICBMs. The counter argument, of course, is that a SALT agreement that requires proliferation of 5000 dummy silos boggles the mind; at a minimum, it raises an enormous "breakout" problem.

Arguments in favor of SALT II are that it includes the first major Soviet strategic reductions. Though militarily marginal, the psychological impact of actual reductions and the codification of equality in several areas cannot be lightly dismissed as a factor in Soviet politics. Thus, if one purpose of SALT is to improve the manageability and predictability of strategic relations, SALT II represents an advance over SALT I.

It is also argued that the other provisions are not of immediate importance. The United States is unlikely to deploy any new ICBMs before 1980-1982, or deploy SLCMs and GLCMs in that period so that only "paper rights" are foreclosed. If the Soviets are, in fact, deeply concerned about GLCMs for example then the United States might have a bargaining counter for SALT III goals. Thus, as the protocol period nears its end the leverage should be on the U.S. side.

An evaluation of the agreement in technical military terms is beyond the scope of this paper, to say nothing of the author's competence. One school can demonstrate a major shift in the Soviet favor in all categories of static and dynamic analysis. Another school, including the U.S. Government, can demonstrate that the overall "balance" remains about equal (e.g. Secretary Brown's posture statement, Chart 1-A1, p. 104) shows essential equivalence after a nuclear exchange).

Where To Now?

The fate of SALT II, and perhaps SALT III will turn not so much on technical arguments understood by experts, but on political questions (1) what is the impact on Soviet-America relations, and (2) are we at least "equal" to the Soviets?

The first question involves speculation about two aspects of Soviet policy:

—Sometime in the 1980s, the Soviet economy is likely to enter a period of severe strain, with falling growth rates, manpower shortages, and increasingly severe demands for technological imports. While experts are wary of predicting any impact on defense, the implication of the analysis is that defense issues in the mid 1980s will become extremely difficult; moreover, dependence on the west will grow;

—the leadership of the Soviet Union in that period will be almost an entirely new set of men; by 1987, for example, when the XXXVI Party Congress takes place, it is virtually impossible that more than two or three of the present top echelon of leaders will survive, and then only as quite elder statesmen.

In short, a new leadership will for the first time face pressures that have been forestalled, deferred or ignored by the present generation.

On the other hand, during this same period, some observers predict that the United States will be a period of maximum danger, and the Soviet will be in a position to extract the major geo-political gains from a clear strategic advantage. Even if one concludes that the situation will not be this extreme, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the mid-1980s will be a period of extreme fluidity in the Soviet Union. The overriding question for the United States, therefore, is to fashion both a defense strategy and an arms control strategy that will have the optimal chance of steering Soviet choices in the most favorable direction.

Thus SALT III, unfortunately, is destined to carry an even heavier burden, politically, and involve more difficult political and technical issues:

—a sweeping new agreement within a few years of SALT II seems highly improbable; if only because the Soviets are reluctant to revise existing agreements so quickly;

—a more feasible prospect may be a series of complementary agreements, that would address specific problems; e.g. ICBM vulnerability and mobile deployments

—ignoring the “grey” areas, or the “Euro-strategic” balance is likely to be increasingly unacceptable to NATO countries. But is SALT the proper forum? What is the relationship to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations? To what extent will American Forward Based Systems and Allied nuclear systems have to be drawn in?

Thus the final paradox seems to be that SALT will inevitably be broader, involving more parties and more weapons systems and more complicated negotiations; but, at the same time, protracted negotiations once again run the danger that technology will outpace statesmanship, and unilateral military decisions will be required that will inevitably undermine, if not upset the SALT process. The current debate over MAP is only the tip of an iceberg that is now slowly drifting onto the path of SALT III.

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Anyone who nostalgically or in search of wisdom takes one of Bernard's books
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The 1950s were the first time in at least a century that Americans became professionally concerned, in peacetime, with military strategy. (That had not been the business of the Army or the Navy.) At Yale and at Princeton, at SRI and ORO and the Lincoln Laboratory, and at MIT, even at Harvard, but most of all at the RAND Corporation, this new academic profession grew in size and influence. The leading intellects of that movement—it had some of the characteristics of a movement, and was often seen as one—were known to each other and many became known to the public. The germination date was August, 1945; and the movement reached a kind of maturity, from which it never recovered, when it moved in 1961 into the Establishment, the Departments of State and Defense. The idea stage was about over then, although books reflecting earlier thought and work continued to appear in the early 1960s.

Among the originators of that academic profession, Bernard Brodie was first—both in time and in distinction. He was one of the very few whose training was professionally oriented towards the study of war and peace, and he had published two excellent books by 1942, years before any of the familiar names of later years were associated with strategy. His *Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (from which the first word in the title was deleted so that the Navy could assign it to officers without embarrassment) contains some of the best early “systems analysis” I ever saw, all presented in straightforward English. As editor and one of the chief contributors to *The Absolute Weapon* (1946), he set standards for thinking about nuclear strategy and made predictions that could actually be falsified or verified by later events, an unfashionable kind of prediction then as now. And his articles on limited war, deterrence, and strategy as a science, in *World Politics*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *The Reporter*, culminating in *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959), were of an analytical and literary distinction that set him apart. He was a central figure in the RAND “oral tradition” that gave shape to strategic thinking as it emerged in the 1960s and—it is still about all we have—the 1970s.

By the middle 1960s he had to change sides on a number of policies to oppose “carrying an intrinsically good idea so much too far,” publishing the brief and slightly polemical *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, seeming to relish his first publication in more than a decade that did not have to meet the requirements of security clearance. And in 1973 he published *War and Politics*, turning his historical perspective for the first time since *Naval Strategy* to the bitter non-nuclear wars that were real in his lifetime, rather than the hypothetical nuclear wars that his own work, I truly believe, has helped us to avoid.

Anyone who, nostalgically or in search of wisdom, takes one of Bernard's books from the shelf will be quickly reminded of the breadth and the depth of Bernard's thinking, his use and enjoyment of history, and the taste with which he wrote English. He, more than anyone else, helped us to learn to think about how to survive in a world with nuclear weapons.

—Thomas Schelling

STABILITY AND STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

For many years there existed in the United States a broad consensus on both the requirements to preserve a stable strategic nuclear balance and the role of negotiated arms control agreements in contributing to this stability. The cornerstone of American policy has been the maintenance of a secure retaliatory force which would provide the Soviet Union with a powerful incentive to avoid nuclear war. Arms control agreements, seen as a means to further this end, have been intended to lead to substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both states and to constraints on the qualitative improvements of the forces.

These views have been subjected to increasing challenge, however, as the United States lost its position of strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, as the Soviet threat to the U.S. land-based missile force has grown, and as relations between the superpowers have become more tense.

The next several months may witness the most significant national debate on U.S. strategic policy since the late 1950s, stimulated in particular by Senate deliberations on ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Among the important questions relevant to this debate are: What do we mean by stability in the context of the contemporary nuclear balance? What problems do "gray area" weapons pose for arms control and defense policy? Should plans for nuclear war-fighting receive more attention than they have in the past? What kinds and levels of forces should the United States maintain, given the military and political utility of various weapons systems? What would be the economic effects of a SALT II Treaty? What would be the consequences in military, political, and economic terms if the SALT process failed to continue?

In this issue, International Security offers essays which address each of these questions, with the goal of furthering informed discussion of these subjects of national and international importance.

—The Editors

Maintaining Stable Deterrence

McGeorge Bundy

With a SALT II agreement somewhere in prospect, discussion in the United States has been proceeding mainly from prepared positions; the true believers, whether in the Committee on the Present Danger or in Arms Control, have been happily denouncing each other. Nominally, the debate has turned on a number of arcane questions like the range of the Soviet Backfire bomber, or the degree to which limitations on cruise missiles might affect our ability to help our allies in NATO, or the degree of confidence one can have in verification of this or that clause in the agreement. These debates, on the whole, have been healthy, because they have encouraged our negotiators to avoid the imprecision that seems to have accompanied the boldness and privacy of SALT I. But it cannot be said that the discussion thus far has produced a solid base for a national consensus on SALT II. Skillful swordplay around these relatively small matters has left larger issues unresolved. In particular, there is no agreement yet on what will probably be the largest single question in the minds of Senators as they prepare to vote on any treaty: *are we satisfied with the condition and prospects of the American strategic deterrent, with or without SALT II?* Senators who cannot give an affirmative answer to this question are not likely to vote readily for a SALT Treaty, even if the treaty itself is not the cause of their real concerns.

Thus the condition and prospects of our own deterrent forces have become the central issue, both of defense planning and of arms control, that now faces the country. My present thesis is that this question, if carefully and soberly addressed, can be answered in ways that should unite, rather than divide, the Senate and the country. This is a large proposition, flying in the face of much that has been asserted on both sides. Moreover, my grounds for believing it can only be sketched in the space of this article. Yet the notion, if even partly valid, may have enough significance to justify the exposure of the argument, at least in outline.

Let me begin with two bits of history: one relates to the evolution of official doctrine on what our strategic forces are for, and the other to what we know of the way nuclear deterrence has worked so far.

The beginning of the doctrinal problem dates from the emergence of a wholly new level of Soviet strategic capability some ten years ago. Under President Eisenhower, and in a somewhat different way during the years when Robert McNamara was our most articulate spokesman, we combined a posture of relatively moderate strategic deployment with a posture of strongly asserted strategic superiority. At

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the end of the 1960s this double stance was overtaken by events. It fell to President Nixon to give explicit recognition to the fact that meaningful superiority was no longer attainable, and while he could not resist the temptation to suggest that somehow this was the result of decisions by his predecessors, he firmly turned away from any effort to reestablish superiority. Instead, the United States would seek "strategic sufficiency." It was an excellent decision, one of several in Mr. Nixon's years that would have been accepted with much less grace from a Democrat.

Excellent, but deeply imprecise. Indeed, there is every reason to suppose that the fog in which the phrase was enveloped was deliberate. The speeches and statements of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Kissinger gave different impressions at different times, depending on whether they were defending or ending ABM, raising or lowering particular budget items, warning the Russians or reassuring the Senate. They agreed that sufficiency did not require superiority, but as to just what it did require, the Nixon Administration was not a pellucid teacher.

Nor was there great pedagogical progress under President Ford. James Schlesinger attempted at once too little and too much in his effort to redefine strategic targeting policy, and Henry Kissinger was necessarily preoccupied by the defense of the SALT process, rather than by the definition of strategic sufficiency as such. No more than any of its predecessors (or successor so far) was the Ford Administration eager for a direct encounter with the organized military, and indeed the last Republican Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, clearly preferred a more militant approach, both to strategic weaponry and to the Soviet Union, than Dr. Kissinger.

It was Kissinger, speaking in Texas in March, 1976, who came nearest to clarity about the nature of the strategic situation of the United States as it stood after the Soviet build-up of the previous decade.¹ He warned sharply against any effort to assess our forces by crude comparisons with the Soviet Union, and he now based the existence of "rough equilibrium" less on specific weapons decisions made by Democrats in the previous decade than on the "inevitable" evolution of the Soviet system. "No policy decision on our part brought this about. Nothing we could have done would have prevented it. Nothing we can do will make it disappear." He then took the next great step toward clarity: our strategic forces must

1. The essence of this important and undernoticed speech was reprinted as "Documentation," *International Security* Vol. I No. 1, Summer 1976.

be defined by our requirements, not by imitation of Soviet choices, and he stated the primary U. S. requirement in terms that are not easy to improve:

Our nation's security requires, first and foremost, strategic forces that can deter attack and that ensure swift and flexible retaliation if aggression occurs.

It was only a beginning (what, even approximately, is meant by "aggression?"), but it was the right beginning. Much of the rest of the speech was devoted to a skillful rejection of the strategic fears of Present Dangerites, and the Secretary balanced his saddlebags with a firm rejection of the kind of "minimum deterrence" that has almost no support in the country as a whole. He also asserted the durable stability of the strategic balance in terms that will always come naturally to defenders of SALT, leaving it to others to say just which steps would be needed, and on what scale, to continue to meet his basic criterion. But any weakness in his debating points and any lack of clarity in his specific prescriptions were unimportant compared to his clear acceptance (1) of strategic equilibrium as the best we can aim at, and (2) of persuasive deterrence, based on ensured capacity for swift and flexible retaliation, as the first and foremost purpose of our own strategic deployments.

The next considerable step forward in official analysis came early in 1978, in the annual report of Harold Brown. In a passage on "The Conditions of Deterrence" he spelled out three critical criteria. One was the already familiar capability of "Assured Destruction," defined as "the capability at all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union, including destruction of a minimum of 200 major Soviet cities." But this must not be our only choice, said the Secretary (concurring with his immediate predecessors), and he gave fresh emphasis and clarity to "Survivability and Control" and to "Flexibility." When these two additional conditions of "stable deterrence" are met, he agreed, the United States is able to respond to, and so to deter, other things than a massive attack on "U. S. or allied population and industry." To meet the three conditions, the Secretary said, was to do all that was necessary for "credible and high-confidence deterrence."

This, I think, is the main line of evolution of a solid doctrine of strategic sufficiency. Unfortunately, there is a second evolution, of a concept called "essential equivalence," which is much less helpful.

The trouble with "essential equivalence," a standard which emerged from the Senate in the course of the ratification of SALT I, is that no one has any objective way of knowing what it requires. It is generally agreed that it cannot and should not mean equality of all sorts, on all measurements, between U. S. and Soviet

forces. The two countries have quite different military preferences, capabilities, and even doctrines of sufficiency. Thus essential equivalence leads rapidly to subjective matters of "perception," and also to criteria, like equal numbers of launchers, which themselves are quite undefining. Thus the discussion of this subject, even in the hands of a Harold Brown, is inescapably murky. General Maxwell Taylor seems to me correct in his conclusion that whatever real military meaning there is in "essential equivalence" is subsumed under the concept of "credible and high-confidence deterrence," and that any strategic deployment beyond what that concept requires is likely to be wasteful. I agree with General Taylor that a self-confident and self-respecting nation should be able to avoid spending large sums for such essentially nonmilitary purposes, and that in fact such an action "could suggest to observers, not determination, but rather the lack of assurance of the frontier tenderfoot in the Western movie who carries two oversized guns to town to demonstrate his readiness for 'high noon'."² Obviously our forces must be designed to maintain effective deterrence in the light of what the Soviet Union has and can expect to have. In this sense there is a deep and real relation to be monitored, and to be controlled by SALT where possible. But this real relation between forces is confused, not clarified, by trying to make out of essential equivalence anything different from credible deterrence. In the rest of this analysis I shall be assuming that if we have highly credible deterrence we have all we can expect and all we should want. I think a force that 'clearly meets this standard will seem easily sufficient to most Americans. If it must be called essentially equivalent too, no basic harm is done—but the nomenclature should not be allowed to add cost to confusion.

The second point to be made from the history of the nuclear age is that while the capacities of those involved have changed in all sorts of ways, the fact is that deterrence has worked, in all directions, since 1945. It is indeed a balance of terror, but as Bernard Brodie repeatedly and wisely reminds us, it has not, on the record, been delicate. The one moment of relatively high danger, the Cuban Missile Crisis, proves the rule, for in that case no one on either side appears to have come close to giving, or recommending, an order for nuclear action; it was precisely because of their well justified fear of any such action that the main actors on both sides were so cautious. While occasional careless retrospective comments could suggest that nuclear decisions were near, the facts are opposite. Whatever the generals in various countries have said in support of their preferred systems or their as-

2. Maxwell D. Taylor, *AEI Defense Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 22.

served doctrines, both the words and the actions of civilian leaders (if we exclude occasional bluff and bluster from Nikita Khrushchev) have shown a respectful awareness that *these weapons are different*.³ Indeed the political and psychological protections created by this historical record are a salutary reinforcement to military deterrence. There is evidence of this protective force in every conflict or contest since 1945 between a nuclear and a nonnuclear state, as well as in the deeply cautious behavior of both superpowers in the long series of crises that have found them aligned on opposite sides. Moreover, it is not certainties that have created all this caution; it is what *might* happen. If the criterion of credible deterrence is amply met by objective standards, as I believe it is and should be for the foreseeable future, then, on the historical record, its effectiveness will be further reinforced by what all rational leaders know about the awful power of nuclear weapons and the risk of setting them loose.

Against this background let me now turn to a number of propositions around which one might hope to build agreement.

For effective deterrence the strategic nuclear forces of the United States do not need to be more powerful than they are now.

The validity of this proposition is suggested in the first instance by the fact that those advocating new weapons systems today only rarely base their claims on the need for larger destructive capability. The number of our strategic warheads is still rising, as missiles with more vehicles in them are deployed, and those warheads are also still gaining in accuracy. But these are simply marginal gains that have been unconstrained by the rules of SALT. They are not crucial issues in any present or prospective debate.

This proposition is not as weak as it may seem to many of those who believe, as I do myself, that our numbers of warheads, and their yields, in fact exceed what we really need, for we must recognize that among Americans as a whole there is a strong and simple desire not to fall "behind" the Russians. Over the last fifteen years the Soviet Union has mounted a massive and sustained expansion and modernization of its offensive strategic nuclear forces—a process little constrained by SALT. It has long since overtaken us on such measures as missile throwweight; it is likely to overtake us in ICBM warhead numbers, and it gives

3. Authoritative and persuasive evidence supporting this view of what Soviet leaders think was marshalled by Raymond Garthoff in this journal (Volume III, Number 1).

every sign of catching up in accuracy. In this context the absence of any general desire for bigger, as distinct from better, systems bespeaks a considerable sobriety among us. People do not want to fall "behind," but there is no great momentum in favor of matching the Soviet Union pound for pound or even warhead for warhead. We have already accepted Soviet superiority in capacity for mindless first-strike mass destruction. This situation is caused by heavily excessive Soviet missile throwweight, and it is insensitive to any changes proposed by anyone, up or down, in the U. S. force level. If this egregious capability could confer something called "escalation dominance," as some have suggested, it would have done so already. Conversely, if there is no escalation dominance in this overbuilt force today, there need be none over the next decade. Our own overabundant and survivable deterrent will remain, and that is what counts.

These realities are related also to the essential stability of the balance of terror and the deep incentive for both sides to avoid dangerous encounters. It is quite true that in this situation there can be political questions about the credibility of the deterrent in such important cases as the maintenance of the nuclear umbrella for NATO. But that credibility cannot in fact be altered by marginal changes in the strategic balance. It must be maintained in the future as in the past by other means—by the believable military presence and strong political will of the United States, and also, though in a quite different way, by the will of the European members of the alliance. Those who think that either political will or less-than-nuclear strength is unimportant in such matters will find instruction in considering the record of Yugoslavia under Tito. If Tito could stave off the Soviet Union, must NATO fail? The question cries shame to prophets of doom.

The maintenance of three distinct strategic weapons systems is good insurance against nasty technological surprises.

The current TRIAD of land-based ICBMs, ocean-going submarines, and manned aircraft is the product not of theology but of history; each of these three weapons systems was adopted in the 1950s and the essential balance among them was set in the early 1960s. The word TRIAD became current only in the 1970s; it has acquired a life and luster of its own, but it makes sense to go past the word to the real decisions which underlie it.

We built three systems because we thought each of them, in its own different way, was a system that could be relied on to survive any first strike and reply as the President might decide. Any one system, we knew, might become vulnerable

as time passed, and in 1960-61 no one could foretell which one it might be. What we did know was that in an age of technological acceleration it would be unwise to place all our eggs in one basket when for a relatively modest price we could have three, each posing very large problems to anyone who wished to neutralize it.

Thus we bought redundancy of survivable systems, and it is right that we should seek to sustain that redundancy over time. We do not need all these survivable systems all the time; any two that are still reliable constitute a massive deterrent. But if the survivability of any one is coming to an end, it becomes only prudent to replace it, because in time technology may well produce another threat to another force.

Something needs to be done about Minuteman vulnerability.

Our Minuteman force was developed in the late 1950s as a solid-fuel, quick-reaction, hard-site system essentially invulnerable to the first-strike capabilities of any other nation. It was an excellent system in its time, a pathbreaker for the missile age. It is therefore no trivial matter that over the next five years or so the Minuteman system as it now stands will become vulnerable to a preemptive first strike from the Soviet Union. By then Soviet ICBM warheads will have a number, size, and accuracy such that a fraction of the total force might overwhelm Minuteman. It is true, as Kissinger and Brown among others have argued, that it would be a risky and uncertain business to mount such an attack in the light of (1) the absence of any experience anywhere with massive simultaneous nuclear launchings, and (2) the certainty of large-scale collateral destruction and death. Although Soviet accuracy is improving faster than was expected when Steinbruner and Garwin wrote their powerful paper scouting the real danger to Minuteman in 1976, much of their argument about the uncertainties in any mass attack remains valid.⁴ It is also true that the threat to Minuteman has its parallel in a growing threat to Soviet ICBMs from our own improving accuracy, and with no sign of Soviet panic on the point. Nonetheless it is certain that we would not today design or build a system with any such vulnerability as that which faces Minuteman, and it is no longer plausible that our best course is to leave it as it is. It is going to be vulnerable in a way that our other two systems are not. It will have served us well for twenty years; it is time to arrange its replacement.

4. See *International Security*, Volume I, Number 1, pp. 138-181.

The current strategic capabilities of the United States are such that we have plenty of time to deal with Minuteman vulnerability.

I repeat that the TRIAD exists for redundancy, not for the sake of the certain survival of all three systems at all times in all circumstances. The prospective vulnerability of Minuteman requires us to ask, for the long run, what we will do about it, but it does not create any early danger unless there is a parallel threat to one or both of our other systems, or unless those other systems are incapable of strategic deterrence without help from Minuteman. Neither condition holds today.

The technical demonstration that neither submarines nor aircraft face early vulnerability is complex, and it seems best here to fall back on authority: the repeated assessment of both civilian and military authorities over the last two Administrations, and the absence of any proposal that these two systems be given up, even from the most earnest believers in Present Danger. There has been no serious challenge to the general view that with prudent modernization (like air-launched cruise missiles for the airborne arm) these systems will be strongly survivable for at least a decade.

Once we accept the survivability of the submarine and airborne elements of the TRIAD, we can allow ourselves to consider their deterrent strength—and it turns out that each of them, independently, has much more than enough explosive strength, just in its alert elements, to constitute a deterrent, and indeed a deterrent in depth. A relatively simple calculation, familiar to the experts, makes the point clearly.

Let us take as a base the concept of equivalent megatons (EMT), here defined as $N \times Y^{\frac{1}{3}}$, where N is the number of warheads and Y is yield in megatons. Thus one warhead of one megaton is rated equal to five separate warheads of forty kilotons each ($1 \times 1 = 5 \times .04^{\frac{1}{3}}$). This measure takes reasonably good account of the value of accurate smaller warheads and the value of avoiding overkill in warheads too large for their targets. It reflects the kind of assessment that has led us to prefer Minuteman III, with three warheads publicly reported at 170 kilotons each, over Minuteman II, with a single less accurate weapon in the one megaton range.

Let us next assume, with Secretary Brown, that *one* of the most important things we want to retain is the assured capacity to inflict a level of destruction on the Soviet Union that its leaders would never wish to invite, or even to take a chance on. My personal belief is that this level of deterrence would be reached if even a small number of large Soviet cities were faced with thermonuclear catastrophe. That judgment has not been widely shared in Congress or in any admin-

istration, although I find much support for it among those with a good claim to know what moves political men, as distinct from military planners, in the Soviet Union. But let me note this belief simply as a reminder of the awesome magnitudes we are discussing.

The following analysis is more orthodox and more appalling:

If "assured destruction" is defined as a level of destruction in each of the largest 200 Soviet cities averaging some ten times greater than what was done to Hiroshima, we get a requirement of about 200 EMT delivered on targets in those cities. Our submarine force at sea and the alert portion of our bomber force (assuming less than a 50 percent penetrability for its warheads) each can deliver more than 500 EMT. Thus we would need less than one-fifth of our survivable forces to carry out a mission of "assured destruction" of a magnitude that is surely great enough to attract the wary attention of any rational Soviet leader listening to any clever military briefer. Assuming effective command and control and flexible targeting, much the larger part of our surviving strength could be used in other ways, or held in reserve, to encourage a quick return to sanity. Or alternatively, and perhaps less madly, the assured destruction force itself could be held back. The point is not that we *would* do this terrible deed, but that we most assuredly *could*.

Stable deterrence in the age of bilateral strategic overarmament requires greatly increased emphasis on survivable and redundant command, control, communications, and intelligence, C³I in the new jargon.

When we had overwhelming strategic superiority, and when we first developed the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), to "prevail" in any general war, the primary objectives were only two—not to fire by mistake, and if we fired, to fire overwhelmingly; indeed the strategic gospel of the time was that any assignment of strategic weapons to special missions must be resisted because it would "degrade the SIOP." Now we have a different and more difficult third requirement: that we must have capabilities that will deter *through time*; a capability limited to a single massive spasm is simply not as credible for deterrence as a redundantly controlled and survivable set of forces.

This proposition is not new to 1979. In different ways it has been advanced for years (and especially clearly by Steinbruner and Garwin in the article already cited). The reason for giving it new emphasis now is its growing importance to the credibility of the deterrent in the context of growing Soviet capabilities. The more we can make it clear that our capacity for decision and action will

survive any assault, the less likely that assault. To put it another way, the greatest single threat to the strategic deterrent is the threat to its nervous system and its brain. No deterrent dollars will carry more conviction to friend and adversary alike than those spent on our real need for greatly strengthened C³I. This is also a far better way of dealing with questions of perception and will than building weapons that would have no justification in terms of real military missions. On this issue the emerging posture of the Carter Defense Department is excellent, but the amount of work to be done is large.

We should avoid all systems that require a hair-trigger decision from the President for their effectiveness.

We must avoid dependence on any doctrine of launch-on-warning. It is odd to find some ardent advocates of arms limitation defending this option as anything but a reasonable contribution to Soviet uncertainties while we go about replacing Minuteman. The right line of argument is surely that any system which could force a President to quick decision is *ipso facto* undesirable.

A good new system will be a bargain even if its initial cost is high.

Experts differ on the right way of measuring our strategic expenditures, but there is no difference on the historic fact that in constant dollars these expenditures went down dramatically—perhaps as much as 50 percent—between 1962 and 1977. In strategic procurement, in spite of the large cost overruns of TRIDENT, we have been coasting for many years.

Even a procurement expenditure of tens of billions on a new system would not take us back, in constant dollars, to the levels of strategic spending of the Kennedy Administration. It is true that much of the argument against such abandoned weapons as the B-1 has been related to their cost—but what was really wrong with the B-1 was that it was a very expensive way of doing what could be done better by air-launched cruise missiles. A good new leg to the TRIAD would have a wholly different value; it would be an expenditure contributing significantly to strategic stability, as Minuteman has in its time. It is sheer demagoguery to suggest that we cannot afford whatever we truly need in this field. Cost-effectiveness is a proper issue; cost as such is not.

There is no necessary conflict between a new survivable system and the SALT process; instead the two can reinforce each other.

As a believer in SALT, and in reductions of strategic weapons going far beyond anything now proposed for SALT II, I would oppose any new system that interfered seriously with the effort for strategic arms limitation. But diversity of systems is in itself no bar to large reductions in numbers, and the stabilizing effect of diversity should be as welcome to arms controllers as to everyone else. There is certainly a complexity, from the standpoint of verification, in any system that would hide the missile in one of a number of holes or multiple aiming points (MAP). Such a "shell game," especially if imitated by the Soviet Union, would force the negotiation of complex new arrangements for inspection. But in itself that is not a compelling objection if the system really does turn out to be survivable, cost-effective, and stabilizing. It is not the object of SALT, after all, to undermine anyone's deterrent, or to prevent redeployments that reduce instability.

More broadly, I think that what is good for the diversity and stability of the deterrent is also usually good for SALT. We negotiate better from confidence than from fear, and the better the quality of the deterrent, in stability, C³I, and diversity, the more we can afford to press for other kinds of agreed limitations.

It is easier to say that we need a replacement for Minuteman than it is to say what that replacement would be. But while the propositions I have put forth do not sharply define the nature of any new system, they do suggest some of its desirable characteristics:

1. It need not have a very large number of survivable EMT to serve its purpose. It is a renewal of insurance, not an increase of destructive power, that is needed. The currently proposed MX missile may well be bigger than what is needed by this standard.
2. It does not have to be land-based, but it does have to be quite different in its potential vulnerability from our long-range bombers and long-range submarines.
3. Any new system, like any continuing system, should be subject to highly effective, redundant, and flexible command, control and targeting.
4. It should also be free of any requirement for a hair-trigger decision to retaliate.
5. Any new system, like any existing system, should be subject to limitation or even abandonment in return for matching Soviet concessions in SALT.

I do not here take the argument further. My impression of the current debate

over alternative new systems is that so far it has been too much contained within the rather narrow bureaucratic confines of a search for something that the Air Force will like. I believe it will turn out that the most interesting, economical and stabilizing possibilities are to be found at sea, and in a system or systems so different from ocean-going submarines as to constitute a quite separate kind of survivable force. I also believe that MAP may turn out to be unnecessarily costly, environmentally unpopular, and an object of political derision. But these hunches are not my present point. I am arguing instead—against what I as an individual might wish or even choose—for the reinforcement of our basic deterrent by the best new third system we can design. In the larger view I believe that this relatively modest new investment is one which is likely to win both deserved acceptance for SALT II and renewed national confidence in a strategic deterrent which remains very cheap indeed when compared to what it helps prevent.

As a sketch thrown out by a single individual this argument is obviously open to improvement. Moreover, we are concerned here not only with what makes sense, but with what Americans can agree on as sensible, which is at once a more important and a more flexible test. But unless the whole notion of an agreed middle ground is misguided, specific weaknesses in the argument become nothing but a challenge to do better. It has become common in recent years, among friendly foreign observers of our strategic controversies, to remark that the Americans would really rather quarrel with each other than try to frame a common platform for strategic stability. The possessors of embattled positions, like the advocates or opponents of particular future weapons, are only too often more concerned with their own special interest (in the most literal sense of that phrase) than with the need for a sound and strongly supported national posture. But it will be little more than a lucky accident if good results come from such hot-tempered contests. My belief is that we can do much better if we start from what most of us can accept. I have tried to think and write in that spirit.

Arms Control Enters the Gray Area

Robert Metzger and
Paul Doty

If a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is reached and ratified, ceilings and subceilings will have been placed on the number of launchers from which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could attack each other over intercontinental distances. If the SALT process is then to continue, the reductions in such ceilings and subceilings becomes an obvious goal of further negotiations. Since both national leaders have endorsed reductions in numbers on numerous occasions,¹ it is even more likely that this will be a central feature of negotiations when they resume after SALT II.

Yet, progress in reductions could be an illusion if at least a start is not made in bringing weapons of lesser range under control. These are the gray area weapons that can reach targets 400 to 2,000 miles or more distant from the point of launch. For the most part these weapons are concentrated in Europe and the western military districts of the Soviet Union. These gray area weapons unconstrained by either SALT² or MBFR³ consist of a wide array of medium bombers, fighter-

1. A number of quotations from both the U.S. and Soviet leadership are given in P. Doty, *Daedalus*, 104, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 73-4. The U.S. SALT proposals of March 1977 included "deep" cuts in MIRVed ICBMs and moderate overall cuts. Soviet response indicated that such cuts should be negotiated in SALT III.

2. SALT has dealt with U.S. and Soviet central strategic systems including ICBMs of intercontinental range (greater than 5500 km), SLBMs carried on "modern" ballistic missile submarines, "heavy" bombers, and, most recently, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried on heavy bombers.

Pursuant to a revised Protocol to the 1972 Interim Accord, dated August 3, 1974, only ballistic missile submarines developed after 1964 are considered "modern" ballistic missile submarines, except that retrofitting new SLBMs on boats developed prior to 1964 causes such boats to qualify as "modern." Twenty diesel-powered *Golf*-class SSBs, which entered service beginning in 1958, are not "modern" and hence are excluded from Interim Accord strictures on SLBM launchers.

3. MBFR has not dealt at all with nuclear- or nuclear-capable systems based in Soviet territory, as the MBFR negotiations affect only active duty air and ground forces deployed in the so-called "agreed reductions area"—Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia and Poland. Other direct participants in the negotiations are the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and the U.S.S.R.—as their forces are stationed in the reductions area. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Europe: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks* (Oct. 1978).

NATO's "Option III" proposal at MBFR has introduced a small fraction of Western theater

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bombers, carrier aircraft, intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. With these each side can deliver several thousand nuclear weapons against the other. Although these forces are small compared to the central strategic forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., their destructive potential, military relevance and political impact are enormous.⁴ Moreover, the further growth of these gray area systems could obviously outrun reductions that might be negotiated in the central balance.⁵ Finally, Soviet spokesmen have made it known that the Soviet acceptance of equal ceilings for central strategic weapons at Vladivostok and in the SALT II Draft Treaty—while neglecting limits on forward based NATO aircraft or compensation for the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France—was possible only because of the relatively high ceilings involved: subsequent reductions would require agreed upon limits on weapons systems of intermediate range that could reach their homeland.

Meanwhile Western Europeans have become more conscious than before of intermediate range weapons⁶ capable of reaching their territories. A major stimu-

nuclear weapons into the MBFR negotiations. Option III calls for, as a first phase, U.S. withdrawal from the reductions area of 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft, 36 *Pershing* ballistic missiles (with a range estimated at about 440 nm.), 1000 tactical nuclear weapons and 29,000 U.S. ground force personnel. The Soviet Union would be required to withdraw five army divisions (a total of 68,000 troops) and 1700 tanks. *Id*; cf., N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1977, at 1.

4. Gray area systems are of direct importance to the security of the continental United States. Press reports in November, 1978, indicated that the Soviet Union had shipped to Cuba 18-20 MiG-23 tactical aircraft. Whether these aircraft are capable of ground-attack missions with nuclear weapons is not publicly known at the time this article went to press. Two Soviet gray area systems in the U.S.S.R., the *Backfire* bomber and, to a lesser extent, the SS-20 ballistic missile pose at least a theoretical threat to the United States even though outside the limits imposed by SALT. The *Backfire* is a greater potential threat to the United States than the SS-20. The consensus of expert opinion is that the *Backfire* can attack some targets in the U.S. through adjustments to operational variables, including forward basing, flight profile, payload, use of refueling, or use of standoff ballistic or cruise missiles. Collateral restraints, as may be agreed upon by President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev, may alleviate the risk of intercontinental capability to some extent.

Whether the SS-20 threatens U.S. targets is less clear. If off-loaded from three to one re-entry vehicle, some analysts believe the SS-20 acquires intercontinental range. The SS-20 also could reach American targets if fitted with the SS-16 third stage (the SS-20 is the first two stages of the SS-16 ICBM). However, the United States reportedly has insisted that SALT II contain a ban on SS-16 deployment, in part to forestall the risk that the SS-20 could be equipped with the SS-16 "front end."

5. For example, if *Backfire* deployments to the Soviet LRAF reach the level of 400 predicted, and each aircraft is assumed capable of delivering a 1 MT. warhead upon six separate U.S. targets, an increment of 2400 deliverable megatons is added to Soviet forces limited by SALT II.

6. For purposes of this article, "intermediate range" systems have a range between 1950 km. (1050 nm.) and 5500 km. (2950 nm.). "Medium-range" systems are those between 300 km. (160 nm.) and 1950 km.

lant has been the increased capability of recent Soviet deployments: the SS-20 mobile ballistic missile, the new SU-19 *Fencer* and MiG-27 *Flogger* aircraft and the *Backfire* bomber. In some Western European circles this has created a felt need for a visible response in the form of new weaponry, particularly ground launched cruise missiles, as a counter-balance. Such considerations have led to a search for a methodology or framework within which the deployment of nuclear weapons of intermediate range in the European theater (including the Western U.S.S.R.) could be assessed and arms control options defined.

Thus it is that both Soviet concerns and Western fears converge on the gray area systems, the weapons that neither SALT nor MBFR have addressed. Indeed, to the extent that SALT succeeds in stabilizing the central nuclear balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., it can transfer the competition downward to the next level, that of intermediate range systems, if these are left unattended.

The object of this article is to assemble relevant information on these gray area systems in both West and the East, and to examine the means and the extent to which they might be brought under control rather than be left to become the vehicles of an alternative arms race in the twilight zone between intercontinental strategic and short-range tactical nuclear forces. We shall refer to these weapons and their launchers as long-range theater nuclear (LTN) forces with the understanding that the lower range limit is 400 to 1,000 n.m. (nautical miles) and the upper limit is 1,000 to 3,000 n.m. Moreover, despite the reliance on the U.S. strategic forces to deter the U.S.S.R. from resorting to the use of nuclear weapons against Western Europe there is a continuing concern with the extent to which LTN forces in Western Europe should be focused on this same deterrent mission, that is being able to reach significantly into Soviet territory. And, the improved capability of new Soviet weapons to reach all of Western Europe obviously stimulates concern over whether or not the West should seek to match or offset this growing capability.

Before proceeding we should stress our own bias: that the use of even a few percent of the weapons being discussed could devastate Europe and Western U.S.S.R.; that it is the attempt to see if they can be brought under control and reductions negotiated that motivates our preoccupation with numbers; that such an exercise is highly abstract and artificial in that any conclusions that may be reached regarding balance or imbalance could not be put to the test without the involvement of much larger U.S. and Soviet strategic forces which would in turn make the original estimates quite academic. However, if assessments of this type—despite their artificiality—lead to some consensus and then to successful nego-

tiations, the possibility of political exploitation of alleged superiority would be greatly reduced and a cooperative exercise in restraint could be initiated in an area that has bred history's greatest wars.

The Context of Gray Area Systems in Europe

The concern with gray area systems is not new. The Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) and NATO have feared the threat of nuclear attack from the other side for more than two decades. And in that time the military doctrine on both sides has given nuclear weapons a central role, envisioning use after reverses in a conventional engagement, or in preemption in the expectation that the other side is about to change to nuclear warfare. Once the threshold is crossed, the pressure to expand the role of nuclear weapons to attack targets far behind the battle area will heighten, risking escalation to the use of long-range theater nuclear weapons, from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as the initiation of general nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Although the probability of this chain of events occurring remains extremely small, it is increasingly common to ascribe a political advantage of uncertain magnitude to that side which is the better equipped for this hypothetical contest.

It is in this context that several developments in recent years have increased the perceived importance of gray area systems.

For Western Europe the primary stimulant has been the decade-long improvement and modernization of Soviet forces to the East, particularly those gray area systems, capable of attacking Western European population and economic centers. At the conventional level Western technological superiority and the belated NATO decision to accelerate its modernization may counter the increased numbers, readiness and equipment of WPO forces. At the strategic level, essential equivalence may be enforced by SALT treaties. But in the gray area there is little in being to compensate for the high accuracy and reduced vulnerability of the SS-20 or for the wide ranging capability of *Backfire*. With about 50 SS-20 and 80 *Backfire* now on line, about two-thirds of which are assumed directed against Western Europe, a higher level of threat against Western Europe is developing. This trend is reinforced with an improved Soviet naval capability in European waters and continued modernization of Soviet air defenses. In contrast to earlier times, when alleged Soviet theater superiority could be explained as a counter-balance to U.S. advantage in intercontinental strategic capability, today continued Soviet investment in theater-force improvements must be viewed in the context of approximate strategic equilibrium.

The anxieties bred by this steady Soviet military buildup have been further fueled by developments in the SALT II negotiations and by doubts generated by U.S. behavior in alliance-related problems. The concern that SALT may adversely affect the European situation had been clearly stated by Chancellor Schmidt.

... strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities in military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.⁷

As decisions at SALT II have had increasing significance for the theater military balance, some in Western Europe have expressed doubt that the United States is adequately protecting Alliance interests in the negotiations.⁸ These doubts have been reinforced by the reported terms of SALT II. While these terms are not yet known, they may indeed limit the U.S. (as well as Soviet) production of some types of cruise missiles. However, the development and deployment of new intermediate range missiles and medium bombers would not be restricted, thereby allowing adequate flexibility for programmatic responses.

These concerns over SALT eroding European security resonate with the doubts never far below the surface in some quarters over the credibility of the American strategic guarantee.⁹ This condition has been aggravated by disputes in the trans-Atlantic relationship which have cast doubt on the certainty of American leadership notwithstanding President Carter's pledge of a three percent annual increase in defense expenditures for NATO.¹⁰ Disagreements between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany over nuclear exports, economic policy, the production of the neutron bomb and American petroleum imports have been particularly troubling.

This anxiety over the American commitment is not without precedent.¹¹

7. 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, delivered by Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 28, 1977, reprinted in *20 Survival* 2, at 3-4 (Jan.-Feb., 1978).

8. West German Defense Minister Apel, speaking in August, warned the United States that SALT II will leave Europe faced with an overwhelming potential in Soviet "gray area" weapons. *Baltimore Sun*, Aug. 29, 1978, p. A2. Apel said later that solving the "gray area" problem is "one of the most important security tasks confronting the NATO Alliance today." *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 18, 1975.

9. Cf., M. Wörner, "NATO Defenses and Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *Strategic Review*, 5, 13 (Fall, 1977).

10. Some Western European analysts are less than enthusiastic about American efforts to bolster conventional forces in the theater, believing such efforts as doomed to failure—because of the great Soviet advantage—and, worse, are likely to accelerate decoupling.

11. For example, during the debate over the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) there was considerable anxiety over Soviet "superiority" in theater nuclear systems and uncertainty

When nations view their security as dependent in large measure on the will of another nation, geographically remote, to defend them—even at the price of the defender's destruction—it is inevitable that those defended will question the certainty of their protection and seek assurance through independent military strength. This particular problem is exacerbated because those American systems which most exactly counter the Soviet theater nuclear threat—the 48-60 *Poseidon* submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) under SACEUR command—and which are most survivable and hence most credible as instruments of deterrence, are also the least *visible* manifestations of the American guarantee. The contribution of the SACEUR *Poseidons* to balancing the Soviet threat to Western Europe is also reduced by the operational barriers to employment of these weapons, and by the concern that their use in conflict would encourage escalation. At the least, although a formidable force by any standard, the SACEUR *Poseidons* may fail to satisfy the political and psychological requirement of *demonstrated* American resolve. Thus, there are pressures for the U.S. to field in Western Europe a new ground-based, intermediate-range, nuclear system. Yet, despite American development of the GLCM and the new initiative to field an extended-range (1500 km) version of the *Pershing* SRBM (called the *Pershing II* by 1983, doubts remain in Western Europe as to the ultimate willingness of the U.S. to deploy these new weapons if they would come at the expense of further progress at SALT.

Taking a longer view the Soviet Union has equal reasons to fear developments in NATO gray area systems. The *Poseidon* submarines have already multiplied by several times the nuclear capability of the *Polaris* SLBMs that they replaced. Substantial improvements in NATO forces are underway supported in part by an increase in U.S. defense funding in the NATO arena: the most thorough modernization of Western air forces since the end of World War II is in progress; NATO

over U.S. protection. A 1965 article in *Aviation Week & Space Technology* contained the following:

U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization commanders here and West German defense leaders in Bonn still are pressing for an additional nuclear weapon to counter the threat of 700 Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles pointing at Europe.

These top officials argue that the *Polaris* missiles on submarines and the intercontinental ballistic missiles based in the U.S. are neither as responsive nor as menacing as missiles based in Europe with enough range to hit Russian cities.

... West German leaders feel the MLF at last would give them some voice over the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. "We're not 100% convinced that if the Soviets attacked Germany the U.S. would launch its missiles," a West German spokesman said.

"Bonn Seeking Additional Nuclear Weapon," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Oct. 18, 1965, pp. 23-24.

deployment of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) seems imminent; longer range *Pershing* missiles capable of reaching a small portion of Soviet territory seem likely; and research and development proceeds on several types of theater cruise missiles which, if allowed by SALT II, could in time confront the Soviets with very large numbers of conventionally or nuclear armed weapons capable of reaching the western Soviet homeland. Moreover, the Soviet Union faces a slowly growing Chinese threat, a highly modernized but non-nuclear Iranian air force, the likelihood that Israel is nuclear-armed, and the possibility that India and Pakistan may go nuclear within the next decade. Thus, anxieties over unrestrained gray area systems in the 1980s cannot be purely a NATO monopoly.

The Long Range Nuclear Balance in Europe

Simply stated, the concept of a long range theater nuclear balance compares Western European-based nuclear systems capable of attacking targets in the Soviet Union with Soviet nuclear systems directed on Western Europe. As a concept it is not without serious flaws. But it recognizes and provides a means with which to assess a political-military reality: that Western Europe is at the peril of Soviet intermediate- and medium-range nuclear systems, that Western systems based in Western Europe or under NATO control threaten targets in the Soviet Union, and that all but a very small fraction of these weapons are excluded from present arms control restrictions.¹² Moreover, any analysis of this balance must recognize that the gray area problem is derivative in nature. No purely objective assessment of the balance of gray area weapons as such is possible; rather, in counting such weapons, they must be abstracted from the role they might play in a controlled nuclear exchange in Europe or the contribution they may make to general nuclear war.

Even with Western Europe there is no consensus on the existence of a separate Eurostrategic balance. Official French policy squarely opposes the concept. As stated by French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud:

The approach based on the concept of a Euro-strategic balance implies that there can be a separate balance of nuclear capabilities assigned to the European theater,

12. Certain weapons subject to SALT restrictions can fulfill Eurostrategic missions. A portion of the U.S. *Poseidon* SLBM force is known to be under the command of SACEUR. Similarly, a part of Soviet SLBM or ICBM forces, for example, the SS11, may be directed against theater targets.

isolated from other elements of deterrence. It leads to a "decoupling" which is precisely what we are trying to avoid. In other words, it would be tantamount to recognizing that the United States' central strategic forces do not cover Western Europe.¹³

French opposition to a Eurostrategic calculus reflects many of the arguments against the concept. Methodologically it is extremely difficult to determine exactly which forces should be assigned to a Eurostrategic balance.¹⁴ Inclusion of one *Poseidon* or several Soviet ballistic missile submarines, for example, "would be enough to upset this hypothetical balance."¹⁵ And, the Eurostrategic concept may be challenged for suggesting that U.S. central strategic forces are not aimed at many of the same targets as Eurostrategic weapons.

The utility of a "Eurostrategic" calculus does not require, however, satisfying all political or technical objections. No measurement can fully and accurately assess the complex, dynamic interactions among military systems and the disparate and military significance of opposing forces. Some analysts, recognizing the inherent artificiality of isolated distinctions among different levels of military forces—which, in their view, are unfortunate by-products of the East-West arms control process—advocate a comprehensive framework, a so-called "global balance," in which all manner of military forces would be integrated. If possessing analytic integrity, however, the implementation of this concept is methodologically intractable. The choice, then, is between manageable artificialities and unmanageable realities. A Eurostrategic balance is a useful concept because it provides a framework to assess the political and military implications of nuclear weapons in and targeted at Western Europe in a way that responds to psychological and political concerns. But it is useful only so long as its defects are recognized. To seek mathematical "parity" in the Eurostrategic balance would be a grave error, just as misleading as, for example, it would be to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union faces both geographically remote and geographically proximate threats, dictating systems of distinctly different capability than ours, while the West, in contrast, requires the capability (for deterrence) to destroy a set of targets located in a single geographical area—the Soviet Union. Failure to take this asymmetry into account could lead the West into expensive and pointless

13. Lecture by Louis De Guiringaud, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Three Aspects of French Foreign Policy: Defense, Detente, Disarmament*, at the Institute of Advanced National Defense Studies, Feb. 4, 1978, Release 78/35 of the Press & Information Division, French Embassy to the U.S., at 6.

14. *Id.*

15. *Id.*

efforts to "mirror image" specific Soviet peripheral attack systems, increasing the risk that European security would become decoupled from the U.S. strategic guarantee. In a similar way it would be imprudent to react in a mirror image fashion to imbalances that may turn up in assessments of the LTN forces in Europe.

Assessing the Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces

Before undertaking a comparison of LTN forces in Europe a number of considerations which affect the task of measurement must be addressed.

The main parameters of the LTN force assessment are the nuclear weapons delivery systems based in or near Western Europe capable of attacking targets in the Soviet Union and Soviet systems capable of attacking Western Europe. Beyond this enumeration it would be useful if the delivery systems could be weighted in some rough way proportional to the equivalent megatonnage they deliver and their performance factors, but this has not been attempted. The calculation of the balance is further affected by a variety of assumptions and variables difficult to quantify. The capabilities of particular weapons systems are often either ambiguous or highly elastic to operational variables.¹⁶ Finally, the decisive factor in setting the boundaries of the LTN weapons is *range* or, in the case of manned aircraft, *combat radius*.¹⁷

Here, establishing the boundaries of the balance is complicated by a *geographic asymmetry* between East and West. Weapons systems with a range (or radius) of only 400 nautical miles (n.m.), located in the German Democratic Republic or Western Czechoslovakia, can reach all of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and as far into France and the United Kingdom as London and Paris. Thus, included in the 400 n.m. arc from these launch points are much of the NATO command structure, key supply areas, ports, nuclear weapons storage sites and bases for NATO nuclear delivery systems. In contrast, NATO weapons based equally close to the East-West border with a 400 n.m. range can reach only as far as Warsaw and Budapest, leaving the Soviet Union untouched and most of the Warsaw Pact command structure, supply areas and intermediate-range nuclear weapons unaffected.

16. For combat aircraft, for example, important operational variables are ordinance load, flight profile, and speed. The combat radius of a tactical aircraft can be appreciably increased beyond that with a typical tactical weapons load by carrying only a single nuclear warhead, and by minimizing low-altitude and high-speed flight.

17. Range, or radius, are key determinants of a particular system's ability to cover the set of potential targets in the adversary's territory.

To possess approximately equivalent target coverage to Soviet 400 n.m.-range systems based in the G.D.R. or western Czechoslovakia, NATO weapons based in or launched from the F.R.G. require more than twice the range. With a 1,000 n.m. range, NATO systems can reach the Western military districts of the Soviet Union as well as Kiev and Leningrad. However, Moscow, Murmansk and the Black Sea ports lie beyond at a distance of 1,300 to 1,500 n.m.

Accordingly, included in our assessment of the balance are Soviet weapons with a range of 400 n.m. and NATO weapons with a range of 1,000 n.m. if based in the F.R.G. As some British and French independently controlled nuclear weapons are further removed from the East-West border, they are included in our assessment only if capable of 1,500 n.m. missions. In the tables discussed subsequently, we also include certain Western systems (principally tactical aircraft) with a nominal radius of 400-1,000 n.m. While these weapons are not counted in our assessment of the balance, conceivably they could contribute to Western capability if sent on one-way missions, launched from extremely forward sites, or (in a few cases) if lightly loaded while flying fuel-efficient flight profiles.

Of the several indexes that might be used to characterize the potential military usefulness of the LTN forces, we have opted for two: the number of launchers and the number of deliverable warheads. These are not only the most obvious indexes for counting but also provide the most likely approach to defining arms control options. The counting of launchers by categories is, of course, the same approach as used in SALT. But this was itself inadequate: hence, the additional step of separating MIRVed and unMIRVed missiles was taken and further categorization with respect to the number of warheads allowed per missile as the loading limit ALCMs on bombers is likely. The counterpart for our purposes is to provide a separate listing of the number of weapons normally loaded on each launcher (bombs on RVs).

A special problem arises in the gray area due to the deployment of dual purpose aircraft capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear bombs. At this stage it seemed appropriate to include all such aircraft in the nuclear inventory. This exaggerates somewhat the estimates of the number of bombs deliverable but such a bias seems permissible in early considerations and even the first stages of arms control.

It remains to be noted that the 480 weapons on 48 SACEUR commanded *Poseidon* missiles are counted as NATO weapons and deducted from U.S. central strategic forces totals. These weapons are included in the strategic inventory

limited by SALT treaties but this should be no cause for distinction.¹⁸ However, if a number of the Soviet Union's strategic missiles are similarly allocated to use in Western Europe, they cannot be entered in our inventory since such number is unknown. The Soviet LTN forces may be underestimated on this account. But any such reassignment would draw down their central strategic forces accordingly.

We have chosen to base our assessments of LTN forces on both numbers of launchers and numbers of deliverable nuclear warheads subject to the range criteria noted above. We believe it more realistic to give greater attention to warhead numbers, even though arms control may be more conveniently exercised through numbers of launchers. Numbers of warheads do emphasize target coverage while neglecting the differences in warhead yields,¹⁹ and, as is true of all "static" methodologies, this index fails to reflect important operational and doctrinal factors. Among these factors, which in the aggregate may shift the "true" balance from the calculated static balance, are pre-launch survivability, accuracy, reliability, employment doctrine and release procedures, command and control, probability of penetration, and forces held in reserve and reinforcement.

Significantly, our measurement assumes the scenario of an attritional war of escalation. Should either side depart from this assumption and attempt a preemptive attack without warning, the actual results of the battle could be radically shifted to favor the attacker. Soviet capability to destroy western theater-based nuclear assets with little tactical warning, impressive before the SS-20 and *Backfire* programs and not necessarily dependent on the exclusive use of nuclear weapons, is improving with the deployment of these new systems. While the Soviet hard-target, time-urgent capability against theater assets is disturbing,²⁰

18. That these *Poseidon* SLBMs are included in SALT limitations is not material to their effect upon the military capabilities of the West at issue in calculations of the Eurostrategic balance. Should gray area weapons become the focus of East-West arms control negotiations, the dual status of SACEUR *Poseidons* will be politically significant and may warrant some compensation in Soviet concessions at the bargaining table.

19. An aggregate number of deliverable warheads is not equatable to an identical number of vulnerable targets. To destroy some targets may require a number of warheads (depending on yield). On the other hand, warhead yield is an imprecise gauge of destructiveness as it fails to reflect accuracy of delivery, target hardness, and non-linear blast effects.

20. The preemptive threat may dictate design parameters for future Western systems to increase tactical warning and enhance pre-launch survivability. Introduction of the U.S. AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft will help provide tactical warning of low-altitude penetrating aircraft.

the preemptive threat should not be overstated. The essential weakness of the preemption scenario is the very high probability that *strategic* warning of at least a few days would be received prior to such an attack. Strategic warning of a few days would allow for dispersal of moveable assets, including theater nuclear warheads (from peacetime storage sites), tactical aircraft, and mobile missiles (including, if deployed, GLCMs).²¹ General Haig, SACEUR, has stated that recent Soviet improvements have "reduced but not eliminated warning time" and that the minimum expected warning of 48 hours is "at the bottom edge of reality with a more likely warning time being in the neighborhood of one or two weeks."²² Nor can Soviet planners neglect the possibility, however remote, that if confronted with unambiguous strategic warning, the preemptive initiative might be exercised by the United States.²³ Finally, a successful preemptive attack against Western Europe would leave unscathed U.S. central strategic forces. Even after a coordinated preemptive attack against Western Europe and the United States, significant numbers of U.S., British and French retaliatory forces (principally SLBMs and U.S. heavy bombers) would survive.²⁴ Soviet leaders can have no assurance these forces would not carry out their second-strike mission in the aftermath of a Soviet preemptive attack.

The comparatively simple counting scheme adopted here does not purport to be the kind of "dynamic" analysis which—in theory at least—takes into account

21. Some targets, of course, cannot be moved. Fixed "soft" targets include ports, staging areas, and airfields. Fixed "hard" targets—such as command, control and communications (C³) facilities and nuclear storage sites—will be vulnerable if not already so. And, it is generally acknowledged that further hardening of such facilities is a "dead end street" as no amount of hardening can protect targets located in the crater caused by detonation of a nuclear warhead. See "Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper," *Science*, Vol. 201 (Sept. 22, 1978), at 1102. Efforts should thus be made to provide alternate, secure and survivable C³, and to establish rapid procedures for dispersal of warheads from key depositories.

22. Interview, *U.S. News & World Report*, June 5, 1978, pp. 20–22.

23. Strategic warning minimizes the risk of pre-emption only if the warning is believed and acted upon when received. Moreover, dispersal of vulnerable assets does have the character of a mobilization, and could be interpreted by the Soviets as prefatory to a NATO preemptive initiative, or otherwise could induce the Soviets to accelerate the attack timetable. In this context, ironically, the SS-20 *adds* stability because its reduced vulnerability (through mobility) diminishes the incentives for NATO to seek to preempt. See Richard Burt, "The SS-20 and the Eurostrategic Balance," *The World Today*, (Feb. 1977), pp. 43–51, at 46. Hence, the prospect of strategic warning, while indicating circumspection in evaluating the significance of the preemptive threat, does not render such a contingency meaningless. Operational uncertainties also contribute to restrain the possibility Soviet decision-makers take the pre-emptive gamble.

24. Should the Soviets attempt preemption only in the European theater, the entire U.S. arsenal of "central strategic" forces could be used for "massive retaliation." Should the Soviets contemplate attack against the continental United States as well, the operational credibility of the theoretical vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs also may give pause to Soviet leaders.

the spectrum of operational and doctrinal factors. The temptation to introduce some dynamic modeling is always present, but dynamic analysis in the Euro-strategic context quickly succumbs to enormous scenario dependency and computational imprecision. For example, within each scenario, assumptions about each operational factor must be weighted by doctrinal inputs and various synergisms. The result is that the lure of the realism that attaches to dynamic analysis falls victim to the sensitivity of the results to the chains of assumptions involved. The simple procedure of static analysis has, furthermore, the comparative advantage of being communicable—among analysts, in negotiations and to the public. Thus, our examination of the gray area problem proceeds by means of a static accounting of deliverable weapons over appropriate ranges.

The Comparison of Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces

The relevant data are assembled in Tables I and II for Western forces and Soviet forces, respectively, for 1978 and for two projections to 1985, moderate and high. In both projections it is assumed the limits in SALT I and II are in force and the growth assumed reflects our interpretation of published reports. The first part of each table summarizes the strategic forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. so that the context in which the long range theater forces exist is clear.

It should be noted that in Table I 480 *Poseidon* warheads have been deleted from the U.S. strategic systems; they appear as the first entry in the second part of the Table. In Table I, following the inventory of central strategic systems, the LTN forces of the West are presented in two parts: those with ranges greater than 1,000 n.m. (U.S. and dual key) together with British and French systems of greater than 1,500 n.m. and all of those with ranges of 400-1,000 miles. This subdivision is not made on the Soviet side for the reasons stated earlier.

We have chosen low-estimates of bomb-loading for dual-capable aircraft to compensate for the low probability that all these aircraft would actually be used for deep penetration nuclear strike missions, and uncertainties as to the probability of how many of these aircraft (except the F-111 and *Backfire*)²⁵ can survive air defenses to penetrate to target. Projected force levels for 1985 assume that SALT II ceilings are in effect; "moderate" assumes either unilateral restraint or successful arms control initiatives; "high" growth assumes a period of worsen-

25. The *Backfire* and the SS-20 (if fitted with the third stage of the SS-16) are the principal such weapons. See note 4 and accompanying text, *supra*.

Table 1
Western Central Strategic & Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capability: Deliverable Warheads

	Weapons per vehicle	197B		1985 moderate		1985 high	
		Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs
Western Central Strategic Systems							
Paris A-3 SLBM	1	160	160	160	160	160	160
Poseidon C-3 SLBM ^a	10	448	4,480	224	2,240	212	2,120
Potent C-4 SLBM	10	0	—	376	3,760	376	3,760
Jan II ICBM	1	54	54	44	44	44	44
Auteman II ICBM	1	450	450	450	450	450	450
Auteman III ICBM	3	550	1,650	550	1,650	450	1,350
K ICBM	10	0	—	0	—	100	1,000
2 ^b	8	316	2,528	210	1,680	210	1,680
2 w/ALCM	24	0	—	122	2,928	64	1,536
Missile Carrier ^c	30	0	—	0	—	58	1,740
-111	5	65	325	65	325	65	325
Totals		2,043	9,647	2,201	13,237	2,189	14,165
European Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems with a Range/Radius in Excess of 1000 n.m.							
S. SACEUR							
Poseidon ^d	10 (MIRV)	48	480	48	480	60	600
S. F-111 E/F ^e	2	156	312	156	312	156	312
S. GLCM	1	0	—	0	—	540	540
S. SLCM (land-attack)	1	0	—	0	—	325	325
ance SLBM (M-2/M-20)	1	64	64	80	80	64	64
ance SLBM (M-4)	3 (MIRV)	0	—	0	—	32	96
ance IRBM (S-2/S-3)	1	18	18	18	18	18	18
ance LRCM	1	0	—	0	—	100	100
K. SLBM (Polaris) ^f	3 (MRV)	64	192	64	192	64	192
K. Vulcan B-2	2	48	96	0	—	0	—
K. LRCM	1	0	—	0	—	100	100
R.G. GLCM (dual key)	1	0	—	0	—	100	100
Totals		398	1,162	366	1,082	1,559	2,447
European Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems with a Range/Radius Between 400 and 1000 n.m.							
S. F-4/F-16 ^g	1	400	400	600	600	700	700
S. Pershing IIXR ^h	1	0	—	108	108	108	108
S. Pershing IA SSM	1	108	108	0	—	108	108
S. A-6E/A-7E/A-18 ⁱ	1-2	72	100	72	100	72	100
ance Mirage IV	1	37	37	37	37	37	37
ance VF/2000	1	30	30	60	60	60	60
ance Super Eternard	1	0	—	24	24	24	24

Table 1 (continued)

Western Central Strategic & Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capability: Deliverable Warheads

	Weapons per vehicle	1978		1985 moderate		1985 high	
		Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs
U.K. Buccaneer	1	50	50	0	—	50	50
U.K. F-4	1	14	14	14	14	14	14
U.K. Tornado	1	0	—	220	220	220	220
F.R.G. Pershing IA (dual key)	1	72	72	72	72	72	72
F.R.G. F-4 (dual key)	1	60	60	60	60	60	60
F.R.G. F-104 (" ")	1	144	144	0	—	0	—
F.R.G. Tornado (" ")	1-2	0	—	210	210	210	420
F.R.G. F-18L (" ")	1	0	—	0	—	48	48
Belgium F-104G	1	36	36	0	—	0	—
Belgium F-16	1	0	—	88	88	88	88
Denmark F-16	1	0	—	58	58	58	58
Greece F-4	1	n/a	—	56	56	56	56
Italy F-104 G/S	1	72	72	102	102	102	102
Italy Tornado	1	0	—	100	100	100	100
Netherlands F-104G	1	36	36	0	—	0	—
Netherlands F-16	1	0	—	102	102	102	102
Turkey F-4	1	49	49	71	71	71	71
Turkey F-104S	1	30	30	0	—	0	—
Totals		1,210	1,238	2,054	2,082	2,360	2,598
Grand totals		3,651	12,047	4,621	16,401	6,108	19,210

Notes to Table 1: These figures are all drawn from publicly available data. Relied upon primarily is *The Military Balance 1978-1979* (IISS 1978), although some additional authorities are noted below.

Introductory Definitions and Notes:

RVs: This is the abbreviation for "re-entry vehicles." For purposes of this table it refers to the number of separately targetable warheads carried by a MIRVed ballistic missile (except in the case of the U.K. *Polaris* SLMBs, as noted below) or to the number of nuclear weapons (bombs or air-to-ground missiles) which the authors estimate can be carried by particular aircraft. Estimates of weapons loading for aircraft reflect the authors' own assessment of aircraft size, payload capacity, and other factors. Both aircraft and missile launchers are assumed capable of only one mission (aircraft) or launch (missile). The estimates as to force loading and the assumption of no reloads or second missions must be recognized as introducing a range of error into the calculations. In addition, RV estimates for ballistic missiles assume a SALT II ceiling of 10 RVs for any ICBM (new or old) or new SLBM (i.e., deployed after the date of agreement), and an average of 10 RVs for U.S. *Poseidon* C-3 SLBMs even though this missile has been tested with 14 RVs at reduced range.

Range Classifications: In determining whether an aircraft with a nuclear weapon(s) load falls within a particular range category, the authors' estimates reflect conservative assumptions about the operational combat radius achievable by an aircraft flying in a high-threat environment in wartime. Aircraft range is elastic to many variables, including weapon(s) loading, flight profile, tactics, speed, availability of ECM (electronic countermeasures) protection, and so forth.

1985 Moderate and 1985 High Estimates: Both estimates assume a SALT II Treaty is agreed to, ratified by the United States, and that the Treaty remains in force through 1985. The 1985 *Moderate* Estimate, in particular, assumes no GLCM (Ground-Launched Cruise Missile) or SLCM (Sea-Launched, land-attack Cruise Missile) deployment by any Western power. This result could occur should the SALT II Protocol be extended to 1985 (or later), or as a result of political or budgetary decisions within the U.S., France, the U.K., or the F.R.G., or for other reasons. The 1985 *High* figure assumes the SALT II restrictions on GLCMs and/or SLCMs lapse and that the U.S. is able to provide some assistance to enable France, the U.K., and the F.R.G. to develop cruise missiles.

European Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems: Included in these tables are only those aircraft or missiles regularly stationed on a day-to-day basis in the European theater (or on board carriers operating off European shores). Hence, available reinforcements (through redeployment of forces stationed in the continental United States) are not counted. Note that the U.S. has announced plans to be able to treble the number of tactical aircraft in the European theater within one week.

a. Figures for *Poseidon* C-3 SLBM launchers assigned to the U.S. Central Strategic Systems category have been reduced by an amount equal to the number of launchers estimated to be assigned to SACEUR.

b. By 1985 a portion of the B-52 force may be replaced with an updated version of the F-111 (tentatively termed the F-111H) which would increase the percentage of the U.S. strategic bomber force capable of low-altitude penetration. As no decision has been taken to proceed with the F-111H, it is not included in the table; in any event its deployment would not affect significantly 1985 total force loadings of bomber-deliverable nuclear weapons (although the F-111H might improve upon the probability of penetration of bomber force mix).

c. Presently the U.S. is considering a number of candidate aircraft to supplement B-52Gs as launch platforms for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). Among the aircraft under study are those of 747 or DC-10 size (which could carry as many as 60 ALCMs) and smaller aircraft, the YC-15 and YC-16, capable of short takeoff but which would carry a far smaller number of missiles. The figure of 30 missiles per Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC) represents a compromise amount, and also reflects the possibility that SALT II may impact upon CMC force-loading.

d. The correct number of SACEUR-assigned *Poseidons* is not publicly known. While the figure of 60 missiles (or about 600 RVs) is often used, we have chosen for the 1978 and 1985 *Moderate* figures the lower estimate, also available in published sources, of 48 missiles. Cf., SIPRI, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives* (1978) 115 (noting the range in estimates). For the 1985 *High* Estimate we have used the figure of 60 SLBMs (600 RVs) and reduced correspondingly the total assigned to U.S. Central Strategic Systems.

e. One hundred fifty-six F-111E/F are presently based in the U.K. An additional 22 F-111F and 22 F-111E are based in the United States and could be redeployed rapidly to U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE). And, there are significant numbers of less-capable, earlier F-111 versions potentially available: 141 F-111A (of which about 40 may be refitted into the EF-111A electronic warfare version) and 96 F-111D.

f. The U.K. *Polaris* SLBMs carry triplet warheads of British design and manufacture. While not independently targetable (hence, MRVs and not true MIRVs), the triplet MRV does increase hypothetical target coverage and lethality.

g. The USAFE presently has deployed in Europe about 400 F-4 and 75 (not nuclear-capable) F-15 aircraft, in addition to the 156 F-111E/F previously noted. Many of the 400 F-4 on station are assigned to missions other than the Quick Reaction Alert role, so the exact number available for nuclear strike missions is difficult to specify. About 800 additional F-4C/D/E could be rapidly deployed to reinforce European deployments if current U.S. efforts to treble USAFE tactical aircraft (to 1900) within one week of mobilization are achieved. Additional F-15 deployments and the entry of the F-16 into service will increase, in theory at least, the number of aircraft available for nuclear delivery missions.

h. The *Pershing* II XR, according to current plans, would add to the present *Pershing* IA a third stage coupled with a radar area correlation guidance system to enable warhead delivery at

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ranges up to 1500 km (800 n.m.) with an accuracy of 120 feet CEP (circular error probability) or less. Initial operating capability might be as early as 1983 with an expedited program.

i. In the Mediterranean the U.S. Navy ordinarily maintains two aircraft carriers on station with the Sixth Fleet, each with 2 squadrons of about 24 F-4 or F-14 aircraft for combat air patrol and fleet air defense. Because of the importance of this mission in the high threat environment, these aircraft probably would not be used for nuclear strike roles. Nor, in all probability, would any of the 24 aircraft in the two squadrons of light-attack planes (A-7D or A-4M), because of insufficient target coverage. One squadron of 12 medium-attack A-6 A/E is also onboard; these do seem to have at least the range and the ordnance delivery capability to serve in deep penetration nuclear strike missions. Hence 24 A-6 aircraft are included in the estimate, one squadron from each of the two carriers in the Sixth Fleet. As for the Second Fleet in the Atlantic, assuming that four of the five carriers assigned to the fleet operate in the North Sea or Baltic areas, and that each of these contributes one squadron of A-6s to deep penetration missions, an additional 48 carrier-borne aircraft are included, for a total of 72. A-7E aircraft might also be used nuclear-strike missions, though with less reach and diminished effectiveness. Carrier-borne capability could be increased quickly with reinforcements. A total of about 240 A-6 aircraft are slated to be upgraded to A-6E variants, with highly sophisticated avionics to allow for long-range precision bombing.

ing East-West tension, a greater commitment of economic resources devoted to military development and procurement than at present, and efforts by the U.S. (and the Soviet Union, in the case of Table II) to maximize force loadings consistent with SALT strictures. The 1985 High Estimate assumes Western deployment of long range cruise missiles (LRCMs) account for the bulk of Western European-NATO growth during the 1978-1985 period. The 1985 Moderate Estimate, in contrast, includes an estimated 108 U.S. *Pershing* IIXR theater ballistic missiles, but does not include any ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) or ship launched cruise missiles (SLCM). An entirely new U.S. mobile medium-range ballistic missile (MMRBM) is possible in the late 1980s.

Table II presents corresponding data on Soviet nuclear forces. Again there are three classes of figures, but these differ from those in Table I. Figures for Soviet central strategic systems do not include any deletions for weapons committed to European targets. Apart from central strategic forces, Soviet LTN forces are separated into two categories: those dual-theater nuclear delivery systems with ranges in excess of 400 miles but deployed outside as well as inside the European theater and those deployed exclusively in the European theater. This distinction allows the first category to be reduced by an estimated factor to obtain the numbers deployed in the European mode. This is a rough estimate at best and does not take into account redeployment. However, it is useful to note that with minor shifts (SS-5 and SS-12) the second and third parts of Table II do become synonymous with those of Table I.

Table 2
Soviet Central Strategic & Long Range Theater Nuclear Capability: Deliverable Warheads

	Weapons per Vehicle	1978		1985 moderate		1985 high	
		Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs
Intercontinental (central) strategic							
SS-N-18 SLBM (early)	3	48	144	376	1,128	0	—
SS-N-18 SLBM (late) ^a	10	0	—	0	—	376	3,760
SS-N-17 SLBM	1	12	12	396	396	396	396
SS-N-8 SLBM	1	346	346	180	180	180	180
SS-N-6 SLBM Mod. 3	1	528	528	0	—	0	—
SS-N-5 SLBM	1	21	21	0	—	0	—
SS-X ICBM (SS-19 replacement)	10	0	—	100	1,200	150	1,500
SS-XX ICBM (SS-11 replacement)	1	0	—	200	200	200	200
SS-19 ICBM	6	200	1,200	370	2,220	320	1,920
SS-18 ICBM (lo-MIRV) ^b	8	110	880	240	1,920	0	—
SS-18 ICBM (hi-MIRV) ^b	10	0	—	0	—	240	2,400
SS-17 ICBM	4	60	240	110	440	110	440
SS-16 ICBM ^c	1	0	—	0	—	0	—
SS-13 ICBM	1	60	60	0	—	0	—
SS-11 ICBM ^d	1	780	780	105	105	81	81
SS-9 ICBM	1	190	190	73	73	73	73
Bomber-X (hypo- pothetical, W/ ALCM) ^e	24	0	—	0	—	50	1,200
Tu-(26) BACKFIRE w/ALCM ^f	14	0	—	0	—	74	1,036
Tu-95 BEAR	4	100	400	100	400	0	—
Mya-4 BISON	4	35	140	0	—	0	—
Totals		2,490	4,941	2,250	8,262	2,250	13,186
Dual-Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems with a Range/Radius Greater Than 400 n.m. (250 n.m. for SLBM/SLCM)							
SS-20 IRBM ^g	3	50	150	275	825	400	1,200
Tu-(26) BACKFIRE (LRAF) ^h	4	80	320	175	700	350	1,400
GOLF-I SSB w/SS-N-4 SLBM ⁱ	1	27	27	0	—	0	—
GOLF-II SSB w/SS-N-5 ⁱ	1	33	33	0	—	0	—
SS-N-3/12 SLCM ^j	1	324	324	296	296	384	384
SS-12 SSM ^k	1	72	72	0	—	72	72
SS-4 MRBM	1	500	500	300	300	300	300

Table 2 (continued)

Soviet Central Strategic & Long Range Theater Nuclear Capability: Deliverable Warheads

	Weapons per Vehicle	1978		1985 moderate		1985 high	
		Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs	Launchers	RVs
SS-5 IRBM	1	90	90	50	50	50	50
Tu-16 BADGER (LRAF) ^l	2	305	610	0	—	305	610
Tu-22 BLINDER (LRAF) ^m	2	136	272	136	272	136	272
Totals		1,617	2,398	1,232	2,443	1,997	4,288
European Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems with a Range/Radius Between 400 and 1000 n.m.							
Su-19 FENCER A	2	190	380	250	500	250	500
I1-28 BEAGLE	1	100	100	0	—	0	—
MIG-27 FLOGGER B/D/F	1	200	200	300	300	300	300
Su-17/20 FITTER C	1	200	200	300	300	300	300
Totals		690	880	850	1,100	850	1,100
Grand Totals		4,797	8,219	4,332	11,805	5,097	18,574

Notes to Table 2: These figures, which must be regarded as provisional, represent the authors' best estimates drawing from publicly available data. Relied upon primarily is *The Military Balance 1978-1979*, although some additional authorities are noted below.

Introductory Definitions and Notes:

RVs and Range Classification: Refer to the first two notes to Table 1. Note, in addition, that in the absence of a SALT II limit on fractionation, the Soviet advantage in ICBM throw-weight theoretically could be exploited to increase beyond 10 the number of MIRVed warheads carried on large missiles such as the SS-18.

1985 Moderate and 1985 High Estimates: Both estimates assume a SALT II Treaty is agreed to, ratified by the United States, and that the Treaty remains in force through 1985. An overall limit of 2250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) is thus assumed in this Table, effective in 1980 or 1981. Sublimits of 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs (1320 including cruise-missile equipped bombers) are also assumed. And, accordingly, the Soviet Union is assumed to be allowed to deploy one new MIRVed ICBM (referred to as the SS-X in the Table) and one new single-RV ICBM (the SS-XX). If the *Backfire* is equipped with an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), it is counted as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle against the SNDV ceiling. Generally, both the *moderate* and *high* projection assume the Soviets will seek to increase sea-based deliverable warheads, by equipping a large portion of its ballistic missile submarine force with MIRVed SLBMs, and both estimates assume a continuing modernization program. The *1985 high* estimate is premised upon proportionately greater development effort and higher expenditures throughout the 1979-1985 period. Thus, for example, while the *1985 moderate* estimate credits the SS-N-18 SLBM with 3 RVs, the *1985 high* estimate allows for 10 warheads per MIRVed SLBM. And, only the latter estimate assumes a Soviet ALCM or a new Soviet bomber (*Bomber-X*).

Dual-Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems: Each of the weapons in this category have peripheral attack capability such as to allow use against targets other than those located in the European theater. Some portion of these forces, in the aggregate, are probably dedicated to countering other potential peripheral threats or otherwise held in reserve. In our analysis in the text, we suggest

that one-third of these dual-theater forces may be considered as directed against non-European targets; this estimate may be wrong in either direction. Note that the SS-20 and *Backfire* may have some potential capability against targets in the continental United States. See note 4 to text.

European Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems: These figures for tactical aircraft represent the authors' estimate of the number of such aircraft capable of nuclear-attack missions deployed in either the Western Military Districts of the U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe. Many uncertainties contribute to the possibility that these estimates are in error in either direction. Among the uncertainties are: wide variation in Western published data concerning deployments; the possibility of redeployment and reinforcement, availability of aircrews trained in nuclear weapons delivery techniques; and the difficulty in estimating future Soviet production plans.

a. The SS-N-18 SLBM has not been tested with ten warheads, but fractionation to ten RVs could be achieved, in theory at least, by 1985. The U.S. *Poscidon* C-4 SLBM has been tested with as many as 14 warheads.

b. *The Military Balance 1978-1979* indicates the Mod. 2 warhead for the SS-18 contains eight 2 MT. warheads. While some SS-18 may carry the Mod. 1 re-entry vehicle (a singlet warhead of 18-25 MT. yield), all SS-18s are assumed MIRVed. To the authors' knowledge, the SS-18 has not been tested with ten RVs, but the high throw-weight (16-20,000 lb.) of this "heavy" ICBM is sufficient to carry many more RVs than the ten reportedly allowed by SALT II.

c. The mobile SS-16 ICBM has been produced and is ready for deployment in silos, but reportedly the Soviet Union has agreed at SALT II not to deploy this system. See note 4 to text.

d. Some SS-11 ICBMs may be directed towards targets on the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addition, some SS-11 may be equipped with the Mod. 3 re-entry vehicle with a triplet MRV. *The Military Balance 1978-1979* reports the SS-11 force is converting to SS-17 and SS-19, both of which have been tested with MIRVs and hence will be counted as MIRVed delivery vehicles for SALT II purposes.

e. At present there has been no official confirmation of the development or even the existence of either a new Soviet bomber or a Soviet ALCM, although the fiscal 1979 Department of Defense Posture Statement anticipates both and notes a Soviet ALCM is expected within 5-10 years. It is assumed a new bomber with ALCM would fall within SALT II limits on SNDVs and within the 1320 ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and cruise missile-equipped aircraft.

f. While it is not expected that the *Backfire* will be covered by the SALT II agreement, and instead would be subject to certain "collateral restraints" on basing and refueling (for example), it is assumed that a *Backfire* equipped with (as yet hypothetical) ALCMs would come within SALT II restrictions.

g. The estimate of 50 deployed SS-20 IRBMs represents a compromise figure. *The Military Balance 1978-1979* contains an estimate of 100, a figure which seemed high to the authors as initial deployment was confirmed by the Defense Department only in December, 1977. Another source contained a figure of "20+" deployed as of March 1978. *Air Force Magazine*, at 52 (March, 1978).

h. The estimate of 80 *Backfire* is also a compromise figure, and includes only those aircraft assigned to the Soviet Long Range Air Force (LRAF) but not *Backfire* in service with the Soviet Naval Air Force (NAF). *The Military Balance 1978-1979* estimates 50 *Backfire B* deployed with LRAF, and 30 with NAF. *Air Force Magazine* indicates delivery of about 100 of the aircraft to the LRAF and the NAF (one-third to the latter). The 1985 moderate figure of 175 assumes *Backfire* production limits of about 2.5 aircraft per month through to mid-1985, with one-third of these aircraft going to the NAF. The 1985 high figure of 400 assumes production at between 2.5 and 3.0 per month for the duration of the SALT II Protocol period and production at a rate of about 90 per year thereafter. Two-thirds of the aircraft produced are assumed assigned to the LRAF.

i. The SLBMs on these submarines are not considered strategic missiles for purposes of the SALT I limits. See note 2 to text. Some Golf-class SSBs (diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines) are known to be based in the Baltic. These SSBs are assumed retired by 1985.

j. The SS-N-3 *Shaddock* sea-launched cruise missile is thought to be guidance-limited to a range of about 250 n.m., and can carry a thermonuclear warhead of about 1 MT. yield. Some of these missiles are probably intended for maritime targets rather than land-attack. A successor

missile under development, the SS-N-12, is expected to have slightly better range and accuracy. The figure of 324 launchers assumes 29 *Echo II* SSGNs (nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines) with eight missiles per boat, 16 *Juliett*-class SSGs (diesel-powered) with four missiles per boat, six *W-Long Bin* SSGs with four missiles per boat, and two *W-Twin Cylinder* SSGs with two missiles per boat. The 1985 *moderate* figure assumes the older *W*-class boats are retired and not replaced; the 1985 *high* figure assumes construction of an additional eleven *Echo II*-type SSGNs, and retirement of the *W*-class boats. Neither estimate includes SS-N-3/12 launchers on surface ships, on the premise that counting *all* of the SLCMs on SSGNs or SSGs balances out that portion of the missiles on Soviet surface ships which might be used to attack land targets.

k. The SS-12 SSM has a maximum range of about 450 n.m., according to published estimates. Forward deployment in Eastern Europe would be required to achieve significant target coverage of Western Europe.

l. Not included in this figure are the approximately 280 TU-16 attached to the Soviet NAF, or 94 configured for electronic countermeasures (ECM) or 22 configured for reconnaissance. (These figures are drawn from *The Military Balance 1978-1979*, which estimates 75% of the TU-16s with the LRAF are based in European Russia). Another source indicates that 283 TU-16s are oriented toward the European theater, 203 of these bomber versions (the remainder being tankers, ECM or reconnaissance aircraft), with 144 oriented to China. See R. Berman, *Soviet Air Power in Transition* (Brookings, 1978).

m. The 40 TU-22s attached to the NAF are not included in this figure. Also excluded are TU-22s configured for reconnaissance. Berman, *op. cit.*, estimates 98 TU-122s attached to LRAF are oriented towards European targets.

No non-Soviet (i.e., WPO) systems are included, though there is some possibility Pact aircraft could be used on nuclear missions as there have been published reports suggesting some Pact air crews have been trained in nuclear attack delivery techniques. Estimates of Soviet central strategic force loading in 1985 assume a SALT II limit on extensive fractionation of MIRV loadings. We assume no more than ten RVs on any deployed ballistic missile. It is also assumed that SALT II allows the Soviets one new MIRV'd ICBM (the SS-X ICBM in the Table, replacing the SS-19) and one new un-MIRV'd ICBM (the SS-XX ICBM in the Table, replacing the SS-11).

All figures are drawn exclusively from public sources and represent the authors' own estimates, where differences occur. The IISS publication, *The Military Balance—1978-1979*, has been the principal source. Most figures used are approximations of forces in place as of July 1978. See also Notes to Tables.

An attempt to interpret some of the data in Tables I and II is presented in Figures 1-3.

In Figure 1 the 1978 estimates of deliverable warheads are sketched. The outermost bars represent the central strategic inventory of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In the center are the LTN forces. On the left is shown the Western deployments: 1,238 (shaded) plus 1,162 of shorter range which we argue should not be included in the LTN comparison because of the geographical asymmetry discussed earlier. On the right is shown the Soviet/Pact deployments. These consist of the

Figure 1
Comparison of Long Range Theater Nuclear Delivery Capability (No. of Weapons)—1978




Figure 2
Western strategic and long range European theater nuclear weapons

Soviet strategic, long range European theater and other theater nuclear weapons





Figure 3 Western strategic and long range nuclear-capable delivery systems



warheads deliverable by European committed systems, 880, plus that portion deliverable by the dual-theater systems. Our estimate is that two-thirds of this latter number, i.e., 1,600, are deployed in the European theater, although this is a very rough figure. On this basis the LTN forces could deliver 2,480 warheads, corresponding to the shaded area of the bar. From this perspective the Soviet/Pact LTN forces are clearly dominant. However, if the range difference arising from geographical asymmetry had not been introduced, the number of deliverable warheads would have been comparable.

Figure 2 displays the 1978 data on deliverable warheads from Figure 1 and the two 1985 projections for both sides. The European LTN weapons are added to the central strategic weapons in each case. A substantial growth potential is evident. In 1985 European LTN deliverable warheads would be brought into balance if Western forces met the High Estimate and Soviet forces met the Moderate Estimate or if the West replaced many of its shorter range systems with longer range systems.

Figure 3 presents corresponding data for launchers. Here the central strategic systems are restricted by SALT and remain nearly constant and equal. The Moderate Estimates show a small reduction in the LTN forces (shaded areas) for both sides but a substantial growth in shorter range launchers (400-1,000 for U.S.-NATO). The High Estimate shows a very large growth in LTN delivery systems for U.S.-NATO and only about half as much on the Soviet side.

Before discussing the conclusions that can be drawn from these data it is useful to restate the inherent uncertainties, some of which could be reduced with better intelligence than is publicly available.

1. Some of the 1,238 weapons on the Western side deployed in delivery systems of 400-1,000 n.m. range may be useable in a long-range mode in one-way missions or from basing further forward.
2. Reinforcements from outside the European theater and the reload potential for launchers have not been included.
3. Not all of the national forces (U.S., U.K. and French) may be committed.
4. The assumed division of Soviet forces (two-thirds European oriented) may be wrong in either direction.
5. The U.S.S.R. may have dedicated some of its strategic forces to European theater mission.
6. Either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. may reassign other portions of their strategic forces to the European theater.
7. Unequal air defense capability may diminish bomber effectiveness more on one side than the other.

8. Preemption, lack of readiness, defensive measures or delay in nuclear weapons release, and other operational or doctrinal factors may diminish the actual wartime delivery capability well below the theoretical maximum.

With the reservations in mind that these uncertainties produce, several tentative conclusions can be drawn concerning the present LTN force balance (figure 1) in Europe:

1. When target asymmetry with respect to the north-south border is taken into account the Soviet-Pact forces have a clear numerical advantage measured in terms of deliverable warheads. This means they have a superior capability, measured in deliverable warheads to reach the major targets relevant to both war fighting and deterrence in Europe.

2. However, if target asymmetry were ignored there is a rough parity with respect to both deliverable warheads and launchers. Thus in terms of deliverable warheads at ranges beyond 1,000 miles the Tables show, after shifting the SS-5 and SS-12, the Soviet-Pact side to have 1,490 and the U.S.-NATO side 1,162. In the 400-1,000 n.m. range the numbers are 988 and 1,238, respectively.

3. The Soviet LTN warheads constitute a much larger fraction of their worldwide deliverable warheads than is the case for the West. Numerically this is due to the larger total number of warheads in the U.S. inventory but it may also reflect the emphasis in Soviet force structure to Western European targets relative to more distant targets.

4. The Soviet preponderance in LTN forces noted in 1) may simply be a consequence of the requirements of NATO's doctrine of flexible response or the Soviet preference for longer range weapons because of their perceived political and deterrent advantage.

5. As mentioned earlier, the numbers of weapons are extremely high for any rational requirement and many thousands of additional weapons with ranges of less than 400 miles have not been included in this inventory. Even with severe attrition in delivery systems a very small fraction of the warhead inventory could decimate Europe and Western U.S.S.R. With this insensitivity of numbers to requirements a variety of reduction schemes would appear possible if arms control could be negotiated.

The projections forward to 1985 (Figure 2), however, indicate a substantial growth in these forces. On the Western side growth may be concentrated in shorter range weapons (Moderate Estimate) or both categories could approximately double (High Estimate). The Soviet growth could range from quite small

(Moderate Estimate) to 50 per cent (High Estimate). Thus, restraints in this projected growth are an obvious objective for arms control negotiations if undertaken soon.

A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 show a lack of proportionality between warhead numbers and launcher numbers in the aggregate. Thus if launchers remain the point of control the limits on loadings of launchers will have to be carefully negotiated. With aircraft and cruise missiles this could be a nearly impossible undertaking because of the variable loading of aircraft and the verification problems which cruise missiles present. Thus the possibilities of other means of control deserve early examination.

The Prospect for Arms Control Gray Area Systems

Today there is a rough parity in the central strategic balance. The major decision confronting the Western alliance is whether the asymmetrical situation in long-range theater nuclear target coverage, favoring the Soviet Union, is of such political and military significance as to bar any arms control initiatives until Western programmatic action can redress this imbalance. It is the authors' view that the significance of the Soviet advantage is tempered by the expectation that to a large extent the target sets for United States central strategic forces and Western LPN forces overlap. Moreover, arms control initiatives may be used in conjunction with measured programmatic action. The near-term objective of arms control strategies in the gray area should be to encourage the political and military circumstances which will facilitate achievement of an approximate balance in LTN force as measured by target coverage. In this context the next objective of arms control should be to maintain this balance at a successively lower increment of future growth and thus at lower economic costs, lesser risks of action-reaction acceleration and greater political stability. Whether the present Soviet advantage requires Western programmatic action prior to pursuit of arms control initiatives ultimately will require an alliance decision. It is our view that deployed Western LTN forces, together with the U.S. central strategic arsenal can meet the requirements of deterrence at both the theater and intercontinental levels and that this should be the basis of planning. If this is done, the crucial question to resolve in the early stages of East-West arms control discussions is whether a ceiling and later reductions that would cover Soviet launchers that can target all of Western Europe is negotiable. If not NATO may wish to seek this goal by new programs of its own. Despite the outcome on this issue,

however, negotiations could proceed on constraining growth and subsequent negotiations of ceilings as soon as NATO positions could be agreed upon following a SALT II agreement.

Over the long-term, gray area arms control should seek *reductions* in deployed LTN forces. But, reductions will have to come later not only because growth restraints and ceilings come first logically but because the LTN forces of the West are at present highly stressed since most of NATO's medium- and intermediate-range delivery capability is provided by dual-capable, multi-role tactical aircraft which play important roles, other than that of deep-penetration in interdiction and battlefield support. Thus to negotiate early reductions in existing Soviet forces—particularly the SS-20—might come at too great a cost to Western military capabilities in the theater.

Hence it is abundantly evident that arms control in the gray area will be a formidably complex task. Apart from the asymmetries in currently deployed forces, the difficulty of measuring the LTN balance and verifying what is to be controlled there remain a number of extremely difficult and intricate political and technical impediments to be considered and overcome.

Political Impediments to Gray Area Arms Control

WESTERN EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT

Any serious arms control initiative, whether in negotiations or otherwise, must be preceded by a planning phase in which options are defined and analyzed, and a decision-making phase in which one or more options are selected for action. Prior to either phase it is desirable, if not necessary, to achieve within the West a general consensus on the aim, direction, and limits of the Western arms control strategy. This consensus has been difficult to achieve in the U.S. over the last decade; it will be even more difficult to achieve when Western Europe (and other allies, such as Japan) are involved. Obtaining a consensus within Western Europe will itself be quite difficult because of inherently different outlooks, different assessments of acceptable risks, different attitudes toward and strategies for the employment of nuclear weapons. And, despite its 30-year history, NATO lacks experience in developing a political consensus and in making alliance decisions collectively in the area of East-West negotiations affecting nuclear weapons—an area where grave issues of national security and survival are at stake.

Yet, there is evidence that the planning phase is getting underway in the West. Useful discussions of arms control in the gray area took place in the summer of

1978 (see footnote at the beginning of this article and Aspen Institute Berlin Workshop Report by R. Metzger, 1978). And governmental discussions began in the High Level Group of the NATO Planning Group in October, 1978.

Of course, this represents only a beginning. Further difficulties will arise when Western Europe and the U.S. begin to develop a common position. The much greater military power and military technological advantage of the U.S., the greater and more imminent risk of destruction faced by the Western Europeans and the fluctuating degrees of confidence in the U.S. strategic umbrella will all converge to complicate the later stages of decision making.

THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

While consensus building must contend with the French allegiance to an unfettered, independent nuclear policy and the British insularity, it is West Germany that faces the greatest difficulties and constraints in finding an appropriate role in such an enterprise. The Federal Republic bears the greatest burden of NATO's peacetime defense, and in the event of war, it can expect disproportionately heavy devastation. Yet alone among the three great European powers it has no independent nuclear deterrent—only the guarantees of the U.S.²⁶ and the U.K. and the prospect of French involvement in a common cause. The opposition to West Germany becoming a nuclear power is overwhelming; the U.S.S.R.²⁷ and France²⁸ are resolute; the U.K. and the U.S. are of the same mind but less outspoken and, there is no serious, substantial desire that it be otherwise within the Federal Republic, as its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty testifies.

Nevertheless, some in West Germany feel the burden of this asymmetry most

26. Part of the American guaranty to the Federal Republic is the provision of U.S. tactical nuclear warheads to certain F.R.G. weapon systems on a dual-key basis.

27. A cornerstone of Soviet policy towards NATO has been the limitation of West German military strength. Soviet insistence on "national subceilings" on conventional forces at MBFR is an example of this policy. Historically, Soviet opposition to a NATO multilateral nuclear force, or MLF, was based upon concern MLF would lead to West German nuclear capability. See generally, Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970* (Johns Hopkins Press) at 113-116 (MLF), 406, 488 (1970).

28. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in an interview broadcast on February 9, 1978, was unequivocal on this point:

First, one essential point. France is opposed to any direct or indirect possibility of the nuclear arming of Germany. This represents a fundamental concern for us and moreover it's a pledge by West Germany.

Interview of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic at the Elysee Palace, Broadcast on February 9, 1978, Release 78/12 of the Press & Information Division, French Embassy to the U.S., p. 15.

keenly and there is a yearning that a European land-based deterrent against a Soviet attack be given higher priority and that they be a part of it. Concerns such as those voiced by CDU shadow defense minister, Manfred Wörner, that the Soviet Union not be allowed to remain a sanctuary in a European war, call for a reply.²⁹ In this situation, the promise of "deep penetration" capability inherent in West German-based dual-key nuclear-armed long-range cruise missiles or intermediate-range ballistic missiles, or in their conventionally armed counterparts, have a considerable attraction to many in the Federal Republic.³⁰ Too many concessions by the U.S. towards satisfying this interest in a deep-penetration capability would risk Soviet alienation and a souring of detente at least. Too small a U.S. response to these interests and anxieties might prompt West Germany to consider pursuit of an independent course toward nuclear armament, or conventionally-armed cruise missiles, or to diplomatic adventurism that would strain the Atlantic Alliance.

The stress inherent in this situation makes any move in the gray area more risky than it would be otherwise and dictates that the Federal Republic, despite its non-nuclear status, be a full partner in the planning—decision-making—negotiating sequence. And this in turn suggests high priority be given to the upgrading of assessment and analysis capability of West Germany as well as other NATO allies, if arms control in the gray area is to be fairly examined as an alternative policy for the West.

INCENTIVES FOR THE U.S.S.R.

A principal reason for the failure of MBFR negotiations in Vienna to achieve any result after five years seems to be the absence of any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate away the substantial numerical advantages they have in several aspects of conventional military force in Central Europe. Before venturing into arms control negotiations affecting gray area systems, the West should be sure to identify incentives sufficiently attractive for the Soviet Union to provide a basis for

29. See M. Wörner, *NATO Defenses and Tactical Weapons*, *supra* note 9.

30. Among the options available there may be responses to F.R.G. concerns short of an independent West German deep-strike force are: increasing the number of *Poseidon* SLBMs under SACEUR command; deployment of SLCMs on U.S. attack submarines with SLCM employment under SACEUR command; deployment of SLCMs on theater-dedicated submersible platforms under joint U.S.-FRG control (on a dual-key basis); deployment of expanded range versions of the present *Pershing* ballistic missile (the so-called "*Pershing II*XR") under U.S. or joint U.S.-FRG control; deployment of a new mobile, medium-range ballistic missile (MMRBM) under U.S. or joint control; or deployment of GLCMs in West Germany, again either under sole U.S. control or joint command.

Soviet willingness to make concessions. It would represent a considerable advance if the U.S.S.R. were to find sufficient incentive in the classical benefits ascribed to arms control: greater stability and reduced likelihood that war will break out; lower levels of damage if war occurs, lower military costs and lowered tensions. However, experience tends to show that more is needed to induce genuine Soviet interest in arms control. Gray area arms control might proceed by seeking to trade restrictions on what each side fears most.

In the present situation such a paired set of fears seem to be emerging. With the continued deployment of *Backfire* and SS-20 the Soviet Union is increasing its threat to targets in Western Europe. With the evolution of a practical long-range cruise missile capable of a variety of launch modes from many sites, and the emergence at the planning level of an extended-range *Pershing* or an entirely new mobile theater ballistic missile, the West is on the verge of a major increase in theater-based capability to threaten the western Soviet Union.

It will be unfortunate if this drama is played out to its bitter, expensive and risky end. The costs and risks of a potentially futile competition provide incentives on both sides to test the waters of arms control in the gray area. Chairman Brezhnev, during his state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1978, reportedly expressed willingness to negotiate with the West over "gray area" weapons, including medium-range missiles as an example.³¹ After full discussion with its Western European allies and Japan, the United States should seek to discern the Soviet position in greater detail and devise an appropriate strategy.

THE NEGOTIATING FORUM

The direct impact of gray area weapons on Western European security requires a change in the structure of East-West arms control negotiations. Consultation as it has existed in the past must be replaced with a mechanism which provides for more active and more substantial Western European participation. In recognition of increasing Western European interests, some analysts have recommended treatment of gray area issues in a third arms control forum. These "Theater Arms Limitation Talks," or TALT, would allow for direct Western European participation in a multilateral forum.

However, on balance a multilateral third forum appears undesirable at this time. As borne out from the experience at MBFR, establishing procedures and defining the boundaries for a new multilateral forum could be expected to take

31. *Washington Post*, May 10, 1978, p. 24.

years. And, TALT would seem to require French participation which is extremely improbable, especially at the outset.³² Moreover, another potential defect is that it would require the U.K. and France, if participating, to place their entire strategic nuclear forces on the negotiating table, while the Soviet Union would be negotiating only an increment of its much larger nuclear arsenal. Should either Britain or France decline to participate in TALT, the result could be a serious breach in the Alliance. And, even if TALT were convened with full Western participation, the Soviets could be expected to exploit Western differences at TALT to drive a wedge into NATO.

Because Western European nations have little if any margin of excess capability with which to negotiate—but only uncertain *potential* capabilities—it appears probable that the United States will have to bear the initial responsibility for gray area arms control initiatives. Since such initiatives would involve primarily (if not exclusively) American systems, presently deployed and forthcoming, it would be convenient to treat gray area issues as part of a revamped SALT structure. But, the introduction of gray area issues into SALT III has attendant risks. The complexity of the gray area, unless skillfully managed, could lead the entire SALT process into an impenetrable impasse. While some observers propose that gray area systems should be kept out so that SALT III negotiations can address ICBM vulnerability, further delivery system reductions and qualitative restraints on strategic weapons development, the evidence summarized at the beginning of this paper argues that gray area arms control cannot be put aside if the SALT process is to go forward. At the expiration of the SALT II Protocol in the early 1980s, decisions on deployments of long-range cruise missiles may be forced upon the U.S. and Western Europe. The question of further cruise missile deployment will then be decided either as an exercise in arms control or in arms competition. Further, rising political pressures from Western Europe will make it impossible to ignore gray area weapons in SALT III negotiations. And, the

32. In part, French opposition to SALT reflects the French government's official critique of the Eurostrategic balance concept. See text and accompanying notes 15–17, *supra* at —. France has proposed convening a European conference on disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals—which would deal with conventional weapons only.

Gray area issues conceivably could be treated within MBFR, but this course would require renegotiation of the agreed-on “reductions area” to take into account systems based on Soviet soil. In view of the protracted negotiations which were required to reach agreement on the present “reductions area,” to seek to redraw the MBFR boundaries is a prescription for delay, if not deadlock, and would deprive MBFR of whatever chance there is now for agreement. By taking gray area issues entirely out of MBFR there may be an improved opportunity for MBFR to be redirected towards measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack.

Soviet Union may demand inclusion of gray area issues if the East-West nuclear arms control process is to continue.

Therefore, the most attractive alternative would appear to proceed with SALT on two parallel tracks. Should the Soviets concur, one track might address further reductions in or limitations on central strategic forces and steps to limit land-based ICBM vulnerability. The second track could pursue measures designed to restrain future growth of LTN weapons. Initially, with U.S. weapons the only ones on the Western side to be limited the Western European involvement could be in the form of an "antechamber" structure—whereby the U.S. would first negotiate with Western European representatives (in consultation with Japan), and then, as "emissary," present an agreed upon position to the U.S.S.R. and negotiate within agreed upon guidelines with continuous on-the-spot consultation.

Technical Impediments to Gray Area Arms Control

New military technologies can generate new gray area weapons almost without limit. The current contribution, the cruise missile with effective multi-mission, conventional or nuclear, capabilities and a very small physical size has already caused very special problems. The advent of these weapons has resulted in a blurring of distinctions between "theater" and "strategic" weapons which, though always somewhat artificial, have facilitated a separation of issues into different arms control forums.³³ At a two-track SALT III, new military technologies will make it difficult to allocate issues and particular systems to one or the other track. This will almost certainly generate intense disagreements on "counting rules," and ultimately may frustrate verification objectives. The possibility of intractable problems arising in negotiations affecting gray area weapons, however, suggests that these forces should be brought into SALT only if segregation of central strategic issues can be achieved and maintained.

COUNTING RULES, ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION

While our analysis, as a point of departure, seeks to evaluate the LTN balance in terms of deliverable weapons, a more sophisticated counting scheme will have to be devised should a comprehensive, negotiated agreement limiting gray area weapons be sought. The multi-mission capabilities of many gray area weapons will have to be taken into account. There will be pressure to insert many variables

33. See, R. Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," *Survival*, pp. 14-15 (Jan./Feb., 1976). R. Burt, *New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions*, Adelphi Paper No. 126, p. 24 (1976).

into a negotiated gray area counting scheme. While delivery systems might be weighed by the number of warheads assumed carried and to the great diversity of systems involved, the risks and ambiguities inherent in warhead estimation suggest such an approach will be difficult to manage in negotiations. And this will be further complicated by efforts to accommodate asymmetrical geographic situations and the variable range of many delivery systems so as to move toward more nearly equivalent target coverage. Other difficulties will arise from reinforcements, systems deployed outside the theater but readily introduced into it.

The complexity of counting rules could easily become staggering if all relevant factors were to be taken into consideration. This should not be necessary, however. Initially, a negotiated approach to reducing the growth rate of gray area weapons could involve a baseline figure of systems presently deployed or in production weighed by two or three key factors, for example, range, warheads and whether or not dual-capable. From this baseline ceiling an initial common ceiling could be agreed upon, with defined rates of growth (or no-growth, or reductions). Beyond this, modernization and replacement conventions would have to be established. Even at this level, the procedure presents considerable difficulty and verification will be excruciatingly complex.

By their nature, many weapons in the gray area have ambiguous capabilities, mobile and hence concealable, and may be redeployed rapidly and perhaps covertly. Thus verification of compliance with agreements will be much more difficult than in SALT I and II. Ironclad verification, of the sort the U.S. Congress has insisted upon for SALT may not be possible³⁴ even with considerable innovation. However, some aspects of the verification problem may not be intractable, as in theory conventions could be reached concerning aircraft and missile basing. Whether or not SALT III includes the gray area, many of the same verification problems will arise since cruise missiles and mobile ballistic missiles are already subject to limitations in SALT II.

Alternatives to Negotiated Gray Area Arms Control

Even the most optimistic observers must doubt whether gray area arms control negotiations, with complexities that seem to exceed those of SALT can keep pace

34. See generally, R. Perry, "Verifying SALT In the 1980s, in *Adelphi Paper No. 141*, pp. 15-24 (1978); J. Harris & W. Bajusz, "Arms Control and Gray Area Systems," *Air Force Magazine*, pp. 36-38; R. Perry, *The Faces of Verification: Strategic Arms Control for the 1980s*, RAND Report P-5986 (Aug., 1977).

with the demands imposed by rapid technological change.³⁵ Therefore, in conclusion, we turn to the oft-recommended, but little used, alternative of non-negotiated arms control initiatives.

If gray area systems cannot be brought into the arena of negotiated arms control some arms control objectives may be met in part, and indeed more promptly, by attempting to limit Soviet deployments of particular systems by coupling the West's deployment of an equivalent system to the rate of Soviet deployment. The reciprocal threats generated by Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles and a variety of long range cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe illustrate the basis for such a coupling.

Notwithstanding their limitations theater-based long range cruise missiles pose two difficult predicaments to the Soviet Union. First, they threaten to erase for a number of years much of the gains the Soviets have achieved in theater military capability. Second, they confront the Soviets with a choice: either to spend billions of rubles in hopes of developing a sophisticated low-altitude air defense system theoretically capable of destroying cruise missiles, or, admitting the penetrability of NATO cruise missiles and thereby compromising in part, their historic dependence on air defense.³⁶ Therefore, deployments of U.S. theater-based LRCMs (or IRBMs) could be linked to the size of that portion of the SS-20 force determined to be aimed at Western Europe. By a joint NATO-U.S. communication, for example, the West could declare that each SS-20 deployed beyond a certain baseline figure will be matched by the deployment in Western

35. Technical and political barriers as well as the mixed results of negotiated arms control in the past suggest consideration of initiatives which do not require formal negotiations, at least initially. Negotiations tend to exaggerate narrow imbalances of forces, bringing into sharp focus the insecurities of the participants. The effect is to encourage a piecemeal appraisal of the military balances at issue. Entering into the negotiations process by itself tends to freeze deployments at existing levels, encourages developments of new systems to redress perceived imbalances in particular capabilities, and leads to development of "bargaining chips" which if credible become non-negotiable. See, Jane M. O. Sharp, "Is European Security Negotiable?" in *European Security: Prospects for the 1980s*, ed. D. Leebaert (Lexington: D.C. Heath, in press, 1979).

36. Anticipated U.S. deployment of ALCMs on board B-52s (or other cruise missile carriers) will pose the low-altitude threat to the Soviets regardless of NATO deployment decisions on GLCMs and/or land-attack SLCMs. Deployment of theater cruise missiles, however, increase the magnitude of the problem confronting the Soviets and would require additional investments to protect Eastern European theater assets, as well as greater defense coverage in the U.S.S.R. to account for the multiplication of cruise missile launch points and penetration routes. According to Undersecretary of Defense William Perry, defense against present generation cruise missiles would require the Soviets to spend \$30-\$50 billion for up to 100 AWACS-type aircraft, several thousand interceptor aircraft and up to 10,000 low-altitude capable surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), such as the SA-10 now under development. See, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Nov. 20, 1978, pp. 24-25.

Europe of, say, three long range cruise missiles or a comparable IRBM.³⁷ Should the Soviet Union fail to demonstrate "restraint by conditioned mutual example," the U.S. and NATO would retain complete flexibility to deploy without limit.

As a first step toward managing gray area competition, conditioned restraint has some advantages. It could be attempted relatively soon—after coordination with Western Europe and consultation with Japan—as it bypasses the structural, substantive and political problems attendant to preparing for and carrying out gray area negotiations. Moreover, if conditioned restraint were successful, it would contribute significantly toward maintaining a LTN force balance, and may foster an improved East-West climate that would favor further non-negotiated arms control initiatives. And, if conditioned restraint had some success but inevitably ran short of closely coupled systems, all parties would be better prepared to enter into negotiations on a broader range of gray area topics, first to codify and define the non-negotiated understanding, eventually to expand upon it.

37. Coupling could be calculated on the basis of deliverable warheads. Since the SS-20 carries a triplet MIRV, three (single warhead) LRCMs would be allowed for each SS-20 beyond the baseline.

How Little is Enough?

Francis P. Hoerber

Shortly before he took office, President Carter called for a study of the feasibility of reliance on some 200 to 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.¹ In his inaugural address, he also stated an ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. His March, 1977 SALT proposals included a 10 to 25 percent reduction from the 1974 "Vladivostok Guidelines" limit of 2,400 intercontinental weapons launchers agreed to in 1974.

While President Carter's statements were widely discounted as simply rhetoric, or "looking at all options," it has become clear that the thrust of his thinking is firmly toward a return to a doctrine of finite or even minimum deterrence. Numerous presidential decisions have unilaterally limited U.S. strategic capabilities and hedges—cancellation of the B-1, closing of the Minuteman III production line, postponement of M-X, the May, 1977 concessions in SALT after the "comprehensive" March proposals. The awkwardly-handled postponement of the neutron bomb decision may have weakened deterrence at the substrategic level (which interacts with the strategic) and certainly strained NATO alliance cohesion. Secretary of Defense Brown's first "Posture Statement" indicated a return to the McNamara concept of Assured Destruction and the capability to destroy 200 Soviet cities as a deterrent, while retaining some of the concept of flexible response and essential equivalence.²

The impact of the finite deterrence doctrine, and its possible embodiment in SALT agreements, must, therefore, be taken seriously and rigorously questioned; the implications for U.S. security may prove to be the most important issue facing this country in the next years.

Finite deterrence was first defined as official U.S. strategic doctrine by Secretary of Defense McNamara in the early 1960s. McNamara had initially flirted with a "city-avoidance, counterforce-only" doctrine.³ This proposal evoked widespread protest, particularly from the Soviet Union, that it would make unthinkable nu-

1. "Nuclear 'Blockbuster,'" Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1977, p. A-24. Also, "Carter to Get Study on A-Deterrence," Edward Walsh and George C. Wilson, *The Washington Post*, January 28, 1977, p. A-3. Evans and Novak referred to a meeting on January 12, 1977 between Carter, Defense Secretary-Designate Harold Brown, and General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979*, Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, February 1978, p. 55.

3. See his Ann Arbor speech in Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

clear war thinkable and hence more likely. Perhaps of greater impact in changing the Secretary's policy were the seemingly endless demands of his military technicians for both qualitative and quantitative increases in strategic arms to carry out the difficult—at that time almost impossible—counterforce mission with high confidence. McNamara's systems analysts therefore asked, "How much is enough?"⁴ Their answer came in the doctrine of Assured Destruction. In this concept, the United States would need only sufficient forces—even after absorbing a counterforce first strike—to inflict an arbitrarily-determined level of "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union.⁵ The resources required for this task would be finite, numerically manageable, and not needing technological improvements, such as increased accuracy. The Soviet Union would be deterred by the threat of "Assured Destruction."⁶

It is the object of this paper to initiate a search for some guidelines for negotiations toward such lower bilateral strategic arms levels. We ask, in short, "How little is enough?" The President implies that the ultimate answer should be, "Zero nuclear weapons." There is great romantic appeal in this notion. But even if we could get there from here—which we cannot—most people would have second thoughts about wanting to, as they contemplated more than three decades of peace among all nuclear powers and the horrors of a nonnuclear World War III rendered more likely in the absence of nuclear deterrence.

We will focus therefore, on the less utopian but more practical question of the potential reduction, through SALT, of the levels of the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers, arsenals which today overwhelmingly dominate those of the four or five other nuclear powers.

4. See Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough?, Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

5. McNamara's Assured Destruction criteria changed each year from 1964 to 1967. They ranged from 20 to 33 percent destruction for population and from 50 to 67 percent for industry, and in 1968 he simply called for a capability to inflict "an unacceptable degree of damage" and "to destroy the attacker as a viable 20th Century nation. . . ." See Department of Defense Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions on H.R. 7179 and 10939, respectively, pages 40 and 33, respectively, and 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1, p. 44; also Statements of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before Joint Sessions of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, for Fiscal Years 1966, 1968, 1969, pp. 45, 44, 43, 47 respectively.

6. The author has described and analyzed these changes in a series of books edited with William Schneider, Jr.: *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1977, 1978, 1979* (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1976, 1977, and 1978). See also *Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977*, James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, Chapter II, and *Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1977*, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, pp. 46-49.

How low can the two arsenals go and still permit the retention of a stable power balance? What are the risks and rewards of bilateral reductions? How, and at what levels, can these risks and rewards be balanced? What U.S. strategies, military and diplomatic (including in SALT), do the answers suggest? Given the yearning for escape from nuclear threats and the administration policy of pursuing decreases under SALT, what conclusions can we reach on how much SALT is safe? Even things one believes good for the health must be taken in nonfatal doses.⁷

It is generally agreed that small decreases from the 1974 "Vladivostok Accords" levels, or from current levels (U.S. forces being somewhat below the Vladivostok 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles⁸ and Soviet forces being somewhat above), would *not* have a serious effect on deterrence, one way or the other. The current disagreement between the U.S.-proposed SALT II level of 2,160 (a ten percent reduction from Vladivostok) and the Soviet-proposed 2,250 (a 6-1/4 percent reduction) has to do with what specific systems might have to be added or abandoned, not really with overall levels of forces or of deterrence. On the other hand, it is also widely agreed (for reasons that will become evident below) that 200 to 250 delivery vehicles would be dangerously low. The question is, can we determine a number in between that would be acceptable and one that would not? How little is *too* little?

Clearly, we shall not be able to determine precise numerical answers, but perhaps we can indicate important principles that should govern the ultimate answer. We shall discuss first the deterrent threats that the United States may be able to pose, at various levels of nuclear arms, then both military and politico-military factors to which the question of acceptable levels is sensitive, and finally state some hypotheses and draw some conclusions for policy.

What Deterrent Threats Can The United States Pose?

There are many ways to threaten the use of nuclear weapons with the intent of deterring Soviet nuclear attacks or other major actions inimical to vital U.S. in-

7. Note that these are at once cosmic and severely constrained questions. The writer has expressed elsewhere considerable skepticism about the prospects of SALT and concern about the imminence of Soviet strategic superiority and the diplomatic uses of that superiority: Hoerber and Schneider, *Op. Cit.*; Amoretta M. Hoerber and Francis P. Hoerber, "SALT: Options for the New Administration," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1977; and Francis P. Hoerber, "SALT I: The Morning After," Rand P-4867 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1972).

8. "Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" refers to the "Central Systems" covered in SALT: ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), and

terests. We have already alluded to the McNamara threat of Assured Destruction, to which the Carter Administration has avowedly returned.

The writer has examined many 1980s scenarios in which a nuclear war starts with a Soviet counterforce attack—an attack on U.S. ICBMs, bombers on their bases, missile submarines in port, and command-control facilities for the launching of the forces. In every case, a U.S. Assured Destruction second strike (counter-value—against population and industry in large cities) appears to be deterred by the Soviet third-strike countervalue potential inherent in the Soviet Union's remaining withheld forces. Even assuming that a future strategic arms limitation agreement (SALA) establishes realistically equivalent Soviet and U.S. inventories, several asymmetries appear to assure the Soviets a lower Assured Destruction weapons requirement than the United States.⁹ The Soviet population is inherently geographically more dispersed than that of the U.S., and in addition the Soviets have a program for dispersing and hardening their industry and for protecting their political leadership, key industrial workers, and general population (in that order of priorities). The question frequently asked, whether Soviet city-evacuation plans will work and can be sustained, appears to be irrelevant, because (1) Soviet emphasis is shifting toward shelter programs and away from evacuation and (2) the prospect of even partial success of the population and industry protection programs appears to enhance Soviet deterrence of a second strike. The achievability of Assured Destruction of the Soviet Union by U.S. forces is increasingly dubious, and surely will be more so as U.S. forces are further reduced.

Despite the shift, started by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and continued under Secretary Rumsfeld, away from population targeting to threatening economic, political and military targets, with emphasis on inhibiting or preventing Soviet economic and military recovery "more rapidly than the United States,"¹⁰ the resulting "Assured Retaliation" appears to involve almost as great a threat as Assured Destruction to the Soviet population—if it is not successfully defended. Old key questions remain: What levels of attack might cause breakdown of civil order? Of the centrally planned economy? Of central authority

heavy (long-range) bombers—at present defined as B-52s and Soviet Bisons and Bears. Note, however, that for missiles the item controlled is really launchers—ICBM silos and SLBM "launch tubes"—not vehicles *per se*.

9. Whether the Soviets have an Assured Destruction objective is not at issue here. It is U.S. perceptions of Soviet capabilities that will influence U.S. behavior.

10. *Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1978*, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, p. 68.

over military forces? Subjectively, one strongly suspects that, while present weapon levels may be more than enough, 200 weapons (warheads?) will not be. One also suspects that the value of repeated attacks will rise (see below).¹¹

As implied above, it is generally considered that the U.S. strategic forces would be the first targets of a Soviet attack, either in a partially-disarming first strike or as the first-priority target in a larger preemptive strike. The question for American policy is whether a capability and doctrine for a U.S. attack on the Soviet forces would enhance deterrence and provide some damage limitation, should deterrence fail.

Crucial to the answer to this question will be whether the postulated SALT limits specify MIRV (multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles, or warheads) levels along with delivery vehicle numbers. Also critical will be the question of reduction or retention of vulnerable fixed basing, under agreements or unilaterally, by either side. If the Soviets retain their large proportion of fixed targets (ICBM silos), the United States may need a capability to identify which Soviet silos have fired their missiles as well as warhead accuracy/yield combinations adequate for hard-target kill (a capability which could be in weapons other than ICBMs—bombers may have it now; SLBMs could eventually have the requisite accuracy/yield).¹² Enemy reload capabilities, after both cold-launch¹³ and hot-launch, may dictate U.S. counterattack on empty as well as full Soviet silos, but a U.S. capability may still be needed to identify the full and thus more time-urgent silo targets, since the Interim Agreement and Vladivostok Accords limit launchers only, not back-up missiles, which could be reloaded in silos or fired from concealed surface launchers. At lower levels, it will become even more important to consider limiting numbers of weapons, not just launchers, with all the difficulty that this implies for verification.

11. See again, Hoeber and Schneider, *Op. Cit.*, for extended discussion of why both Assured Destruction and Assured Retaliation are becoming increasingly infeasible for the United States.

12. The author believes that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as now under negotiation, would prevent the achievement of better yield-to-weight ratios by the United States, as well as adequate testing for high-confidence maintenance of warhead inventories. It would be subject to undetected evasion by the Soviets with low-yield explosions "decoupled" from seismic shock by the use of large underground cavities. If the Soviets could thus continue testing when we could, they might in time also make substantial advances that could result in a divisive technological surprise of the United States.

13. "Cold-launch" means that the first-stage rocket motors are not ignited while the missile is in its silo or launch tube. The missile is "popped up" by a gas generator, and then the rockets are ignited. Since hot gasses damage a silo, cold launch permits "rapid reload." (It also permits greater efficiency in terms of the maximum throw-weight achievable from a silo of given size). The Soviets have cold-launched SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs. The U.S. cold-launches its SLBMs.

Soviet doctrine calls for preemptive attack against other military and support targets as well as against strategic weapons systems. The author regards these Other Military Targets (OMT) as a sort of "lower case" counterforce, more general than the limited "Counterforce" case, above. He also believes that OMT are a potentially important target set for the United States, if they can be effectively attacked, in view of the high dependence of Soviet regime-maintenance on military power, as well as the increasing infeasibility and inherent immorality of attacks on population and civilian assets.

Particularly when strategic nuclear weapons are in limited supply, OMT targeting may be one of the most rational options available. A key question to be explored is: When heavy attacks are not feasible, would a credible deterrent be the threat to deprive the Soviets of (1) the capacity for internal control and peripheral defense, and (2) capabilities for projection of power to coerce remote nations in Western Europe? In East Asia? In North America? (A special case relates to economic attacks designed primarily to impede economic recovery, since Soviet projection forces could be used to coerce assistance in their recovery and to interdict assistance to U.S. recovery).¹⁴ Whether there is a limited set of high-value military targets that would make such a threat credible with relatively small forces must be investigated.

Finally, it is U.S. policy to maintain a capability for flexible response—limited nuclear options (LNOs) between all-out use of our strategic forces and surrender, or accession to Soviet demands in time of crisis or conflict. Such limited options are intended to provide for response appropriate or proportional to limited Soviet provocations or attacks, and to demonstrate U.S. will, conduct bargaining moves, control escalation, and negotiate for acceptable war termination "while something is left standing." The principal difference in the case of severely limited forces will be the question of the capacity for carrying out such options without unduly impinging on the forces remaining for deterrence.

The Parameters of "How Little Is Enough?"

As indicated in the introduction, at the time of writing (summer, 1978) the Carter Administration appears to have chosen, from the above menu of deterrence alternatives, the first option of Assured Destruction for the deterrence of major

14. Note that the start and rate of economic recovery in Europe, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, after World War II was virtually dictated by U.S. and Soviet policies, backed by their latent power to support or inhibit that recovery.

nuclear attack and Flexibility (or Limited Nuclear Options) for the deterrence of lesser threats. The Defense Department is also conducting, by Presidential Directive (PD-18), a Nuclear Targeting Study to evaluate a wide range of options. Regardless of the effect of that study and of SALT II of official U.S. doctrine, it is the purpose below to consider what doctrines may be feasible and sensible under hypothetical conditions of sharply decreased U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. Actual numbers must, of course, be left to official channels, in view of the need to use classified data on the Soviet target systems (and those in other potential enemy countries) and to collect data on U.S. target systems in cases of important potential asymmetries.

The next two sections will discuss military and politico-military factors that must be considered, and will evaluate the sensitivity of U.S. security to variations in these factors, as the agreed levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic arms may be decreased.

Military Parameters

Let us start with what we choose to call strictly military considerations. In each case, the sensitivity of U.S. security to the factor in question appears to rise as the level of the strategic offensive forces declines. In other words, the risks are inversely related to the numbers.

Consider first the role of the active defenses of the enemy: air defenses, missile defenses (ABM), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. The smaller the numbers of attack weapons, the more significant are active defenses. In particular, a Soviet technological breakthrough that surprises the United States might yield such an effective defense against small numbers of potential U.S. attackers that the United States would be effectively disarmed and completely at the mercy of Soviet diplomatic coercion. One cannot predict surprises, but the possibilities are manifold. They include: (1) rapid deployment of a new ABM system (a sudden "breakout" from the ABM Treaty), perhaps with a new warhead developed in clandestine testing under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (the great exoatmospheric lethal range of "hard X-rays" against attacking missile warheads were a technological surprise from testing); (2) a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) permitting "trailing" of U.S. missile-launching submarines; (3) a more exotic breakthrough in high-energy lasers (HEL), directed particle beams, or other "death rays" that could bring down both ballistic reentry vehicles and aircraft; etc.

Even without technological surprises, active defenses are more effective against

small than large attacking forces. One of the principal means of penetrating military defenses is by massing to overwhelm, or "saturate," them. Small numbers can be massed regionally, or by attack corridor, to assure penetration. Defenses must be dispersed over all areas or approaches, since the offense has the "last move" (unless the defenses have very long range, so that the defense can regain the last move). Massing an attack increases its shock value. The shock is generally greater if 90 percent of a smaller target set is destroyed rather than, say, 10 or 20 percent of a larger set. Massing may maximize the economic impact on a region, and also the political impact, especially if it renders the region vulnerable to internal nationalism and/or external threats.

On the other hand, with small total forces, massing the attack limits the number of targets that can be threatened or attacked. For example, it may be more effective to attack a large portion of one or a few critical economic sectors, rather than all industry in one region, but this may not be feasible if the sectors are dispersed through many defended regions. Similarly, the Soviet leadership is likely to be too dispersed (and sheltered) in crisis or wartime to be vulnerable to small forces. Moreover, if targets in only one or a few regions are attacked, assets from the other regions can be brought to bear in relief and rehabilitation functions, just as they are in natural disasters. If all regions are hurt, as in an Assured Destruction or Assured Retaliation attack, none may be able to help others—to succor the wounded or to repair the factories. The total damage—or threatened damage—will therefore be greater than the sum of smaller attacks on all the regions.

Clearly, low bomber levels may not be achievable (or acceptable) in the absence of a limitation on air defenses. However, formulation and verification of such an essential limitation appears to present formidable difficulties, because: (1) the units are small and numerous; (2) strategic and tactical air defense systems are distinguishable, if at all, only by their location; and (3) radars and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems may be mobile. It should also be noted that today's single Soviet ABM site, particularly with longer-range interceptors, could become significant at lower levels of permitted ballistic missiles.

In addition to active defenses, targets may be protected by passive defense. Targets may have inherent, or natural, passive defense, in that they are proliferated, dispersed and hardened for social and economic reasons, as in the case of population and industry in general, or for tactical or administrative military reasons. Targets may also be deliberately (artificially) passively defended against nuclear attack, as in the case of civil defense programs, silo and command-control-facility hardening, etc. Passive defense may be particularly effective against

limited attacks: by saving a portion of the assets attacked, they facilitate rescue, repair or replacement of assets that have been hit, just as in the case of active defenses.

However, it should also be noted that there are institutional and psychological limits to the implementation of passive defenses. Dispersal of plants takes a very long time, if one relies on dictating the location of new facilities; it may run counter to managerial and labor interests; and it requires added resources for new infrastructure (transportation, power sources, housing, commercial facilities, etc.). Population relocation plans may be resisted by people who panic, doubt the threat, or follow orders improperly, etc., or by people in the "host areas" who feel unfairly burdened. The examples of such problems can be multiplied; in sum, they are what some analysts have in mind when they doubt the Soviet claims for the potential efficacy of their civil defense programs. In fact, in the event that these programs are used, the truth may well lie between the Soviet claims and the minimal effects predicted by their strongest denigrators. What matters for deterrence, however, is not what U.S. critics believe but what the Soviet leaders believe. What matters in coercive Soviet diplomacy may turn out to be what the U.S. leaders believe the Soviet leaders believe.

There is also the possibility of surprise in passive defense. This is an analog of the possibilities of technological surprise (and rapid deployments) in active defense, but for different reasons. Civil and military passive defenses are characterized by low visibility, low obsolescence, and the possibility of rapid upgrading. Consider, for example, the extensive tunneling that surprised the French in Indochina and the Americans in Korea; the rapidity with which city evacuation might be implemented (especially, perhaps, in a tightly-controlled totalitarian society); the speed with which machinery might be protectively covered in factories; the extensiveness with which materials, parts, machinery and end-products can be duplicated and stockpiled, slowly but unperceived; and the suddenness with which the deployments of military forces can be changed on the basis of contingency plans and under cover of military exercises. Surprise in passive, as in active, defense will have much greater impact in downgrading the potential deterrent value of small forces than of large ones.

The survivability of the offensive forces is also essential to the maintenance of deterrence as well as war-fighting capability. As force levels decline, it would appear to be increasingly important to reduce their vulnerability by:

—*Diversity.* We presently rely on a "Triad" of forces (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) for insurance against both surprise attack and technological surprise. There have been suggestions that, as the fixed ICBMs become vulnerable in the

1980s, we consider abandoning them (instead of, for example, putting them, or their successors, in a mobile or "multiple aim point" deployment mode). There have been other suggestions that if the cruise missiles and/or their carriers become too vulnerable, we abandon the airborne arm of the Triad. As numbers decline and unit costs increase, it may be very tempting to rely on a "Dyad" or even a "Monad" in place of the current Triad. With small numbers, however, redundancy and hedges decline, and that may be precisely the time for prudence in the maintenance of the diversity of a Triad or even a "Multad."

—*Concealment*. This includes system mobility, measured with respect to enemy intelligence-cycle leadtimes and weapon flight times. It also raises questions of SALT Treaty formulation and verification.

—*Alert rates*. This applies primarily to waterborne and airborne strategic platforms that are subject to close control and recall if launched on warning. Ships have historically "shown the flag" to demonstrate national will. In today's strategic arena, however, bombers are more effective than submarines, because submarines must stay concealed. These boats may be put to sea on warning, but their ballistic missiles (SLBMs), once launched, cannot be recalled, and their control is subject to tenuous communication links in wartime. Bombers need not hide or use other defensive measures until they reach enemy air defenses.¹⁵ They are subject to close control and recall for 6 to 8 hours, and even longer if they are refueled for loiter outside the enemy defenses. Thus they provide time for reflection and negotiation that ballistic missiles do not.¹⁶

Other capabilities besides survivability are also important for the offensive forces. If the numbers of vehicles and warheads, and perhaps their sizes, are taken as given under SALT agreements, the capabilities of much-reduced forces become of increasing importance.

—*Reload/Recycle Capabilities*. If silos can be reloaded with additional missiles, or extra missiles can be launched without silos, and bombers can return home and reload with fuel and bombs, then arms control agreements can be circumvented, especially under present formulations that limit only numbers of silos, submarine launch tubes, and bombers. This argues strongly (with large

15. This may be subject to change in the future. With adequate surveillance, bombers could be attacked in midcourse (over the oceans) with large ballistic missile warheads or other means. Evasive action by the bombers—changing course—would in turn require impressive capabilities for surveillance and assessment of enemy launches, elaborate and survivable communications to the bombers, and penalties in bomber fuel consumption.

16. See the author's *Slow to Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976).

forces and more so with small forces) for including the "Reload/Recycle" parameter in future SALT negotiations and agreements. There is a trade-off involved here: reload/recycle for repeated attacks may have great value for us; but lack of limitation on this parameter clearly risks decisive Soviet superiority in such standby capability. Survivability of reload/recycle capabilities is crucial and may not be symmetrical. The location and number of enemy reload or soft-launcher missiles will always be known better by the Soviets than by the United States. For bomber recycle, the Soviets have the advantage in defense attrition of U.S. bombers (since they have heavy air defenses and we do not), and in intelligence (since theirs is a closed society and ours is open). Bomber attack planning may have to include protecting recycle capability, minimizing losses, minimizing enemy countermove capabilities, "ferrying" weapons (withholding some weapons during an attack for use in the next attack) vs. prepositioning at recycle point, etc.

—*Excessive Forces.* The possession of greater-than-agreed force levels means *evasion*, or violation, of agreements and increases the problems of both verification and options for response to observed violations. The concealment of small numbers of weapons could multiply small permitted forces, as against marginally increasing large force levels.

—*Accuracy.* Increased accuracy permits high expected damage for given warhead yields and/or the use of lower-yield warheads, and also lower collateral civilian damage, to minimize escalation risks. The limiting case is the use of conventional high explosives (HE) with almost perfectly accurate weapons against point targets. Does this mean strategic weapons not covered in SALAs (avoidance rather than evasion?) Does it mean a U.S. advantage? (How long will a technological lead last?)¹⁷

—*Reconnaissance.* Reconnaissance acquires increasing importance as numbers decline:

For verification, whether or not SALAs specify verification by national technical means;

For monitoring avoidance;

For conserving resources; in the short run (intrawar), timely intelligence can focus attacks on undamaged high-value targets. Reconnaissance is improving,

17. It has been reported that recent Soviet tests have shown SS-18 and SS-19 accuracies approaching 0.1 nautical miles (600 feet), better than the reported Minuteman II accuracy, and equal to the accuracy Minuteman III may achieve in the early 1980s. See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 3, 1978.

but not rapidly. No breakthroughs, such as the satellite photography and other sensing capabilities developed in the 1960s, appear to be in the offing. Moreover, U.S. reconnaissance is threatened by the development of Soviet antisatellite systems.

—*Command, Control and Communications (C³)*. C³ also increases in importance as numbers decline. War, even more than most human activities, is almost always sloppy—battles are “ragged.” C³ is more important for nuclear than for conventional forces, because accidents and mistakes are more serious and escalation is more threatening. Paradoxically, C³ is even more critical for smaller nuclear forces: escalation may not be quite as threatening, but accidents are, and conservation of nuclear resources to maintain deterrence, in crisis and intrawar, becomes more crucial.

—*Nonstrategic Use*. As strategic force levels decline, it would appear that they must become increasingly dedicated to exclusive strategic use and unavailable for substrategic (theater—conventional or nuclear) use. Such use of bombers has been important in the past and could be in the future.

Politico-Military Parameters

Military capabilities are necessary but not sufficient for strategic forces. The interplay of political factors with military capabilities must also—always—be considered in negotiations about these forces and in their planning, deployment, and employment doctrine.

One must note immediately that the United States and the Soviet Union, while dominant, are not the only nuclear powers in the world. While the Chinese, French and British nuclear forces are today of some concern to the Soviets, and the Chinese forces perhaps also to the United States, at the present high bilateral levels of strategic forces these third-country forces do not enter importantly into the strategic equation. With sharp bilateral reductions by the two superpowers, these third countries could become “instant superpowers,” because (1) the superpower arsenals would be reduced toward their levels and (2) the smaller nuclear powers might have an incentive that does not realistically exist today to start increasing their levels in direct competition with the present superpowers. In a world of three or more superpowers, deterrence and strategic calculations would be transformed. The instability of alliance diplomacy could return to a dominant role in international relations—with far greater risks than in the prenuclear world.

There is the further vexing problem of nuclear proliferation. The disincentives

for Nth countries to "go nuclear" have in the past often been underestimated. It took nineteen years for the fifth nation, China, to join the "nuclear club," and another ten or more years for the next two to join (counting India and assuming Israel to be a member). Nevertheless, reversing "vertical proliferation" in the superpowers by cutting back their arsenals could decrease these disincentives to "horizontal proliferation" among nations. The economic and political price of entry at a competitive level could appear much less formidable, and the potential political and perhaps military utility of modest nuclear forces could appear much greater.

A political-military problem that already complicates SALT is that of the "Gray-Area Systems." These are nuclear systems of greater range than the so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use. They are "theater weapons" of potential intersuperpower use. Their name is a SALT term of art; they cannot be defined "in black and white," except to the extent that they are systems not to date included in SALT, as distinguished from "Central Systems" that have been included. Examples are: intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles (IR/MRBMs), e.g., the Soviet SS-20, an intermediate-range missile which can become an ICBM with the addition of the compatible SS-16 third stage; U.S. "forward-based" fighter bombers, deployed for the defense of Western Europe but capable of reaching the Soviet Union; "medium" bombers, notably the controversial Backfire; and the Soviet Shaddock cruise missile, a 350-mile submarine-deployed weapon called an antiship missile by the Soviets but capable of use against many strategic targets in the United States. As the Central Systems are cut back, Gray-Area Systems will look increasingly threatening, and the need to include them in an expanded SALT domain will become more urgent.

At some level, tactical nuclear weapons also become indistinguishable from strategic nuclear weapons, since platforms (e.g., ships) can always be found from which they can be launched against strategic targets. There are three implications of this fact:

1. A constraining SALT agreement could be circumvented;
2. Tactical nuclear weapons could constitute a "withheld force" for strategic exchange that exhausted the SALT Central Systems and even Gray-Area Systems;
3. An attempt could be made to incorporate tactical weapons in a SALT-type agreement. (This would appear to be a terribly difficult, if not utopian, project.)

Declining numerical levels of nuclear weapons reduce their utility as an in-

strument of diplomatic coercion. This increases the influence of conventional forces, in which the Soviet Union is superior. Of special importance may be chemical warfare, for which the Soviets are prepared and we are not. Biological warfare possibilities may also become important. We must ask, will SALT reductions ultimately "make the world safe for conventional warfare?"

Can Deterrence Be Maintained? Some Hypotheses

The above discussion is not encouraging. It suggests that, while "small is beautiful" may apply with great appeal to strategic nuclear forces, there are many complex problems and potential pitfalls if we are to seek such a goal.

Despite all these problems, minimum deterrence *may* work. Surely, no Soviet leadership will want to contemplate the horrors and uncertainties of nuclear war even if the threat is, say, hundreds instead of thousands of nuclear warheads. If the nuclear world becomes indeed multipolar, something reminiscent of Bismark's nineteenth century "nightmare" of coalition may add to deterrence. But the prior issue is always, who is most deterred in a crisis? It is not a question of either side deciding that "X million deaths are worth it" (for whatever national interests are at stake in some future crisis). Rather, it is an issue of diplomatic coercion, of whose deterrence is greater, of who wins the battle of perceived capabilities and of national will. The latent threat of nuclear coalition would also worry the United States. And asymmetries in active and passive defense might create a credible perception of a greater threat with given forces against the United States than against the Soviet Union.

If low levels of strategic offensive forces are to be a U.S. negotiating objective, then the U.S. national security authorities (the Defense Department, the National Security Council and the President) must analyze with great care the options that successful negotiation will leave open to them.

From the above review of at least some of the relevant factors, the writer has derived some tentative hypotheses. They are not optimistic, but very little about potential nuclear conflict is.¹⁸

18. It was noted above that nuclear weapons appear to have deterred *major* war (nuclear or conventional) for over thirty years. This may be true, but is is not *knowable*. We know there has been no WW III, but we cannot know that this is because of nuclear weapons—that without those weapons there would have been a major war. But if nuclear deterrence was in fact the reason for peace, the question of major importance is now, can this deterrence continue in the future?

HYPOTHESIS ONE:

Assured Destruction is not today a credible option, and it will not be at lower levels of forces.

Some of the reasons for the non-credibility of Assured Destruction were noted earlier in this paper. Carrying out the threat of Assured Destruction has never been a rational action; today, Soviet civil defense programs plus population distribution asymmetries mean that the Soviets could impose far greater "urban/industrial" punishment on the United States than vice versa—in a suicide pact, we would be "deader." Moreover, the SALT I Interim Agreement permitted the Soviets half again as many ICBMs, with several times the U.S. throw-weight. The Soviets are MIRVing these missiles, and acquiring as great or greater accuracy than the United States. They were also permitted more SLBMs and they are modernizing these. Bombers were not controlled—we had more in 1972 (not counting the Soviet "medium bombers"), but U.S. numbers are declining while the Soviets are building the Backfire and developing a new bomber, and they have heavy air defenses while ours are token only. By the early 1980s the Soviets will have the capability to increase their advantage with a first strike on the Minuteman force, leaving their remaining forces greater than ours and surely deterring our deterrent.

HYPOTHESIS TWO:

Economic threats, including that of enforcing slower Soviet than U.S. post-attack recovery, may be feasible, even with a significant decline in total forces.

The United States does have a larger, more flexible, probably more resilient economy. Its leadership and control mechanisms, being less rigid, may also be less fragile. The Soviet economy is far more autarkic, but U.S. dependence on imports *in extremis* is often exaggerated, as WW II experience strongly suggested. On the other hand, Soviet preparations for "hardening" the economy (by protection of plants and workers, possible stockpiling, etc.) are apparently greater; as potential levels of damage decline, the hope of inducing economic breakdown may become chimeric. Finally, as noted earlier, recovery may be quite largely a function of relative surviving military power.

This brings us to the issue of counterforce targeting, in the writer's view a more proper use of armed forces than targeting civilians and their assets. This moral principle has particular force in the case of a population of coerced victims of the same totalitarian regime that would be attempting to coerce our country if a crisis or *casus belli* existed.

HYPOTHESIS THREE:

If strategic force levels are stringently curtailed, the special Counterforce case of strategic offensive weapons versus strategic offensive weapons will be ruled out by virtue of the fact that with such limited forces probably both sides, and surely the United States, will feel compelled to make their forces highly invulnerable.

We are more concerned, therefore, with counterforce against other military targets, or OMT.

HYPOTHESIS FOUR:

There are important reasons for considering other military targets for deterrence of the threats posed by Soviet forces under low SALT ceilings.

These reasons have to do with the importance to the Soviet leadership of retaining power in any crisis or conflict. Regime maintenance must be a primary objective of Soviet leadership. There are no electoral or other institutional arrangements for periodic or occasional changes in regime in the Soviet Union, even when the occasion is the death of the Chairman. At any given time, therefore, the regime must regard itself as permanent and must strive to maintain itself. The principal tools of its power are force, both military and paramilitary. A threat to destroy the means of retaining power, if feasible, may well be a deterrent to "adventurism" on the part of the Soviet regime in control at a given time. The argument gains force from the implication that signs of weakening power of the regime may stimulate both internal and peripheral resistance to that regime.

A Soviet counterthreat to U.S. military targets would not comparably threaten U.S. leadership, which would not be primarily preoccupied with its own preservation of office. The United States does not have comparable internal nationalisms and dissidence. It is an "island" power without peripheral enemies. The President would, however, be deeply concerned with the potential collateral damage from such an attack, primarily in civilian casualties, as well as with the impact on the post-exchange U.S.-Soviet power balance.

There is, therefore, a need for an in-depth examination of whether there is a limited number of identifiable, targetable high-value Soviet targets, the loss of which would threaten regime maintenance. One can think of such targets, e.g., major concentrations of ground forces, major air and ground maintenance depots, major airfields, naval bases and shipyards, military (and political) command control centers and facilities, and so on. How effectively the United States might target Soviet forces for internal control, peripheral defense, and projection of power (probably vulnerable in reverse order) could only be determined on the basis

of full intelligence and a great deal of detailed analysis of the degree of hardness, dispersal and concealment of such targets and of further dispersal practices in time of crisis.¹⁹

For analytical purposes, it would be necessary to create a comparable "Blue" target data base for the United States (on which we do not spend intelligence efforts comparable to those expended on "Red"!) and to estimate what a comparable number of weapons could do to the United States, both directly and in collateral damage.

Pending such a detailed, two-sided study, the following further subsidiary hypotheses appear not unreasonable:

1. There is an asymmetry in favor of the United States in the vulnerability of the leadership and of national stability to loss of military forces; and
2. There are asymmetries in favor of the Soviets: (a) their military forces are larger and probably more dispersed, hardened, and concealed, at least in many categories (the United States is currently debating the closing of more than a hundred military bases, further concentrating, not dispersing, its target system); and (b) Soviet crisis dispersal plans may also be superior—while both sides' navies may have standing orders to put as many ships to sea as possible (U.S. ships are said to have the capability to remain at sea longer, and in normal practice they spend less time in port), one can imagine (perhaps unfairly) that the Soviet ground forces have standing orders, perhaps rehearsed, to disperse on given crisis signals, while U.S. "SOP" may be to "report to the parade ground at high noon for further orders." (These are interesting questions, and there might be things that could be done on the U.S. side to solve problems of dispersal, collateral damage, etc.)

HYPOTHESIS FIVE:

The final category for deterrence defined at the beginning of this paper, Limited Nuclear Options, will, with stringent limitation of numbers, become decreasingly available for the deterrence of limited attacks, the control of escalation (intrawar deterrence), and war termination.

This will be probable for two reasons:

1. All potential strategic attacks will be becoming more limited; and

19. One of the least-improbable crises of the sort that might at some time be sufficiently serious to require a nuclear threat and/or attack would be a war in Europe. In such a scenario, many of the Soviet target systems of interest might well be dispersed forward into Europe, where they would be difficult to attack and would involve collateral damage to our allies and to potential allies in Eastern Europe.

2. Limited numbers of weapons offer less scope for piecemeal nuclear attacks—probes and demonstrations of will—as we transit from a “weapon-rich” to a “weapon-austere” environment. Premature, piecemeal use of weapons may appear to be dangerously self-disarming.

HYPOTHESIS SIX:

Deterrence-only will be less and less feasible as force levels decline, even if parity can be maintained with high confidence.

The United States is a status quo nation and its military philosophy is one of deterrence, not of war-fighting. In strategic nuclear terms, its philosophy and doctrine is one of deterrence *only*. The Soviet Union, in contrast, is a still-expansionist nation with a philosophy of inducing change, by diplomacy where feasible, but by war as “an extension of diplomacy” where necessary. Even at the strategic nuclear level (and the Soviets do not make the sharp distinction that we do between strategic nuclear and other levels of nuclear and conventional war), they consider a warfighting capability, including defenses, essential.

The above hypotheses suggest that: (1) deep bilateral cuts may further one objective of arms control—to limit worldwide damage, should deterrence fail; but (2) if they go too deep, such cuts will actually weaken the more important arms control objective of preventing nuclear—and major conventional—war, or undue concessions of national interests. This implies the advisability of great caution and careful study of the implications of going too rapidly down this road (should the Soviets, for ingenuous or disingenuous reasons, agree).

Because (2) is a profound risk inherent in the present policy goals of the current Administration, we will list a number of measures that are essential for the amelioration of this national risk. These measures fall in two categories: (1) principles and policies for arms control negotiations, in or beyond SALT; and (2) unilateral measures that should be taken by the United States, whatever the pace of negotiated strategic force limitations.

SALT Implications

Massive reductions in strategic force levels would sharpen a number of concerns about SALT negotiations:

—*The current scope of SALT is far too narrow.* There will be an increasing need to cover non-Central Systems. This means not only covering some Gray-Area Systems but also expanding negotiations to merge with other, nonstra-

tegic arms control forums, notably, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR). Furthermore, the risks of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the credibility of the U.S. deterrent forces must be reassessed. Involvement of other nuclear powers in SALT becomes increasingly important, if still difficult and inimical to prospects for successful agreement. More parameters of strategic forces need to be brought under control, including, for example: throw-weight (or volume) rather than just numbers;²⁰ weapons rather than just launchers; and defenses as well as offensive arms (limitations on air defenses and ASW operations—and assurance on the ABM Treaty).²¹

—*Verification procedures need to be strengthened.* Measures that will be needed are not likely to be verifiable entirely by national technical means. More cooperative and more intrusive means will have to be sought.

—*Dollar savings are likely to be illusory.* While economies are desirable, they should not supersede security as an objective. Lower agreed levels are likely in the long run to increase costs for: verification; intelligence; R&D hedges; survivability (limited forces will require greater dispersion, mobility, concealment, alert levels, and reload/recycle capabilities—if these are not controlled—plus continued diversity, with attendant higher unit costs); and other weapons (conventional capabilities and perhaps also standby nuclear deployment capabilities).

—*Increased security may be illusory.* It will be necessary to find ways to measure the reduced deterrence which will come with reduced numbers. Is this compensated for by reduced damage potential? Ultimately, this may be a question of whether the likelihood of conventional war, including chemical warfare and perhaps even biological warfare, will be perceived as increasing, and, if so, how seriously.

—*Can we get there from here?* Insofar as the likelihood of reaching an acceptable agreement at low force levels is a function of Soviet attitudes (which historically have emphasized the need for covering all targets), as well as those of third countries, we cannot know the answer to this question. However, many problems remain to be answered unilaterally, as indicated in the next section.

Unilateral Implications

If SALT or other agreements on sharply reduced levels are reached, prudence

20. The potential usefulness of the throw-weight limitation concept is discussed in Amoretta M. Hoeber and Francis P. Hoeber, *Op. Cit.*

21. The Carter Administration has suggested limitations on civil defenses, and a Task Force has been set up for U.S.-Soviet discussions of the question. Civil defense is not included above,

will still require vigilant maintenance and implementation of a number of precautionary unilateral policies:

—*A mixed strategic force will be needed.* The tradeoffs here are difficult. The traditional Triad arguments for assurance against both surprise attack and technological surprise appear to acquire greater force. At the same time, at low total levels a mixed force means very small force elements, and this means high unit cost and possibly low penetration confidence.

—*High strategic force survivability will be needed.* This means increased requirements for mobility, dispersion, concealment, reliability, and alert rates. (All of these are costly, but alert rates are primarily a matter of operating costs and these are somewhat less separated and conspicuous and therefore often more salable than high unit procurement costs.)

—*Highly survivable and effective command, control and communications will be needed* for all elements of the strategic forces. If small forces are to accomplish their vital missions, all elements and units must be controllable with the highest confidence possible.

—*U.S. air defenses will have to be rebuilt.* These defenses have been reduced to token levels for "control of the sovereignty of U.S. airspace," on the argument that without ballistic missile defenses, air defenses don't matter. But if enemy bombers are given a "free ride," a standoff in missile forces will not save us from coercion by the Soviets.

—*Civil defense will be needed.* The United States cannot now or in the foreseeable future afford to ignore the growing U.S.-Soviet asymmetry in civil defense. Civil defense must be broadly defined to include a wide range of preparedness measures for the protection of population, industry (including the mobilization and recovery bases), and continuity of government (including protection of leadership, communications and information bases, and arrangements for post-attack federal-state-local cooperation). This broad interpretation is inherent in the new Federal Emergency Management Agency. However, the removal of civil defense from the Department of Defense should not lead us to forget that civil preparedness is an integral part of the strategic military posture, not a purely civilian matter.

—*Continued intensive R & D will be needed.* Since the potential destabilizing effects of Soviet technological surprises will be greater if the strategic forces are small, it will be essential to keep up with the potential state of the art to prevent

simply because the author cannot at present conceive of ways for effective, verifiable limitations in this area.

or limit surprise, and to have standby technology to enable rapid deployment of responses to surprise.

—*There is a potential lulling effect of a big success or series of successes in reaching agreed reductions in SALT.* Major efforts will need to be made to insure that there will be public support for the precautionary measures (above) that such agreements will require.

—*New doctrine will be required.* Finite deterrence becomes less and less credible as force levels become small. The potential of OMT attacks on the Soviet power base should be intensively investigated. The imbalance between the U.S. deterrence-only and Soviet war-fighting, war-surviving, war-winning doctrines must be redressed.

Conclusion

While (1) it has become a cliché that larger U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces *reduce* security, (2) sharp and continuing reductions in these forces appear desirable and are an Administration goal, and (3) ultimate reduction to zero nuclear weapons is an objective with wide appeal, the author is nevertheless compelled by the above analysis to important contrary conclusions. While some—even dramatic—bilateral strategic force reductions, perhaps by as much as, say, one-third or one-half, may be useful, if they can be achieved *equitably and verifiably*, further reductions would *lessen* U.S. security, because they would involve the following intolerable risks:

1. If both U.S. and Soviet strategic force levels are very low, but balanced, the strategic balance can be more easily destabilized by:

- Technological surprise;
- Cheating;
- Avoidance of limitations, i.e., the exploitation of loopholes by the legal expansion of forces in ways not covered by the formal agreements;
- Sudden breakout from ABM Treaty or other subsequent defense limitations, and unforeseen increases in the effectiveness of passive defenses;
- Build-up of the nuclear forces of present third countries (China, France, Britain, India, Israel) and unanticipated alliance realignments; and
- Further nuclear proliferation to new “Nth” countries.

2. A shrinking U.S. strategic nuclear “umbrella” will weaken alliance cohesion and will increase the likelihood of conventional war and the importance of a costly—both economically and politically burdensome—buildup in U.S. conventional forces.

Mobilization in the Nuclear Age

Paul Bracken

Over the past twenty years, the possibility of a large scale American military mobilization effort has been increasingly dismissed as a serious national security option. Even the mention of the term "strategic option" has more and more come to be synonymous with some form of employment of nuclear weapons. However, the ability to assemble rapidly a superior military force has several favorable characteristics not shared by nuclear options. Indeed, in many circumstances, the prompt conversion of potential into mobilized forces could be considered a complement to any nuclear capability. Perhaps most importantly, a large scale competitive mobilization may be among the more likely forms of superpower confrontation over the next twenty-five years. Such is the position analyzed in this paper, along with a discussion of the characteristics a mobilization would probably possess. Moreover, an attempt at a synthesis of mobilization options together with the currently emphasized aspects of nuclear strategy will be undertaken in order to examine the deterrent value of a large techno-economic mobilization base. Of course, the complexity of these issues and the years of careful thought given them preclude any chance for other than slight clarification and illumination of the basic problems. But certain aspects of a modern mobilization in the nuclear age have received such scant attention that even a preliminary, tentative analysis may be an interesting and worthwhile undertaking.

As used in this paper, a mobilization is defined as the rapid assembly, production or deployment of a superior force of military arms. While the mobilization of American industry in World War II is in some sense typical, the efforts during the Korean War are more interesting for present purposes. During this latter conflict, both nuclear and conventional armaments were produced on a major scale. Mobilizations of current interest could last months and years as well as days or weeks, as would be the case for a manpower mobilization to reinforce a war in NATO Europe. While shorter term situations employing stockpiled armaments are not precluded from consideration, they are primarily examined in comparison with options requiring a much greater time span. Thus, a critical question is the degree to which existing assets could be replaced by the production potential that a mobilization base offers. Arms control aspects of this trade-off are also of im-

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portance, as are the range of threats such a base could make credible. A strategic mobilization as referred to in this paper denotes the use of mobilization for its threat and deterrent value as well as its capability-enhancing characteristics. It is thus not exclusively concerned with armament production, but with the overall political and military effects of possessing such economic and technical resources.

There is a sharp contrast between a long term mobilization effort and the length of time needed to employ strategic nuclear options. Even to mobilize reserve forces would necessarily require a lengthy time. Should an array of new weapons be produced, the time required would increase greatly, perhaps to several years. Development times for new weapons have been growing considerably so that peacetime development now often exceeds a decade. Alternatively, technological trends have caused an order of magnitude reduction in the reaction time needed to employ strategic nuclear forces. A curious contrast is arrived at wherein systems needing perhaps ten years for development are to be employed in a period of a few hours or less. Examples of this include the trend toward increasing interconnectedness between real time warning systems and the nuclear forces, and the development of missile force retargeting systems. The Command Data Buffer System, for example, will permit a reduction in the time needed to reprogram the Minuteman missile force to perhaps less than one hour. This quick reacting character of American and Soviet strategic nuclear forces will grow substantially during the 1980s. Discussions now center upon so-called "launch on certain warning" control systems that would launch a missile force upon detection of an opponent's similar action. Future developments in computer technology are expected to provide the incredible capability to retarget a large portion of a land-based missile force while it is in flight. In some future crisis where nuclear weapons are being considered for employment, a president may be called upon to make crisis nuclear/war bargaining decisions in less than twenty minutes time!

This contrast between short and long reaction times is raised because it may not always be desirable to have such quick reacting forces. Slow motion strategic options could be of more value in many crises and it could plausibly be argued that one of the greatest needs of American national security is the development of alternatives to the precipitous employment of nuclear weapons. At the least, some means of braking the rapid momentum leading to the nuclear decision point would be a valuable adjunct to existing crisis management plans. This is a key consideration in our analysis of mobilization. For, given the possible interlocking character of superpower nuclear actions, a World War I move-countermove dystopian sequence could develop that would lead both nations to disaster. Technological developments since then have added a crucial qualitative factor which makes

such a nightmare more difficult to prevent. The time constraints of the pacing events have shortened enormously. In 1914, European decision-making was geared to the seventeen days required to generate and deploy the German Army. Technological trends may reduce the corresponding time in the 1980s to only seventeen minutes.

With this problem as a context, this paper examines the types of crises for which a mobilization would be a useful and appropriate response and the closely related issue of relative superpower positions for engaging in such a mobilization. Here, some comparisons are developed that indicate the importance of Soviet economic growth since 1950.

The Context for Strategic Mobilization

The most common objection to a mobilization strategy in the nuclear era rests upon the seemingly common sense observation that a nuclear war between the superpowers would be so brief and so totally devastating that the American industrial base which proved so decisive in World War II would be of no use whatsoever. For a few years, in the early 1950s, an opposing argument was advanced, especially by the U.S. Army. The gist of this argument was that an American-Soviet general war would initially see mutual atomic strikes by long-range bombers on the urban-industrial assets of each side. This would be followed by a large scale mobilization of the surviving and reconstituted resource base which would again produce a large ground army to recapture lost territory on the Eurasian land mass. Subsequent to the full understanding of the effect of hydrogen (rather than atomic) bombs, this "broken back" argument was laid to rest. Although mobilization planning has continued to the present time, there has been an increasing air of unreality and skepticism about it. This has led to a wide divergence between paper plans and reality with respect to American mobilization capability.

But rationale other than that of an atomic World War II exist for mobilization planning. Perhaps the most basic of all of these is one that receives almost no consideration today. If a major conflict with the Soviet Union suddenly appeared to be more likely, the American government would probably be prepared to spend very large sums of money for defense in a fairly short period of time. In this situation, nuclear weapons are not falling on either side's homeland. It is somewhat similar to the large increases in defense spending after the outbreak of the Korean War. At that time, Congress was debating whether to spend \$14 to \$16 billion for defense. Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea and after American involvement, Congress was catalyzed into voting \$50 billion for defense in the

first year and \$62 billion in the second. The most important consequence of this four-fold increase in defense spending was its effect upon the Soviet Union. Soviet material aid losses in Korea from attrition were insignificant compared to the shift in world military power that followed after Congress committed \$60 billion to defense. These large national security budgets of the early 1950s were not devoted exclusively to the Korean ground war. A large share was devoted to research and development and to a strategic nuclear weapons build-up. This jump in defense spending ultimately made possible the development over the next decade of the nuclear stockpile, the Atlas, Polaris and Minuteman strategic missiles, several intermediate range ballistic missiles, three large scale early warning systems and a host of other activities that directly threatened Soviet security. Just as important, this increase helped to create the American military-industrial complex with its technological prowess in the field of defense armaments. Within the Soviet Union, there were attempts to match this build-up but, because of the size and technical resources of the American economy, these attempts were doomed to fail and served mainly to retard Soviet economic progress. In effect, therefore, the large defense expenditures of the early 1950s sowed the seeds for a rapid shift in the world balance of military power. It insured an American military superiority that has lasted until at least the mid 1970s.

Mobilizations could be a useful defense tool for situations involving a long period of worsening relations, minor provocations and hostile actions prior to a confrontation. Of course, there can be no guarantee of such a long preparatory period. But strategic planning must consider situations other than short, intense wars. The recent emphasis given to a short war in Central Europe and the decreasing time needed to employ nuclear weapons has made it imperative to develop strategies not based upon hair trigger reactions. A basic model for utilizing the mobilization option is then a peacetime series of confrontations, analogous to a return to the Cold War, but on a more intense level of competition. This could involve a sequence of minor acts that culminate in some crisis involving actual Soviet military force which required an American response, for example, a limited Soviet territorial conquest in an area where the United States has little conventional military capability.

It is instructive to consider the alternatives in this type of situation. Use of existing strategic nuclear forces, with their total emphasis upon intercontinental attack of homelands, would surely increase the pace of crisis events. Their limited employment in the form of coercive or escalatory attacks could rapidly lead to a situation getting completely out of the control of either party. Moreover, a serious question exists as to whether or not the United States possesses the kind of


nuclear force that is most useful for limited coercion. Over the years, American nuclear forces have been designed to provide a secure retaliatory capability, something quite different from their employment as a political big stick. Attempts to use forces designed for the former task, in order to fulfill the latter need, may be one of the best ways to risk inadvertent or accidental war, or unintended large-scale escalation. There are two specific dangers in this situation. The first is the possibility that a president may be so paralyzed by the risks of large-scale escalation that he may be boxed into taking no effective action whatsoever. Of course, conventional forces would be useable, but depending upon the circumstances there may be none available in the appropriate location. It is a large world and American conventional forces are already outnumbered and spread thin. Second, a president may actually decide to use strategic or tactical nuclear forces in a controlled and limited manner in order to favorably terminate a crisis. Here, he would court the risks of either being matched, trumped or of something going wrong in terms of system or human performance. Orders can be garbled, field test accuracies fudged, and targets mistaken.¹ The risks would be enormous especially as the entire decision process might occur in such a short time period.

While the capability to execute a limited nuclear option or engage in some other form of controlled nuclear conflict is certainly desirable compared with launching more massive attacks, it does not in itself constitute a preferred response for handling crises. In many circumstances, a range of alternative strategic mobilization options would be preferable to launching such attacks on the Soviet Union. Nuclear attacks might have to occur in situations where Soviet retaliation would be possible or even likely. Even threatening to employ nuclear options might eventually force a president to carry out such threats—or to accommodate on unfavorable terms. A simplified presentation of this line of reasoning is shown in Figure 1. It is important to recognize that a mobilization option expands rather than substitutes for a range of response actions. The capability to wage limited nuclear war could still be retained as an alternative to large all-out wars.

Many questions are raised by considering a mobilization option. And, in the nuclear era, a mobilization might look quite different from the mass production industrial mobilization of World War II. One could expect a far more capital intensive mobilization than in that conflict. Beyond short term needs, it could conceivably be oriented toward an overwhelming build-up of long-range nuclear

1. This problem is much greater than is commonly believed, especially by those not familiar with some of the details involved. See Paul Bracken, "Unintended Consequences of Strategic Gaming," *Simulation and Games*, September 1977, p. 283.

Figure 1
Crisis Response Decision Tree



attack forces, thick ballistic missile defense systems with boost phase kill potential, or massive anti-submarine warfare barrier systems. The assembly line production of thousands of nuclear cruise missiles and development of a dominant capability for a war in space are other candidate options that could exploit special talents. Moreover, the shock value of an American Congress authorizing a multi-trillion dollar defense budget could also have an important effect upon an opponent's willingness to negotiate a settlement to a crisis. The threat value of this type of mobilization to deter the enemy from engaging in provocative acts in the first place is a crucial issue that has received little recent attention.

One objection often raised is the provocative, escalatory and dangerous character of such a mobilization. But this is precisely what a strategic mobilization is designed to be—directly threatening to the enemy. It would only be employed in the most extreme crisis and is best thought of in relation to the other options shown

in Figure 1. One of its main advantages is that it is a response that can slow down the crisis momentum that may be getting out of control. This feature may be very desirable when the only realistic alternative is employment of quick reacting nuclear forces. Thus, because of its long time requirements, a mobilization temporizes. If accompanied by a declaration of national emergency or perhaps even by a formal declaration of war, it could provide extended time for negotiations and communicate declaratory American policy while preventing a total deescalation of the crisis to a *fait accompli*. Because the precise settlement terms of any declaration would not be detailed at the outset, presidential options would be preserved for a relatively long time. This might permit more limited demands involving achievable aims. Alternatively, after the United States initiated mobilization, the Soviets might feel compelled to "buy us off." In other words, national aims might be achieved for which, without mobilization, a nuclear war might have to be started. Termination of a mobilization could be based upon negotiation or ultimatum. At any rate, the main point is that a mobilization could be employed to slow down a crisis, perhaps preventing the possibility of a twenty minute ultimatum/bargaining ordeal using limited nuclear options.

Another frequent objection to the kind of mobilization described here is the ability of a nuclear armed opponent to preempt before it could get underway. This is an outcome that must be taken seriously. However, if no nuclear weapons had as yet been used, there would be strong inhibitions about crossing this threshold, particularly as the other side would presumably retain its own nuclear retaliatory force. Even if limited or battlefield nuclear weapons had been employed, a mobilization could be implemented as an excuse or face-saving way to deescalate. If theories of victory or even escape from annihilation were beginning to be doubted, then both sides might be grateful for an extended "phoney war" of mobilization. But there can be no guarantees in such bizarre situations. One feature of a strategic mobilization would probably be the development of emergency cover forces that could bolster nuclear deterrence in a very brief period of time. Just as European ground armies have long used cover forces to protect borders and invasion corridors while their main armies were mobilizing, so too might *strategic cover forces* be used. These could consist of surge deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and/or previously stockpiled nuclear arms.² The United States, for example, currently has 120 Minuteman III missiles in storage that are not counted under the

2. See Herman Kahn and Paul Bracken, *Strategic Mobilization and Ballistic Missile Defense*, (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, March 1977).

SALT ceilings. These could be dispersed and set up in soft or hidden positions during an emergency when treaty violation would no longer be an important issue.

The basic model so far considered to demonstrate the utility of a mobilization option has been a situation where the Soviet Union has initiated limited military actions or engaged in other provocative acts. A slightly different context would be the all-out arms race following a long period of tension. For example, if a nuclear arms agreement such as the ABM treaty were abrogated, a large scale armaments build-up might ensue. In this situation, the United States would literally be forced into a mobilization, as there would be few other options. It is unlikely that limited nuclear options would even be considered if no fighting had occurred. Prior planning for such an eventuality could make the difference between success and failure and could also contribute to deterrence of such an occurrence.

While the previous situations have primarily examined strategic weapons mobilization, it is not impossible that large scale conventional mobilizations could also occur. A long drawn-out crisis might see both superpowers pouring conventional armaments into Europe for the purposes of deterrence, bluster or bluff. This might also be accompanied by some limited mobilization of strategic armaments. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that protracted conventional wars involving the United States could be fought that would require industrial mobilization. The United States has, after all, fought two Asian ground wars in the nuclear era.

In summary, a mobilization option could prove useful in several political-military situations. Rapid armament build-up induced by provocation, treaty abrogation or some other stimulus would offer definite advantages not found with the immediate use of a nuclear option. The period of competitive build-up could be described as a *mobilization war*. Little or no large scale fighting would occur, rather there would be a maneuvering for position based upon the respective armament build-ups. This could involve deployment of massive conventional forces to Central Europe or the construction of strategic forces to alter the world balance of military power.

A protracted hot conventional war with the Soviet Union is less likely to take place. However, if surrogate forces were used, an industrial mobilization could still be of importance. Additionally, the ability to quickly prepare for such a war could forestall or prevent its occurrence altogether. Mobilization capability would be relevant in either case.

A mobilization option would not be directly relevant for crisis situations postulated on a bolt from the blue surprise attack or generally where there is little or

no warning. Such situations would require competent standing forces. But a central thesis of this paper is that a no-warning situation is not the only contingency that a nation should prepare for. Moreover, it is probably not even among the more likely varieties of future superpower conflict.

Arms Racing Potential

Any suggestion that large scale military build-ups may occur in the future raises the subject of the relative superpower positions in this regard. Consideration of this topic is interesting because it can give some insight into the capabilities and feasible types of competition which could take place. Naturally, a great many factors enter into such an analysis. Political willpower, civilian morale and administrative skill are all of obvious importance. However, it is the techno-economic resources of the two sides that can be considered to form the feasible regions of build-up, against which these other factors can be applied. For the relatively high technology arms races postulated, strong political will is probably a necessary characteristic, but it is not likely to be a sufficient determinant of an effective mobilization program.

Techno-economic resources are also important for the more conceivable situation of limited or partial military build-up. This type of mobilization is also more likely to exploit the threat and deterrent effects of even greater build-ups. A limited or partial arms race could be used to communicate to an opponent that, if need be, a nation would be willing to convert even more resources to military ends. Thus, the total techno-economic resource base becomes important not because it is actually converted to military end-use but because such an action is threatened. The technical and economic vitality of the American economy offers many such opportunities for bargaining and coercion. In this regard, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has recently remarked "Surely we must be able to say to them [Soviet leaders] 'Look, you had better deal with us now or we will go back and raise such hell, we will double the defense budget, we will quadruple the budget; we can spend indefinitely such that when you are bankrupt we will not be, and so you had better negotiate with us.' But if you have psychologically discarded that bargaining technique, then, in fact, you are disarmed."³

Some selected economic and technological indicators of Soviet and American mobilization bases are shown in Table 1.⁴ These trends can provide some very

3. Interview found in *Public Opinion*, May/June 1978, p. 7.

4. This table was derived from data contained in Office of Economic Research, Central Intelli-

Table 1.
Soviet-American Economic and Technological Trends

	Industrial Output (1960=100)		U.S.S.R. GNP As A Percent of U.S. GNP
	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	
1950	54	68	
1955	73	88	33%
1960	100	100	44
1965	137	136	45
1970	185	164	51
1976	256	197	54

U.S.S.R. Output as a Percent of U.S. Output for Selected Items

	Then	Now	
Crude Steel	25%	125%	} 1949-1976
Primary Aluminum	21	65	
Electricity Generation	20	49	
Coal Production	41	84	
Petroleum Production	17	125	
Plastics	11	23	} 1960-1976
Production of Metal-forming Machine Tools	155	208	
Tractor Production	134	246	
Production of Television Receivers	30	50	
Inventory of Civil Aircraft	61	109	

approximate comparisons. Broadly speaking, the Soviet economy has been expanding faster than that of the United States for the past thirty years. This is especially true for heavy industry and military related production. One reason for this is obviously the much smaller base from which the Soviet Union began after the war.

The relevance of the production levels in Table 1 for mobilization is the fairly strong relationship between steel, aluminum, electricity and energy output and overall military potential, especially for conventional armaments. Moreover, a strong relationship generally exists between these indicators and overall techno-

logical sophistication. This is an empirical observation on the military potential and economic power of modern states.

Certain trends within the Soviet Union's economy reveal that its technological base may be inferior to that of the United States but the gap is not nearly as great as in the 1950s. For example, television receiver production has increased considerably, to over 7 million units per year, indicating the mastering of mass production skills for electronic equipment. This capability would have a military conversion potential that was obviously lacking in the 1950s. Even standing Soviet military forces have shown large gains in their technological sophistication. Better evidence of this than a citation of a particular radar or airplane is the change in the economic structure of the Soviet national security budget. In 1955, about 42 percent of all national security expenditures (in rubles) was estimated to be spent upon personnel pay and maintenance. This was the World War II Red Army, massive in numbers with little technical sophistication. By 1975, however, only about 15 percent of defense outlays (in rubles) were dedicated to personnel support and maintenance.⁵ The great difference in these shares is accounted for by the redistribution of resources into research, development, and the prototyping and procurement of technologically high performance systems such as strategic missiles and space hardware.

A trend related to quantitative capacity for build-ups of conventional forces is also pertinent. During the 1950s, the Soviet Union was probably incapable of surging production of conventional armaments much above ordinary output. This is surely no longer true as the scale of the Soviet economy has grown and as automotive production has grown from small to fairly substantial proportions. Soviet tractor production in 1976 was 562,000 units and bus, truck and automobile output was about 2,000,000 units. This is a productive capacity that was largely nonexistent in the 1950s but could now be converted and surged for tank, artillery and perhaps aircraft production.⁶ This does not include the surging capacity available from existing military production by adding second and third shifts of workers or starting up dormant production lines. Furthermore, the Soviet Union maintains sizable stockpiles of conventional armaments. The relevance of this for a

5. William T. Lee, *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-1975* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 117.

6. The author is aware of arguments that this capacity is sharply limited for military conversion potential because of the lack of overhead cranes in these plants. It strikes me as myopic that this would actually be a serious problem to a (nearly) trillion dollar economy. Exactly the same problem proved easily solved in the U.S. conversion of its enormous automobile production to military uses in 1942. See Francis Walton, *Miracle of World War II* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956). p. 236.

partial mobilization to rapidly bolster conventional military power in Europe or the Far East is obvious. Its threat value naturally depends upon the counter capability of American and West European establishments. However, the key observation is the Soviet attainment of a potential surge conventional force production capability that was not previously possessed.

Given the relative mobilization positions at present, it is interesting to speculate about future trends into the 1980s. Even more interesting would be to consider the total mobilization potential of each side. Of the comparisons previously discussed, all have a peacetime context and neither side is on a war footing. Should a series of crises occur, a crucial issue would be the total possible economic resources for arms racing that could be generated over a given period. Of course, any such estimate will be only a crude approximation of real capability. But it is almost because these estimates are approximate that they are of real value—any estimate claiming precision would likely be misleading. Moreover, crude estimates along these lines are likely to be as worthwhile as the static counts of strategic missiles and accuracy estimates that are so often (mis)used in arms limitation discussions.

A situation of mobilization warfare is now considered that lasts three years, culminating in 1985. United States GNP as estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (revised late 1976 projection)⁷ is expanded to a full mobilization GNP by altering assumptions in the BLS model. Basically, the average work week is assumed to expand, reflecting wartime hours as in World War II. Arbitrarily, 1944 hours are taken as reasonable. Furthermore, the work force participation rate also grows to 1944 levels (62.1 percent) for those not in the military service (both sexes). Allowance is made for size of the armed forces because this removes workers from productive employment. Civilian GNP is then computed as the product of labor force size, productivity per man hour and average number of annual hours worked. This civilian GNP is then allocated for various end uses: consumption, private domestic investment and nondefense government operations (including state and local government). After these allocations are specified, the remainder of GNP is allocated to national security expenditures. For the 1985 mobilization warfare situation, no combat destruction of resources is assumed. This reflects the scenario wherein a competitive mobilization occurs in a cold war environment. Per capita consumption in 1985 is assumed to be cut back, (by rationing, taxation, etc.) to 1980 levels, where these levels are taken as estimated by the Bureau of Labor

7. Ronald E. Kutscher, "Revised BLS Projections to 1980 and 1985: An Overview," *Monthly Labor Review*, March 1976, p. 3.

Table 2.
A Mobilized United States, 1985 (in 1977 Dollars)

Size of Armed Forces	Maximum Armament Expenditures
4 Million Men	\$1,303 Billion
8	1,204
12	1,105
16	988

Statistics. Investment is taken as the amount needed to merely maintain and replace existing private capital with no allowance for non-defense capital expansion, or roughly 3.5 percent of GNP. Non-defense government consumption is reduced from present levels to 10 percent of the mobilized GNP. These assumptions seem entirely plausible in such an emergency and the sensitivity to variations in private consumption is later examined.

The total mobilized national security expenditure for armaments is clearly dependent upon the manpower size of the armed forces. Since we are interested in partial mobilizations which may involve widely different numbers in the armed forces, this figure is treated as a parameter. Military pay and related expenses are assumed to average \$9,000 annually in 1977 dollars. While this is considerably lower than present levels, it is quite likely that in this type of emergency the draft would be reinstated and military pay levels reduced.

Military pay costs are subtracted from the total available national security expenditures to derive resources available for armaments. This figure includes procurement of weapons, operating and maintenance costs, research and development, etc. As already mentioned, armament expenditures exclude manpower costs. A least squares regression can then be fitted relating the size of the armed forces to armament expenditures. Some data from this estimating procedure are shown in Table 2.

It is apparent that trillion dollar defense budgets are entirely feasible by the mid-1980s if a serious crisis arises. Nonetheless, the armament sums are staggering. The 1977 defense budget allocated about \$41 billion to armaments. Peak World War II armament expenditures were on the order of \$190 billion in 1977 dollars.

However, if the crisis were deemed serious enough, then ever greater armament expenditures would surely be feasible. Cutbacks in personal consumption would

Table 3

1985 U.S. Mobilized Armament Expenditures (in 1977 Dollars)

Personal Consumption Reduced to	Maximum Armament Expenditures
1980 Levels	\$1,204 Billion
1970	1,682
1960	1,920
1944	2,126

probably be the area that would be squeezed for more defense resources. During World War II, personal consumption was cut back 20 percent in Great Britain and an incredible 47 percent in the Soviet Union,⁸ although part of this was because of a smaller population base following German conquests. The sensitivity of 1985 U.S. armament expenditures to personal consumption levels for an 8 million man force is displayed in Table 3.

Admittedly, to cut back consumption below 1980 levels in 1985 would require an emergency so total as to make World War II pale in comparison. But these bizarre situations are important for their threat value as well as for the capabilities actually generated. They are also no stranger than most of the missile wars whose analysis is now so fashionable.

Estimation of 1985 Soviet mobilization capability is much more difficult than for the United States. The structure of the economies is so fundamentally different and the lack of detailed data so complete that only a heuristic effort is undertaken here. Nonetheless, this attempt may be a useful preliminary step for more sophisticated investigations, perhaps aided by recent advances in econometric modeling of the Soviet economy.

Before a 1985 Soviet projection can be given, a current conversion factor relating Soviet and American mobilization capabilities must be determined. It is proposed to assume that, at present, the Soviet Union has 60 percent of the U.S. ability to produce conventional and strategic armaments when both have equal numbers in the armed forces. This is an intuitive estimate, based upon both the indicators in Table 1 and the scanning of opinion on relative economic and technological abilities. As for future trends, a problem arises on alternative Soviet growth rates. A great deal of economic opinion in the United States foresees a

8. Theodore A. Sumberg, "The Soviet Union's War Budgets," *The American Economic Review*, May 1946, p. 120.

sharp downturn in Soviet growth rates in the early 1980s. The Central Intelligence Agency forecasts a 2.5 percent real rate of growth in this period.⁹ However, the possibility exists that higher growth will prevail if Soviet leadership undertakes appropriate measures. To incorporate both of these possibilities, two 1985 Soviet mobilized estimates are made, one using CIA economic estimates, and the other extending the 1976–1980 Soviet Five Year Plan into the 1980–1985 time period. With CIA estimates, it is presumed that in 1985 the Soviet Union would have 61 percent of American mobilization capability and with the extended Five Year Plan rates, it would have 75 percent. The CIA projected downturn can thus be observed to be quite substantial relative to projected United States growth to 1985.

Given these estimates, it is possible to make a 1985 Soviet mobilization projection. The ratio of the slope of the Soviet to the American regression line will be the inverse of the ratio of productivity of Soviet to American industry. This is assumed at present to be 60 percent and is estimated in 1985 to be either 61 percent or 75 percent, depending upon whether the Soviet economy slows in growth, as forecast by the CIA, or continues at the rate in the 1980s set in the 1976–1980 plan formulated by Moscow. Two alternative Soviet regression lines are thus developed.


In order to complete this analysis, the current Soviet-American relative positions for 1977 are estimated. These are based upon Defense Department values for American manpower costs (excluding retirement pay), and for the Soviet Union an average of CIA dollar estimates with the larger estimates of W. T. Lee.¹⁰ The current positions are that the United States has 3,036,000 men in service (including civilians) and spends \$41 billion for armaments (1977 dollars), while the Soviet Union has 4,760,000 men in service and spends \$77 billion on armaments (1977 dollars). The Soviet estimate was achieved by factoring out manpower costs in the dollar conversion process. Although the Soviets have a much larger standing army, this is more than offset by the very low pay which permits the higher armament expenditures vis-à-vis the United States.

These 1977 positions and the 1985 mobilization positions, parametrized on size of the armed forces, are displayed in Figure 2. The lines in this figure are the

9. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1977, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government*, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977, p. 5.

10. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report, FY 1978*, January 17, 1977, p. 287. Also for larger estimates of 1977 expenditures by W. T. Lee see, "Soviet Defense Expenditure," *Air Force* (December 1977), p. 80.

Figure 2
Mobilization Capabilities, 1985



estimated maximum armament budgets that the Soviet and American economies could sustain contingent upon having a specified number of men in the armed forces. As manpower is withdrawn from the civilian labor force and put in military service, maximum armament expenditures decline. This is because fewer workers are available—producing a smaller gross national product which in turn translates into a smaller armament budget. Furthermore, as the manpower level of the armed services increases, more money must be used for personnel pay and maintenance rather than for development and acquisition of armaments. Two Soviet lines are drawn, labeled CIA and Plan. These refer to the alternative economic prospects discussed earlier, with the former based upon CIA estimates and the latter extrapolating the Soviet 1976–1980 Five Year Plan into the 1980s. Regions to the left of the Soviet and United States lines in this figure describe regions of limited or partial mobilization. The points labeled as 1977 denote existing peacetime armament and manpower levels.

The most important observation concerning Figure 2 is the significantly greater American resource position after the postulated three year mobilization. The difference between the CIA and the Plan growth are also striking. In either case, the United States dominates. However, with the larger estimate, it is at least conceivable that the Soviet Union could be in the race—this being less likely with the lower estimate. A comparison of this graph with one for the 1950s, however, would show a dramatic Soviet catch-up. In other words, had such a competitive effort broken out during the 1950s, the overall result could not have been in doubt. The American effort would have swamped that of the Soviet Union. Today, the ordering is still the same, but the gap has been closed considerably. The Soviets can now engage in a competitive mobilization. Given a crisis or provocation such as the Korean War, the United States is much less likely to rapidly achieve the massive superiority it achieved during the build-up of the 1950s. This may require a more thoughtful, selective American approach as to what should be mobilized. The United States tradition in World War II was to produce an overwhelming armaments superiority on all fronts. This might risk dilution of effort if the opponent has a respectable mobilization potential. In this regard, the possibility of a slowdown in Soviet growth could be welcome.

Other observations are also important. The larger Soviet standing forces, both in manpower and in armaments, could indicate an early propensity to engage in offensive operations, particularly given the superior American long-term capabilities. This has importance especially for conventional warfare on the Eurasian land mass. For, if early local victory could be attained there without being followed by escalation to city-trading nuclear war, the Soviet Union might feel capable of engaging in enough of a competitive arms race to beat back the superior American challenge. In our analysis, the technical and economic resources of Western Europe and Japan have been excluded and these could be a deciding factor in a given situation. If the technical and economic base of the European Economic Community came under the control of the Soviet Union in 1985, their combined GNP in an unmobilized situation would be about \$3.3 trillion 1977 dollars. This compares with a projected U.S. 1985 GNP of \$2.5 trillion 1977 dollars. While it is not useful to place too great an emphasis on GNP statistics, it would seem that if this eventuality did arise, the United States could be in a near desperate long term situation, even if a military conflict were not going on.

A related possibility is the feasibility of some tactic that would degrade overall mobilization capabilities but would be short of launching a large nuclear attack. One item that comes to mind would be to shock the mobilizing American economy by disrupting crude oil imports. An obvious question is the sensitivity of the

U.S. position to an oil cutoff, either by neutralization of Middle East oil output or by naval attacks on tankers. Some recent studies of the impact of an oil embargo can be used here. An approximate estimate of the results of such a tactic is that U.S. GNP in a 1985 mobilizing environment would be reduced by nearly \$300 billion 1977 dollars if 50 percent of foreign oil imports were cut off.¹¹ Of course, the effects on Europe and Japan would be devastating. These issues need to be examined in greater detail as they could make enough of a difference to tilt the overall balance against the United States.

A final comment deals with limited mobilizations. The current 1977 positions are so far removed from mobilization limits that it should be clear that neither power is on a war footing. One should not be under the illusion that, given sufficient reason, the superpowers would be unable to engage in an armaments race. With much smaller economies the 1940s experience indicates otherwise. The current large fraction of Soviet GNP dedicated to defense could be enormously increased under appropriate conditions. Moreover, a 12 percent of GNP defense effort (the 1977 Soviet CIA estimate) should not be confused with a similar 12 percent budget for a mobilized economy with its double and triple shifts, large work forces, price controls and centralized authority.

Conclusion

Throughout its history, the United States has always held a distinct military advantage in its economic vitality. Admittedly, the advantage has often taken considerable time to convert into tangible military strength. Yet even when this great resource was not used in combat, such as during the Cold War, it has had a tremendous impact upon friend and foe alike. This is an influence and source of power that ought still to have great advantage if properly managed. While it can have little effect for bolt from the blue deterrence, it can be a very threatening response that any adversary must incorporate into his defense planning. Indeed, for the more likely forms of superpower confrontation, it is a resource that offers special advantages not possessed by other options.

However, the relative scales of the two world super economies has changed

11. This estimate derives from applying a GNP loss estimator for an interruption in oil imports to the "High" 1985 oil demand projections used in studies of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The GNP loss estimator description is contained in "A Model to Estimate the Economic Impact to an Interruption in United States Petroleum Imports," Randall G. Holcome, *Federal Energy Administration Final Report* (Texas A & M University, April 1976).

during the past thirty years indicating that some rethinking is needed if American mobilization potential is to be a useful element of a coordinated deterrence policy. No longer is it possible to concentrate exclusively on a one-sided analysis of either limited or all-out arms racing. In the past, American economic size and prowess permitted such a perspective. But, because of its secular economic and technological growth and its internal allocation of resources, the Soviet Union has developed a substantial mobilization potential that must be factored into American policy decisions. Attention has recently focused on the growth problems of the Soviet economy over the next few years. However important these prospects, they should not distract attention from long term Soviet development since the early 1950s.

Soviet growth in mobilization potential should force a reappraisal of American attitudes in this area. This potential is one where the United States still holds a sizable lead despite Soviet growth and it represents an important alternative to other forms of deterrence. Indeed, a mobilization option is in many ways more attractive than the ability to initiate limited nuclear war. Its slow reacting character provides greater time for negotiation and offers an alternative to the enormous risk of using or threatening a nuclear option. With the intelligent use of strategic cover forces a mobilization would not invite preemption and would temper the headlong rush to the nuclear decision point. The mobilization option does not totally replace the need for the threat of limited nuclear options—rather it expands the number of alternatives available. Taken together, nuclear options and a strong mobilization base are complimentary and serve to broaden the spectrum of deterrence.

The relative positions with respect to mobilization potential suggest that greater attention be given to the category of partial mobilizations. In addition to being unlikely, an all-out mobilization would dilute overall effort across too many competing programs. Perhaps this would have been feasible in the early 1950s but Soviet economic and technological growth since then make it a dangerous course of action. Concentration on crucial areas whose control could lead to overall military domination should be a guiding factor in mobilization policy. In this context, the increasing militarization of space cannot be ignored.

Just as important as the production and deployment decisions of a mobilization program are the related peacetime strategy questions of deterrence and arms control. Ways should be found to further exploit the deterrent value of the American technological and mobilization base. If this is done well enough, there will be less need to resort to other very costly programs that draw resources away from civilian use. One method of increasing this type of deterrence would be to re-establish the Office of Defense Mobilization, long since dissolved. Its formation

would attract attention to the importance placed on this issue by the American government. Studies and analyses of the many political and technical aspects of strategic mobilization could then be undertaken in a centralized manner. Raising these subjects would also have the political effect of heightening awareness of American potential in this field.

Arms control considerations are also relevant because a mobilization base could be used to substitute for standing forces. It is at least conceivable that the added deterrence of a mobilization base could compensate for the reduction of some strategic systems. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have (nearly) abandoned deployment of ballistic missile defense systems while maintaining a warm research and development base in this field. These programs are primarily intended to deter abrogation of the agreement, rather than to develop better ABM systems. A fruitful area for arms control with respect to mobilization would be the incorporation of all strategic delivery vehicles into arms negotiations. At present, ICBMs may be stockpiled in unlimited quantities. Should a serious crisis erupt, these vehicles would probably be deployed in soft positions, thereby nullifying nearly ten years of the SALT in only a few days.

For too long, the observation that mobilization is useless in a nuclear conflict has led to the conclusion that it is an outmoded concept in the nuclear era. This line of thought is very shortsighted, neglecting most of the more plausible forms of superpower confrontation. Of course, absolute guarantees of security are impossible. But, judged by the standards of relative disutilities and costs, a mobilization base could lead to a more effective program for managing crises and expanding deterrence in the years ahead.

The Economics of Arms Control

Roger Zane George

For the past decade the SALT negotiations have played a visible, if controversial, role in American strategic planning and overall defense policy. The current debates over a proposed treaty lasting into the mid-1980s have proven to be no less significant, and, by virtue of the diverse interpretations of its impact, the arguments favoring this arms control effort are not uniformly accepted. For one thing, the international and domestic political context for SALT has changed dramatically since 1972. Seven years ago, SALT I marked the zenith of the detente relationship. Since then, American and Soviet officials have found it necessary to extend the interim accord beyond its original five-year period while the SALT II negotiations dragged on, and there is uncertainty about the acceptability of any treaty to a Senate that distrusts Soviet military and global aspirations. It is within this vortex of uncertainty that SALT II's budgetary benefits have been touted recently.

Few analysts have given much thought to the economics of SALT efforts, focusing instead on other objectives which such measures are designed to achieve.¹ Three arguments are generally given for agreements designed to regulate U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces: first, SALT can lessen the likelihood of nuclear war by promoting strategic deterrence; second, it can reduce the destructiveness of war, should it occur; and third, agreements can minimize the economic costs of the arms race by restricting the areas of military competition between the two states. Individuals disagree over the order and emphasis attached to this trinity of goals, but few have questioned the desirability of formulating agreements which satisfy all three. President Richard Nixon referred to all three objectives in his 1970 "State of the World" message as the basis for U.S. SALT initiatives:

We should seek to maintain our security whenever possible through cooperative

1. An exception is Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," *International Security*, Summer 1976, p. 19. Brodie argues that "in a pragmatic approach to arms control, the objective of saving money really deserves a superior rating to that of saving the world."

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efforts with other nations at the lowest possible level of uncertainty, cost, and potential devastation.²

Predictably, the "cost dividend" argument for SALT is gaining some prominence as the military and political rationales for the SALT II Treaty become embroiled in hard-fought debates within the Congress and the Executive branch. Competing analyses of the treaty's impact on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance already present confusing, if not contradictory, assessments of its political effects and military desirability.³ Only the economic argument remains relatively unscathed by the pre-SALT II joust, and as the debates over the emerging agreement intensify, the economic aspects of SALT are likely to gain more attention. Last-minute interest in the economics of arms control also found its way into the 1972 campaign to sell the first set of strategic arms accords to the Congress. Then, President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger added to their defense of SALT I the warning that there would be a \$15 to \$20 billion increase in strategic spending without an agreement.⁴ Similarly, some references to the economic rationale for SALT II are emanating from top level Administration officials and from other quarters. Following some tough criticism of the proposed agreement's strategic value, led chiefly by the Committee on the Present Danger, the White House circulated its view that unless an agreement is signed, strategic spending would rise by one-third. And backing up this suggestion, Secretary Brown testified before Congress that, without SALT II, a \$2 billion increase in annual strategic spending is probable.⁵

This economic case for SALT, however, suffers from an ailment common to the other criteria for judging the merits of arms control—that is, it can be both over-sold or unappreciated unless special care is taken to establish a realistic analytic framework.⁶ The absence of such a paradigm was evident in the SALT I debates,

2. See Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Seventies: A New Strategy for Peace*, 18 February 1970, p. 143.

3. A list of competing SALT II analyses would be very long. Among the most publicized are the following: Representative Samuel Stratton, "Strategic Missile Counterforce Capability: U.S. v. the Soviet Union," *Congressional Record*, 20 December 1977; Representative Les Aspin, "SALT II or no SALT," January, 1978; Paul Nitze, "Current SALT II Negotiating Posture," reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, 2 November 1977; and Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, pp. 751-770.

4. See Richard Nixon, "News Conference of 29 June 1972," *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 July 1972, p. 80, for Nixon's basis for this estimate.

5. *Baltimore Sun*, 3 March 1978. Also, the *Washington Post*, 16 March 1978, carried White House estimates of a one-third increase in strategic spending.

6. Richard Burt's recent article of SALT makes note of this danger with regard to setting the objectives and goals of SALT. See Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, pp. 751-770.

where both unrealistic expectations and hypercritical devaluation of the agreement's budgetary impact went hand in hand. Some congressional supporters of SALT presumed that dramatic savings in nuclear arms budgets were possible, along the lines of the White House estimates of \$15 billion, while SALT critics called the argument "nonsense on stilts."⁷ In fact, estimates during the debates predicted a modest \$4.3 billion reduction in FY 1973-79 strategic spending as a result of the ABM limitation and selective slowdowns in U.S. offensive programs made possible by numerical limitations on Soviet missile programs.⁸ Yet, these savings were not visible in the FY 1973 budget—i.e. strategic spending remained constant at the FY 1972 level of \$7.2 billion.

On the contrary, what was most visible was the acceleration of certain U.S. offensive strategic systems (\$1 billion for the B-1 and Trident programs) which offset the reduction in Safeguard funding made possible by the ABM treaty. These increases were, in part, "assurances" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that a vigorous modernization program would make the interim agreement's asymmetrical limitations unimportant, and, in any case, provide bargaining leverage for a more equitable SALT II agreement.⁹

The impact of these publicized accelerations in strategic program funding tended to obscure the long-term budgetary importance of averting a major ABM deployment, which, according to a 1976 Congressional Budget Office report, saved the U.S. \$11 billion in programmed funds through the FY 1973-81 period.¹⁰ To be totally candid, however, that congressional agency also conceded the mixed budgetary character of the accords, reporting that SALT I "has not directly enabled the U.S. to go beyond cost-avoidance to major savings."¹¹

In view of these confusing facts which can be marshalled pro and con the economics of arms control, it is vital to begin any discussion with a reasonable set of expectations. An analysis of SALT II's economic effects must be framed by several controlling propositions about U.S. nuclear planning. First, U.S. strategic forces are designed primarily to enhance strategic stability, which, as

7. Senator Henry Jackson, quoted in the *New York Times*, 1 July 1972.

8. *Washington Post*, 4 June 1972. This analysis by Barry Blechman and Alton Quanbeck was quite balanced, citing the probable need for certain programs "in order to hedge against the unexpected and to modernize."

9. The modernization "assurances" are to be found in the JCS testimony before the U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, July 1972, p. 69.

10. Congressional Budget Office, *SALT and U.S. Strategic Forces Budget*, Background Paper No. 8, 23 June 1976, p. 6.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

currently conceived, requires that the U.S. maintain forces which are "essentially equivalent" to those of the Soviet Union. Second, SALT has been pursued so far as a complement to, not a supplement for, the strategic forces which meet those requirements and will deter the Soviets from either direct attack or indirect blackmail. Thus, strategic arms control measures can regulate and reduce—but certainly not eliminate—U.S.-Soviet strategic competition; moreover, one can only expect SALT to remove some of the uncertainty and instability in that relationship, but not all of it. By virtue of this limited objective which SALT has been given, a third important proposition is both essential and unavoidable. That is, strategic forces and their associated costs are not driven primarily by arms control agreements, but instead result from more fundamental planning in the Pentagon, the White House and the committee rooms for the Congress.

Hence, to attribute budgetary savings entirely and unequivocally to a SALT agreement would be to ignore the important intervening decisions which shape both the spending for strategic forces and specific arms control agreements. The budgetary impact of SALT II will be necessarily indirect, but nonetheless noticeable under certain circumstances.

Starting from these basic premises, one can arrive at a general understanding of the economic importance of arms limitation agreements like the proposed SALT II Treaty. At the most superficial level, one can say without a doubt that the "savings" permitted by the emerging treaty will be less than treaty advocates predict, but more than SALT opponents care to believe. The difference between those two positions continues to be not only a function of interpretations of the treaty's restrictive elements, but also a result of competing sets of threat assessments, force requirements, and procurement recommendations which are being put forward by different factions. This is a long way of saying that even with a SALT II agreement, difficult choices about "how much is enough" will still be required, but in all probability the range of choices will be affected by the success or failure of the current negotiations.

At a more concrete level, the range of SALT II's economic benefits can be highlighted by utilizing two budgeting perspectives for determining the possible cost of U.S. strategic forces. First, one can attempt to calculate the long-term budgetary costs which might be incurred if the absence or rejection of an agreement drove a major acceleration of U.S. strategic modernization efforts. This so-called "cost-avoidance" effect tends to illustrate in a relatively optimistic fashion the maximum "savings" which might accompany successful negotiation and ratification of an arms control pact. And second, one can analyze the agreement's restrictive impact on U.S. strategic modernization and associated costs, along

with countervailing pressures for continued strategic modernization and spending programs—the so-called “cost-reduction” effects.

The following analysis will attempt to highlight the range of budgetary effects which might occur as the result of a successful conclusion of the current arms negotiations, and, as importantly, illustrate the many uncertainties which accompany any predictions of SALT II’s economic effects. Scenarios other than those which follow can be built to illustrate the complex and speculative nature inherent in economic analyses of arms control agreements. But using any reasonable set of assumptions and scenarios, one ultimately arrives at the realization that much of the responsibility for achieving either “cost-avoidance” or “cost-reduction” savings rests on the shoulders of American policy makers and does not depend upon the treaty limitations *per se*.

How Important Is Strategic Spending?

Before analyzing the range of SALT II’s economic effects, it is worth asking how significant strategic spending is in any respect. Choosing the proper analytic framework is a matter of some importance. Viewed on a weapon-by-weapon or program-by-program basis, strategic spending is quite significant. One need only look at the escalating price tag on the Trident submarine program, in which the costs per unit have risen from \$800 million to \$1.2 billion (50 percent) in less than four years. Or, consider the MX (missile experimental) ICBM program whose costs range—depending upon the hypothetical basing mode and number of missiles—from \$25 to \$40 billion. Such an itemized analysis does show that strategic systems per unit are more expensive than any other item in the federal budget, which is reason enough to watch those programs closely and determine how cost-effective they truly are.

This particular vantage point does not, however, reflect the relative paucity of defense resources which are devoted to strategic forces, and thus does not indicate the real constraints operating against any large-scale budgetary savings achieved through arms control agreements. Simply stated, maintaining strategic nuclear deterrence is relatively cheap. For example, in the \$126 billion FY 1979 defense budget request, the strategic forces program constitutes only \$9.8 billion (TOA), or 8 percent of the total military spending.¹² The modesty of this

12. The Senate Budget Committee has arrived at some slightly higher figures. In its “Staff Memorandum on National Defense,” April 1978, total strategic spending (including intelligence, research and development, and related support costs) is set at 12 percent of the military budget.

Table 1

Strategic Forces (TOA) (\$bil)

	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79
Current Dollars	9.4	9.3	9.8
Constant FY 79	10.6	9.8	9.8

Source: Department of Defense, *News Release 17-78*, January 23, 1978, pp. 13-14.

budget element is entirely the result of the prevailing force requirements for stable deterrence and the perceived adequacy (although frequently contested) of U.S. strategic forces. The Carter Administration was able to keep strategic spending relatively constant for the FY 1977-79 period largely because it chose to scrap the B-1 program (saving \$20 billion) as a cost-ineffective program.

While it is possible to see the B-1 decision as being partly motivated (or justified at least) by its favorable impact on Soviet behavior at SALT, it most certainly was driven by the Administration's initial urge to avoid the dramatic increase in strategic budgets recommended by the Ford Administration in 1977.¹³

Over the long-term, it is hard to imagine how deep *cuts* in strategic spending can occur in the future without a major change in U.S. deterrence requirements and force planning, especially since some rather dramatic cost reductions in strategic spending have already occurred. In fact, prior to SALT I negotiations, a rather steady decline in strategic spending occurred as the result of U.S. decisions on both the size and type of forces required for stable deterrence. In the mid-1960s Secretary McNamara formulated a new strategic doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) which established the criterion of "unacceptable damage" for the sizing of U.S. strategic forces, and placed certain limits on additional procurement spending. Hence, the largest investment in our strategic forces was made between 1960 and 1967, at the time that the U.S. was adopting its Triad concept of force structuring. Using a liberal formula for estimating all costs attributable to strategic programs, a 1976 Brookings study plotted the steady decline in such expenditures to below 20 percent of the total military budget:¹⁴

13. The Ford FY 1977 budget would have increased strategic spending by \$1.6 billion and allowed a 3 percent real growth rate for the FY1977-82 period. President Carter, after pledging a \$5 billion cut in defense spending in 1976, is now favoring a similar 3 percent real growth rate in the military budget.

14. Henry Owens and Charles Schultze, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years*

Table 2

Costs of Strategic Nuclear Forces
Selected Years 1962-77 (\$bil TOA)

	Current	Constant 77	Percent of total defense
1962	17 ↑	40.7	34.1
1964	16.1	36.7	31.8
1965	14.3	31.8	28.2
1968	14.9	29.6	19.7
1972	16.3	24.5	21.0
1974	15.4	19.4	18.1
1976a	17.3	18.5	17.6
1977a	20.6	20.6	18.3

^aEstimated

Source: *Setting National Priorities: the Next Ten Years*, Henry Owens and Charles Schultze, Ed., p. 82.

Hence, over the past decade, strategic budgets have continued to be reduced below the pre-SALT levels, but not entirely because of the arms talks themselves. For example, the 1969 strategic budget of \$8.5 billion was 40 percent larger in real terms than the FY 1979 \$9.8 billion strategic forces request. Part of this decrease came about through the ABM limitation, but clearly most of it was the result of living off of the nuclear arms investments of the 1960s.

By any measure, though, strategic forces presently constitute a minor element in the U.S. defense budgets, and many would argue that such spending for deterrence is by far the most cost-effective in preventing a major war. In this sense, controlling strategic budgets too much could prove to be both militarily unwise and economically misguided. Especially since strategic costs remained nearly constant at \$10 billion for the FY 1977-79 period while total defense spending rose from \$108 to \$126 billion, the principal solution to growing defense budgets does not seem to be in economizing on strategic forces. As is clear to most analysts, the area of greatest cost growth is in the conventional forces, where renewed commitments to higher NATO-related spending will drive overall growth in defense budgets for

(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 82. The figures include major strategic program costs, plus percentages of research and development (40 percent); intelligence and communications (50 percent); national guard/reserve (10 percent) and small amounts from the defense-wide support costs.

the next few years. To take just one example, the Office of Management and Budget noted that the FY 1979 military request included an additional \$6.6 billion for general purpose forces, which amounts to *over 50 percent* of the actual strategic forces budget of \$9.8 billion.¹⁵ Keeping in mind the small size of strategic spending as a parameter for assessing the economic impact of arms control agreements, one can turn to the matter of SALT II's economic impact with greater appreciation of the difficulties in mounting an unequivocal economic argument for arms control agreements.

Planning Under SALT II

SALT II's economic impact, whether it is measured in terms of cost-avoidance or cost-reduction, will be determined predominantly by current U.S. strategic force goals and by the degree to which programmed forces are perceived to be sufficient in light of the agreement's actual provisions. Starting from this premise, the agreement can be seen as a tool for reinforcing confidence in mutual deterrence by putting concrete limits on the projected Soviet threat which would be expected and planned for; but, the SALT I experience demonstrates that such measures cannot prevent Soviet threats which were already evident or expected—i.e. the ICBM vulnerability problem—nor prevent all modernization. Considering the economics of arms control, then, agreements can remove the necessity for some expenditures on new systems, but they may not entirely eliminate the need for additional programs. In the case of SALT II, the budgetary impact depends on the extent to which it removes the necessity for future modernization. Certainly, the magnitude of U.S. modernization could change, depending upon the absence or presence of a follow-on agreement. For this reason, one must first examine U.S. force planning against potential Soviet threats into the mid-1980s and the treaty's impact on those factors.

U.S. strategic forces are designed to deter Soviet attack under a wide range of circumstances and potential threats. Simply stated, U.S. forces must withstand a large-scale attack by the Soviet Union and then be able to deliver a devastating retaliatory attack upon the Soviet homeland. To ensure that American forces have the capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" upon the Soviet Union, the United States maintains a mixed force of heavy bombers, land-based missiles and sea-launched missiles, representing considerable redundancy in destructive

15. Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget of the United States Government FY 1979* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978) p. 70.

capabilities. This "synergism" has been justified in order to compensate for any "worst case" scenarios of a Soviet attack in which their forces would perform more effectively than anticipated, while American systems would perform below expectations.

As Soviet forces grow in both size and sophistication, this redundancy also becomes important for maintaining the strategic objectives of "essential equivalence"—that is, "any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by other U.S. advantage."¹⁶ In practice, this means that U.S. nuclear systems must not only represent survivable second-strike capacity, but must also match Soviet weapons in terms of their diversity, targeting flexibility, and residual postwar destructive potential.¹⁷ Maintaining this "essential equivalence" has become an objective of the SALT process as well, so that all arms control proposals seem to provide for the same redundancy of forces rather than substantial cuts in the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. In recognition of this fact, SALT has not diminished interest in maintaining the Triad. We continue to operate and improve the force of B-52s, Minuteman missiles and Polaris/Poseidon missile-firing submarines, as well as build the newest Trident SLBM system.

Current defense planning acknowledges that continuing modernization programs will be required to counter the steady increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities over the next ten years, even in the presence of arms control agreements. Between 1969 and 1977 the Soviet Union further developed a large and diversified arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and a fleet of missile-firing submarines. Soviet emphasis on the two missile-bearing legs of its own Triad resulted in force levels which exceeded the U.S. levels in these areas, going well beyond some predictions of the U.S. intelligence community. As a result, there is a group of defense analysts who recommend an accelerated American modernization effort as a "hedge" against future Soviet deployments and/or a breakdown in SALT—not to mention as bargaining leverage in the talks themselves.

Modernization of the existing Triad force of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs was actively begun in the mid-1970s through the initial funding of the Trident submarine and missile program. Funds for the first Trident boat were authorized in 1974, in recognition of the fact that the oldest Polaris submarines would reach the end of their planned 25-year service life by the late 1980s. The total number of Trident submarines and missiles to be procured has not yet been decided, but the current building program calls for three submarines every two years, based

16. FY 1979 Defense Department Report, p. 6.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

on the need to begin replacing the Polaris force by 1985. By then, ten Tridents (carrying 240 Trident I missiles) are expected; however, this production schedule has not been met because of recent construction problems and cost-overruns.¹⁸ Still, this has not diminished the American resolve to have a strong sea-based deterrent, and the Navy is already exploring the feasibility of a larger, more accurate Trident II missile for the late 1980s.

The increasing numbers and accuracies of Soviet ICBMs, along with a robust submarine program and impressive anti-bomber capability, have also stimulated American efforts to improve the other legs of the Triad. Under the Ford Administration, special emphasis was placed on creating the option to replace the B-52 force with a follow-on B-1 bomber and to augment or partially replace the Minuteman force with a new, possibly mobile, MX missile. The Ford FY 1978 budget request included \$2.1 billion for eight production B-1 aircraft and doubled research and development on the MX (from \$135 million in FY 1977 to \$294 in FY 1978) so that deployments could begin in the early 1980s. In 1977, the Carter Administration revised both programs, cancelling the B-1 program entirely in favor of a mixed force of B-52 bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and funding MX at a lower rate to push the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) to 1985. Problems encountered with the evaluation of a multiple basing mode for MX also slowed its advancement to full-scale engineering. In spite of recent funding increases, its IOC is still likely to be closer to 1986 or 1987.

The shift from procurement of the B-1 (with a total estimated cost of \$22.8 billion) to the B-52/cruise missile program (costing about \$4.1 billion) provides a modernization effort which will be available to the United States before 1985. Secretary Brown has described his support for the B-52/cruise missile program as the "better choice on the grounds of expected cost and effectiveness," and would still curb "current trends toward excessive reliance upon SLBMs."¹⁹ An accelerated funding program for the twin cruise missile projects (ALCM and Tomahawk) has pushed these systems into full-scale development so that a limited IOC will be possible in March, 1980 and full IOC in June, 1981.

In reviewing these current plans, it is evident that the major improvements in U.S. strategic forces for the early 1980s will come from the present Trident program and the B-52/cruise missile modification programs. Otherwise, most planned modernization—including MX and additional Trident boats beyond the

18. FY 1979 *Defense Department Report*, p. 113.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

first ten—would be delivered after the expiration of the proposed SALT II Treaty. Importantly, U.S. planning is looking to the late 1980s, not 1985.

In contrast, the Soviet force capabilities, upon which many U.S. decisions are based, reflect ready deployment options during the SALT II Treaty's operation. Thus, for the Americans, a SALT II Treaty could prevent Soviet deployment potential from being fully exploited. SALT I's numerical limits already embraced the asymmetrical building programs evident in 1972, allowing the Soviets a 40 percent numerical advantage, but it did put an upper limit on that deployment program. Yet, the high launcher levels found in the interim accord permitted a dynamic Soviet modernization program between 1972 and 1978. The Soviets exercised the "freedom to mix" option in order to increase their SLBM force through the dismantlement of the older SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs. They held their operational ICBM force to below 1408, while building toward the allowable 950 SLBMs through the addition of twenty Delta II class submarines since 1976.²⁰ This growth reflects the Soviet capability to construct as many as six or seven nuclear-armed submarines per year, giving them the opportunity to begin replacing their old Hotel class submarines with the Delta II class or the newest Delta III now undergoing sea trials.

More central to Soviet strategic modernization potential has been their demonstrated interest in improving their ICBMs. While the oldest land-based missiles (SS-7, 9) are being traded for longer-range and more accurate SLBMs (the SS-N-8 and possibly the SS-NX-18), a new fourth generation of MIRV-capable ICBMs (SS-17, 18, 19) are replacing the current SS-11-13 and -9 force at the rate of 125 missiles per year.²¹

The Soviet program as a whole, then, has the capability of rapidly building up its inventory of SNDVs—perhaps at an annual rate of 125 ICBMs and 6-7 SSBNs (80-96 SLBMs). As long as the SALT I limitations apply, these capabilities are being channeled into the form of major replacements of older systems within their offensive launcher ceiling of 2358 SNDVs. Under a continuing application of the SALT I limits or a new SALT II limitation, Soviet potential would still be limited to a replacement program, which by itself might pose problems for U.S. defense planners. However, without any numerical limits imposed by an arms control regime, there would be the opportunity for Soviet growth in both num-

20. *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1979*, Statement of General George Brown, 20 January 1978, p. 27.

21. *FY 1979 Defense Department Report*, p. 125.

bers and quality, making for an even less stable balance and raising the possibility of enlarged and expensive U.S. strategic programs.

If the United States felt it necessary to counter this Soviet deployment potential in the aftermath of SALT II's defeat or rejection, it would have to rely primarily upon unplanned "quick fixes" to achieve deployments prior to 1985. These sudden measures might include extending the service life of the existing Polaris force, fully exploiting the American cruise-missile advantages, replacing Minuteman II missiles with existing spares and additional Minuteman III missiles, and possibly shifting existing FB-111 aircraft to a strategic mission. Yet, the impact of any of these programs would be minimal on static indicators of the strategic balance. Some illustrative estimates of U.S. and Soviet strategic inventories are provided in Table 3 to indicate the areas of growing Soviet advantages in the absence of any SALT II limits.

These speculative forecasts indicate that planned U.S. modernization will not provide very effective "hedges" in the 1979-85 period, if the SALT process breaks down. Planned increases in U.S. forces in the mid-1980s will not yet include significant numbers of MX missiles, additional cruise missile-carrying aircraft or large numbers of Trident missiles, creating a wider disparity in deployable strategic launchers. Moreover, the current U.S. advantage in MIRVed vehicles could evaporate, which would remove the often-cited U.S. superiority in deliverable warheads (force-loading ratio). This would complicate the U.S. objective of maintaining "essential equivalence" since it would remove a major offsetting strategic advantage which the U.S. now holds over the Soviet Union. The result could be less confidence in our ability to maintain "crisis stability" and greater concern about "pre-emptive" counterforce strikes. Ignoring the obvious worry that nuclear stability would be lowered, attempts to prevent such events might require larger U.S. investment in strategic forces than might otherwise have been planned.

What and Whom Will SALT II Limit?

Under even the most optimistic circumstances, SALT II will not be able to eliminate all outstanding asymmetries in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance. Nonetheless, the agreement will achieve some notable gains. At a minimum, SALT II will extend limitations to all major nuclear delivery systems, including heavy bombers, which were excluded in 1972. For the first time, qualitative restrictions are also provided. More importantly, the proposed treaty will be consistent with the U.S. demand for "essential equivalence" in terms of applying common SNDV and

Table 3
U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance

	U.S. ^a —1985		USSR—1985		
			With SALT	Without SALT	
	With SALT	Without SALT		Moderate Estimate ^b	High Estimate
Launchers	2,001 ^c	2,120	2,250	2,960	4,315
Warheads	12,760	14,015	7,555	10,615	12,595
EMT	4,570	4,940	7,790	10,095	11,875
ICBM/SLBM (throwweight in pounds)	3,972,000	4,422,000	10,285,000	15,761,000	20,733,000

U.S. as a Percentage of the Soviets in the Static Measures—1985

	With SALT II	Without SALT II	
		Moderate Estimate ^b	High Estimate
Launchers	89%	72%	49%
Warheads	168%	133%	111%
EMT	59%	49%	42%
ICBM/SLBM Throwweight	38%	28%	21%

Source: Dennis Ross, "Incremental or Comprehensive SALT," *ACIS Working Paper*, Center for International and Strategic Studies, January, 1979.

^aLes Aspin's January, 1978, study "SALT II or No SALT II" (especially p. 5) was the main source for the numbers of U.S. and Soviet launchers. The slight difference between Aspin's numbers and those portrayed here stem from a slightly different appraisal of the breakdown of U.S. and Soviet forces. *IISS Military Balance 1977/78* descriptions and formulae have been used to derive warhead, EMT and throwweight figures from the posited number of launchers.

^bThe moderate estimate assumes full modernization of Soviet ICBM/SLBM force—i.e., the Soviets fill all their existing silos with missiles introduced after 1973 and deploy three Typhoon subs a year starting in 1980; the high estimate assumes no missile retirement and the building of new silos for new missiles—it also assumes a deployment rate of 86 Typhoon subs a year.

^cThe U.S. launchers would be limited approximately to this number to stay within the MIRV ceilings.

MIRV ceilings upon the two parties, thereby meeting the 1972 Jackson Amendment's call for U.S. forces not "inferior" to those of the Soviet Union. Negotiations are continuing over the exact details of the eight-year treaty (1977-85), its three-year protocol, and the statement of principles to guide future arms control talks. Although at the time of this writing important issues that will affect U.S. planning remain unresolved, public disclosures of the general categories covered by the agreement permit some observations about its impact on each side's forces.²²

The limits provided by the SALT II Treaty can be discussed in terms of three general categories of constraints: (1) total aggregate ceilings on SNDVs, (2) separate sublimits on major categories of strategic delivery vehicles, and (3) some restrictions on modernization of forces. The first two categories, covering total launcher ceilings and related sublimits, are included within the eight-year treaty, while many of the modernization restrictions are thought to be contained in the three-year protocol. The parties have not yet settled on starting dates for the protocol, although they will fall well ahead of the treaty itself.

The SALT II aggregate and sublimit numbers will continue to legitimize considerable redundancy in inventories of delivery vehicles. However, in place of the asymmetrical ceilings of SALT I, common limits are established. The total number of strategic launchers will initially be set at 2400 for each party, then gradually reduced to 2250.²³ Following the 1974 Vladivostok formula, MIRV limits for both sides will remain at 1320 for the duration of 1977-85 period. This ceiling will include all ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles. Some additional restrictions will apply within the 1320 MIRV aggregate—namely, sublimits of 820 ICBMs and 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. Finally, an important limit will be placed on Soviet heavy missiles—freezing their current force of 313 MLBMs (Modern Large Ballistic Missiles).

The other major category of limitations, those on modernization programs, appears to be more significant to the American arsenal than the specific limits for launcher numbers. Both the treaty and the protocol place limits on the testing and deployment of cruise missiles. According to reports, the treaty restricts the

22. The most complete sources on the proposed treaty include: Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1978, pp. 751-770; Jan Lodol, "SALT II and American Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1978-79, pp. 2, 4, 5-68; and U.S. State Department, *The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*, Special Report, July, 1978. This latter article notes that the treaty will also include vital definitions of limited systems, provisions to enhance verification, and counting rules to facilitate verification of MIRV limits (p. 8).

23. The Soviet Backfire will most likely not be included in the aggregate ceiling, so long as acceptable limits on its production and deployment continue.

deployment of air-launched cruise missiles only through their application to the MIRVed launcher sublimit and will not place range limitations on these ALCMs. At the same time, the protocol establishes a three-year moratorium on the deployment of sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles but permits testing in both modes.²⁴ Technological restraints on this "gray-area" system are complemented by the protocol's ban on mobiles and "new types" of ICBMs and SLBMs. The pace of the MX and Trident II missile programs—as well as the reported fifth generation of Soviet ICBMs and the SS-NX-18 SLBM—may be altered by the final definitions incorporated into the protocol and the duration of those limitations.

From the American perspective, the aggregate and sublimit categories appear unquestionably favorable. In the first place, they will prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting its current deployment capacity (ca. 200 launchers per year). Instead of a possible 3–4,000 delivery vehicles predicted by some analysts, the Soviets would be limited to 2400 initially (they currently have 2358) and eventually they would have to remove about 100 launchers to stay within the 2250 ceiling. The United States will face no such restraint. It has not planned to increase the number of SNDVs before 1985 and its current force of 2059 missiles and bombers is below both proposed aggregate ceilings. Secondly, the MLBM sublimit will prevent additional Soviet deployments of the large SS-9 or SS-18 missiles.

The MIRV sublimits do not provide much restraint on either side's existing forces, since both are well below the 1320 limit. It prevents the "worst case" predictions of 1600 to 2300 Soviet MIRVs, but allows the Russians to build approximately 1000 more, including a MIRVed ICBM force of 820. The United States, which has an inventory of 1046 MIRVed delivery systems (roughly split between land- and sea-based missiles), will be forced to choose among its planned 1985 deployment of ten Trident submarines, the B-52/cruise missile force, and existing MIRVed Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. Since the cruise missile force and the Trident program will become strong elements of U.S. deterrence in the 1980s, small numbers of Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missiles might be withdrawn from U.S. forces to allow the deployment of 120 ALCM-carrying B-52s and a Trident SLBM force of 240 by 1985. This would require a minimal adjustment in forces, as the ALCM and Trident programs would only bring the U.S. MIRV total to 1346—barely over the SALT II ceiling.²⁵ Should additional Trident boats be built, some further reductions in older MIRVed sys-

24. Lodal, p. 266. Also, limits may be placed on the number of ALCMs carried on heavy bombers.

25. These figures are based on a high number of B-52s armed with cruise missiles (160).

tems would be required, presumably coming from the Minuteman 3 force which is becoming more vulnerable to accurate Soviet ICBMs.

SALT II's modernization limitations promise to affect the United States more directly, but only temporarily. For the early 1980s, the United States could only place cruise missiles on its aircraft, although the development of SLCMs and GLCMs could be continued short of actual deployment. Depending on the terms of the agreement, the development of the mobile MX and Trident II missile systems might be slowed temporarily by the ban on the testing and deployment of "new" missiles. The degree of restraint will depend upon whether such limitations are finally placed in the treaty itself or in the protocol. However, these two systems will not be ready for deployment before 1985 regardless of SALT, so that to be significant modernization, restrictions would have to extend beyond 1985.

Table 4 compares the areas in which the forces of the U.S. and Soviet Union will be most affected by SALT II through 1985, and illustrates its asymmetrical impact.

Can SALT II Save Money?

The SALT II treaty's asymmetrical impact on projected U.S. and Soviet strategic forces has a number of important implications for U.S. strategic spending. Admittedly, any conclusions are only accurate insofar as the illustrative 1985 Soviet force level projections correspond to real probabilities. The possible U.S. forces likely to be developed without SALT II limits could lead to significantly higher

Table 4
Effects of SALT II Restrictions on Potential 1985 U.S.-Soviet Deployments

Category	Provisions	U.S.	Soviet
Total Delivery Vehicles	2,400 (2,250)	none	large
Total MIRVs	1,320	minor	large
MIRVed ICBMs	820	none	large
MIRVed ICBMs/SLBMs	1,200	minor	large
MLBM	313	none	large
Modernization* -3-year duration	"new types" banned	minor	minor
	mobiles banned	minor	minor
	cruise-missile range/ testing deployment	minor	none

*Final definitions and dates may have some effect.

defense costs. On the other hand, a less aggressive Soviet response to a SALT impasse would have equally important effects upon U.S. forces and their costs. Certainly there is a case for arguing that the steady expansion of Soviet offensive forces between 1972 and 1977 may diminish the extent of any numerical Soviet build-up in the future, and that the recent trend toward qualitative replacement—rather than large-scale deployments—might dominate Soviet force planning in the absence of SALT accords.

The unpredictable nature of Soviet and American strategic responses to a breakdown in SALT complicates cost analyses of U.S. strategic forces. Yet, such imponderables do not eliminate the eventuality of higher U.S. strategic costs. Quite the contrary, it is precisely the uncertainty of the adversary's reaction which drives U.S. "worst case" fears toward larger and more expensive nuclear forces.

As mentioned earlier, two potentially important budgetary effects may be produced in response to a SALT II Treaty. First, the agreement may encourage a "cost-avoidance" effect. By clarifying the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces over time, the acquisition of some costly U.S. programs designed to counter a projected "worst case" scenario may not occur. Conversely, in the absence of SALT II, additional systems might be built which are not currently budgeted in the future—MX being a prime example. Second, an arms control treaty may have a "cost-reduction" effect by directly restricting planned U.S. deployments and forcing less spending. The complexity of the agreement's budgetary impact is, in fact, reflected by the ironic forecast that SALT II will provide room for "cost-avoidance" but fail to achieve major "cost-reductions" in the near future.

What Costs Might Be Avoided?

The "cost-avoidance" effects of SALT II stem from the treaty's elimination of the "worst case" analysis, which might have driven U.S. force levels beyond their current plans. In this sense SALT II is similar to the purported impact of the 1972 interim agreement on expected Soviet deployments. Some analysts have already noted with regard to SALT I that, "the United States can now more comfortably discount its worst fears about the growth of Soviet forces. With the agreement in force, the worst case build-up projected by some analysts is not very likely to occur, whatever the earlier intentions (or hopes) of Soviet force planners."²⁰ Similarly, SALT II might eliminate the "worst case" scenario and

26. G. W. Rathjens, Abram Chayes, J. P. Ruina, *Nuclear Arms Control Agreements: Process and Impact* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974), p. 13.

prevent the U.S. from embarking on "quick fix" deployment programs which would commit the United States to additional, costly strategic procurements. According to one analysis, authored by Representative Les Aspin, the United States could end up spending perhaps as much as \$20 billion on additional systems without significantly reducing the projected asymmetries in U.S.-Soviet strategic balance by 1985. According to Aspin, "if we reject SALT II we can have the privilege of spending an additional \$20 billion to end up in exactly the same position we would be in if we ratified SALT II."²⁷

The futility which Mr. Aspin ascribes to a "quick deployment" effort by the United States is apparent, but does not eliminate the likelihood of some costly American response to a breakdown in SALT negotiations or a rejected treaty. Many modernization options exist for the United States within its current planning, which might be fully exploited to maintain "essential equivalence" with an unconstrained Soviet Union. For example, a decision might be made to simply accelerate existing offensive programs such as MX and Trident, while reviving recently discarded options like the B-1. This course seems most plausible, if one assumes that cost is not a major factor in the U.S. decision, which it is not likely to be under the heightened tension created by a rejection of SALT. This response also makes some sense, if American defense planners decide that the Soviet threat would develop over time and thus justify a more gradual build-up of U.S. forces. A longer-range program of force improvements would argue in favor of simply adopting the present strategic options available to the U.S. and implementing them under an accelerated schedule. Under those conditions, we might expect that the costs of SALT II's absence would be those associated with additional funds spent on a B-1, expanded Trident, and accelerated MX programs.

Clearly, a second and probably more destabilizing option would be some combination of defensive measures against a Soviet threat, requiring the abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty. It has been accepted that, without effective limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs, U.S. second strike force would become even more vulnerable to a "pre-emptive" attack from the Soviet Union. Applying this logic to the possibility of unsuccessful SALT II negotiations, the U.S. negotiating team issued a unilateral statement on May 9, 1972, asserting:

If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations

27. Les Aspin, "SALT II or No SALT II," January, 1978, p. 7. Aspin assumed that the U.S. would be moved to deploy extra Minuteman 3s to replace the Minuteman 2 force, build 100 FB-111H aircraft for strategic missions, retain the Polaris force beyond 20 years, and deploy SLCMs. He further notes that the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance would be worse without SALT II limits.

were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.²⁸

Hence, the rationale exists for resuming a large ABM program. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) research and development has continued at a steady rate of \$200 million per year, to fund advanced technology programs and Defense Department officials have continued to advocate an aggressive BMD R & D program to keep pace with Soviet efforts. It has been the JCS view that "we cannot permit the degradation of our technical capability to reactivate our ballistic missile defense system. Neither can we concede technological superiority in this area to the Soviet Union."²⁹

In both the offensive and defensive scenarios, some costs would be associated with programs which might not be necessary under a SALT II treaty. A brief examination of each option will summarize the magnitude of the costs involved without pre-judging whether they might occur regardless of a SALT II agreement.

OFFENSIVE OPTION

To enhance its offensive capabilities the United States might first search for the most readily deployable system which would fit into its long-term modernization plans. In addition to the currently planned B-52/cruise missile force, defensive planners might revive the B-1 program as a relatively near-term improvement in the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. forces. In contrast to U.S. missile programs, the manned bomber would be desirable for its quick production potential. Until July, 1977, its full-scale production was assumed, although the numbers were uncertain; in fact, B-1 production was begun in FY 1976, and would have achieved an operational capability in 1982. Since the termination of the program is recent, the Air Force might still imagine it could achieve an initial operational capability before the end of 1985.³⁰ The price of such a revived procurement plan would be high, since the remaining acquisition cost has been placed at

28. American Unilateral Statement of the U.S. Delegation, 9 May 1972, cited in Robert Bell, *Implications of Extending the SALT I Interim Agreement*, Congressional Research Services, Library of Congress, 16 May 1977, p. 24.

29. U.S. Military Posture for FY 1978, Statement of General George Brown, 20 January 1977, p. 72.

30. As of May, 1978, SAC General Richard Ellis felt that the B-1 "remains a viable option . . . if things go sour and the Soviets show no intention of stopping the development of their systems." *The New York Times*, 28 May 1978.

\$18.4 billion.³¹ Accelerating the program back to its original production schedule would cost at least \$12 billion through FY 1983, thereby adding \$2 to \$3 billion per year to the strategic forces budget over the next five years.³²

In line with current modernization objectives, the United States might also decide to accelerate and expand the Trident program. In 1977 the program called for a 13-boat fleet at an estimated acquisition cost of \$13.6 billion over the next five years; in the 1973-76 period, this program alone amounted to nearly half of the total acquisition costs for major strategic offensive forces, and the Ford Administration slowed the funding of Trident from two boats per year to three boats every two years, "to ease the financial strain on the Defense Budget."³³ Accelerating the program would raise that problem again, and might prove more expensive or even impossible in light of current delays in the existing procurement schedule. The Secretary of Defense acknowledged last year that the first Trident will not be delivered until January, 1981 because the program has required a major expansion of the ship-building facilities, along with a substantial increase in manpower.³⁴ This makes Trident a less likely option if defense planners view the Soviet threat as a near-term problem. However, the SLBM force continues to provide the most survivable element in the current Triad, which will be further enhanced by the increased operational range provided by the Trident submarine itself and the improved payload, ranges and accuracies available in the Trident I and II missiles. Hence, an expanded SLBM program would not be out of the question as a long-term compensation for growing Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces, especially in light of the unavoidable vulnerability problem of U.S. land-based forces in the mid-1980s.

The costs of an accelerated Trident program will depend upon the ultimate size of that SLBM force and its pace of delivery. A fleet of 20 to 30 boats is often mentioned, and occasionally a figure of 40 Tridents enters the discussions between Congress and the Defense Department. Already, the planned force of 14 ships is estimated to cost \$16.2 billion by 1983, while a 20-submarine fleet could run as high as \$27.5 billion in current dollars.³⁵ Of course, actual costs will be higher, as

31. Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues*, April, 1977, p. 36.

32. Based on figures found in Archie Wood, "Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force Without Really Trying—A Case Against the B-1," *International Security*, Fall, 1976, p. 98.

33. FY 1976 Defense Department Report, p. II-31.

34. FY 1979 Defense Department Report, p. 113.

35. Figures taken from Joseph Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The FY 1979 Budget*, p. 221.

new technical difficulties arise and production costs increase. Assuming the acceleration of the program to a 2-ship per year delivery schedule, the added cost annually would be approximately \$1.4 billion, not including any additional costs for the development and deployment of the Trident II missile.

The MX missile program offers a third possible long-term offensive countermeasure to a projected Soviet ICBM threat in 1985. The debate over the MX will be greatly influenced by the absence of SALT, and, while current objections to its strategic and economic consequences are evident, such considerations would be less relevant to decision makers faced by an unpredictable Soviet strategic program. The MX missile could be available for procurement in 1986 and has been described as an effective means of enhancing the U.S. counterforce capabilities against a large Soviet land-based threat. At this date, MX seems likely to be deployed in a mobile mode to eliminate its own vulnerability to higher accuracy Soviet ICBMs in the 1980s. After first examining a trench mode concept and finding some serious technical and cost problems, Pentagon analysts are now moving more toward a multiple aim point (MAP) system which would allow each MX to be moved throughout a complex of 20 to 25 separate launch-point shelters (either horizontal or vertical). This "shell-game" concept would thus employ 5000 to 8000 semi-hardened silos—95 percent of which would remain empty—as a way to increase the number of Soviet warheads expended on an attack of U.S. land-based forces and still frustrate a first strike opportunity.³⁶

Regardless of the final MAP system employed, the MX system would cost at least \$20 to \$25 billion. A 200-missile MX force in the trench mode was recently estimated to cost \$25 billion when completed, and preliminary cost figures for the "shell-game" MAP run between 18 to \$20 billion.³⁷ The immediate additional costs of an MX program would not be substantial, as the U.S. is currently pursuing its research and development as rapidly as possible (with a total cost of \$3.9 billion); however, the major procurement costs which would be incurred after 1985 might be avoidable within a SALT II environment, whereas without any arms limitation agreements, MX is almost certain to be deployed.

The total cost of these offensive modernization programs, then, could be considerably higher than currently planned U.S. forces. At present we tend to make trade-offs among expensive strategic systems; however, without an arms con-

36. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 19 June 1978, p. 22.

37. *Ibid.* The exact costs will depend upon the selection of vertical or horizontal shelters and on the extent of security measures required. Presently an airborne deployment move is also being examined, which is estimated to be similarly expensive.

trol accord, there would be a tendency to pursue every feasible option. A B-1 program would add at least \$12 billion over the next five years, with total costs in excess of \$18 billion. A larger Trident force, delivered at an accelerated pace, would add \$1 to \$2 billion annually, and the additional acquisition cost beyond the current 13-ship fleet might be as high as \$11 to \$12 billion (assuming only a 20-ship fleet). Finally, the MX procurement (not including research and development) would add at least \$20 billion in total acquisition costs, although it might not significantly raise annual strategic spending over the next several years. Hence, the maximum possible "savings" of SALT II through "cost avoidance" might look like Table 5.

DEFENSIVE OPTION

Exercising the defensive option might first require abrogating the ABM Treaty, which would only add to the destabilizing effects of a SALT breakdown. Yet, in the absence of SALT and any clear indications of the magnitude of a Soviet build-up, the United States might feel driven to end the ABM limitations in order to permit sufficient lead-time to deploy ballistic missile defense. In addition, the U.S. would most probably accelerate other active and passive defense efforts. These too would have some budgetary impact.

The cost of deploying any new ABM system which incorporates the current state-of-the-art technologies is uncertain, but would be substantially more than the U.S. currently spends on BMD R & D (\$200 million per year). Prior to the 1972 ABM Treaty, the United States was spending on the average \$1 billion per year to develop a questionable ability to protect only a portion of its ICBM force. The highest expenditure for the Safeguard system was in 1971 when \$1.4 billion was authorized for the initial deployment phases of a two-site system. Had the U.S.

Table 5
Offensive Cost-Avoidance Effects

	Total	Five Year
TRIDENT ^a	\$12 billion	\$7 billion
MX ICBM	20	1 ^b
B-1 Bomber	18	12
Total	* \$50 billion	\$20 billion

^aAssumes 20-ship fleet at current prices.

^bAssumes accelerated R/D only.

continued to the eventual 12-site program proposed by the Defense Department, the minimum cost would have been \$18.4 billion; and that figure, submitted by the Pentagon in 1973, was hard to justify considering that \$9.8 billion had already been spent on only two sites.³⁸

Present U.S. research on BMD is, of course, far different and more sophisticated than the Safeguard system. In retrospect, scientists have concluded that this older technology for hard-site defense was not fully optimized for that purpose. Hence, using old figures on the cost of re-establishing an ABM (properly inflated) might overstate the cost of defending U.S. ICBMs. Many experts have suggested far less complicated mechanisms for protecting Minuteman, which would not involve the same magnitude of expenditures.³⁹ On the other hand, current ABM research programs are focusing upon much more complicated problems, including improved integration of the BMD components as well as increased attention to high-energy lasers, particle beam weapons, and space-based sensors to assist missile defense. Those could prove quite costly, and it would not seem unreasonable to assume that spending for a number of ABM options—pursued simultaneously—could cost at least \$1 billion a year, even without immediate procurements.

In addition to direct hard-site defense options, the United States would probably increase its air defense and civil defense efforts beyond current spending levels. Particularly in the area of air defense, there is room for considerable expansion of U.S. deployments. The Joint Chiefs have discussed plans to revamp air defenses to counter the projected deployment of a new Soviet strategic bomber in the 1980s, and congressional testimony hints at the procurement of 170 F-15s (costing between \$2 and \$3 billion to produce) for that purpose.⁴⁰ Last year, Secretary Brown began arguing for stronger American air defense, along with some increases in civil defense spending. All these statements, accompanied by recent decisions on measures, may reflect some serious rethinking of the American decision in the 1960s to emphasize strategic offense over defense. If agreement is not reached to limit offensive weapons, certainly the possibility exists for much larger spending on a variety of defensive efforts, which could add at least \$1 to \$2 billion per year to the strategic budget.

38. Cited in U.S., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Amended Military Authorization Request Related to the SALT Agreement*, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, June, 1972, pp. 4229, 4276.

39. For cheaper and more novel suggestions see Richard Garwin, "Effective Military Technology for the 1980s," *International Security*, Fall, 1976, pp. 50-77.

40. U.S., House, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations, Strategic Nuclear Offensive/Defensive Forces*, 95th Congress, 1st Session, February, 1977, p. 427.

In summary, there is ample evidence that SALT II can provide the opportunity for noticeable savings through "cost-avoidance." The number of U.S. offensive and defensive options in the absence of SALT II is quite large, and the development of systems like the B-1, MX, and Trident have been referred to as "hedges" against Soviet resistance to more extensive SALT limitations. Importantly, Secretary Brown has alluded to the American determination to respond to Soviet deployments in kind if SALT is not signed: "if the Soviets do not opt for restraint by SALT agreements, but choose increased forces instead, mutual deterrence can still be maintained by the appropriate U.S. force deployments."⁴¹ Under almost any circumstances the certainty and sizes of such deployments will be much greater in the absence of an agreement. Put in its best light, an agreement can help minimize the necessity for "worst case" planning for all kinds of strategic forces, and could prevent the United States from committing an additional \$20 billion over the next five years to strategic programs.

But Can Strategic Costs Be Reduced?

The other half of the budgetary equation for SALT II is not so rosy. Inherent in the preceding analysis of the "cost-avoidance" effects has been the assumption that policy-makers would *not* find other reasons, unrelated to SALT, for moving toward greater modernization of U.S. strategic forces. Clearly, this presumption is not entirely tenable, and actual strategic spending will be dramatically affected by the degree to which modernization is pushed even with an agreement. In large measure, the opportunity for such modernization is the result of the particular limits which SALT II allows through 1985. As the earlier discussion emphasized, the current U.S. program will not be greatly affected by the aggregate and sublimit restrictions and will only be marginally constrained by the modernization restraints found in the treaty and the protocol. This provides some reassurance to the skeptics of SALT's strategic implications, but does little to reduce the planned costs of U.S. strategic forces.

The SALT II quantitative restrictions will not have a major impact on U.S. forces in the foreseeable future, making any significant budget reductions unlikely. The total launcher ceiling of 2250 is noticeably higher than the current U.S. force of 2059; in a similar fashion, the MIRV sublimit of 1320 is much higher than the present U.S. MIRV force of 1046 ICBMs and SLBMs. Therefore, no de-

41. FY 1979 Defense Department Report, p. 60.

ployed systems will have to be eliminated in order to remain within the SALT II accord. In fact, the treaty has the effect of allowing the United States to "level up" by adding 274 MIRVed launchers. This "leveling-up" would be in line with existing plans to increase U.S. MIRV forces through the acquisition of a mixed B-52/cruise missile force and a larger MIRVed SLBM force (through Trident).

A future decision to procure a small MX missile force (perhaps between 200 and 300) would complicate the U.S. plan to stay within the 1320 MIRV limit as well as the 1200 MIRVed missile sublimit. However, this forced trade-off would not be required until the late 1980s when a large Trident force could be operational (10 boats by 1985) and a possible MX missile force could be deployed.⁴² By 1985, a combined missile force of 550 Minuteman 3s, 400 Trident Is (160 "back-fitted") and the remaining 336 Poseidon C-3s would account for a MIRV total of 1286, and require the retirement of only 86 MIRVed launchers to remain within a sublimit of 1200 MIRVed missiles. This would still permit 120 ALCM-carrying B-52s as MIRVed launchers within the 1320 sublimit. Alternatively, the existing Minuteman 3 force might well be cut in half to allow the deployment of 200 MX ICBMs after 1985.⁴³ Assuming that the existing ICBM force will become more vulnerable by the late 1980s, such a deactivation could easily be justified on strategic grounds alone.⁴⁴

Potentially, the protocol restrictions on modernization contain the kernels for significant restraints on future U.S. strategic systems, but they will not affect strategic programs or budgets dramatically over the next five years. The ban on testing and deployment of SLCMs and GLCMs with ranges greater than 600 km., and bans on "new" types of ICBM's and SLBMs could impose severe restraints on future U.S. plans to develop strategic versions of SLCM and GLCM, as well as retard the introduction of MX and Trident II missiles in the late 1980s. However, these testing and deployment limitations would be in effect only for the duration of the 3-year protocol, and would not force a major slowdown in these U.S. research programs. The deployment of ALCMs on the B-52G force will begin in 1980 and be completed by 1987 and will not be restricted by SALT II. The SLCM

42. At that time a decision to deactivate a number of the oldest Poseidon SSBNs which had not been backfitted with Trident missiles and to dismantle part of the more vulnerable Minuteman 3 force could be made.

43. Adding MX to the probable Trident, Poseidon and Minuteman MIRVed missile force would total 1486—or 286 over the lower 1200 MIRVed missile sublimit.

44. The current operating cost of the entire ICBM force is approximately \$1 billion, so deactivating only part of the Minuteman 3 system would have only a minimal effect on total strategic costs—undoubtedly less than the added cost of operating a mobile MX force.

Table 6
Strategic Spending and Total Defense Spending

	FY 1979-83	TOA	(\$bil current)		
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Total DoD	126	145	155	165	177
Strategic	9.8	12.3	11.1	12.6	12.5

Source: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February, 1978.

and GLCM programs are less fully developed and therefore will not be far enough advanced to be severely restrained by the testing and deployment provisions of the protocol.

Finally, the treaty may well exempt the MX or Trident II systems from limitations; in any event, they are at such an early development stage that a three-year ban on their testing and deployment will be largely irrelevant to their availability dates or their costs. As Defense Secretary Brown has phrased it, SALT II would "preserve" many U.S. options: "Mobile ICBM research and development can continue on a schedule that will not inhibit our present plans. Work can go forward on ground-launched and sea-launched missiles."⁴⁵

Extending the protocol's modernization restraints for the duration of SALT II could, of course, slow all of these programs, but there has been no indication that the Americans would permit such a shift, even if the Soviets propose it. The most that might be expected would be a protocol expiring three years after the treaty is initialled—sometime in 1983.

In short, SALT II will not constitute a major determinant of U.S. strategic spending in the next five years, since few programs are curtailed or restricted by SALT. Within the broad provisions of the treaty, U.S. defense planners will be able to pursue strategic options currently available to the United States. Indeed, it is likely that strategic spending will increase modestly over the next few years, with or without SALT. Defense spending as a whole is projected to rise 3 percent annually through 1983, and Secretary Brown has mentioned strategic modernization plans as one source of this real growth. Some outyear projections of future strategic spending were released by the Defense Department last year,

45. FY 1979 Defense Department Report, p. 61.

and they revealed a slight increase in strategic spending through the FY 1983 period.

At least three factors will reinforce this projected level of spending: (1) the perceived modernization needs for U.S. forces under a SALT II agreement; (2) modernization commitments designed to assure Senate ratification of the proposed treaty; and (3) SALT's possible "rechanneling" of funds to other defense programs.

MODERNIZING WITH SALT II

Pressure to continue currently planned modernization will make any decrease in strategic spending highly improbable for the next few years. As one keen observer notes, "regardless of whether a new agreement is both signed and approved by the U.S. Senate, the United States will not be spared some difficult strategic deployment decisions in the immediate years ahead."⁴⁶ In particular, SALT II has not eliminated the perceived need to solve the ICBM vulnerability problem and the concern with the growing U.S. reliance on sea-based deterrence. There is general agreement that sometime in the mid-to-late 1980s the Minuteman force will be highly vulnerable to improved Soviet missile forces. The agreement's proposed sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBMs is very high, well beyond the number required to threaten the survivability of U.S. silo-based deterrent forces. Thus, the search for ways to upgrade other elements of the Triad (like cruise missile forces and an expanded Trident force) and to reduce ICBM vulnerability (through a mobile MX program) appear integral to American strategic planning. Moreover, there is the impending decision on whether the U.S. should adopt some form of limited counterforce posture (either through an MX or other higher accuracy programs) to match a projected Soviet capability.

These pressures for greater strategic capability make it likely that the U.S. will pursue arms control agreements and modernization simultaneously. "SALT alone cannot preserve long-term strategic stability," according to Secretary Brown. "It must be supplemented by prudent U.S. decisions to ensure the strategic deterrent."⁴⁷ An annual strategic budget of \$11 to \$12 billion over the next five years appears very modest, given the rising costs of MX, Trident, and cruise missile programs. As each system enters its production phase in the 1980s, we can expect acquisition costs to rise even more dramatically. A table of projected strategic

46. Burt, p. 751.

47. FY 1979 Defense Department Report, p. 61.

Table 7

Projected Costs of Strategic Force Development and Acquisition Program FY 1978-1983 and to Completion (\$ million TOA)

Major Programs	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Total 1978-83	To Completion
Land-based forces								
Improved Minuteman	104	93	85	85	30	0	293	0
MX ICBM	135	158	520	1,100	1,600	2,450	5,828	20,000
Sea-based forces								
Trident submarine	1,930	1,657	1,310	1,365	2,270	1,450	8,502	uncertain
Trident I SLBM	1,505	1,130	1,020	865	825	805	4,645	2,000
Trident II SLBM	5	16	205	550	800	1,150	2,721	13,500
Sea-launched cruise missile	210	152	195	415	535	485	1,782	130
Strategic Bomber forces								
B-1 bomber	443	106	109	0	0	0	215	0
B-52 modifications	130	293	437	360	360	320	1,770	1,100
ALCM	389	426	455	600	600	600	2,681	50
ALCM carrier aircraft	15	41	30	100	150	200	521	16,000
Advanced strategic air- launched missile (ASALM)	37	48	151	225	170	195	789	uncertain
Total Cost	4,903	4,120	4,517	5,665	7,790	7,655	29,747	

Source: Estimates from *Setting National Priorities: The FY 1979 Budget* (Brookings, 1978), p. 221.

procurement costs illustrates where these increases are likely to occur in the next five years and also highlights the outstanding investment commitments involved in these programs.⁴⁸

THE SELLING PRICE OF SALT

The tendency toward further modernization may well be unavoidable for some political reasons as well. Senate criticism of America's bargaining leverage in the

48. Pechman, *Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget*, p. 221. The chart indicates acquisition costs of major systems, including spending for research and development, but omitting operations and maintenance and construction costs. The MX force is assumed to be 200, placed in a mobile mode. The total for Trident is uncertain, but a force of 20 ships would cost about \$27.5 billion, compared to the presently estimated cost of \$16.2 billion for 14 ships. The Trident II

arms control negotiations and genuine concern for future strategic stability will monopolize much of the debate over the SALT II Treaty, and additional modernization pledges from the Administration may be the price of Senate ratification. One legacy of SALT I was a severe polarization of the defense community and Congress over the acceptability of any SALT II Treaty which does not force the Soviet Union to grant major concessions—principally considered were large cuts in its existing ICBM and MLBM forces. When Paul Warnke's nomination as chief SALT negotiator narrowly passed the Senate (58-40), the vote was interpreted to mean that a SALT II Treaty would have to provide significant constraints on Soviet programs to gain ratification. The withdrawal of the March, 1977 SALT proposals has meant that most of the constraints placed on Soviet systems which pleased Carter's critics are now gone, making renewed criticism of SALT a major determinant of future strategic programs.

Given the greater difficulty which SALT II faces in the new 96th Congress, a principal tool for encouraging greater support is a presidential pledge to maintain an active modernization program. The military and the congressional armed services committees will certainly insist upon this, as a form of "insurance" against Soviet technical breakthroughs or breakouts from the SALT limits. To insure that the United States has sufficient "hedges," as well as "bargaining chips" for the next round of SALT, the Administration must present a strong modernization program along with the treaty itself. Thus, Trident, cruise missiles, possibly MX, and even civil defense spending will become important elements of SALT's ratification process, and the cost of SALT's passage will have to be subtracted from any potential "cost-avoidance" savings.

Of course, one can add to the selling price of SALT II numerous other actions which the Administration presumably could take to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its critics. Included among these costs would be increased spending on intelligence gathering activities related to SALT, which might mollify Senate concern about the U.S. ability to monitor treaty violations. Those activities are hard to measure in budget terms, but will be an important factor in the debates. Outside of the strategic realm, actions might be taken to reduce the danger of SALT II being linked to other U.S.-Soviet areas of competition where the Carter position has been. One can imagine, for example, some officials pushing hard for more

figures reflect an estimated 585 missiles for 20 Tridents, using the Trident I program as a baseline for procurement costs. The cruise missile force considered here includes 50 wide-bodied jets, armed with 50-70 air-launched cruise missiles each. Finally, the ASALM program is too new to estimate total costs with any precision.

spending on conventional defense forces (perhaps in addition to current plans), or possibly the deployment of neutron weapons or other tactical missile systems in Europe. These collateral actions, while perhaps not important monetarily, could exact high political costs in U.S. relations with allies as well as with our Soviet negotiating partners.

THE RECHANNELING EFFECTS OF ARMS CONTROL

A third factor which will reinforce current or slightly increased defense spending is the phenomenon of "rechanneling." Simply stated, if an arms control agreement forbids spending in one area, then there is a tendency for the military acquisition process to reoptimize those funds and direct them into other defense areas. Some "rechanneling" occurred after SALT I when monies ear-marked for ABM deployments were reallocated to the Trident and B-1 programs. In part this was done to appease SALT I opponents, but it also was driven by the technological imperative to use funds efficiently and to fill other military gaps in the U.S.-Soviet military competition. SALT II is far from preventing new excursions into a U.S.-Soviet technological race in strategic arms, and there is ample opportunity for channeling funds from restricted areas into unrestricted ones. The most obvious areas for strategic rechanneling include satellite and antisatellite research, greater active defense capabilities, and more expensive, passive defense techniques. As the SALT process slowly closes the door on offensive arms competition, it would seem probable that military science will step into the realm of strategic defense and command and control capabilities with more vigor.

Finally, one cannot overlook the very likely rechanneling of funds from strategic programs into conventional defense. One of the curious effects of the SALT process has been to highlight the disutility of nuclear weapons and perhaps refocus defense planners' attention to regional military balances. The result has been a greater appreciation for modernizing U.S. general purpose forces. This process has already begun, with some major initiatives for improving U.S. NATO forces (including airlift and prepositioning of military equipment). It would not be unlikely that whatever immediate savings result from SALT II would indirectly find themselves invested in more conventional combat capabilities like tanks, conventional cruise missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels.

Thus, SALT II by itself cannot create dramatic "cost-reductions" in strategic spending for the next five years. The treaty will not restrict U.S. programs. By making some trade-offs in its MIRV systems, the United States can avoid the cancellation of any contemplated improvements. And, the time-limited modernization provisions of the treaty afford little relief from continued upgrading

of the Triad. With so few specific constraints, other forces will dominate actual spending decisions. Chief among them will be continuing perceptions of U.S. strategic vulnerabilities and the changing requirements for "essential equivalence." Secondly, political debates over the treaty will encourage the use of modernization programs as justifications for SALT's acceptability. Finally, the technological pressure to explore new areas of strategic warfare, to ferret out unappreciated defense weaknesses and redress them, seems to be an unfortunate companion to the SALT II agreement. So far, the rechanneling of defense funds, for a variety of strategic, political, and technological reasons, has prevented any major reductions in strategic budgets.

Conclusions

If the economic effects of the SALT II Treaty appear to be confusing and slightly contradictory—and the preceding discussion of "cost-avoidance" and "cost-reduction" effects leads one in that direction—it is because arms control agreements provide one rationale for avoiding major increases in strategic budgets, but do not eliminate every reason to consider modernizing U.S. nuclear forces. The SALT II Treaty, for example, can be an aid to U.S. force planning, in that it will shape U.S.-Soviet arms competition in directions complementary to existing and projected U.S. strategic forces. More importantly, the agreement can remove much of the necessity for "worst case" analyzing of Soviet nuclear threats, and thus prevent a massive response to an unconstrained Soviet military potential which would exist without SALT. On the other hand, the treaty will not rule out other reasons to pursue new strategic programs, especially those judged essential for countering threats which SALT has not eliminated. Neither can the agreement control the political bargaining aimed at its own ratification, nor the new avenues for military spending which are unconstrained by its provisions or which are unrelated to strategic matters. Those factors remain subject to decisions within the Executive branch and the Congress.

Economically, this means that SALT II can produce some savings, but the magnitude will be determined by important procurement decisions which may be made after the treaty is approved. An optimistic estimate of SALT II's economic benefits might cite a \$20 billion savings over the next five years, if the agreement encouraged policy makers to forego major improvements in U.S. forces, such as MX, a revived manned bomber, and additional Trident submarines; the life-time savings might reach \$50 billion if such systems were abandoned. Realistically, however, not all of these systems are likely to be avoided, and,

ironically, some might be built to sell SALT. Hence, the net economic benefit will be more modest, but nonetheless important. To give but one example, the probability and size of any MX deployment will be determined in part by the presence of ICBM restraints placed on the Soviets by SALT II. While the new missile might be built under any circumstances, a recent congressional study indicates that a smaller MX program would be necessary to compensate for the Soviet counter-silo capability allowed within the SALT II limits. In effect, the treaty could cut a possible MX force from 300 to 200 missiles, and save \$7.4 billion in investment costs alone.⁴⁹

Where SALT may have its greatest effect is on the future planning of U.S. strategic forces, including perhaps some fundamental rethinking of deterrence requirements beyond SALT II. Currently, U.S. doctrine rests on high strategic force levels, a Triad structure, and necessarily higher strategic costs than might be necessary under a more modest set of deterrence requirements. As SALT slowly reduces the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic systems, it may well be possible to revise American adherence to the Triad concept and further reduce the investment in expensive strategic systems. Shifting to a Dyad structure, for example, might easily save the United States between \$15 and \$30 billion over the next 20 years.⁵⁰ This potential SALT dividend, however, will be part of a long process, in which policy makers argue, dispute, and decide what forces will be necessary into the 21st century. The tenuousness of this policy outcome does not make the long-term economic savings the most compelling case for approving a SALT II Treaty.

Nonetheless, economic arguments will continue to be made in support of the proposed treaty. In fact, this case will be largely inconsequential to those already committed to the treaty as well as to those already opposed to it. Where the economic rationale may have some effect will be on the uncommitted who remain slightly confused by the array of SALT analyses pro and con. In these instances, well-conceived budgetary arguments combined with a forthright presentation of the continuing redundancy in U.S.-Soviet strategic arsenals and implausibility of any resort to nuclear weapons could prove persuasive. But if so, the cogency of the pro-SALT position will be not only economics, but also simple common sense that an arms race will not gain more security for the United States *at any cost*.

49. Congressional Budget Office, *Planning U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces for the 1980s*, Budget Issue Paper, June, 1978, pp. xiv-xvi.

50. *Ibid.*, p. xvii. Avoiding any improved, possibly mobile, ICBM forces would "save between \$27 and \$35 billion, making this estimate conservative."

In the Absence of SALT

Michael Nacht

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have been a central feature of the Soviet-American relationship for almost a decade. The conclusion of the SALT I agreements in 1972 permitted the establishment of economic, cultural and scientific arrangements between the two nations which would otherwise not have been possible to complete, and raised expectations in the United States that future SALT agreements would help shift the emphasis of the superpower relationship from confrontation to cooperation. A regulation of the military competition between the two powers seemed to be in sight. But since 1973 there has developed such a marked and steady cooling in Soviet-American relations, with only an occasional upturn, that few now expect this shift to take place. Because of Soviet and American actions, technical obstacles, and the interplay among these developments, it is no longer clear whether a SALT II Treaty will enter into force or what the fate of the SALT process will be even if it does.

No doubt some Americans would equate the collapse of SALT with bringing on World War III, while others would see it as a marvelous opportunity to jettison a Chamberlain-like policy of appeasement in favor of a Churchillian emphasis on *realpolitik*. But neither of these extremes tells us much about what the actual consequences of a SALT breakdown might be.

It Matters How SALT Stops

The first point to be made about a world in the absence of SALT is that it is important how we get there. Few would have predicted that almost seven years after the signing of the Interim Agreement to Limit Strategic Offensive Arms and eighteen months after its legal termination the two governments would still be actively engaged in trying to conclude a SALT II Treaty and would be participating in more than a half-dozen other arms control negotiations, while at the same time haranguing each other for being guilty of poisoning the political atmosphere in which these same negotiations are being conducted. Both the slowness of the progress to date and the willingness of both governments to continue to negotiate

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over a protracted period suggest that it is no easy task to identify those conditions that are likely to lead to the termination of the SALT process. But if one had to face the question, "How might SALT stop?," at least four responses could be offered: the slow technical death, the political collapse, the nonratification termination, and the post-SALT II disease.

The slow technical death would involve the continuation of the negotiations well into 1979 without an agreement, insulated for the most part from other issues in Soviet-American relations. The battle would be fought primarily on whether a verifiable accord acceptable to both governments and to the U.S. Senate could be reached that would take into account ballistic missile modernization and testing, cruise missile deployments, and constraints on the *Backfire* bomber. Assuming protracted negotiations led to the conclusion that no such agreement could be reached, this might still be the preferred way for SALT to end. The lengthiness of the process would permit both governments to consider alternative negotiating frameworks, to formulate their weapons acquisition and deployment decisions carefully and without haste, and to make preparations so that the termination of the negotiations would not immediately produce a highly charged confrontational environment.

The political collapse would probably be a much more dangerous rupture. If the United States, for example, chose to terminate or at least "defer" the SALT negotiations in retaliation for a Soviet action not directly related to SALT (e.g., further military involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, overt attempts to return post-Tito Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit, or another Shcharanski-type trial), the Administration would be hard-pressed to resist strong domestic political pressures to cease virtually all negotiations with the Soviet Union and to increase substantially the pace and funding level of several American weapons programs. Under such conditions it would be very difficult to renew the negotiations at a later date and it might even be hard to retain any sustained form of government-to-government communication. The need for both leaderships to show their strength vis-à-vis the potential adversary would be even more compelling than at present, and the result could be a renewal of Soviet-American confrontations reminiscent of the 1961 Berlin crisis.

The nonratification termination could well be the most dangerous development of all. If a SALT II Treaty were presented to the U.S. Senate and failed to achieve the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification—an event that has happened only sixteen times in American history¹—the debate would likely have been so

1. Since 1789, almost 1,600 treaties have been sent to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Of those

vituperative that the President would be mortally wounded in terms of his ability to continue to exercise political leadership. The 1980 presidential election would in all probability then be fought over the issue of which candidate would be toughest against the Russians. The new President—it is hard to envisage the incumbent being renominated and reelected under such circumstances—would be pressured to the utmost to adopt an anti-Soviet foreign policy which might have as its goal not merely the containment of Soviet military power and the recapturing of American military superiority but the crippling of the Soviet economy as well (some tactics that might be applied are cited later in the paper). In such an environment it is highly unlikely that the Soviet leadership (whether Mr. Brezhnev or his successors) would act in any other than an acutely defensive manner. Greater allocation of budgetary resources for defense, if at all economically feasible, a tightening of the political controls at home, and increased efforts to promote instability and insurgencies in Third World areas could be expected reactions from the Soviet leadership.

The post-SALT II disease, on the other hand, is likely to have less severe repercussions. This scenario envisions the completion and ratification of a SALT II agreement followed by the realization by both sides that SALT III negotiations would be futile. This realization could occur for several reasons. The costs to the Administration of Senate approval of SALT II could be very high (perhaps a commitment not to renew the Protocol to the treaty after it expires). Immediate post-SALT II Soviet behavior could be threatening (e.g., deployment of antisatellite weapons). An impasse could be reached between the United States and its allies over the appropriate way to introduce gray area systems into the negotiating framework. Or developments outside the SALT arena, such as new evidence of nuclear proliferation or a Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East or Yugoslavia, could alter dramatically the climate of international politics. Under these circumstances, the futility of trying to reach an agreement to reduce substantially the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or to achieve qualitative constraints would be obvious. SALT II would be permitted to remain in effect

treaties which came to a vote, only sixteen failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. However, some treaties were withdrawn by the President before they came to a vote in the Senate, presumably to avoid defeat, and others never entered into force because the Senate attached amendments or reservations to them provoking either the President to exercise his veto or other parties to reject the revised treaty. In all, the Senate has ratified without amendment about 70 percent of the 1,600 treaties. (See *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 14, 1978, pp. 54-55) But few of these treaties were of great international significance. The rejection of the SALT II Treaty by the Senate would probably be the most important Senate rejection since the Versailles Treaty failed to win Senate approval after World War I.

until 1985, but no commitment beyond that date would be made by either side. Depending on the nature of the conditions that led to this sense of futility, it might still be possible for the United States to retain with the Soviets a relationship marked by some cooperative efforts. While there would certainly be increased support to ensure a condition of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union at the strategic nuclear level and to redress the military balance in central Europe, the establishment of a different forum to continue the arms control dialogue would also be feasible.

American and Soviet Objectives in SALT: Can They Be Achieved in Its Absence?

Central to the concern of what will happen in the absence of SALT are the objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union in participating in the process. Understanding the character of these objectives will help identify what each government expects to lose if SALT is stopped and whether they can hope to achieve their goals through other means. This is, of course, no simple task. Governments do not often reveal what their objectives truly are, these objectives frequently change, and different individuals in the same government often endorse a policy for different reasons. But the subject is still worthy of examination.

Of great familiarity are the objectives of arms control set down around 1960 by members of the academic community: to reduce the likelihood of war; to reduce the degree of damage should war occur; and to limit the resources devoted to the preparation for war. An examination of American and Soviet SALT behavior, however, suggests that these objectives have not played a central role.

The United States has moved through three phases of SALT policy: the McNamara phase, the Nixon/Kissinger phase, and the Carter phase. In the early thinking about SALT in the Johnson Administration it was Secretary of Defense McNamara who championed the idea. The principal source of his enthusiasm appears to have been the belief that the deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems by both the Soviet Union and the United States would be "destabilizing" because it would create confidence in the minds of decision makers that a first strike could be carried out successfully. (The attacker would presumably be able to saturate the defenses of his opponent and destroy much of the defender's retaliatory force. The attacker could then use his own ABM system to defend against the retaliatory attack.) Since the Soviet Union was already deploying the ABM system around Moscow and the United States was moving toward a positive deployment decision on ABM as well, McNamara felt that only through a negotiated agree-

ment could ABM deployments be avoided, thereby preserving the stability of the strategic balance.

When the SALT negotiations actually commenced in 1969, however, the Nixon Administration formulated a position that was dominated by political rather than strategic concerns. Although the halting of Soviet ABM and ICBM deployments remained high on the priority list, President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger developed the fundamental objective of using arms control agreements as a means of altering Soviet foreign policy behavior. They reasoned that successful arms control pacts would lead to improved East-West relations, in turn promoting Soviet economic relations with the West. They hoped that the Soviet economy would, over time, become sufficiently dependent on Western economic assistance that the Politburo would be forced to choose between an aggressive foreign policy inimical to Western interests and a more moderate stance necessary to retain Western economic support. Arms control became a means to achieve broader and deeper political ends.

With the recognition that the Soviet leadership could defend against this tactic and was unwilling to accept the political strings attached to Western economic assistance, the Carter Administration has returned to more traditional and limited arms control objectives. President Carter appears to desire a SALT II Treaty in order to place limits on the overall numbers of certain classes of Soviet nuclear weapon systems. His aim is to inject predictability into Soviet force levels and American force planning. Moreover, he holds out the hope that a successful SALT II Treaty will pave the way for greater progress in strategic arms control—a goal he seeks in its own right and which he feels will further the cause of both his nuclear nonproliferation policies and his desire to lessen tensions in Soviet-American relations. But his national standing and his position with the Congress are sufficiently precarious that his administration has been forced to alter its SALT negotiating posture in order to satisfy congressional critics (most recently by declaring that a multiple aim point system for land-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles must be permitted under the terms of the Treaty). From a political perspective, therefore, Carter has evidently concluded that he is better off without a SALT II Treaty than with one that runs a great risk of failing to obtain Senate ratification.²

2. Note that patterns in American public opinion provide President Carter with conflicting advice. Recent polls suggest that more than 70 percent of the American public supports a SALT II Treaty. Yet these same polls show that almost 60 percent of the public supports an increase in U.S. defense expenditures above the previous year's level to counter growing Soviet military strength.

Whatever political gain may accrue to the Carter Administration from the absence of a SALT II Treaty could, however, be more than offset by the economic difficulties in which the Administration might find itself should negotiations cease. With the American economy still on very shaky ground five years after the recession of 1974, with inflation reaching dangerously high levels in economic and political terms, and with a severe balance of payments deficit and an unprecedentedly weak dollar in the international money markets, President Carter is fighting an uphill battle to prevent an economic recession from appearing in 1979. The collapse of SALT would reduce the predictability of Soviet force levels and place considerable pressure upon Mr. Carter to spend more dollars on defense.³ If, as many economists contend, the added defense burden would fail to generate multiplier effects throughout important segments of the economy, the result would be a further aggravation of the inflationary condition.

The Soviet Union appears to have held a rather different set of SALT objectives. By achieving SALT agreements that improved East-West political relations, the Soviets expected to be free to pursue military programs not explicitly constrained by the agreements while the U.S. slowed the pace of its military procurements as a consequence of improved relations. Besides halting the deployment of the U.S. Safeguard ABM system, the Soviets hoped that sufficient support for unilateral restraint would build in the West to permit the Soviet Union to close the gap and eventually overtake the United States in terms of measurable indicators of military power. The improved climate of East-West relations stemming from arms control agreements and negotiations could also have two additional benefits. It could lead to increased Western economic assistance for the Soviet Union, particularly high-technology goods and managerial assistance, which would benefit sectors of the Soviet civilian economy and perhaps be useful in selected military applications as well. And stable Soviet-American relations would also serve to dissuade the United States from improving its relations with the People's Republic of China. American policy makers would presumably be aware that such steps, particularly the fostering of Sino-American military ties, would run the risk of wrecking Soviet-American cooperation and even provoke a Sino-Soviet conflict. It is even possible that by pursuing SALT bilaterally with the U.S. while simultaneously building up its nuclear and conventional forces earmarked for the European theatre, the Soviet aim was to exacerbate tensions between America and its allies and to create an image of the United States as something less than a

3. To use the terminology of Roger George in his article elsewhere in this volume, the "cost-avoidance" benefit of SALT would be lost.

dependable ally of the Western European democracies. Beyond these rather tangible goals, it is probable that the Soviet leadership hoped to use SALT as a means of codifying the Soviet Union's status as a global power on a par with the United States. Such an achievement would surely enhance the influence and prestige of the Soviet Union within the international community and would serve to strengthen the leadership at home.

A rupture of the SALT process could damage Soviet objectives in several respects. It could lead to the stimulation of American weapons deployments and military technological developments, in time wiping out the gains the Soviet Union has achieved over the last few years. It could produce much closer Sino-American military ties, which would certainly not be in the Soviet interest. And it could dash what hopes the Soviets still retain of receiving significant—if selective—economic assistance from the West. It is certain that the great dual accomplishment of the Brezhnev era has been an enormous gain in Soviet military strength vis-à-vis the United States together with the maintenance of relatively relaxed East-West political relations. The termination of the SALT process could gravely jeopardize this quite remarkable Soviet achievement.

If this summary of American and Soviet objectives in SALT approximates reality, it is not clear who has more to lose from a termination of the process. Several key Soviet foreign policy objectives have been or are being met through SALT, and they would be difficult to satisfy in its absence. The United States, on the other hand, has narrowed its SALT objectives considerably in the last few years, so that the main effect of the collapse of SALT would be to exacerbate the weaknesses of the American economy.

Military Systems, Defense Budgets and Arms Control

It seems likely that the termination of the SALT process would have a significant impact on the pace and scope of American weapons procurements and on the size of the American defense budget. But it is no easy task to specify the precise nature of this impact and what the Soviet reaction to it will be in tangible terms.

A recent Senate Budget Committee memorandum conjectured that the collapse of SALT could lead to additional U.S. defense spending of as much as \$100 billion over the next fifteen years.⁴ But gross budgetary estimates are of limited value. If the SALT process terminated because of nonratification of a SALT II Treaty

4. Senate Committee on the Budget, Markup Materials for First Concurrent Resolution On the Budget for Fiscal Year 1979, March 31, 1978, pp. 050-3, 050-4.

by the Senate, an incremental cost of only \$6 or \$7 billion per annum may be a very low estimate indeed.

It is more instructive to consider the impact on specific weapon systems. From the vantage point of the contemporary strategic debate, it would appear that a cessation of the SALT process would immediately steer the United States into a major unilateral effort to solve the Minuteman vulnerability problem and to accelerate the development and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles, with sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles receiving lower budgetary priority. In the short term this would in all probability mean a commitment to the establishment of an alternative launchpoint system for Minuteman III and an acceleration of the procurement of a large-throw-weight ICBM (probably the MX, but possibly Minuteman IV or the D-5).

If SALT were severed abruptly and relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly, President Carter would be faced with a large number of additional requests for budgetary support. They include:

- The procurement of an SLBM hard-target killer, the Trident II, together with acceleration of both the Trident submarine procurement schedule and the deployment of the Trident I missile.
- Rollback of the decision to cancel procurement of the B-1 bomber or, at a minimum, the commitment to a new, lower-cost penetrating bomber.
- Commitment to the rapid development and deployment of a new fleet of aircraft carrying air-launched cruise missiles to serve as standoff bombers.
- Substantially increased budgetary authorization to examine alternatives for an American civil defense program. This would satisfy those who believe that a "war survivability gap" has been created as a consequence of Soviet civil defense efforts during the last fifteen years.
- The deployment of new air defense systems, particularly if evidence is indisputable that the Soviet Union is deploying a new intercontinental-range bomber.
- Increased research and development funds for ballistic missile defense technologies, especially for hard-site defense. This budgetary item could grow very rapidly if as a consequence of the termination of the SALT process, it appeared that the Soviet Union was prepared to abrogate the ABM Treaty.
- Accelerated research and development of U.S. antisatellite capabilities.

In a highly charged domestic political environment, it will be no small feat for the Administration to determine which programs should be approved as a matter of military necessity, which should be supported as an appropriate "political" reaction to the end of SALT, and which should be rejected. Whether the administration could reconfigure the defense budget to accommodate many of these programs without significantly affecting total outlays is highly doubtful.

Beyond stimulating these requests at the strategic-nuclear level, the termination of SALT would likely generate the belief of enhanced prospects of Soviet-American confrontation in regional situations. Pressures would then be felt to:

- Increase NATO's military strength, in particular the deployment in Central Europe of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and/or ground-launched cruise missiles to counter the Soviet deployment of SS-20s and *Backfire* bombers.
- Augment airlift and sealift capabilities and organize and train specialized elite forces capable of intervening in the Persian Gulf should the supply of oil to the West be threatened by local conflict, a fifth Arab-Israeli war, the prospect of Soviet intervention, or unilateral acts by the supplier states.

A bitter budgetary battle could well ensue within the defense community: some arguing for enhanced strategic capability, others pleading for improved theatre-capable forces, and still others for both. Because of the potential burdens on the domestic economy, it is highly unlikely that the Administration would acquiesce to all these demands unless a situation of acute international crisis prevails. The great challenge for the Administration would be to do enough to meet domestic criticism and to convince the Soviet Union of American willingness to compete in military terms without overreacting to the point of either producing (or exacerbating) an economic recession or provoking the Soviet Union to act preemptively.⁵

If Soviet economic difficulties were to be as grave as CIA forecasts indicate, the Soviet leadership could be forced to respond to American actions with more words than deeds. The Soviet economy has evidently managed to sustain a 3 percent per annum real growth in defense spending for many years, with defense expenditure levels at 13 percent of GNP or more. While the actual resource allocation process in the Soviet Union remains a mystery to almost all observers, there are indications that the Soviet leadership is allocating about as much as it can to defense spending; augmenting the considerable investments already made for both cruise missile technology and sophisticated cruise missile defenses or placing the economy on a war-time footing may be the only options. What has astounded most Western analysts is the incredible perseverance with which the Soviets continue to pursue solutions to a vast array of military problems. If the Soviet Union

5. A crude estimate would be that if the President sought to purchase all the items cited above, the defense budget would rise to 6.5–7.0 percent of the U.S. gross national product. To push the level up to 10–12 percent of GNP would require resumption of the draft, major new investments in labor-intensive defense expenditures, and an acceleration of the manufacturing of capital ships. Recent public statements by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the advantages of reintroducing the draft suggest that taking some of these steps is more than a theoretical consideration.

indeed needs to import oil in the early 1980s or must cope with tensions among the Soviet nationalities by increasing the availability of consumer goods, or runs into severe labor shortages, it may not be possible for the leadership to earmark an increasing proportion of its resources for defense.

The potential budgetary strains on both the U.S. and the Soviet economy suggest two points. First, while the continuation of SALT has seemingly had little or no restraining effect on the defense budgets of either the United States or the Soviet Union, the absence of SALT would be a major budgetary stimulus, at least for American defense spending. Second, even in the absence of SALT, all hope need not be lost for arms control. As mentioned earlier, a gradual termination of SALT would permit both governments time to think through possible alternative negotiating frameworks. But even if SALT should collapse abruptly, both governments have the option to practice a limited form of arms control through unilateral self-restraint—motivated not by altruistic objectives but by economic necessity. Although the prospect of this taking hold is admittedly not very great, it has greater promise than negotiated arms control once SALT has collapsed.

Allies and Leverage

If SALT collapses, America's West European allies and Japan would be prompted more than ever to pursue a dual track: maintaining as well as possible calm bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, while simultaneously seeking to enhance their own defense capabilities. Continued expressions of American commitment to their defense, while not necessarily believed, would most assuredly be solicited by all of America's allies. What Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Ohira and the other national leaders would be pushed to do by their own internal situations could be speculated upon at length, but that is not the subject of this essay. It is important to emphasize, however, that the United States must act with prudence and strength once the SALT process has terminated to reassure each nation that its future lies best in the existing international political framework. Several governments may be pushed by opposition parties to explore alternative strategies: separate accommodations with the Soviet Union or "go it alone" approaches, perhaps with independent nuclear capabilities. It is imperative that the United States provide these nations with whatever incentives it can to avoid adopting such courses of action.

Two danger points should be recognized. If American relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate rapidly, the United States could be tempted to enlist allied support in an anti-Soviet strategy. Some say today that the U.S. has little economic

leverage over the Soviet Union: if we fail to sell them wheat, they can obtain comparable foodstuffs from Canada, Australia or Argentina; if we fail to deliver high-technology goods, West Germany or Japan will take up the slack. Others claim that economic assistance can be turned on or off to induce the Soviet leadership to adopt policies more consistent with American interests. But in a far nastier world than the present one, the United States might be tempted to exert extreme pressure on its allies to cut off all assistance to the Soviet economy. While such a tactic might serve American foreign policy objectives, it could add significantly to the centrifugal forces pulling America's allies out of the American orbit once SALT has collapsed. American leaders must be sensitive to the management of such risks if this tactic is adopted. Moreover, the temptation in the United States to promote Sino-American military ties, now greatly strengthened with the normalization of Sino-American relations, could become irresistible. That this step will add to concern in Japan and India is assured. That it could provoke the Soviet Union to strike Chinese military targets in order to avoid the Russian nightmare of having to face, in twenty years, a China that had achieved superpower status is no sheer fantasy. That it could make positive contributions to American interests or to the Soviet-American military balance is not at all clear. Indeed, this act could be one of the most significant "destabilizing" results of a world without SALT.

Could There Be Positive Effects If SALT Stopped?

This essay has tended to suggest that the absence of SALT would bring about several undesirable consequences. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to increase, with greater risks of crisis and confrontation. The American response would probably be substantial increases in defense spending emanating from an acrimonious domestic debate which would leave a weakened President in its wake. The increased commitment to defense would, overall, have a deleterious effect on the domestic economy, with added inflationary pressures outweighing gains in the reduction of unemployment. The future of arms control would be noticeably dimmer than it is today. Strains with America's allies would be difficult to avoid. And indeed, nations contemplating the acquisition of nuclear weapons would have stronger reasons, real or contrived, to pursue that goal.

Must the consequences be dominated by the negative? Three positive alternatives seem plausible. In the first instance, the termination of SALT is followed by a rapid acceleration of American weapons programs which demonstrates the resolve of the United States to the Soviet leadership. After a relatively brief period of

time of intense competition and confrontation, the Soviet Union seeks to establish a fundamental military and political equilibrium with the United States rather than risk being outdistanced in a totally competitive environment. The United States grasps the opportunity for political and economic reasons and the two nations engage in a constructive dialogue leading to the sort of cooperative relationship envisaged by some Americans at the time of the signing of the SALT I accords. In the second case, a protracted confrontation develops between the superpowers which leads to the isolation of the Soviet Union (except for nominal support from the Eastern European socialist bloc). Because of the difficult international situation, considerable economic strains, enormous tension between various Soviet nationalities and the Russians, and the inability of the rigid political structure to adapt to the changing domestic and international environment, a transformation of the Soviet political system takes place—perhaps not without bloodshed—which leads to the establishment of a modified communist state willing to forego its military and political challenge to the West. The third case envisages the development of a Soviet-American military balance in which unilateral acts continue to preserve a sense of equilibrium such that SALT no longer seems to be useful to either side for military or political reasons. In such a world SALT would not die but would slowly fade away, almost unnoticed.

Unfortunately, at this writing it seems that if SALT collapses, the pessimistic scenarios are far more probable than the optimistic alternatives.

The Historian and Battle

John Keegan

Petrarch was the first writer to climb a mountain—Cezanne's Mont St. Victoire in Provence, as it happened—Winston Churchill, I think, the first statesman to have flown in an airplane, Joseph Conrad the first, and probably the last, major novelist to have gone around Cape Horn under sail. Thus far, no intellectual has gone into space. I suspect that the NASA personnel selection board finds what it probably calls a "negative correlation" between speculative intellectual habits and suitability for deep space missions, and I can certainly see that I would not myself choose as a capsule companion someone whose mind might well be working on problems of the persistence of self or the space-time continuum when we were supposed to be carrying out a docking maneuver. "Later, later," are the least impatient words I would expect to hear on my lips in the circumstances.

But if we do not know and cannot guess who will be the first man to take a reasonable prose style beyond the stratosphere and bring it back again, we do know who was the first historian to take part in a battle; and the answer, as with so many historical firsts, is Thucydides. He undoubtedly took part in a small naval battle in 424 B.C. Thereafter, the accounts of battles to which we can attach the names of historians as participants flow thick and fast until in our own times it sometimes seems difficult to find major historians who cannot make that claim. The great American admiral-professor Samuel Eliot Morrison was said not only to be perfectly content to let it be known that he had been present at many of the major naval battles of the Pacific war, but was not averse to having it be thought that he had actually stood at Nimitz's shoulder and even occasionally waved his hand.

Battle is unquestionably one of the most popular of all historical subjects, as something to read about, whether the reader can test the accounts by personal experience or not, and as something to describe, even if the writer saw nothing of the events, but especially if he did. As a result, the shelves of history libraries, whether arranged by date or by country, are burdened with books about battles, or with books in which battles figure very largely. It is only in libraries arranged by subject or name that the pacifically inclined reader can escape from the sight, smell, and taste of blood. Many libraries arranged by theme make the possibility of such an escape almost total, lunging from Dewey Decimal number 354 to Dewey Decimal number 356 across the blood-stained 355, as if it carried the risk of infection. I remember as a freshman at Balliol, already seriously infected by an

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interest in military history, subjecting the upper library to an expectant scrutiny and finding only one book answering to my special interest—Sir Paul Cadell's rather dull history of the British Army. And that clearly placed item, was an exception to what seemed an ideological principle, only because the status of the author overrode the disreputability of his material. I mean, of course, that he was an old Balliol man. Balliol's particular outlook—Fabian, humanitarian, and progressive—and its well-known achievements—in the production of prime ministers, foreign secretaries, classicists, economists and masters of Eliot House—made it, I suppose, understandable that its library would be one of those arranged automatically so as to exclude the military principle from the diet it offered to the undergraduates. But it did not stand alone. Twenty-five years ago most of the academic libraries I frequented were arranged on the same lines—the Codrington, the Radcliffe Camera, the history faculty library. No doubt, buried somewhere in the catacombs of the Bodleian were the books I wanted, but like most undergraduates before and since, I never discovered how to find them in the catalogue or, if I did, to master the patience necessary for them to be excavated by the staff. The historical process was something I thought I came to Oxford to study, not to undergo.

To get directly at printed military sources meant a trip to London, either to another subterranean library in the basements of the War Office, which entailed acquiring a special pass and being escorted from the heavily-guarded entrance to the shelves by a retired sergeant major in brass buttons, or to the library of the Royal United Service Institute. The latter should have been a pleasure to visit, since it was housed in Whitehall in Inigo Jones's Banqueting Hall, from a window of which Inigo's patron, Charles I, stepped onto the scaffold in 1649. The building and its interior are extremely beautiful and the contents, in those days a fascinating collection of British military memorabilia, were distributed among the bookcases in a fashion so charmingly haphazard, as greatly to enhance the apparent interest and value of the works themselves. It was rather like the library of a grand country house, and should have been a pleasure to visit, had it not been for the appearance and behavior of its principal denizen. A retired major general with a double-barelled name—Rolls-Brummell, as I recall—he maintained an unvarying station, standing bolt upright behind a handsome mahogany campaign desk, across the surface of which he breathed a trembling indignation at the impertinence of anyone wanting to read *his* books, sometimes, I had to feel, at the idea of anyone wanting to read anything at all. He so intimidated me that I took to wearing a dark suit and stiff collar whenever I visited the library and, that obviously failing to placate him, even to carrying a bowler hat in the hope of passing myself off as a young officer of the Footguards with an eccentric

literary inclination. But he was implacable. His glare drove me into a dark corner of the gallery which overhung the library; there I was occasionally able to summon enough composure to do a little reading. Eventually, however, he defeated me. From the gallery he might not be seen but he could be heard, barking bad-tempered orders at his terrified staff, or triumphantly refusing to answer inquiries over the telephone. It was such an affair which ultimately drew me from the library for good. Most callers were effectively deterred from telephoning twice by the rudeness of his initial reply. One morning a caller persisted, simply dialing the number again whenever he put the telephone down. "We do not answer verbal inquiries," he bellowed the first time—the truth was that he did not answer any inquiries of any sort. The tenth time, such self-possession as he had cracked altogether as, standing rigidly at attention, he screamed, "You must write a letter, write a letter, write a letter, write a letter." It was clear that he was going to go on screaming until his decibels had destroyed the delicate mechanism of the telephone, so, seizing my bowler hat, I flew from the library to the street never to return or not at least until I was reliably informed that he was dead, a much-to-be-hoped-for event which did not supervene until surprising recently.

In the interval, military history underwent a remarkable change. I noted at the outset that battle is a popular subject, both with readers as with authors. But it has not in recent times recommended itself to professional historians. Because battle is the central act of warfare, it and associated subjects—the lives of great commanders and their thoughts, the histories of the men they commanded—have monopolized historiographical enterprise in the military field. But about twenty years ago, that sort of military historiography began to give way to a new approach, comparable in many ways to that of the new historiography of politics and society. The reasons why that happened are, I think, obvious. It was the historiographical heritage of the Second World War. The war caught up in its workings an enormous number of people, educated people as well as simple people, mature as well as young, female as well as male. That had happened a generation before, during the First World War, but those who had been swept up in the Great War underwent a different experience. What that experience was we know because the survivors have made their feelings about it graphically clear, either in the form of personal memoirs like those of Robert Graves or Edmund Blunden, or of novels, like those of Siegfried Sassoon in England, or of Ernest Hemingway or John Dos Passos in the United States. The war had been terrible. It took them about ten years to find the words to say so and then, in an extraordinary, and quite short-winded outburst, two years each side of 1930, they had said so. But the Second World War had been different. I will not say with A. J. P. Taylor that it

was a wonderful war, because I take the view that no wars are wonderful, but it was unquestionably a very interesting war, indeed.

And interesting at many different levels—political, diplomatic, economic, bureaucratic, civil as well as military. The First World War had, of course, generated some major scholarship, of which Albertini's extraordinary work *Origins* probably stands at the peak. The internal politics of Britain at war has a large and entertaining literature—fact, opinion and fantasy weigh heavily in the memoirs of Lloyd George, Churchill, and Beaverbrook, while Ritter, Görlitz, Craig, and Wheeler Bennett have weighed in more heavily on the side of the military dictatorship in Germany. But if we think of the historiography of the years 1910–1920, our minds turn less to the war itself than to the dramatic events to which the strains of war gave rise—the collapse and division of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the emasculation of Imperial Germany, and above all, the Bolshevik Revolution. That historiography belongs to a branch of the discipline which is not really military. The historiography of the Second World War is different. The terrible spiritual burden of attrition which seemed to deaden intellectual interest in anything about the First World War except its calamitous beginning and cataclysmic end was not felt by the victims and observers of the Second. They found in its progress and internal processes a wealth of fascinating issues. The diplomacy of the alliances, for example, both Axis and anti-Axis, Deakin's work on the Italian-German friendship, or Thorne's on Anglo-American victory in the Pacific represent two of the highest achievements so far. Other issues include the management of economies in warfare, in which Alan S. Milward has pushed beyond the work of the official historians to produce illuminating comparative studies in the war economies of all the combatants; histories of the European resistance movements, which include the eclectic studies of Henri-Michel and an enormous body of detailed local histories, particularly of the French Departments (in which a successor to Richard Cobb may perhaps make exhilarating hay in the not too distant future); internal political histories like those of Addison for Britain and Paxton for Vichy France; histories of the development of atomic energy both in Britain and America; histories of high commands at war, such as the many studies of Hitler and his generals, Pogue's biography of Marshall as Chief of Staff, and John Erickson's amazing penetration of Stalin's relations with his generals, a study that promises to be one of the dozen most important histories of the period. At a secondary level, capillaries shoot off into cultural or social history, so that in Britain we have war studies, more or less light-hearted on Bomb Culture, a frothy confection on the significance of Cyril Connolly's *Horizon*, Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited*, on British literary consciousness, and

on the effect of Dame Myra Hess's lunchtime concerts on proletarian appreciation of classical music; on the sociology of the Blitz; and on temporary assimilation of the G.I. into British home life.

The vitality and variety of Second World War historiography seems to have had a revivifying and diversifying effect on military historiography in general. Some of it is too limited and specialized to have attracted the attention of general historians. But its informing spirit is indeed that of general history, and it is the general and humane quality which makes it different from almost all earlier military historiography. Let me mention the work of two young English historians which seems to typify the new approach: that of Michael Mallet and Geoffrey Parker. The former's book on *Mercenaries and their Masters*, although it might seem an extension of *Art of Warfare in Renaissance Italy*, added in fact a philosophical dimension to what was essentially a technical work (and books which include the words "art of war" in the title are, in my mind, to be regarded with some professional suspicion). What Mallet showed, among other things, was that the North Italian mercenaries, far from being the cynical freeloaders Machiavelli paints for us, gave much better value for money than he had allowed; furthermore the battles which he had depicted as mere shams and fixes staged by both sides to justify to their masters the high wages they were taking, were, in fact, often very bloody. Machiavelli had distorted the evidence in order to further his arguments for the establishment of citizen militias, which he thought desirable on political rather than military grounds. Geoffrey Parker's *Army of Flanders on the Spanish Road*, is more technically military than Mallet's *Mercenaries*, but adds significantly to our understanding of a cluster of related and underrated problems: how the Habsburgs ran their empire; how regular land communications were organized or operated in the sixteenth century; how armies were raised and financed; how competitive military wages were with civilian; and what attendant risks men would accept, in pressing economic circumstances, to earn any sort of wage at all. A highly technical military historian, Christopher Duffy, has even managed to integrate his consuming passion for the history of fortifications and military architecture with social history, arguing that the design of fortification enforced very constricted living conditions in cities, such that the bourgeoisie lived side-by-side with the proletariat; as a result, their social differences were exaggerated and the inter-class hostilities which formed in the great urban suburbs of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe were heightened.

A young historian whose work is extremely impressive is the U.S. Air Force Academy professor—now posted to duty as a helicopter pilot—John Guilmartin. His *Gunpowder and Galleys* is, if you like, the missing military chapter in Braudel's

The Mediterranean, drawn from what must be the only Mediterranean archives, in which Braudel neglected to work. It is as fascinating as any section of Braudel's history for its kaleidoscopic display of detail. But it is also as illuminating for its presentation of two original perceptions, one important for an understanding of the sixteenth century Mediterranean, one for general application to strategic affairs. The first is his discussion of the interpretation of piracy, privateering and warfare, which makes neat categories of the prevailing states of international relations impossible to impose. The second, based on an extremely acute analysis of the strategic reach of naval expeditions in the sixteenth century Mediterranean, and of their dependence on fortified ports, enlarges our understanding of the nature of *all* amphibious campaigns, particularly in the Pacific war of 1939–45. Guilmartin also tantalizingly outlines, though he does not fill out, a sketch for a new theory of naval warfare, more comprehensive than that of Mahan which has so long held the field.

These are principally books which I have enjoyed, rather than books which cannot be ignored, although that does not mean that I think enjoyability is a quality which has to be defended. "If I cannot read it, it must be wrong" my first head of department, a retired brigadier on whom Evelyn Waugh might have modelled Ritchie-Hook, used to say as he threw displeasing student papers into the waste basket. He was making a general point and I would like to use it to justify introducing yet more material—particularly the work of the French historians Girardet and Courvisier, whose studies capture the character of the French Army. Their works have transformed other military historians' understanding of military institutions and offer to all historians a greater understanding of social relationships. I recommend in particular Courvisier's eclectic *Armée et Société en Europe, 1494–1789*, now being translated for the University of Indiana Press.

But I cannot refuse to discuss altogether the books which cannot be ignored. For they overtop in bulk the books I have enjoyed by many heads. I refer, of course, to the official histories. In Britain after the Second World War, as after the First, the government decided to commission a review of its course to be written by qualified historians, who were to be given full access to the record, and to publish at public expense. As was not the case after the First World War, the government decided to make its history a civil, as well as a military one, with highly beneficial results. Some of the volumes in the civil services are vital contributions to the history of Britain in the twentieth century. I would, perhaps eccentrically, choose the volume of M. M. Postan (the distinguished medieval historian) on the design and development of weapons, since it emphasizes so clearly the degree of under-investment, technical backwardness, and lack of productivity in British industry.

The Washington Post's London correspondent is now trying to persuade both Americans and Britons that such characteristics are evidence of Britain's far-sighted abandonment of industrial for post-industrial satisfactions, and of its highly-developed social and political maturity. This may well be, but the benefits of such a transition to a nation locked in a life-or-death struggle for survival are difficult to demonstrate.

I wish I could be as complimentary about the Military as about the Civil Service. But I cannot. There is, of course, a well-known philosophical contradiction in the concept of "official history" and is nowhere better borne out than in the British military histories. Those of the First World War are so little informed by the humane spirit of general historiography that they might have been written by what the advance men for science fiction movies like to call "alien life forms." Those of the Second are considerably better. Their authors are clearly members of the same species as ourselves. But how deferential a sub-set they are, how unwilling to criticize official policy, how sensitive for the reputations of the great and the not very great, how unconscious and apparently indifferent to the feelings of and actions of the vast masses of ordinary people caught up in the events they describe.

Theirs is not general history—nor is any of the official history which had preceded it, either in Britain, France or Germany where, in its military form, official history was invented. It is easy to explain why. The terrible Major General Rolls-Brummel, though a caricature, was a highly characteristic figure of the traditional military man's attitude to the chronicling of his professional activities. Ultimately he saw the story of warfare, as had the medieval chronicler, as entirely personal; a record of conformity to rights and wrongs measured by chivalric standards which has a rather shaky, if deeply-felt foundation in theology. More recently, some of his fellow soldiers have taken the view that a careful record of military events could have a didactic value—didactic was certainly not a word that he would have used—in the training of future generals and staff officers. But how that record would be written, and what would go into it, would be for the soldiers themselves to decide. Let civilians, or civilian historians, meddle in the business at their peril. Let their verbal inquiries be choked off. And if they did "write a letter, write a letter, write a letter" it would not receive a reply.

The British official military history of the Second World War is deeply disappointing. But not so the American. This amounts to saying that the invigoration of academic military history in Britain since 1945 owes absolutely nothing to the official historians (the glittering contribution of Michael Howard is an exception). Any critique of official military history must be reversed in Mid-Atlantic. Michael Howard has called the American official histories "one of the great historiographi-

cal series in the world" and certainly no one in the business in Britain would disagree. The reasons for its outstandingly humane quality is simply explained. The American Government, in reversing its post-1918 decision not to write an official history of the entire war, chose to put the new enterprise from the outset—which was at the very beginning of its involvement in the Second World War—in the hands of professionals. I characterized their approach elsewhere as "patriotic, optimistic and populist." And one of them took the trouble to write to me later and tell me I was wrong. I nevertheless cling to my view. The American Army combat historians do seem to me to have been frontiersmen, in the Frederick Jackson Turner sense—they saw the war as a gigantic national movement and decided to tell it as the story of a free people. Foremost among them was the extraordinary S.L.A. Marshall, whom I saw only once but who left an indelible impression on me.

He had come to address the British Staff College at Camberley. He chose to wear the dress-blue uniform of a Brigadier-General. It sat very badly on his tiny, corpulent person. It went even worse with his manner, which was aggressive, hectoring and rude. He cheerfully insulted those who asked him what he thought were stupid questions. He exuded energy and vulgarity in about equal measure. But I did infallibly detect that he was someone apart and above any military historian I had met before. I subsequently came to feel, as I still do, that he was touched by genius.

S.L.A.M., as he liked to be called, was assigned as a combat historian first in the Pacific and later in the Northwest European theater of operations. His task was to write narratives of U.S. Army operations. He began, as any properly trained historian would, by collecting documents and, since he was given the opportunity, by discussing their contents—operational orders, situation reports, intelligence summaries—with the authors, who were commanders or staff officers. He found he could not square the written evidence with that of his eyes and ears when he visited the frontline. The documents did not tell him what was going on, and he could not puzzle out what was, so he went to ask the soldiers.

There is, of course, a blinding simplicity about great and original ideas. S.L.A. Marshall's idea was original, because no one before had thought of asking soldiers about what had happened to them in battle, not, at least, in the immediate aftermath. It was great because it translated the purpose of the American official histories, to tell the story of a free people at war, into reality by direct interrogation of their representatives—simple riflemen, squad and platoon leaders—as individuals. Then, as self-confidence in his method developed, he met with squad, platoon, and company-size groups, in which he encouraged debate or self-criticism. He

satisfied himself that he could make headway toward the truth. His findings certainly were so impressive that his methods were adopted widely throughout the historical teams. And the result was the magnificent campaign histories, which form the centerpiece of the enterprise.

The essence of Marshall's findings, and that which imbues his narratives with the electricity they discharge, is that few men in a mass army are effective fighters. The majority are willing or at least acquiescent participants. But those who perform the functions of the army, which are to close with the enemy and defeat him in close combat, are a real minority—he estimated about a quarter of those present in the firing line. He further showed the dynamic and cohesive effect they exert on the inert majority. It is their example, active within groups of perhaps only seven or eight men, drawn to each other through training and bound by fear of failing in each other's eyes, which animates and articulates the fighting element of the whole army.

The importance of this discovery does not seem to need emphasis, but I feel it needs advocacy. Historians accept in general the precipitating and catalytic function of acts of violence in the historical process at large. They are eager to enlarge their understanding of the inner workings of riot, rebellion, and revolution. We now recognize the paramount significance of elites in the events of October, 1917. George Rudé and Richard Cobb have earned much of the professional acclaim that they deserve for their success in penetrating the morphology of the eighteenth century revolutionary crowds and showing that they had leaders, organization, and plans. But from the realities of the battlefield, quintessentially an arena of precipitating and catalytic forces, general historians draw back. And this is as true of the new military historians, Mallet and Parker, for example, as of the non-military ones. They continue to focus on the preliminary and subordinate activities of warfare: strategic planning, economic mobilization and industrial choice, design and development of weapons, logistics and supply, determinants of the war process which are essential to its prosecution, and mistakes or failures which frequently lose countries wars. But superiority at that level is no guarantee of victory, as numerous examples demonstrate: Italy's war with the British in the Western Desert in 1940–1941, the Israelis' war with their Arab neighbors in 1948, most recently America's war in Vietnam. Moreover, none of these activities, taken either singly or in concert, are essentially different from the activities of peace. What makes shooting war different from cold war—in which all these activities may be observed—is precisely the fighting. And, to my mind at least, the most useful way of thinking about shooting war—air and particularly sea warfare are different—is the business of groups. What armies do in practice is to create effective fighting

groups. What they attempt to do in war is to break down such groups which they encounter in the ranks of the enemy. S.L.A. Marshall saw that. He looked at the woods and saw the individual trees. Hence his greatness.

Hence too his deficiencies. He liked the trees for themselves, as one might admire gigantic redwoods for their height and girth, but he was not interested in where they came from, how they grew, why some were taller than others. He was an author, not a scientist. His "effective fighters" have names but they might be incognitos. We know nothing about their background or their futures. And that goes for the soldiers in the groups he depicts. He describes in elaborate detail—there is a prurient fascination in Marshall's work that one has to arm oneself against—the horrors they undergo; but he is not interested in how they sustain those horrors, in the way their experiences change the individual group members, or in what feelings they take back into civil life if they survive. If I claim any originality for the work I have done it is in hinting at the *constraints* and *inducements* that armies use to make man bear the burdens of combat. I do not accept the assertion that Marshall's revelations about the effective fighter and group loyalty are a sufficient explanation of how battle burdens are borne. I believe that the chance of enrichment through ransom and loot was formerly a major inducement, that its effectiveness has more recently been replaced by that of coercion, the fear of punishment, and that sedation or narcotics through drink or drugs have always been an important influence on man's behavior in wars. I also believe, as I think I have been able to show, that, nevertheless, a significant proportion of men cannot bear the strains and are broken by battle. And I detect that most men who serve in armies recruited in liberal states are disturbed by the inconsistencies of defending a free society by an institution that is its ideological antithesis—dictatorial, unrepresentative, and often extremely unjust.

Where I know I have failed, where we have not yet begun to make headway, is in pursuing how the experience of battle changes those who are subjected to it. It is not enough, though I think it vitally necessary, to understand the mechanisms of battle. And it is not right to take the easy view that men who submit to those mechanisms are few, that society is larger, that both are inherently amnesiac where horrors are concerned. Battle extends its reach far beyond the battlefield. Those on its fringes may not be touched, many indeed recall nothing of a war but its fun and excitement—it is foolish to pretend that war cannot be fun and exciting. But battle is different. It terrifies those who take part in it, and touches all who care for them. Mothers weep, fathers stifle their sobs, families do not forget the anguish of having a son at the front, however short the span of his absence.

And in any case, those who return, though a group relatively small in absolute

terms, are drawn by definition from its more active and vigorous sector. America, for example, assured by its rotation policy in Vietnam not only that would the war be lost—since the groups the system circulated were inherently ineffective military units—but that it would be lost in a way most harmful to American society, by subjecting the largest possible number of young Americans to battle under the most punitive conditions. No one would, I think, deny the horror. None, I think, could begin to measure or evaluate it.

To do the Americans any credit, assessment has begun. And the Army's attempt to evaluate the harm of Vietnam, though undertaken in self-regarding terms, must not be decried. No liberal society wants war, but it does, for a whole number of reasons, need an army and an army which is prepared to subject itself to criticism; and even if conceived in narrowly professional terms, it is half-way to being the army that a civilian state should have. But we cannot expect the American Army to be its own Solomon. Nor, I think, can we expect the American official military historians, who are already hard at work on a multi-volume history of the war, to achieve the understanding that we need. I do not imply that the Rolls-Brummells have taken over on the Potomac. But the Vietnam war generated too much anguish, at too many levels for any group of official historians anywhere to deal with its ramifications.

I look for hope where I think I should, to the schools of humane academic historiography. I cannot see any work of recent history which more needs to be written in America than a humane account of the Vietnam war. I can see the difficulties and objections. I can believe that the hostilities the war engendered were so deep that the first book may have to be done by an outsider, and I have seriously considered trying myself.

I suspect that that will not be possible. The Atlantic is wide and I live on the wrong side of it. But let me address anyone who feels touched by a challenge. Reviewers were kind enough to say about my book, *The Face of Battle*, that it conveyed a sense of human realities. I take absolutely no credit for that. I was merely lucky enough, at the right time, to be among men in whom the memories of the experience of battle were fresh and urgent. I merely listened—eaves-dropped would be a better word. Because of the eternal realities of warfare, I caught an authentic echo not only of their past but of that of vanished warriors' as well. Those echoes, I am certain, ring loud and clear in America today. But they must be heard where they can be found, and this is not at Harvard, Yale, Stanford, or Berkeley. The besetting sin of historians is gentility. In their studies they mingle with the great of the past, and examine the great unwashed through the safe and of a telescope. I am guilty of the sin of gentility because I heard my echoes in the

gilded surroundings of the Officer's Mess at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Today's echoes must not be heard in university libraries, but far away in the quonset huts, bachelor officers' quarters, and veteran hospitals. The journey will be worth making. It must be made soon, before its colors fade. A fascinating and perhaps a great book awaits anyone who undertakes it.

Instability and Change on NATO's Southern Flank

CSIA European
Security Working
Group

Of all the challenges facing the United States today, one of the most crucial is the restoration of sense of direction and purpose to its policy on NATO's southern flank. For many years Greece and Turkey were among the staunchest members of the Atlantic Alliance, contributing together some 750,000 troops to NATO. Each maintained a special relationship with the United States dating back to the late 1940s. At that time the United States, under the Truman Doctrine, granted both countries large-scale economic and military assistance which allowed them to resist internal and external threats to their security. The military ties initiated under the Truman Doctrine were later expanded and buttressed by a variety of important political and economic ties which served to further cement the bonds between the United States and its two southern allies.

One need only take a cursory glance at the southern flank today to see how radically the situation has changed. On the bilateral level, U.S. relations with both Greece and Turkey have seriously deteriorated. On the alliance level, Greece has withdrawn from the military structure of NATO, while Turkey is threatening to reduce her commitment and could at some point even drop out entirely. Meanwhile, the Cyprus issue continues to fester, poisoning relations between Greece and Turkey and exacerbating tensions over other issues in the Aegean. Lastly, domestic trends in both countries raise troubling questions about the long-term viability of their democratic institutions.

The Military Dimension

These developments highlight the growing disarray on the southern flank in recent years. This disarray has been lent greater importance, moreover, by the changing military balance in the area, particularly the naval balance. The geographic differences between the Central Front (where there is a single line of contact with the Warsaw Pact stretching from the Alps to the Baltic) and the southern flank (where various theaters are separated by rugged terrain) make sea power critical for resupply and reinforcement of ground troops. Without effective sea control a coherent defense of the region is impracticable. For many years this was not a problem because the Sixth Fleet could operate virtually unhindered in the Mediterranean. In the last fifteen years, however, the Soviet Union has greatly expanded

From 1976 through early 1978, Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs sponsored a European Security Working Group, composed of faculty and fellows. This article is based on one of the chapters in their book, European Security: Prospects for the 1980s, Derek Leebaert editor (D.C. Heath & Co., 1979).

its presence in the Mediterranean. In 1963, for instance, there were no Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. Today there are some 42—half of them combatants. While Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean has declined somewhat in recent years, due to the loss of port facilities in Egypt, in less than a decade and a half, the Soviet navy has changed from a coastal navy whose main function was to show the flag to one with significant sea-denial capabilities.¹ This directly affects the ability of the Sixth Fleet to support any land battle in Greece and particularly in Turkey.

In short, there is currently an uneasy balance in the Mediterranean, as a result of the Soviet naval build-up. On the one hand, the United States can no longer exercise undisputed control of the sea. On the other hand, the Soviet Union cannot entirely deny its use to the United States. The determinant of whether the United States can control the sea or whether the Soviet Union can deny us its use (either for military purposes or to interdict strategic supplies such as oil) is likely to be land-based airpower. Here, too, the Soviet Union has made important gains. As a result of the introduction of the Backfire bomber, Soviet land-based aircraft can now reach out into the Mediterranean basin, making what was once a haven for the Sixth Fleet an area that will have to be fought for. From the American point of view, this underscores the vital importance of land-based aircraft in any Mediterranean conflict, particularly of tactical aircraft presently stationed in Greece and Turkey. Without the protection they would afford, the Sixth Fleet would become even more vulnerable.

Another important development has been the expansion and modernization of Soviet land and air forces. On the Southern Flank this has been neither as large nor as intense as on the Central Front, but it has still exceeded that of NATO and has served to give the Warsaw Pact both a numerical and technological advantage over the NATO forces.² In Northern Greece and Turkish Thrace, for instance, 23 Greek and Turkish divisions face an estimated combined force of 32 Warsaw Pact divisions, most of which are mechanized and possess a favorable tank ratio of 3-1. Further East, the Soviet Turkish-oriented forces stationed in the Caucasus have been modernized and now possess a significant air mobile threat. Combined with technological advances in night vision, hand-held air defense weapons, and communications, this could change the character of the war in the area to NATO's disadvantage. Soviet air capability has also been enhanced by the de-

1. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean, see Barry M. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

2. "Security in the Mediterranean—a NATO Perspective," Presentation by General William A. Knowlton, Commander LAND-SOUTHEAST (Izmir), May 20, 1977, p. 5, mimeographed.

ployment in the Ukraine of the Backfire with increased range and payload, which during conflict would probably be directed against the NATO maritime force in the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas, and quite possibly against Greece and Turkey as secondary targets. Last, there is the deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), among them the SS-20, situated in northwest Crimea and in the northern fringes of the Transcaucasus. Presumably, some of these would be used against targets on the southern flank.

By contrast, much of the equipment used by the Greek and Turkish forces is rapidly approaching block obsolescence. While both countries have begun to undertake large-scale modernization programs, these have been handicapped by the dwindling support within Congress for FMA (Foreign Military Assistance) credits in favor of direct commercial sales. This imposes additional burdens on both countries, particularly Turkey, which has been faced with one of the severest economic crises in its postwar history. In the case of Turkey, moreover, the effect of these measures has been compounded by the impact of the arms embargo which, according to NATO estimates, reduced the military effectiveness of Turkey's armed forces in some areas by as much as 80 to 90 percent.³ While the decision to lift the embargo should help to alleviate some of the most serious military problems facing Turkey, the need for modernization is so great that even with the resumption of full-scale U.S. military assistance significant military weaknesses are likely to exist for some time.⁴

The Political Dimension

The above discussion highlights the shifting military balance on the southern flank. However, it is not the Soviet build-up and the expansion of the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean that is at the heart of resulting security dilemmas. For the most part Moscow has been a residual factor, responding to and benefitting from a disarray which it has neither created nor been able to harness. The problems faced by the United States on the southern flank are essentially *political* in nature and have been only tangentially related to the growth of Soviet power. They have their roots in social, economic, and political changes in Greece and Turkey over the past decade as well as in changes of the international system at large.

3. *The New York Times*, May 23, 1978.

4. The Turks have estimated, for instance, that it will take \$600 million worth of spare parts alone to make up the losses caused by the embargo.

Among the most important of the factors contributing to the erosion of alliance harmony on the southern flank have been:

—*The decline of the perceived immediacy of the Soviet threat.* The entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO (1952) was essentially a response to the fear of direct Soviet attack. As long as the threat was perceived as direct and immediate, Greece and Turkey were willing to subordinate themselves to the dictates of U.S. policy in return for U.S. protection. Once this threat no longer seemed immediate, both countries began to be less willing to automatically follow the U.S. lead on every issue and to put alliance interests—or in this case, U.S. interests—ahead of other national interests.

—*Detente.* The process of East-West detente that began to emerge in the mid- and late 1960s eased the sense of external threat and deflected attention toward pressing domestic issues. As a result, an increasing number of people in both countries began to question the need to maintain a defense establishment oriented toward a threat which seemed less and less real. This led to a growing debate in each country as to the value of the alliance and at the same time a desire to expand relations with the Soviet bloc.

—*The new importance lent to energy questions since the oil embargo.* Both Greece and Turkey, particularly the latter, are heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil,⁵ and in the last few years both countries have sought to expand their relations with the oil-producing states in the Middle East. Consequently, today neither country can be counted on to support U.S. Middle East policy—a fact well illustrated by the refusal of both countries to allow U.S. overflights to supply Israel during the October War.

—*Domestic changes in the United States;* especially the more assertive role that Congress has begun to play in foreign policy lately. The President no longer has a pre-Vietnam/Watergate flexibility and latitude in foreign affairs. Traditional majorities within Congress have also begun to dissipate. The overall result of this process has been to make foreign policy a much more complex and unwieldy process and to allow for the greater intrusion of domestic political factors, particularly “ethic politics,” into the decision-making process. There have been a number of recent examples, the most relevant here being the ability of the “Greek lobby”⁶ to maintain the arms embargo against Turkey for nearly four years.

5. In 1975 for instance Greece received 69.1 percent of its oil from OPEC countries while Turkey received 90.7 percent.

6. On the role and methods of the Greek lobby see Morton Kondracke, “The Greek Lobby,” *The New Republic*, April 29, 1978, pp. 14-16. Also Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, *The Power Peddlers* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1977), pp. 406-468.

—*Cyprus*. This problem has perhaps been most responsible for today's troubled situation on the southern flank. The beginning of the erosion of alliance harmony can be traced back to the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis. This revealed the frailty of apparently congruent interests, and it invoked the first major expressions of dissatisfaction with U.S. leadership. While U.S. intervention managed to prevent an outbreak of war, it did so at considerable cost to relations with both allies, each of which accused the United States of supporting the other.

For a while the issue remained quiescent, in part because the head of the Greek junta, George Papadopoulos, consciously sought to avoid becoming embroiled in a dispute which might lead to the collapse of his regime. His successor, Dimitri Ioannides, showed no such restraint. The Greek-inspired coup to overthrow Archbishop Makarios in July, 1974, touched off an international crisis that led to the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in Greece, the invasion and occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus by the Turks, and the withdrawal of Greece from the military structure of NATO.⁷ Moreover, it left a festering sore that has seriously eroded alliance solidarity and which remains a constant threat to regional stability. The U.S. arms embargo, rather than making the Turks more pliant as was its intention, hardened their resolve not to yield to pressure. While Bulent Ecevit, the current Prime Minister, has shown more flexibility than his predecessors, for domestic reasons he has been afraid to make too many concessions. At the same time, the death of Archbishop Makarios in August 1977 has removed from Cyprus the one man who had the prestige and stature to make the politically difficult decisions needed to help break the current stalemate. Thus, despite some occasional signs of progress, the Cyprus problem continues to be a major source of tension on the Southern flank.

—*The Aegean*. The re-eruption of the Cyprus dispute has exacerbated other issues between Greece and Turkey, notably those over national rights to the continental shelf and control of Aegean airspace. These issues are actually more serious and potentially more explosive than the Cyprus dispute because they directly affect the sovereignty and vital interests of both countries.⁸ The Greeks regard the Turkish demands for a share of the continental shelf as little more than a pre-

7. For a particularly good analysis of the crisis and the U.S. behind-the-scenes diplomacy, see Lawrence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1975, pp. 34-37.

8. The Aegean issue is extremely complex and no attempt to analyze the issue in detail can be undertaken here. For a balanced treatment that addresses both the political and the legal aspects see Barry Buzan, "A Sea of Troubles? Sources of Dispute in the New Ocean Regime," *Adelphi Paper 143* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), pp. 28-30.

text for the resurrection of Turkish claims to a number of the Aegean islands and as part of a more militant and expansionist Turkish policy since 1974. As a result, Athens has strengthened its defensive capabilities on a number of islands off the Turkish coast, despite the fact that such actions are prohibited by the treaties of Lausanne and Paris. While Ankara has been careful not to formally challenge Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, it has protested the violations and has sought to build up a special Aegean army.

The Greeks have insisted that the continental shelf issue must be resolved on the basis of past precedents of international law. The Turks, on the other hand, have argued that the case must be settled on the basis of equity and "special circumstances" existing in the Aegean. Talks between the two countries have gone on for several years without visible results—in large part because both Ecevit and Caramanlis fear the domestic political consequences of making concessions on important national issues. As long as the issues remain unresolved, there exists a danger of some minor incident escalating into a major clash—as almost happened in the summer of 1976 when Turkey sent an exploratory vessel into the disputed area of the Aegean.⁹

Taken together, these developments have led to a dangerous decline in security on the southern flank and a sharp deterioration of the U.S. position there. They underscore the need to give serious consideration to the region and to restore a sense of purpose and direction to U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is all the more important because internal developments within Greece and Turkey in the next few years could contribute to further regional instabilities. To better understand the security calculus, it is useful to take a closer look at developments in both countries since the 1974 Cyprus crisis.

Greece

In the more than four years since the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece has made impressive strides toward the restoration of parliamentary democracy and the restructuring of its foreign policy. Much of the credit for the smooth restoration of stability belongs to Greece's Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis. Despite the impressive achievements of the last four years, however, there remain a number of troubling uncertainties.

9. In fact, Andreas Papandreu, the leader of the Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), called upon the government to sink the *Sismik*, a move which would have almost certainly led to the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries.

One of these is the present state of U.S.-Greek relations. These are at their lowest ebb since the end of World War II. A strong current of anti-Americanism exists which puts objective constraints on the room for maneuver of any Greek government, even one as favorably disposed toward the United States as the Caramanlis government generally is. While such sentiment is strongest on the Left and among the youth, it is by no means confined to these groups. It is shared in varying degrees by groups which a decade ago could have been counted among the strongest supporters of the United States.

The deterioration of U.S.-Greek relations and the rise of anti-Americanism have two particular causes. The first is U.S. policy toward Greece under the junta. While there is little evidence that the United States actually engineered the 1967 coup, failure to make more energetic efforts to ensure the restoration of democracy served to undermine support for the United States, as well as for NATO. The Johnson Administration did suspend shipments of heavy arms to the Colonels, but spare parts and other military equipment continued to flow. Under the Nixon Administration, moreover, the United States resumed shipment of some heavy arms and even sought an expansion of the U.S. military presence by negotiating a "homeport" agreement providing for the stationing of a Navy carrier force near Athens. At the same time a number of high-ranking officials—including Vice President Agnew—visited Greece, and those visits were given great play in the controlled Greek press. All this contributed to the impression that the United States supported the junta—a view that is still widely entertained in Greece.

A second and perhaps even more direct cause of the deterioration in Greek-U.S. relations is U.S. policy during the 1974 Cyprus crisis—particularly what many Greeks regard as a U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey. The perception that the United States could and should have prevented the Turkish invasion of Cyprus led to the outbreak of virulent anti-Americanism, and made some sort of response by the newly installed Caramanlis government unavoidable. Under public pressure, Caramanlis was compelled to withdraw from the military structure of NATO and begin a reassessment of U.S. relations. One of the consequences of reassessment was the termination of the home-porting agreement which was widely regarded as an offensive symbol of U.S. support for the junta. Another outcome of the reassessment was the initiation of bilateral talks over the future of U.S. installations in Greece. These talks culminated in the initialling of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in July, 1977.

The new DCA is intended to modernize and replace the 1953 U.S.-Greek Defense Agreement and other bilateral security agreements. Valid for a period of four years, the new agreement allows continued use of four military installations—the

Hellenikon airbase in Athens, a communications station at New Makri near Marathon, a port and airfield at Souda Bay (Crete), and an electric listening post at Iraklion (Crete). In accordance with the new agreement, these facilities will be under Greek control. There are also provisions for the sharing of intelligence. Last, the United States agrees to provide Greece with 700 million dollars in assistance, part of which will be in grant aid.¹⁰

The Greek government has yet to sign the agreement, however, and at present it is unclear whether it will do so. The decision to lift the arms embargo to Turkey—however justified in terms of U.S. national interest—has complicated relations with Athens and is likely to lead to a further cooling of U.S.-Greek relations, at least in the short term. Moreover, domestically, it has served to strengthen the hand of Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and Caramanlis' main political rival, who has touted the move as further proof of America's pro-Turkish bias and the general bankruptcy of Caramanlis' policy. How much political capital Papandreou will be able to reap from the repeal of the embargo remains to be seen, but if the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (signed in March, 1976) is renegotiated, as now seems likely, then Caramanlis could find himself under considerable pressure to demand the renegotiation of the Greek DCA, and to impose tougher terms than are contained in the present draft.

As far as NATO is concerned, here, too, Greece's relationship remains uncertain. Greek withdrawal was more a trial separation than a divorce. While it recalled its representatives from the NATO command at Izmir, Athens has continued to maintain military attachés at a number of embassies in Europe and at NATO headquarters outside of Brussels—an indication of its basic desire to remain in the alliance. Moreover, recently, Greece has shown a willingness to undertake some limited cooperation with NATO. In September, 1977, for instance, Greece participated in NATO maneuvers for the first time since it formally withdrew from the military structure of the alliance in 1974.¹¹

Caramanlis has indicated that he would like to see Greece reintegrated into the military structure of the alliance and negotiations aimed at defining the terms of

10. See "Principles to Guide Future United States-Greek Defense Cooperation," *Department of State Press Release No. 180*, April 15, 1976.

11. Greek participation was limited to naval and air units and was made possible by the manipulation of the NATO command structure. Normally, exercises would have been directed out of NATO's regular headquarters in Izmir (Turkey). Instead, to assuage Greek sensitivity, they were directed from the regular headquarters in Naples; this put the exercises under the command of a British Admiral rather than a Turkish one.

Greece's eventual reintegration are currently underway.¹² However, Greece's ultimate relationship to NATO depends upon a number of factors. The first is the approval of Turkey, which to date has been unwilling to agree to the proposed terms of reintegration—in large part in order to put pressure on Greece to be more forthcoming on other bilateral issues. The second factor is Greece's domestic political situation. Anti-NATO sentiment remains strong and has to some extent even been intensified by the lifting of the embargo. Moreover, since the November, 1977 elections, the strength of the anti-NATO forces, (principally PASOK) has increased, narrowing Caramanlis' room for maneuver. Papandreou has sharply attacked Greece's ties to NATO on the grounds that they result in a "lose of national independence" and make Greece "subservient to an outside power center." As an alternative, he has advocated closer ties to the third world, the development of an indigenous arms industry along Yugoslav lines, and he has even suggested that Greece should consider acquiring nuclear weapons.¹³ To some extent, this may be more rhetorical than realistic, but if Papandreou's strength continues to grow, Greece's reintegration into NATO could become more difficult. And should he come to power in the near future—a possibility that should not be excluded—Greece would probably withdraw from NATO entirely.

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE

The reassessment of U.S.-Greek relations has been paralleled by an effort to expand and deepen Greece's ties to Europe. The keystone of Caramanlis' European policy has been the decision to press for full membership in the European Economic Community. Greece's application to join the EEC represents an historic opportunity to weave the country more tightly into the economic and political fabric of Europe. It thus not only has important political and economic implica-

12. The actual terms of the negotiations have not been revealed. However Greece is thought to be seeking a special status within the alliance in which its armed forces would come under NATO command only in case of major conflict. With this arrangement, a new allied headquarters under a Greek commander would be established in Larissa (central Greece) similar to the headquarters in Izmir. Each of the two headquarters would have a national commander and an American deputy commander. Structurally, they would be subordinate to NATO's headquarters in Naples. (CINCSOUTH) Part of this plan has already been implemented. At the end of June, 1978, a Turkish general took over command of the allied headquarters at Izmir, which until then had been under the control of a U.S. general.

13. Nicholas Gage, "Opposition Leader in Athens of Two Minds about U.S.," *New York Times*, April 12, 1978.

tions but significant security dimensions. These ties are likely to become even more important in the coming years, in view of the weakening of Greece's traditional ones to the United States.

Caramanlis would like to see Greece in the EEC by 1980. However, over the last two years, a number of developments have threatened to upset his timetable. First there has been a growth of the anti-EEC forces, principally PASOK. Secondly, the applications of Spain and Portugal have raised new doubts about the advisability of immediate expansion and have forced the Community to confront larger issues that it has so far avoided. Many members doubt whether the Community is ready to absorb the poorer Mediterranean countries without undertaking a number of structural reforms, particularly concerning agriculture. Some also worry about the costs that any transfer of resources will entail.

These fears have led some leaders to advocate a "global" approach by which Greece, Spain and Portugal would enter the EEC simultaneously.¹⁴ Such an approach, in their view, would allow the EEC—and the countries themselves—to undertake those reforms that would facilitate a smooth transition and minimize the dislocations caused by their entry. For its part, Greece has viewed talk of a global approach with concern because this would tie its fate to that of Spain and Portugal and could delay its entry for an undetermined period. Instead, Athens has argued that it should be treated as a "special case" due to its long-standing links with the EEC, which predate the applications of Spain and Portugal by some 15 years, and that any problems posed by its accession can be solved within the framework of existing institutions.¹⁵

Whatever the validity of the economic arguments for treating Greece, Spain, and Portugal as a package, these must be weighed against the potential political repercussions of such a policy. A prolonged delay on Greece's application could cause considerable disillusionment within Greece and spark a backlash that could ultimately strengthen the effect of the anti-EEC forces in the country. Moreover, if Greece's entry were to be delayed too long, it could possibly be nullified by political changes within Greece itself. Should Papandreou come to power before 1980—the earliest date when accession now seems possible—he might use the delay as a pretext to withdraw Greece's application altogether. Thus an historic

14. See in particular Wilhelm Haferkamp, "Chancen und Risiken der Zweiten EG-Erweiterung," *Europea Archiv* 19/1977, pp. 617-626.

15. See John Pezmazoglu, "Greece: A 'Special Case' for EC Membership," *European Community*, September-October 1977, pp. 7-9.

opportunity to bind Greece politically and economically to Europe—and thereby strengthen the prospects for stability in Southern Europe as a whole—would be lost.

Greece has also begun to expand relations with Eastern Europe, particularly its Balkan neighbors. Soon after coming to power, Caramanlis visited Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and in the last few years, cooperation with all the Balkan countries, particularly Yugoslavia, has intensified considerably. Greece was also the spearhead behind the convocation of the inter-Balkan conference held in Athens in January, 1976, to discuss ways of increasing cooperation in the fields of energy, transport and culture.¹⁶

To a large extent, Greece's more active policy in the Balkans has been aimed at gaining support for its position on Cyprus and outflanking Turkey. But it should also be seen as part of a general effort to diversify its foreign policy and reduce its dependence on the United States. Greece's intensified Balkan policy has given rise to speculation about a possible revival of the inter-war Balkan entente. However, given the very different socio-economic systems and political allegiances that exist today in the Balkans, there are objective limits to which the effort to forge closer ties can be pushed—a fact that has been underscored by Bulgaria's negative attitude toward a follow-up of the Athens Balkan conference. However, under Papandreou, the Balkan option might take on greater prominence. He has been favorably impressed by the manner in which both Tito and Ceausescu have managed to pursue a relatively independent policy, and he has consciously sought to develop contacts with both the Romanian and Yugoslav parties.¹⁷ Closer Balkan cooperation—possibly even in the field of defense¹⁸—would be a logical extension of his general foreign policy orientation.

After a period of stagnation—in large part due to Greek suspicion of Soviet

16. For a good discussion of the Athens Conference and its implications see Richard Clogg, "Balkan Kaleidoscope," *The World Today*, August, 1976, pp. 301-307.

17. Papandreou met with Tito in Yugoslavia in February, 1978, and in September a Yugoslav party delegation headed by Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Yugoslav Central Committee Presidium and the prime candidate to replace Tito as head of the Yugoslav party, visited Greece for an exchange of views with PASOK. See Papandreou's remarks in *Politika* (Belgrade), September 10, 1978, noting the similarity of views between the two parties' approach to Balkan cooperation.

18. Contact between Yugoslav and Greek defense officials has increased considerably in recent years. In June, 1978, Yugoslavia's defense minister, General Nikola Ljubicic, paid an official visit to Athens, while in October, 1976, Greek defense minister Evangelas Averoff visited Belgrade. These visits have been supplemented by other exchanges at a lower level. While Greece and Belgrade have denied that they are considering concluding a defense agreement, Papandreou has claimed that Yugoslavia is prepared to go into joint arms production with Greece. See Nicholas Gage, "Opposition Leader of Two Minds about U.S.," *New York Times*, April 12, 1978.

efforts to court Ankara—relations with Moscow have also begun to improve. In September, 1978, Greek Foreign Minister George Rallis paid an official visit to Moscow—the first visit by a Greek Foreign Minister since the establishment of relations between the two countries in 1924. In addition to providing for the establishment of a Soviet consulate in Salonika and a Greek consulate at the Black Sea port of Odessa, it is expected to lead to the expansion of cooperation in a number of fields, including culture, trade, and merchant shipping. In fact, the visit has already had one important result: in September, 1978, two Greek destroyers made an historic cruise through the Turkish straits to visit Odessa. This visit was reciprocated by a Soviet fleet visit to Piraeus, the traditional port-of-call in Athens for the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, in late October, 1978.¹⁹

The significance of the Rallis visit and other recent initiatives in Greek-Soviet relations should not be overdramatized, however. They simply represent a long-overdue attempt to normalize relations with Moscow, not to change Greece's basic foreign policy orientation.²⁰ Nonetheless, they underscore the degree to which Greece has begun to seek greater autonomy and scope for independent initiatives in its foreign relations in the last few years. Even more importantly, they bear witness to a more active interest in Greece by the Soviet Union. Encouraged by the strong showing of the Left in the last elections (November, 1977) and aware of the pressure for change within Greece, Moscow seems to be looking ahead to the "post-Caramanlis era" and the changes that this may bring.

DOMESTIC POLITICS: AFTER CARAMANLIS, WHAT?

This points to one of the key question marks surrounding Greece's evolution—the prospects for domestic instability and the effect this might have on both its internal development and foreign policy orientation. At first glance there would seem relatively little reason for concern. Since the dark days of the Cyprus crisis in the summer of 1974, Greece has achieved a degree of prosperity and political stability few would have thought possible several years ago. The army has returned to the barracks and been purged of the most recalcitrant supporters of the junta; inflation—which had been running at nearly 30 percent during the last years of military rule—has been drastically reduced; unemployment has been cut; the monarchy has been abolished, thus removing one of the most divisive issues in Greek politics; the foundations of parliamentary rule have been reestab-

19. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 14, 1978.

20. This was underscored by the visit to Athens of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua in September 1978, only a few days after Rallis returned from Moscow.

lished and freedom of speech restored; and the country's foreign policy has been reoriented along lines more in keeping with Greek national interests.

There are reasons for concern despite these many positive changes. Many of the basic problems that have hindered Greece's development in the past remain unresolved: the "parasitic" nature of the Greek economy, particularly the channeling of capital into non-productive sectors such as tourism, luxury real estate, and shipping; the underdevelopment of agriculture; the gross inequities of income; the growing gap between city and country; the backwardness of the educational system, which forces many of the best students to study abroad and often not return; and the "personalistic" nature of Greek party politics. In short, while outwardly Greece has succeeded in reestablishing parliamentary rule, many of the ingredients needed for it to function successfully in the long run remain absent.

Moreover, there are indications that the political stability that has characterized Greek politics over the last four years may be more fragile than initially thought. After the collapse of the junta, Caramanlis was widely perceived even by many on the Left as the man most capable of resolving Greece's crisis and preventing a return of the tanks. As a result, his New Democracy Party won an overwhelming majority in the November, 1974 elections. This seemed to belie fears that the Greek electorate had been radicalized by seven years of military rule. As the memories of the dictatorship have started to fade, however, dissatisfaction and pressure for change have mounted and Greek politics are beginning to display signs of growing polarization.

This growing pressure for change was reflected in particular in the results of the elections, which showed a marked erosion of support for Caramanlis' party. While the New Democracy won 43 percent of the popular vote and 174 seats in Parliament, this was far short of the unprecedented 54.37 percent of the vote and 220 seats which it had won in 1974. For the first time in postwar history the Left broke the 30 percent barrier, gaining 37 percent of the popular vote and swamping the center. At the same time the far Right also made a surprisingly strong showing. The National Rally, a party set up by former Prime Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos only two months before the elections, won nearly seven percent of the vote—a significant gain which suggests growing dissatisfaction on the Right from elements that have traditionally supported Caramanlis.²¹

On the Left, the pro-Moscow Communist Party, KKE (Exterior), which was legalized soon after Caramanlis came to power, received 9.36 percent of the vote—

21. A Rightist party that ran in 1974, the National Democratic Union, received only one percent of the votes and no seats in Parliament.

a sizeable increase over its showing in the 1974 election. The KKE has unabashedly hewed the Soviet line, opposing Greece's entry into the EEC, participation in NATO in any form, and any U.S. presence in Greece. Domestically it has called for an extensive program of nationalization. However, while the KKE has considerable support, among Greek students, most of its adherents are old-line Stalinists, and unless it changes its orientation, the KKE is not likely to increase its strength significantly.

Surprisingly, the Communist Party of the Interior, a "Eurocommunist" party with an orientation similar to that of the Italian Communist Party, did rather poorly. The leftist alliance, of which the Interior was a part, managed to gain just under 3 percent of the vote. Programatically, the Interior has opposed Greece's membership in NATO and the retention of U.S. bases on Greek soil, but it has supported Greek accession to the EEC. While it has the support of a number of Greece's leading intellectuals, the party has been hindered by lack of money and poor organization, and its poor showing in the 1977 elections has diminished its chances of playing a major role in Greek politics in the near future.

By far the most significant result of the elections was the strong showing of Papandreou's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Papandreou's party captured 25 percent of the vote against only 13.5 percent in 1974 and increased its representation in Parliament from 13 seats to 93, displacing the Center Union (EDIK)—which received just under 12 percent of the vote (against slightly over 20 percent in 1974)—as the second strongest party. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that PASOK did well in rural areas that have been traditionally conservative strongholds.

PASOK's success in the November, 1977 elections established it as the most important opposition party in Greece today. An outgrowth of the resistance movement PAK (Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement), founded by Papandreou while in exile, PASOK embodies a variety of elements ranging from Swedish social democracy to the vague radicalism of third world national liberation movements. Although it calls itself Socialist and has sought ties with other Socialist parties, particularly the French, it actually has more in common with many of the radical populist parties of Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s. It draws its support primarily from the lower middle class—the small shopkeepers, peasants, and lower echelon civil servants and white collar workers. PASOK also has been able to attract a large number of young, well-educated technocrats, many of whom were radicalized by seven years of military dictatorship and favor fundamental structural change. While it is one of the few parties besides the KKE with a real grass roots organization and structure, it remains essentially a "per-

sonalistic" party, and Papandreou has shown little tolerance for internal dissent or deviation.

On the domestic front, PASOK has advocated a program of broad social and economic change, including the "socialization" of basic areas of the economy such as energy, banks, and transport. In foreign policy it has called for a number of sweeping changes.²² Papandreou has opposed Greece's planned accession to the EEC, and advocated instead a loose association along the lines of the Norwegian model. In relations with Turkey he has taken an equally uncompromising stand. He denounced the meeting between Ecevit and Caramanlis in March, 1978, claiming that it resulted in unilateral concessions on the Greek side, and he proposed the extension of the Greek territorial waters from six to twelve miles—a move which, while justified under international law, would be likely to exacerbate relations with Ankara and confirm Turkish suspicions that Greece was trying to turn the Aegean into a "Greek lake." Moreover, during the tension over the Turkish dispatch of an exploratory vessel, the *Sismik I*, into the disputed area of the Aegean in the summer of 1976, Papandreou suggested that the Greek government should respond by sinking the ship, which certainly would have led to war.

The degree to which Papandreou will be able to increase his support over the next several years is uncertain. However, the results of the 1977 elections have produced a more fluid political situation. Caramanlis' room for maneuver has been narrowed, and in the future he is likely to face increasing criticism both from the right and the left. The election results point to a trend that could have long-term implications for Greece's internal and external policy. They suggest that the consensus that has existed on a number of important domestic and foreign policy issues since the end of World War II is breaking down.²³

This trend is all the more unsettling because of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the New Democracy. The problem is that the New Democracy is a typical "clientelistic" party, a coalition of notables held together more by the strength of Caramanlis' own personality than by any common ideology or political outlook. Caramanlis is 72, however, and there are signs that after four trying

22. For a good synopsis of PASOK's platform and Papandreou's views see "Socialist Transformation," PASOK, No. 2 (Athens: September 1977) and "Foreign Policy," PASOK No. 4 (Athens: September 1977), particularly Papandreou's position paper prepared for the Malta Conference of Socialist Parties of the Mediterranean, June 1977, "Toward a Liberated and Socialist Mediterranean," in *Ibid*, pp. 13-24.

23. Richard Clogg, "Greece: the End of Consensus Politics," *The World Today*, May, 1978, pp. 184-191.

years he is beginning to tire. He apparently would like to relinquish the post of Prime Minister once many of his major goals—accession to the EEC, reintegration of Greece into NATO, and normalization of relations with the United States—have been achieved. It is widely believed that when the current term of President Tsatsos runs out, Caramanlis will step up to that office.

The key question therefore is: After Caramanlis, what? While over the last year Caramanlis has moved to broaden the base of his party by bringing into the cabinet a number of prominent political figures associated with the Center such as Constantine Mitsotakis, this has done little to solidify the party or prepare it for Caramanlis' eventual departure. At present there is no chosen successor—though two men, Evangelos Averoff, the current Defense Minister, and George Rallis, the Foreign Minister, seem the most likely contenders for Caramanlis' mantel. Of the two, Averoff has the best chance, particularly because he has the trust of the army. Yet neither Averoff nor Rallis has the prestige and authority enjoyed by Caramanlis; there is a strong possibility that the New Democracy could split into a number of warring factions after Caramanlis departs. Such a situation could lead to the type of political maneuvering and instability which precipitated the 1967 coup.

To be sure, much has changed in the last twelve years. The army's image has been tarnished by its mismanagement of affairs during the dictatorship. However, the norm of civilian supremacy is not as firmly rooted in the Greek officer corps as it is elsewhere in Western Europe. The armed forces have intervened in Greek politics seven times in this century, and despite the junta experience they continue to regard themselves as the "custodian of the nation" and symbol of national unity. If there were a precipitous decline in internal security—especially if it coincided with a deterioration of relations with Turkey—the military could be provoked to intervene. Thus, while the situation in Greece now appears stable, developments in the coming years bear watching.

Turkey

Sitting astride the Dardanelles, Turkey occupies a key strategic position in the Mediterranean. Although a Moslem country with over 96 percent of its territory in Asia, Turkey has been engaged in a process of Westernization for almost one hundred years. The real turning point in this process, however, was the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Kemal Ataturk, which marked the beginning of a systematic attempt to transform Turkey into a Western state. Since then, Turkey has evolved from a one-party authoritarian state into a parliamentary democracy. At the same time, through its membership in NATO, its ties to the EEC, and

its participation in the Council of Europe, Turkey has manifested a strong commitment to the West in its foreign relations.

Today Turkey is passing through one of the most difficult periods in its post-war history. Internally, it has been wracked by a crisis which has severely tested its social order and democratic institutions. Externally, there has been growing Turkish disillusionment with its Western ties—especially the United States—and calls for a reorientation of the country's foreign policy.

These calls have their origin in a number of different developments. The first is the emergence of detente. The second is the renewal of tension with Greece, which has shifted the sense of imminent threat to the East and made some reallocation of Ankara's defense forces seem more compelling. A third factor has been the recent decline in the Turkish economy, which has made it increasingly difficult for Turkey to sustain a large defense structure—particularly one oriented against a Soviet threat that is regarded as increasingly unreal. A fourth factor has been Turkey's growing sense of isolation with in its relations the European Economic Community, which has been exacerbated by Greece's application to join the EEC.²⁴

Last, and perhaps most important, has been the increasing strain in relations with the United States and a growing uncertainty about the reliability of the United States as a major ally. The origin of the deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations can be traced back to the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis in which U.S. intervention was highly resented. The sharp tone of President Johnson's famous letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu and particularly the suggestion that, the U.S. might not come to the aid of Turkey in the event of a Soviet attack came as a profound shock.²⁵ One of the most important consequences of the Turks' ensuing foreign policy reevaluation was a reexamination of bilateral defense arrangements. This resulted in the signing of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement in July, 1969, giving the Turkish government more control over indigenous U.S. bases. Another consequence was the initiation of efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. A third was an attempt to expand relations with the Arab world.

During the late sixties and early seventies relations were further strained by a host of other issues: U.S. policy toward Vietnam; port visits of the Sixth Fleet; differences over the pace and methods of modernizing the Turkish armed forces;

24. See Bulent Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies," *Survival*, September-October, 1978, pp. 203-208.

25. For the text of the Johnson letter and Inonu's reply see *Middle Eastern Journal*, Summer 1966, pp. 386-393.

the gradual reduction of U.S. economic assistance; the progressive reluctance of the U.S. Congress to fund military aid; and U.S. efforts to curtail Turkish poppy cultivation in order to reduce the drug abuse problem in the United States. To this must be added other more general factors such as the growth of extremism and the growing polarization of Turkish politics, which finally precipitated the intervention of the military in 1971.²⁶

The most serious cause of friction has been the arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the U.S. Congress in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The embargo was regarded by Turkey as an unjustified slap at a loyal ally which over the years had contributed heavily to collective defense. In particular, it raised further questions in the minds of many Turks about U.S. reliability. In essence, Turkish security was seen as being held hostage to the vagaries and peculiarities of U.S. domestic politics.

The overall impact of the embargo was a serious strain on U.S.-Turkish relations and confirmation of the belief that Turkey had to reduce its dependency on the United States. Over the last few years there has been a growth in the sentiment that Turkey should pursue a more "multi-faceted" foreign policy, which would take into greater consideration Turkey's unique geographic position and historic role as a bridge between East and West.²⁷ This attitude draws on traditions strongly rooted in Ataturk's foreign policy and is widely held within the Republican People's Party (RPP, the current governing party led by Bulent Ecevit, which came to power in January, 1978). It has been made all the more compelling by Turkey's recent economic problems.

It is against this background that recent and future developments in Turkish foreign policy should be viewed. While the lifting of the embargo has removed the most important irritant in U.S.-Turkish relations, it nevertheless seems likely that some adjustments in Turkey's foreign and defense posture will occur. Since January, 1978, Ecevit has stressed the need for a new "National Defense Concept," and representatives from the Defense and Foreign Ministries, the General Staff, and the economic planning organization are currently working on the outlines of such a scheme.

This is not to suggest that Turkey intends to withdraw from NATO. Ecevit has

26. For a good discussion of these issues and their impact on U.S.-Turkish relations see George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance* (Washington, D.C. and Stanford, California: American Enterprise Institute and Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1972), pp. 125-147.

27. See in particular the article by Observer, "A Multi-faceted Foreign Policy as a New Approach," *Dis Politika* (Foreign Policy), Volume 6, Nos. 3-4, June, 1977, pp. 7-17. The author was reputed to be a high official in the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

reiterated the importance he attaches to Turkey's membership. However, it does seem likely that Turkey will reduce its manpower commitment and shift some of its forces away from the Soviet-Turkish border to areas more contiguous to Greece. At the same time, it will probably intensify its efforts to develop an indigenous arms industry and diversify its source of military hardware.

Lastly, Ankara may also seek changes in its bilateral military relationship with the United States. Exactly what this will entail is difficult to predict. To date, Turkey has allowed four of the most important U.S. military installations, closed in July, 1975, to be reopened.²⁸ However, these are on an interim status pending an overall review of U.S.-Turkish military ties, and it is likely that Ankara will insist on a renegotiation of the defense cooperation agreement (DCA) signed in March, 1976 but never ratified by the U.S. Congress.²⁹ In fact, Ankara may seek to use the U.S. installations as a bargaining chip to induce the United States to increase its economic and military assistance. Given the current mood in Congress and its general antipathy toward bilateral aid, such pressure could provoke new tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations. Moreover, there remain differences of approach over military issues. For instance, in looking at Turkey's military needs, the United States is likely to emphasize the acquisition of defensive weapons that will enhance Turkey's ability to defend the three-hundred mile border with the Soviet Union rather than some of the more expensive and prestigious offensive weapons currently desired by the Turkish military. Turkey is also concerned about the U.S. approach to the Multi-lateral Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna, where it is an observer, and would like to see the present negotiating area expanded to include all NATO countries. Thus, while the embargo has removed the most important obstacle to an improvement in U.S.-Turkish ties, relations in coming years are hardly likely to be problem-free.

WESTERN EUROPE, NATO AND THE EEC

The recent strains in U.S.-Turkish relations have lent greater importance to Turkey's ties to Western Europe. Turkey has already signalled its interest in in-

28. These installations are intelligence-gathering bases at Sinop on the Black Sea Coast, Diyadarkir in Eastern Turkey, Belbasi near Ankara, and a navigation station at Kargabrun, north of the Marmara Sea. For a discussion of the functions of these bases and their importance to the overall U.S. intelligence-gathering effort, see *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean*, House Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, first session, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977) March 27, 1977, pp. 37-47.

29. The Agreement provided for greater Turkish control over the installations and expressly prohibited their use for any purpose not authorized by the Turkish government. It also agreed to provide \$1 billion in loans, grants and credits over a four-year period.

creased European cooperation regarding weapons manufacture, and it clearly hopes that some members of NATO will provide greater financial and military assistance. Indeed, the willingness of the West to be responsive to Turkey's economic plight could significantly influence its future relationship to NATO, as well as the West as whole. The European response has been less than hoped for—a fact that has increased Ankara's sense of isolation and abandonment.

At the same time, Turkey's relations with the EEC have become more contentious. In part, the difficulties originated in Turkey's association with the EEC in the early sixties and in the assumptions that surrounded Ankara's application. The application was motivated more by political considerations than economic realities (i.e., Greece's decision to apply to the EEC). A related factor was Turkey's desire to draw closer to the West as the cold war persisted. Turkey's association with the EEC was regarded therefore as a supplement to Ankara's ties with NATO.³⁰ While the EEC had reservations about Turkey's ability to weather stiff economic competition, it felt a certain obligation to be evenhanded and develop relations in tandem with Greece.

The original terms of the 1963 association have not proven capable of preparing the Turkish economy for full integration.³¹ In recent years difficulties have intensified between the EEC and Turkey, leading to bitterness and misunderstandings. There are at least four prime reasons. First, Turkey's growing balance of payments deficit with the EEC has risen from 86.1 million in 1970 to 1.7 billion U.S. dollars in 1975. Second, the implementation of the EEC's Mediterranean policy—particularly the negotiation of preferential trade agreements with virtually all Mediterranean countries—has reduced the value of agricultural concessions granted to Turkey. Third, the economic recession in Europe led to pressure on the part of some EEC members, especially West Germany, to halt the flow of emigrant workers. The result of this policy was an increase in unemployment in Turkey, which added to Turkey's already formidable economic problems. The drop in remittances from Turkish workers abroad threatened one of the main sources of revenue used by Ankara to offset its balance of payments deficit. The recession also made many EEC countries more reluctant regarding the amount of financial

30. See Mehmet Ali Birand, "Turkey and the European Community," *The World Today*, February, 1978, p. 52-61.

31. The association agreement signed in Ankara on September 12, 1963 gave Turkey privileged access to the EEC markets and special financial assistance as well as promising special employment opportunities for Turkish workers within the EEC. The agreement also set out detailed schedules for the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of trade barriers, which led to a full customs union. The goal of these measures was explicitly stated as full membership within the EEC.

assistance they were willing to channel to Turkey. A fourth reason was Greece's application to join the EEC, which sparked new fears that Athens would use its membership to block Ankara's entry into the EEC and to generally thwart Turkey's interests. Such feelings were to some extent reinforced by the general lack of sympathy which the Community displayed for Turkey's position on Cyprus, despite its official position of impartiality, and the skillful manner in which Caramanlis has sought to intensify Greece's ties to Europe since 1974.

All these reasons in one way or another have contributed to the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the EEC and have given rise to growing doubts in Turkey regarding the value of EEC ties. The growth of anti-EEC sentiment has manifested itself most clearly within the National Salvation Party (NSP), which until the formation of the Ecevit government in January, 1978, had been the lynchpin of every governing coalition since 1973. Motivated by Islamic ideas and a desire to see Turkey return to its former greatness, the NSP advocates increasing ties with the Arab world and is opposed to entry in the EEC, arguing among other things that the Arab world provides a better market for Turkish industrial goods than does industrialized Europe. The two leading parties, the Justice Party (JP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP), have generally favored membership. However, the RPP has shown some reservations about the effect that a customs union might have on state planning, and some Turkish commentators have recently suggested that membership in the EEC is incompatible with the Turkish Constitution.³² Even the Justice Party, which is the most favorably disposed toward the EEC, has pressed for readjustments to the Association treaty in order to offset the impact of recent changes in EEC policy.

These questions are likely to be raised with increasing intensity in the coming years as Greece comes closer to full membership, and, unless some compromise is worked out, they could become a source of conflict with the EEC in the future. In Turkish eyes, the Community's willingness to accommodate its demands could well become the acid test of the Community's attitude toward Turkey generally. Thus the issue is an explosive one. As Mehmet Ali Birand has recently noted: "If Turkey is not allowed some sort of presence in the context of the political mechanism of the Community, it will be assumed that Europe has made its choice and the repercussions could be incalculable."³³ Taken together with the

32. See Udo Steinbach, "Auf dem Wege nach Europa? Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft durchlaufen eine Kritische Phase," *Orient* 1/77, pp. 79-101; also Sefik Alp Bahadır, "Europa und die Türkei, Eine Oekonomische Studie," *Die Dritte Welt*, Sonderheft 1975, pp. 154-185.

33. Birand, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

difficult economic problems related to Turkey's integration into the Community, a failure to work out some *modus vivendi* could intensify doubts—already prevalent in some circles—about the value of Turkey's association with the Community and the West in general.

THE SOVIET OPTION

Turkey's recent troubles with the West have given rise to speculation about a possible "Soviet Option." Good Soviet relations were a cornerstone of Ataturk's foreign policy—a fact which Moscow constantly reminds the Turks. Relations between the two countries deteriorated at the end of World War II as a result of Stalin's pressure for a revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention and his attempt to raise claims against the Turkish regions of Kars and Ardahan. In the wake of the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis, however, Ankara embarked upon a policy of rapprochement with Moscow. This culminated in a visit to Moscow by Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in October, 1967.

In the decade since Demirel's historic visit, relations have improved, particularly in the economic field. Under an economic agreement signed in March, 1967, the Soviet Union agreed to aid Turkey in the construction of a number of major projects including an iron and steel mill at Iskenderun, a large oil refinery at Izmir and a major aluminum plant at Seydisehir as well as a dam and glass factory. In recent years, Soviet economic assistance for these projects has been expanded through a series of additional agreements. For instance, in July, 1975 a \$700 million credit deal—the largest ever between the two countries—was signed. In it, the Soviet Union agreed to supply parts and machinery for the expansion of the steel mill at Iskenderun and also for other projects.³⁴ During Foreign Minister Caglayangil's visit to Moscow in March, 1977 Turkey signed an economic agreement in which Moscow pledged a 1.2 billion dollar loan.³⁵

Today, some 11 major projects have been or are being built with Soviet aid. Most are examples of "co-production" in which the Soviet economic assistance is repaid with finished projects from the plants themselves or with Turkish exports. The steel mill at Iskenderun is one of Moscow's largest aid projects in the third world. In fact, in 1975, Turkey received more than one half of all Soviet aid given in that year³⁶—a good indication of the importance which Moscow attaches to improving relations with Ankara.

34. Reuters, July 9, 1975.

35. Tass, March 18, 1977.

36. Christopher Wren, *New York Times*, August 20, 1976.

Moreover, relations in the political/military sphere have also shown signs of improvement. In April, 1978, for instance, Soviet Chief of Staff Nikolai Orgakov paid an official visit to Turkey—the first visit of a senior Soviet military official to Turkey since the visit of Marshall Kliment Voroshilov in 1933—and two months later Ecevit made a much publicized trip to Moscow where he signed a “document on friendly relations and cooperation” with Moscow. While the document essentially reiterated many of the basic principles of the Helsinki Agreement, and fell considerably short of Moscow’s main goal of a non-aggression pact, the fact that Turkey was willing to sign such a document underscores the changed climate of relations in recent years.

Moreover, even if Moscow has not succeeded in attaining its main objective—weaning Turkey away from NATO—its courtship of Ankara has met with some success. In July, 1976, the Soviet aircraft carrier *Kiev* entered the Mediterranean, despite the fact that the passage of aircraft carriers is prohibited by the Montreux Convention, which both Turkey and the Soviet Union signed. The Turkish government accepted the Soviet description of the *Kiev* as an “anti-submarine cruiser,” although the *Kiev* mounts a large scale flight deck and carries helicopters and 30 YAK-36 vertical short take-off and landing (V-STOL) jet aircraft. The Turkish willingness to accept the Soviet classification of the *Kiev* was generally considered to reflect a desire on Turkey’s part to avoid any controversy with the Soviet Union, and it is an important example of the manner in which Moscow has been able to cash-in on the improvement in relations.³⁷

One should not, of course, exaggerate the degree of improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations nor its implications. At present, Turkey is primarily interested in tapping Moscow’s economic potential and it remains wary of the Soviet Union’s long-term political intentions. Turkey has fought some 13 wars with the Soviet Union, and for most Turks, especially those within the higher echelons of the military, Moscow is still regarded as the major threat to Turkish security. Yet Turkey’s policy options are narrowing. If it cannot obtain the weapons it needs to modernize its army to keep pace with the augmentation and modernization of Soviet forces stationed across the Turkish border in the Caucasus, then some accommodation with Moscow is almost certain to occur.

How far this process of rapprochement will proceed will depend upon the course of relations with the West, especially with the United States. While no

37. For a good discussion of the *Kiev* incident and its strategic implications, see Barry Buzan, “The Status and Future of the Montreux Convention,” *Survival*, November-December, 1976, pp. 242-247.

dramatic shift in Turkish policy is likely in the near future, the long-term prospects are less certain. There are elements within the RPP, not to mention the radical Left, which favor closer relations with Moscow and which no longer regard the Soviet Union as a particular threat. At present their influence is not great, but it could increase and find greater resonance if U.S. relations deteriorate further and if the present sense of bitterness and isolation continues to grow.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THIRD WORLD OPTION

In the last few years Turkey has also undertaken a conscious effort to expand ties with the third world. Ankara applied for observer status at the Sixth Conference of the Nonaligned, held in Colombo (Sri Lanka) in August, 1976, (its application was opposed by India, however) and plans to apply for guest status at the meeting of foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries next year. Turkey has also been courting the Group of 77, and in August, 1978 played host to a conference on the New International Economic Order.

The area in which this trend has been most clearly manifested, however, is the Middle East. Historically and geographically, Turkey has had strong ties to the Middle East, and in recent years there has been a growing feeling that Turkey ought to play a greater role in the region.³⁸ This belief has been given greater impetus by the new status of the Middle Eastern countries since the energy crisis, and by Turkey's mounting economic difficulties. Turkey is heavily dependent on outside oil and it was hard hit by the quadrupling 1973 prices.³⁹ As a consequence, Turkey has sought to strengthen its relations with Iran and Pakistan within the framework of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), the economic-cultural arm of CENTO. These efforts have met with only moderate success.⁴⁰ Turkey has also sought to increase cooperation with Libya and Iraq, from whom it imports over 40 percent of its oil. Ankara's main interest has been in obtaining credits to finance its increasing oil imports.

Politically, Turkey's interest in improved relations in the Middle East has

38. As Prime Minister Ecevit recently noted: "Historically and geographically Turkey is primarily a Balkan, Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean country. This certainly does not exclude the fact that Turkey is also a member of the community of Europe, but our starting point is the Balkan area, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore we should give greater emphasis to these historical and geographical realities." Bulent Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies," *Survival*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

39. In 1977, for instance, Turkey's expenditure for the import of oil was \$1.5 billion—nearly equal to the total volume of its exports (\$1.7 billion).

40. See Rolf-Roger Hoepfner, "The Future Course of the RCD—Iran, Turkey, Pakistan," *Aussenpolitik*, 2/77, pp. 227-236.

been prompted by a desire to obtain Arab backing for its position in regard to Cyprus, and since 1974 Ankara has increasingly voted with the Arab states against Israel. To some extent, Turkey's efforts to expand relations with the countries of the Middle East have also been influenced by religious and cultural ties. While constitutionally Turkey is a secular state, Islam still plays an important role in Turkish society, especially in the rural areas which were less directly affected by Atatürk's reforms.⁴¹ During the period when the Muslim fundamentalist National Salvation Party was a key member of the ruling coalition (1973-77), its leader Necmettin Erbakan used his influence to push for increased contacts with the Arab world. The convocation of the Seventh Conference of the Islamic Foreign Ministers in Istanbul in May, 1976, was an important reflection of this policy.

Yet there are objective limits to how far this policy can be pushed. Turkey's Arab opening has failed to bring the hoped for support for Ankara's position on Cyprus. Nor have any of the Middle Eastern countries (with the exception of Libya) shown a strong willingness to help bail Turkey out of its financial difficulties. Moreover, there are historical and psychological factors that inhibit a significant expansion of Turkish ties to the countries of the Middle East. As a non-Arabic state and a former colonial power, Turkey is still regarded with considerable suspicion, in some cases antipathy, by many of the countries in the area. Thus, while Turkey is likely to continue to try to expand its relations with the Arab countries, these ties are hardly likely to develop to the point where they could offer a substitute for Turkey's ties to the West.

TURKEY'S DOMESTIC CRISIS

The deterioration of Turkey's relations with the West, particularly with the United States, is more unsettling because it has coincided with and to some extent has been given impetus by growing domestic tensions. Today, in fact, Turkey faces one of the most serious domestic crises in its modern history. Since the late 1960s there has been an increasing polarization of Turkish political life which has until recently hindered the formation of a stable and effective government, capable of resolving Turkey's mounting internal and external problems. This paralysis and polarization in national politics has been accompanied by an alarming rise in domestic violence, much of which has been precipitated by clashes

41. For an insightful discussion of the revitalization of Islam in Turkish life see Arnold Hottinger, "Kemal Atatürk's Heritage," *Encounter*, February, 1977, pp. 75-81.

between Right-wing and Left-wing students. In 1977, more than 250 persons were killed in acts of political violence and by the end of 1978, the death toll had risen to nearly 1000, provoking the introduction of martial law in thirteen provinces. The violence has important cultural as well as political roots, with various youth groups mobilized in defense of antagonistic traditions. Moreover, in some areas, such as Eastern Anatolia, which is heavily populated by Kurds, the violence has also reflected the emergence of traditional and ethnic conflicts.

The domestic violence and growth of extremism has been reinforced by a sharp deterioration in Turkey's economy. This economic crisis has its roots in a number of developments: the reduction in U.S. aid and the shift of U.S. policy away from bilateral to multilateral funding; the recession in Europe after 1973 which caused a decline in remittances from Turkish workers abroad; the Cyprus crisis,⁴² which resulted in large defense outlays and the diversion of scarce resources to the military sector;⁴³ and most importantly, the quadrupling of oil prices since 1973 which led to a sharp rise in Turkey's trade deficit (about \$3 billion in 1977). As a result of these dislocations, inflation has been running about 25 percent to 30 percent a year since 1974 and unemployment has reached 2 million out of a work force of 16 million. Since coming to power in January, 1978, the new government, headed by Bülent Ecevit, has taken a number of measures designed to bolster the economy—including a devaluation of the Turkish lira of 30 percent against the dollar—and has actively sought financial assistance from organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, despite these measures, the fundamental problems facing Turkey in recent times are likely to continue to pose major obstacles to economic growth in the future. The population (presently about 42 million) is increasing by almost 3 percent per year and is expected to double by the year 2000. Without a drastic reduction in the birth rate, it will be impossible for Turkey to achieve rapid economic development.

This is not to suggest that Turkey's problems are insoluble. But it does highlight the real difficulties the country is likely to face in the coming years and the dangers these pose for domestic stability. If these problems are not faced squarely, domestic violence is likely to continue to mount—and with it the political po-

42. It has been estimated that the first year of Turkey's military presence in Cyprus entailed an expenditure of about TL 35 billion or about 2.5 billion dollars—the equivalent of 40 percent of the national budget for that year.

43. Turkish defense expenditures as a percentage of government spending have been 26.6 percent (1975), 29.4 percent (1976), and 21.1 percent (1977). All figures from *The Military Balance, 1977-78* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 83.

tency of extremist groups. Over the long run, this could erode support for Turkey's democratic institutions and undercut further the country's ties to the West.

Toward a New Policy Toward the Southern Flank

Five years after eruption of the Cyprus dispute the southern flank remains in crisis. Without immediate action the situation is likely to worsen. Yet, despite the great concern over the fissures on the southern flank, there is very little evidence that the problems are receiving the systematic attention and the creative thinking they deserve. Many of the concepts and axioms which lay at the heart of the U.S. approach to the region are carryovers from the late 1940s and 1950s. Today they are no longer an adequate basis for policy toward a region that is undergoing rapid economic and political change.

In the complex and pluralistic milieu of the late 1970s and 1980s, alarmism about the growing Soviet threat is unlikely to be an effective source of policy. This is not to imply that the Soviet threat no longer exists. It does; but today the threat is less immediate and less direct. Most importantly, it is no longer regarded by Greece and Turkey as the main source of their insecurity. An effective policy toward the region must address itself to the real sources of insecurity, and at the same time attempt to reestablish a basis for genuine cooperation which will blunt any attempt by the Soviet Union to exploit the instabilities, both real and latent, on the southern flank. This is all the more important because of the potential for instability elsewhere in southern Europe—particularly in post-Tito Yugoslavia.⁴⁴

The problem of containing Soviet power in the eastern Mediterranean must be seen in a broader context—as part of the larger problem of managing political change. In the coming years, both Greece and Turkey are likely to seek greater autonomy in their foreign relations, reducing to some extent their former dependence on the United States. The United States can hardly prevent this. Nor should it try to. The most likely result of such a policy would be to alienate further Greece and Turkey, as well as weaken their ties to the West. The United States should adopt instead a flexible approach. It should recognize that such efforts are a part of a natural attempt to (belatedly) adapt themselves to a changing international environment, and it should seek to channel and guide these efforts in

44. For a fuller discussion of this question and its implications for regional and international stability see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Balkan Security," *Adelphi Paper* Nr. 135 (London: the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer, 1977).

directions which enhance the security of both countries without undermining the foundations of the alliance as a whole.

The lifting of the embargo offers the chance to set U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey on a new footing and to reestablish a sense of purpose in our policy toward both countries, a sense which has been sadly lacking in recent years. What is needed is a new approach that balances the need for military cohesion with the impulse toward political change. Today more than ever, Greece and Turkey must feel that they are valued members of a wider community of shared goals and ideals which includes—but extends beyond—the narrow boundaries of common defense. Only under such circumstances will both be willing to contribute to the collective defense, and only under such conditions will the United States be in a position to begin to repair the fissures on the southern flank and reestablish genuinely cooperative and harmonious relations with both allies.

At the same time, the United States, in concert with its west European allies, should intensify its efforts to get Greece and Turkey to resolve their differences through negotiations. Given the complexity of the issues and the differing perceptions on each side, this will not be easy. However, recent experience has underscored the fact that progress toward resolution of such intractable disputes cannot be obtained through sporadic discussions, but requires a commitment to intensive and sustained negotiations. This is the lesson of Camp David.

The starting point of such efforts should be Cyprus. The Cyprus issue may prove more amenable to such a process than the Aegean because it involves both protagonists less directly. Progress toward a settlement on Cyprus would create a better psychological atmosphere for the resolution of other bilateral issues and could pave the way for a gradual improvement of political relations between both countries.

None of these measures in and of itself is likely to solve all the outstanding problems on the Southern Flank. However, taken together they would be indicative of a positive new direction in U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and could help to restore a greater degree of stability in an area which in the future could pose a growing threat to European security and Alliance cohesion.

Iranian Defense Expenditures and the Social Crisis

Theodore H. Moran

In 1972 President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, looking at Iran as the second largest oil exporter in the world and a rock of stability in a volatile region of increasing importance to the United States, made the decision that whatever the Shah wanted in terms of military armaments (of a non-strategic nature) he could have. The wisdom of that policy was challenged in the Carter Administration, but at the end of two years the outcome of the debate within the Administration about how (if at all) the U.S.-Iranian relationship should be reshaped had still not been decided when the social explosion in Iran took Washington by surprise.

The debate focused on an Iran whose fundamental characteristics until the fall of 1978 seemed fixed and familiar: a country that was strong, proud, confident, and yet militaristic, repressive, and self-centered; a price hawk on oil, but a dependable supplier to the United States and Israel; a paranoid and interventionist around the Gulf, but a supporter of conservative pro-Western regimes. For more than a decade both critics and admirers of the Shah's regime tended to take the benefits of a stable, self-confident Iran for granted; as guarantor of the regional status quo and counterpoise to emerging radical regimes; as secure supplier of oil to all parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict and invisible but palpable presence behind the governments that favored a moderate solution to Middle East problems; as dampener of Soviet ambitions and as dependable ally of Europe and Japan as well as of the United States on most geopolitical issues.

But the strains that built up within Iranian society suddenly turned the country's role from a constant into a variable, from a factor of certainty to an element of extreme uncertainty. In the worst case, of course, those strains might lead to a Qadafi regime with radical orientation (whose arms and oil might fall into the hands of the Soviets) or a traditionalist regime that tried to turn back the clock of modernization. Of more immediate concern are the growing doubts about the Shah's ability (or the ability of *any* military, civilian, or religious successor) to govern coherently at home or to project a consistent policy abroad. In this setting, the broad goal of decompressing domestic tensions in Iran must take precedence in shaping all aspects of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, including U.S.-Iranian military relations.

Over the past two years, the structure of the debate about how to fashion our

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military relationship with Iran has in fact helped deflect critical thought about the potential for instability within Iranian society. While the debate lacked neither richness nor intensity, the arguments within the Administration fell into a comfortable dichotomy, pitting those who urged restraint in U.S. arms sales against those who saw an overriding need for a militarily strong Iran. One side proposed that we give priority to President Carter's injunction (PD-13) that we not be the first to introduce new kinds or levels of sophisticated weapons into a region; the other side argued that the Persian Gulf was so important and potentially so unstable that the Shah should be given what he needed to cope with almost any kind of threat in the region.

The first side stressed our commitment to human rights and questioned our close military association with a regime as repressive as the Shah's; the second side asked what was the alternative to the Shah, and pointed to his program of liberalization in the midst of broad social change as evidence that his record on human rights was steadily improving. Those who urged restraint feared that our arms sales would merely fuel the arms race already underway in the region. Those who stressed the need for a strong Iran argued that the Iraqi buildup and the portentous activities of the Soviets and Cubans in the Horn of Africa, South Yemen, and Afghanistan justified the Shah's efforts to expand his military strength. The trump argument was that the denial of weapons to Iran would be both foolish (because it would indicate a vote of nonconfidence in the Shah precisely at the moment when stable leadership in Iran was most important to us), and counterproductive (because the Shah would simply turn to other suppliers for military equipment).

The limited focus of the debate (need for American restraint in arms sales vs. need for a strong Iran) played a large role in obscuring what should have been the central point: the opportunity cost to Iran of spending more than one quarter of the public budget on military facilities was extremely large and growing rapidly in terms of development and infrastructure projects foregone, social frustration allowed to grow, and political discontent left to spread. The high priority given the military in Iranian public spending (together with the waste, corruption, and inefficiency of Iran public spending in general) seriously drained the resources and the attention that Iranian authorities could have devoted to heading off the wave of political dissatisfaction, including frustration among those groups that traditionally had been the bedrock of support for the monarchy, especially the peasantry, rural migrants, and lower middle classes in the cities.

The need to give high attention to the task of coping with internal frustration and dissent suddenly became apparent with the massive demonstrations in the fall of 1978. But the fundamental problems had in fact been evident in the recurrent

cycles of violence and protest over the preceding year that combined a traditional religious reaction against modernization with popular demands for more of the fruits (education, income, housing, health services) that modernization had brought in grossly unequal fashion to some of the population. Now, whatever kind of regime emerges in Iran over the next few years—a modified monarchy, a military junta, a civilian coalition—the government will need far greater resources than the country's planners have ever contemplated in the past to try to manage the tensions that have accumulated, and are continuing to accumulate, within Iranian society.

Military Spending and Budgetary Constraints

Prior to the upheavals of late 1978, the Government of Iran had been devoting roughly 25 percent of the general budget (about \$8 billion in 1977 dollars) to direct military expenditures. In addition, there is evidence that civilian accounts included sizable military allocations (e.g., approximately 70 percent of the "public housing" outlays in recent years have gone for military construction) that could amount to an additional 3 to 5 percent of the central government's budget.¹ Annual expenditures on defense have been the fastest growing budget item, rising more than ten times over since 1970, to the present \$8 billion plateau of the past two years.

After the oil-price jump of 1973, Iran began a headlong rush to modernize its economy. Although the pace of the effort was criticized from the beginning as highly wasteful, the government felt propelled by two strong motivations: 1) oil exports were expected to peak in the early 1980s, requiring the rapid creation of a heavy industrial base to become the generator of domestic growth and to earn increasing amounts of foreign exchange; 2) the Shah wanted to ensure that Iran was firmly set on its new path as a middle level industrial power during his regime before he stepped aside in favor of his son.

The growth of official disbursements over the past few years proceeded more rapidly than the above record of appropriations would indicate. While detailed

1. This analysis of the Iranian budgetary process is based on studies originally funded by Resources for the Future while the author was a visiting associate professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1976-1977. See Theodore H. Moran, "Why Oil Prices Go Up—The Future: OPEC Wants Them," *Foreign Policy*, Winter, 1976-77, and *Oil Prices and the Future of OPEC*, (Washington, D.C. Resources for the Future, 1978). More recent data come from U.S. Embassy Tehran, *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Iran* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce, semiannual), and Abbas Amirie and Hamilton A. Twitchell, *Iran in the 1980's*, (Tehran, Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1978).

Table 1.
Iranian Government Appropriations 1975-1978 (\$ Billion)²

	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78 (est)
Expenditures	2.3		
General Affairs	2.3	3.6	2.9
National Defense	6.6	8.0	8.0
Social Welfare	4.4	5.7	7.7
Economic Affairs	6.4	8.2	12.7
Investments Abroad, Loans and Aid to Other Countries	2.4	1.5	1.1
Miscellaneous	3.6	2.3	1.3
Total	25.7	29.3	33.7
Receipts			
Oil and Gas Taxes	17.7	20.0	20.4
Other Revenues	4.7	6.0	7.1
Internal and Foreign Borrowing	0.0	1.1	3.5
Miscellaneous	3.3	2.2	2.7
Total	25.7	29.3	33.7

breakdowns are not available, the 1976-77 budget, for example, was 16 percent underspent while the 1977-78 budget appears to have been 5 percent overspent.³

In the first years of euphoria following the fourfold oil price increase in 1973-74, Iranian planners felt that they had the financial resources needed for all aspects of development. This proved not to be the case. Despite the sharp increase in government expenditures in the civilian sector, the transition from a largely traditional society to a balanced and self-sustaining industrial state presented large and immediately evident structural problems. The social and economic infrastructure was not able to keep pace with demands placed upon it.⁴ The transportation and communications systems became severely overburdened. The coun-

2. Data from Iranian Plan and Budget Organization. See T. H. Moran, *Oil Prices and the Future of OPEC*.

3. *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Iran*, (hereafter *FET: Iran*), July, 1978, p. 6.

4. See, for example, *FET: Iran*, May 1977; "Land of the Shah: Growing Pains in Iran Create Political, Social and Economic Strains," *Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 1977; "Shah's Economic Projects Hit Snags, Periling His Regime," *Washington Post*, April 2, 1978; "Is Time Running Out for the Shah of Iran?", *Forbes*, July 10, 1978; "Economic Woes Mar Shah's Anniversary," *Washington Post*, August 20, 1978.

try experienced its own "energy crisis," with Tehran blacked out for up to six hours a day during parts of 1977, more than 1000 plants seriously affected, and industrial production cut in half. For example, due to the cutback in electricity, Iran's sole aluminum smelter produced in the two-year period 1977-78 at levels roughly 50 percent of what was attained in 1975. Similarly, capacity utilization in textiles has been about 60 percent, in brickmaking about 50 percent, in automobiles about 50 percent, and in tractors about 30 percent. The social problems were less easily quantifiable, but no less serious. A shortage of urban housing and related services (water, electricity, garbage collection) due to the growth of squatter settlements around Tehran and other major cities led to clashes and rioting in 1977, and provided a broad undercurrent of dissatisfaction that fed the religious and cultural upheavals of 1978.

To address the growing economic and social needs, the central government ministries were asked in 1977 and again in early 1978 to draft funding requests for the next five years (1978/9 to 1982/3). On the first tries, the gap between estimates for needed projects and estimates of available resources ran to 200 percent to 300 percent. Consequently, publication of the Sixth Plan was repeatedly delayed. At the same time, the military component remained sacrosanct in both Tehran and Washington.

It is now unclear how any Iranian government can easily defuse the demands of religious leaders who want the preservation of tradition and satisfy the demands of large groups of the population who want a greater share of the country's income. Planners in Tehran estimate that for the current fiscal year (ending in March, 1979) oil revenue losses due to strikes will amount to at least \$2 billion, local tax revenue losses will equal about \$4 billion, and wage increases to government employees will equal approximately \$2 billion. This will add a total of \$8 billion to a fiscal budget already calculated to be \$4 billion in the red. In short, almost one-third of public spending through March, 1979 in an official budget already sharply cut back from pre-crisis expectations will have to be financed through public borrowing and/or the draw-down of fiscal reserves. For 1979-80, under the best of political circumstances, the government will still be \$7 billion in the red even if there are no new commitments made in the military or nuclear areas. These projections will allow for wage increases from 40 percent to 100 percent already granted by the government to public employees (and financed in part by the 14.5 percent OPEC oil price hike). But they will still leave the massive demands for public housing, medical, sewage, and social services unmet. And they

assume that complaints from the rural sector are met through higher prices for farm produce rather than through direct subsidies. This will add to urban inflation and keep the fire under urban discontent.

An examination of what few guideposts exist within which current crisis planning must take place in Tehran indicates that there are severe stringencies on the resources available to decompress social tensions in the short run. Moreover, even if social peace were to be established over the next 2 to 3 years, large new problems loom on the horizon.

The Fiscal Framework for Coping with Current Stresses

While there never was a formally approved Sixth Plan against which to measure the country's capabilities for dealing with the material aspects of the 1978-79 crisis, there is a fairly detailed and authoritative exposition of the government's pre-crisis balance sheet:⁶ 1) real growth would have to slow, but was expected to maintain an 8.6 percent rate through 1980; 2) the government would have to shift public spending in the civilian sector from showcase economic development projects to infrastructure and social programs; 3) public revenues would increasingly become a constraint (even without the crisis) as ministries tried to improve transportation, communication, and power facilities; 4) military outlays would continue at between 25 percent and 33 percent of all government spending. The latter was highly problematic, however, since there has never been a mechanism in the Iranian government for estimating follow-on costs for newly purchased military equipment.

A close examination of the assumptions used by Iranian planners indicates, however, that the financial resources available within the civilian portion of the public budget over this period were likely to fall far short of the government's expectations had the 1978-79 crisis not taken place. With the crisis, the strains on the public purse will be much more severe.

—First, the projections of direct and indirect taxes from the non-petroleum sector from 1978 to 1983 were expected to average \$11.8 billion per year (in constant dollars), or more than three times as much each year as was collected on an average during the 1973-78 period (\$3.7 billion per year), and twice as much each year as was collected in 1977 (\$5.9 billion). Indeed, there is reason to suspect that the 1977

6. The most detailed summary is provided by Firouz Vakil, Undersecretary of State, Iranian Plan and Budget Organization, "Some Macro-Economic Considerations," in *Iran in the 1980's*. The internal use of this budgetary scenario is confirmed in *FET: Iran*, July, 1978.

Table 2.

Sectoral Growth in the Iranian Sixth Plan (1978/9–1982/3)⁷

	Sector Contribution 1977/8	Sector Contribution 1982/3	Annual Rate of Growth
Agriculture	9.4%	7.9%	5.0%
Oil & Gas	37.3%	27.2%	2.0%
Industry & Mines	19.4%	24.7%	14.0%
Services	33.9%	40.2%	12.4%
GDP (factor cost)	100.0%	100.0%	8.6%

tax collection figure (\$5.9 billion) is itself atypically inflated. Under the government's industrial share participation program the share price determination for purpose of payment to the divesting firm was a direct function of the firm's taxable income. Firms may therefore have been motivated to increase tax remissions during the divestment period. Now, the best that can plausibly be expected over the next two years is to reestablish tax collections at a level approaching the 1977 rate, assuming that capital flight is reversed and private funds begin to flow steadily back into Iran (see below). From this, one must conclude that the \$58.8 billion in non-oil tax revenues that Iranian ministries expected to have available for public expenditure between 1979 and 1983 is far too high, probably by a factor of two.

—Second, the Iranian Planning Office projections of private sector growth were quite optimistic even in the pre-crisis context. Domestic business investment was hypothesized to grow at a rate of 16.1 percent per year, or consistently higher than the corresponding rate for public investment (11.6 percent per year).⁸ The private sector was assumed to increase its contribution to Gross Domestic Product during the period 1978–82 from 60.2 percent to 67.2 percent, and to be a more dynamic generator of goods, services, jobs, and tax revenues than public industries such as petrochemicals, steel, and mining. In total, private investors were expected both to assume an increasingly heavy burden in financing the development of the public sector (via taxes), and also to grow faster and invest at a higher rate themselves than the public sector. Now, the first order of business will be to coax \$3 to

7. Vakil, p. 134, compiled from tables 10–11.

8. Vakil, p. 136, table 13 and p. 143, table 22.

Table 3.

Government Resources and Requirements in the Sixth Plan⁹ (as compared to the Fifth Plan)
(constant 1974 billion dollars)

	Fifth Plan (1973/4-1977/8)	Sixth Plan (1978/9-1982/3)
Receipts		
Oil & Gas	80.3	128.6
Direct Taxes	9.3	29.9
Indirect Taxes	9.3	28.9
Other	3.3	12.7
Loans & Bonds	2.7	10.6
Total	104.9	210.7
Payments		
Current	55.9	108.0
Development	35.0	79.6
Other	6.7	19.6
Investment Abroad	7.3	3.5
Total	104.9	210.7

\$4 billion in Iranian capital back into the country to maintain current industrial and commercial activity. Gradually, under the most optimistic of assumptions, the private sector could become a pole of national growth again, but it will clearly not meet the development or employment targets envisioned for the Sixth Plan.

—Third, the private sector was expected to make a contribution to the balance of payments nearly twice as large in the next five years (\$4.4 billion in constant dollars) as it did in the last five years (\$2.6 billion) to meet the planning requirements.¹⁰ These private sector exports were to consist of some unidentified manufactured products. With the dearth of new business investment and wage hikes of 25 to 100 percent promised for this year *and* next, the outlook for industrial exports is not bright.

—Finally, the basic path traced for petroleum production may well be too high. The government hypothesized production at 6.0 mbd in 1978, rising steadily to 6.6 mbd by 1982. Actual production in 1977 and 1978, during periods unaffected

9. Vakil, p. 135, compiled from table 12.

10. Vakil, p. 137, table 14. Since almost all of the steel and copper expected from projects that will be completed by 1983 will have to be used internally, the projection for exports of goods will have to come from the private manufacturing sector.

by oil strikes, averaged 5.7 mbd, and the market for OPEC oil, especially heavy crudes which make up 50 percent of Iranian output, is widely expected to remain weak into the early 1980s.

It is impossible to know, of course, how much of an impact a fully funded Sixth Plan could have had on the infrastructure needs and social demands of Iran as it existed prior to the political explosions of 1978. What is clear in the aftermath of those explosions, however, is that many of the projects planned to cope with those needs and demands will have to be cancelled or delayed for financial reasons while the needs and demands themselves have multiplied several times over.

More Fundamental Problems over the Medium Term

Iran authorities that come to, or stay in, power over the next two to three years will have to preoccupy themselves with the attempt to restore economic stability and relieve the most immediate political and religious tensions. Lurking behind these immediate political and religious tensions, however, are three major problems that will prove to be on-going sources of social strain if they do not become the primary focus of the state's fiscal attention: the need for rural development and for an effort to slow the process of internal migration, the need for new manpower policies to train and absorb workers in both rural and urban settings, and the need for an extension of social services among lower class urban groups.

—*The Rural Problem.* In agriculture, the government has kept price controls on farm products while the price on inputs has risen, squeezing the earnings of both peasants and landlords. At the same time, the urban boom has bid away the services of rural teachers and doctors. As a result, the real standard of living (as well as the relative standard) has declined in many rural areas, creating frustration and increasing migration to the cities.

More than half of Iran's 34 million people still live in rural areas. On an income basis, the rural-urban gap is 1 to 5 and widening.¹¹ The Government has several options by which to try to prevent further deterioration; all of them would require public outlays well in excess of expenditures allocated to agriculture in the past five years. First, the government can keep farm prices tightly controlled and provide subsidized public services to farmers and peasants. Besides the cost of those services, this option will lead to a rising food import bill (currently running at nearly \$2.6 billion per year) due to higher consumption and lower domes-

11. FET: Iran, July 1978.

tic production. Second, the government can decontrol food prices and back this up with a combination of public services and rural infrastructure to stimulate increased agricultural output. This will slow the growth in import costs, but still require the government to expand rural expenditures. In addition, it will raise the food bill of the urban sector, shifting discontent there from the rural areas. Third, it can decontrol agricultural prices to the farmer (as well as provide him with more services and infrastructure) but keep prices controlled at the retail level. This too will reduce the import bill, but require the government not only to expand rural expenditures but also to absorb the difference between the price paid to the peasant and the price charged to the consumer. Food subsidies at the present time are already running between \$1 and \$2 billion per year.

—*Manpower Programs*. In urban areas, inward migration of 1.1 million per year (mostly young unskilled males) plus natural population growth has meant that the industrial and service sectors have had to create 1.4 million new jobs per year, a rate of growth since 1971 of more than 16 percent annually. During the period of the headlong rush to develop (1973-76), there was no problem in absorbing this growth in the urban labor force. In fact, there has been a shortage of labor, especially of skilled workers. The slowdown in economic growth (public and private) projected for the next five years, even if business and commercial confidence are rapidly restored in 1979, will reduce the demand for labor and the tapering off of the construction boom will further limit the ability of the economy to absorb unskilled workers. Moreover, Iran's long term industrial comparative advantage tends to lie in capital intensive rather than labor intensive activities (oil, petrochemicals, LNG, copper, iron and steel), and in the aftermath of the 1978-79 wage demands, Iranian workers are rapidly pricing themselves out of hypothetical textile and electronics markets that could provide export-led growth. In the next five years the government will have to devote a large amount of resources to manpower programs (job training and vocational education to produce skilled workers, job creation to absorb unskilled workers) that have received only peripheral attention in the Fifth Plan. It can also attempt through large-scale rural development programs discussed above to slow or reverse what is now a widening rural-urban gap. That will be a formidable task, however, because the median income gain for the migrant is 400 percent, when he moves to the city.¹² The natural reaction to slower economic growth in urban areas should be to slow the rate of

12. *Ibid.*; and Iraj Vahidi, "A Profile of Iranian Agriculture," in *Iran in the 1980's*, p. 185.

movement somewhat, but (if comparative demographic data from Latin America are a guide) there will have to be a vast social relocation before lower sector income is distributed homogenously enough to stop the momentum of migration. In the meantime, the revolution in traditional consciousness, plus the pull of economic self-interest, has inspired 6 percent of the total rural population to move to the city each year since 1971 and will make it difficult to keep the younger generations down on the farm once they come of age (despite the popular protests against modernity).

—*Urban Services.* Finally, those social services (especially hospitals, clinics, and related health services) that are currently available in the urban areas are either prohibitively expensive on a private basis or are provided publicly in programs largely reserved for the military and some other government employees. To avoid growing discontent among the new middle classes as well as the lower income population, the government will have to make an effort to extend them to other groups as well. With regard to social security, only 2 million workers in an "economically active" population of 10 million are now covered.

To free public funds for these enormous tasks, future Iranian governments may be able to reduce some of the waste, corruption, and inefficiency that have characterized official spending in the past. Other civilian programs (e.g. the 20-plant, multi-billion dollar nuclear power utility grid) are already being slowed, and may be replaced with less expensive, more cost effective substitutes. But the need to make firm choices between guns and butter will not disappear with the first signs of political quiet. Rather, the requirement to shift budgetary priorities from the military to the civilian sector will remain of high importance as a security as well as an economic issue because of the implications for long term domestic stability.

Iran's Military Strength

The concentration on military modernization at break-neck speed through the acquisition of sophisticated foreign equipment has been all the more questionable as a broad national strategy since there is scant evidence that it made sense even in narrow military terms. Rather, a more moderated and balanced approach to military spending would probably have strengthened Iranian defense capabilities as well as freed public resources and talent for dealing with civilian problems.

Beginning in 1973, the Shah attempted to proceed with a vast expansion and modernization program for the air force, ground forces, and navy simultaneously.

The initial assessments of this strategy in 1976 revealed serious absorptive problems, a finding confirmed in a December, 1977 study.¹³

The imperial air force has been the Shah's personal priority and has had less trouble than the other services in attracting qualified recruits and retaining talented and imaginative personnel. However, both studies revealed shortages of trained pilots and trainable candidates, shortages of instructor pilots, shortages of ground crews and maintenance personnel, and severe difficulties for the logistics system in locating and providing spare parts to individual units. On the one hand, the training of new pilots was not able to keep up with the expanded number of planes. On the other hand, the arrival of new generations of aircraft frequently resulted in a degradation of military capability as the best pilots from existing programs were diverted to new programs.

The best documented example of this "degradation" phenomenon has been the shift of the most capable air crews from F-5Es to the more sophisticated F-14s. But the problem of pilots for the F-14 program was not unique. The same process of "poaching" took place with regard to maintenance crews for the F-5Es. Programs of lower priority to the Shah than the F-14 (e.g., the I-Hawk air defense package, one of the largest and most complex of the programs undertaken by the Iranian military) have faced similar or larger difficulties.¹⁴

One would hypothesize on the basis of data from the air force experience that expansion and modernization problems would be even more severe in the services that receive less personal attention from the Shah. The evidence available through the end of 1977 from the ground forces and the navy is consistent with that hypothesis, with major absorptive problems in the helicopter program (army), self-propelled howitzer program (army), tank program (army, with most of the armor provided by the British), and naval training and electronics program.¹⁵

After the initial surveys of 1976 and 1977, there was some improvement in the worst areas, and some decline in other areas.¹⁶ The problem has not been lack of

13. *U.S. Military Sales to Iran*, Staff Study, subcommittee on foreign assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, July 1976; *United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, Future*, Staff Report, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, December, 1977.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. The executive branch study of U.S. military supply relationships with the Persian Gulf states submitted to Congress in 1978 has not been released in unclassified form. While the Central Intelligence Agency has received public criticism for its apparent "intelligence failure" about the political dissension and social crisis building up in Iran, CIA analysts were clear-sighted, consistent, and courageous in their evaluation of absorptive problems within the Iranian military.

effort and commitment on either the U.S. or the Iranian side, but rather the unavoidable strain associated with so massive a military build-up. Thus, even before the social upheavals of 1978, the pattern of lowering current combat capability in order to make room for ever larger amounts of new military equipment cast doubt on the proposition that "more is better" in the Iranian context.¹⁷ Rather, from a purely military point of view (laying aside for a moment the argument about the need to shift expenditures from the military to the civilian sector) the strategy of slowing down and drawing out the pace of new weapons acquisitions has much to recommend it. A more temperate approach would allow the Iranian armed forces to focus their efforts on 1) improvement in the ability to handle equipment already delivered or on order; 2) building a reliable logistics system; 3) broadening repair and maintenance programs; 4) strengthening command and control; 5) conducting more practical exercises and practice operations; 6) hardening military facilities; and 7) extending the road, railroad, and airport networks in a way that would provide major military as well as civilian benefits. While the "nuts and bolts" approach is not as glamorous as simply adding new layers of the latest equipment, it would add substantially to actual military capabilities.

There is a further (military) argument that can be made in favor of a more moderated, better balanced approach to the Iranian defense build-up: it would strengthen regional stability in a crisis situation. The current pattern of rapid equipment accumulation leads military planners in the Persian Gulf region to predict that in an actual combat setting most of the weapons in Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia would not survive much beyond the first strike or two. This leads to a highly unstable environment for crisis management, with a strong motivation on all sides for preemptive attack whenever tensions mount. Faced with a dilemma familiar to nuclear strategists, military leaders must make the choice to "use them or lose them" as they contemplate the vulnerability of their weapons during an emergency. Better logistics and improved maintenance programs would reduce the vulnerability of existing weapons, and so would a hardening of military sites (as well as better use of present hardening features). A broader infrastructure

In this, they represented a counterweight to and independent check on the Pentagon, the Embassy, and the regional bureau in the State Department who passionately fought to minimize such problems whenever evidence of them appeared in Iran.

17. The problem of absorbing large amounts of modernized equipment, even simple equipment, is not peculiar to the military sector. Iranian economists describe the same problem in the civilian sector: "to allay the transportation bottleneck, 2,000 trucks were ordered. When they arrived, there was a shortage of drivers. When the drivers were imported, there was a shortage of garages, spare parts, and so forth." *Iran in the 1980's*, p. 126.

network of roads, railroads, and airports would allow for more measured patterns of mobilization and a less precipitous response to a threat. Finally, a stronger system of command and control would greatly add to the reliability of crisis management.

Thus, even in purely military terms, a slower, more tempered approach to military modernization, especially an approach that dampened the practice of accumulating large numbers of complicated and expensive military equipment as fast as (or faster than) they could be absorbed, would not have hurt and might well have strengthened the country's defense effort.

In the midst of the crisis in the fall of 1978, the Iranian government announced that it was deferring plans for new purchases of military weapons, including 140 F-16 fighters and 70 F-14 fighters. But it declared at the same time that it intended to honor commitments to purchase armaments already on order, including 160 F-16s, 6 AWACs, a new squadron (31) of advanced-design F-4s, more than 2,000 British tanks, nearly 1,000 personnel carriers, approximately 3,000 trucks, almost 500 self-propelled howitzers, and 4 Spruance class destroyers.

The total cost of these commitments is not known, but the American share alone will reach nearly \$12 billion. These acquisitions come on top of the 80 F-14s, 200 F-4s, 200 F-5s, 850 helicopters, I-Hawks, Rapier missiles, and other equipment delivered over the past few years. And, instead of stretching out the purchases over the next decade, delivery is still scheduled to be accomplished by the early 1980s.

In short, while there has been much public discussion in Tehran and Washington about the need to cut military spending to cope with the immediate social crisis, the shift from guns to butter is in fact likely to be small in the short run, especially if some semblance of political tranquility is soon established. For the longer term, the conclusion that less rather than more military spending is in the national interest of both countries still has not deeply penetrated the thinking of defense planners in either capital.

Policy Implications

For nearly a decade U.S. policymakers have tended to interpret the American desire for a strong and dependable ally in Iran in narrow military terms as measured by the amounts of sophisticated military equipment that could be amassed by the Iranian armed forces. They have generally ignored the broader question of whether Iran was apportioning its public resources in a way needed to build broad and popular support for the defense effort. The former conception was flawed, as we have seen, even on its own terms. The latter approach will be much more diffi-

cult, and more expensive, than Iranian (or American) policy planners have imagined. Even an attempt to slow down and in some senses reverse the vast process of social mobilization and social movement, stimulated in the 1971-77 period, will be enormously costly.

Now we face the task not only of helping guide the immediate reconstruction of the Iranian political system, but of rethinking the nature of the U.S.-Iranian military relationship as well. To the extent that the first is successful over the next few years, the bureaucratic politics and private interests of the principal actors on Iranian policy in Washington will move against the second. The natural tendency will be to go from crisis management to business (more or less) as usual. The challenge for American policymakers will be to restructure, with whatever Iranian authorities are likely to emerge, the primary vehicle for the dialogue about military modernization. The renewed dialogue should focus on how best to ensure the stable, robust, and non-repressive evolution of Iranian society.

Ambassador Garthoff has been a student of Soviet military thought, doctrine, and policy longer than I myself have been a student of strategy.^{2*} He has also been a member of the American delegation to the SALT. This background should give him special expertise to comment on the subject of his paper. It is therefore especially disappointing to find that his article is highly misleading ("Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978).

Dr. Garthoff argues that the Soviet military and political leadership accept mutual deterrence, and quotes many Soviet spokesmen or writers in support of this thesis. The difficulty is that the "mutual deterrence" accepted (in a limited sense) by Soviet leaders is not the position advocated by many in the United States.

It is easy to make this difficulty starkly clear. Few readers of this journal—certainly not Ambassador Garthoff—would think of me as an advocate or proponent of "mutual deterrence." Indeed, it is probably fair to say that I have been the most forceful and persistent critic of mutual assured destruction (MAD) ideas in the West.^a Yet, with few exceptions (which I shall identify), I could support the Soviet statements quoted in Garthoff's paper, assuming I had on a "Soviet hat" as an analyst but retained my opposition to MAD ideas. And I doubt very much that Dr. Garthoff intended his paper to be read merely as arguing that: "the Soviets accept MAD ideas in the same sense that Brennan does."

Let us first dispose of the exceptions just mentioned. Garthoff quotes Brezhnev⁷⁶ and Colonel Rybkin⁷⁶ as supporting the idea that "a sufficient quantity of arms has been amassed to destroy everything alive on earth several times over." And the following phrase is attributed to a Major General R. Simonyan: "Given the priority of strategic forces, when both sides possess weapons capable of destroying many times over all life on earth, . . ." ⁷⁸ The idea that existing nuclear weapons are capable of destroying "everything alive on earth several times over" is simply false, and I should not endorse this hyperbole with or without a Soviet hat on. If existing nuclear stockpiles were used in a war of maximum malevolence, they

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* Superscript numerals refer to references in the Garthoff article, or to passages quoted in that article that are attributed to the associated reference. References within this commentary will be denoted by superscript letters.

^a See, e.g., my "Op-Ed" essays "Strategic Alternatives: I" and "Strategic Alternatives: II" in *The New York Times*, May 24 and 25, 1971.

might result in the death of perhaps 10 percent to 15 percent of mankind, assuming little or no civil defense. Of course, I do not suggest that such an eventuality would be of minor consequence, but it is a long way from "destroying many times over all life on earth." Whether Ambassador Garthoff is himself aware that these quotations constitute egregious hyperbole is unclear. There can be question, however, that the Soviet leadership, including Brezhnev, knows better; the large-scale Soviet civil-defense program alone is adequate testimony to that. The fact that some Western spokesmen (such as Henry Kissinger) have indulged in the same hyperbole does not exculpate Soviet spokesmen. (Somewhat parenthetically, it is worth noting that Soviet statements to this effect^{76, 78} impair the credibility of other Soviet statements related to nuclear war.)

Let us now turn to the main issues. Soviet leaders "grew up" in the nuclear era confronting major American strategic superiority. As the Soviets' own strategic forces grew, they naturally began to talk about "both" sides being "deterred," meaning that now also the United States was "deterred." Many of the passages in Dr. Garthoff's paper reflect only this point, which is obviously beyond serious controversy.

The controversial ideas about "mutual deterrence" originated in, and appear to remain only in, the West. Beginning in the later 1950s, some American arms control analysts conceived of "stable deterrence" arms control postures in which the United States and the Soviet Union might each maintain large, reasonably secure second-strike forces that would hold the other side's population hostage.^b It became widely (but not universally) argued (in the West) that MAD stability of this kind should be pursued as a goal, even at the level of *encouraging* Soviet retaliatory capabilities and deliberately eschewing American measures that might reduce the destructiveness of a Soviet nuclear attack. Let us call anyone (Soviet or American) who advocates that the opposing side *should* have good deterrence of his own side

^b Actually, it was recognized in the early to mid-1950s (in the RAND group, including Albert Wohlstetter and his colleagues) that a strategic confrontation of two opposing forces, neither of which could be substantially eliminated in an attack by the other, would be stable (and, in some sense, tolerable). I believe that the original ideas and analysis of deliberate MAD were first recorded in a remarkable draft by Lewis C. Bohn, dated March 18, 1958, that is now virtually unknown. (Produced at RAND, it is classified SECRET-Restricted Data, was produced only as a draft typescript in an original and four carbons, had no RAND-document status, and bears the misleading title *Space "Disarmament," Part I*.) However, this document circulated in the preparatory working group for the Surprise Attack Conference. T. C. Schelling and others subsequently published considerable analysis of this type. (It should be noted that Bohn himself was not and is not an advocate of MAD postures.)

—by such means as encouraging the opponent's SLBM capabilities and opposing active and passive defense for his own side—a MADvocate.

I believe that there are *no* Soviet officials who are MADvocates. Certainly none are indicated in the many quotations in the Garthoff article, and one would assume that Garthoff would have been motivated to find any that could be found. On the other hand, there are *many* American MADvocates (including Ambassador Garthoff, if I am not mistaken). For example, Robert McNamara, early in his tenure as Secretary of Defense, was reported to have favored the advent of substantial Soviet SLBM forces. Practically all of the vigorous domestic opposition to American deployment of active defenses against ballistic missiles (ABMs), and similar opposition to civil defense, has come from MADvocates—so too for opposition to improved accuracy or higher yield in American weapons. The ABM Treaty was conceived and negotiated by American MADvocates.

But—it might be asked—if the Soviets are not MADvocates, why then did *they* sign the ABM Treaty? Ambassador Garthoff himself refers to our lead (in 1969) in ABM technology, and refers (p. 129) to “. . . the Soviet decision . . . that ballistic missile defenses of the two sides should if possible be sharply limited through a strategic arms limitation agreement so as not to risk restoring the United States to a position of superiority . . .” (my emphasis). This is of course only a theory, though a plausible one; it is not supported by any quotations.

I have frequently suggested an additional theory. Soviet planners may well have calculated (correctly, I believe) that they could better limit damage to themselves (in the event of large-scale Soviet-American strategic nuclear war) by counterforce attacks on our Minuteman force, *provided* it was not defended by the then-proposed full Safeguard ABM system, than they could by deploying an ABM system (to protect their cities) based on their technology of that time. This too is only a theory, but it derives some support from a Soviet writer (Trofimenko) much quoted by Garthoff:

The potential possibility of neutralizing a large number of enemy offensive missiles by a compact modern ABM system is in fact ultimately equivalent to stepping up the offensive potential of the side deploying such a system (for ABM defense can be used to defend not only cities but also ICBMs and strategic aircraft at bases).^c

^c G. A. Trofimenko, “The Soviet-U.S. SALT Agreements,” *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology* (in Russian), No. 9, September 1972. (Quotation at pp. 8-9 from the JPRS translation of the *USA* journal.)

Evidently this "stepping up" (say, for the American side) would reside in our intercepting Soviet attacks aimed at American "offensive potential." This perception may well have combined with the Soviet apprehension suggested above about superior American ABM technology to motivate the Soviets to suppress the Safeguard ABM system by means of the ABM Treaty.

Garthoff's article was precisely intended to obviate just such speculation, by establishing an alleged Soviet commitment to mutual deterrence, which would account for Soviet adherence to the ABM Treaty. However, as I have pointed out above, there apparently is no evidence whatever of Soviet MADvacy, which would be *necessary* to account for the Soviet support for the ABM Treaty *on Garthoff's view*—he asserts (p. 136) that "the congruence of Soviet and American views and objectives led to the ABM Treaty in SALT signed in May, 1972." There was no such congruence, as his own quotations make clear.

Let us consider some Garthoff assertions or quotations in this light. For example, on page 126, he asserts (my emphasis): ". . . in 1967–69 . . . the Soviet leadership showed an increasingly clear acceptance of *and commitment to* mutual deterrence, . . ." "Acceptance of," in the sense in which I myself must accept the most elementary technical facts, undoubtedly; "commitment to," in the sense of MADvacy, not in the slightest.

Or, take Garthoff's quotation of Soviet Major General V. I. Zemskov,⁴⁵ (with my emphasis instead of Garthoff's):

Of special importance in this connection [the degree of probability of a particular type of war] can be the disruption of "the nuclear balance." It is possible, for example, in case of further sharp increase of nuclear potential or the creation by one of the sides of highly effective means of anti-ballistic missile defense while the other side lags considerably in solution of these tasks. A change of the "nuclear balance" *in favor of the countries of imperialism* would increase manifold the danger of a nuclear war.

Evidently a change in the "nuclear balance" (resulting from deployment of highly effective Soviet ABM) *in favor of the Communist countries* would not "increase manifold the danger of a nuclear war." This quotation constitutes a clear *rejection* of MADvacy.

As Garthoff himself stated (p. 134), "There are those—again in Moscow and in Washington—who are apprehensive as to whether this [prevailing] parity will be upset by some successful effort of the other side." True; but there are many in Washington who are apprehensive that this parity will be upset by some successful effort on the *American* side, while there are—so far as can be seen—none in Moscow apprehensive over the possibility that parity might be upset by some successful effort on the *Soviet* side.

Or, to consider part of a quotation used by Garthoff from Vasily M. Kulish⁶³ (who is, in my own view, one of the most highly competent of the Soviet analysts of nuclear strategy):

... even a relatively small and brief superiority by the United States over the Soviet Union in the development of certain "old" or "new" types and systems of weapons that significantly increase the strategic effectiveness of American military power could exert a destabilizing influence on the international political situation throughout the entire world and *present extremely unfavorable consequences for the cause of peace and socialism*. (My emphasis.)

Kulish is apparently not concerned about the possibility of any kind of degree of Soviet superiority over the United States.

The misleading nature of the Garthoff paper can be well illustrated with passages of his on pp. 132-133 (with my emphasis):

For reasons discussed earlier, they [Soviet military theorists and leaders] see no inconsistency in recognizing that such [general nuclear] war would be an unprecedented disaster endangering all mankind [sic—see my early comments above], and therefore in *supporting* mutual deterrence based on *mutual* retaliatory destructive capability, . . .

Accordingly, too, the Soviet military have had an active interest and role in SALT. The strong *endorsement of mutual deterrence* made by the Soviet side from the very outset of the SALT. . . .

Well, the said Soviet theorists and leaders are not now and never have been *supporting* mutual deterrence in the sense of MADvocracy; they acknowledge (nay, insist) that deterrence is *mutual* only in the sense that the United States cannot now consider attacks on the Soviet Union without expecting major nuclear retaliation, as I too should insist; and they have never provided an *endorsement* of American deterrence of the Soviet Union, and indeed have never visibly apologized for measures (such as improved Soviet accuracy or the Soviet civil-defense program) that might weaken American deterrence of Soviet leaders.

One Garthoff passage of this type (p. 133) is actually at the level of a *non sequitur*: "The Soviet leadership, as the American, continues to look in the first instance and in the final account to *its own unilateral military strength as the guarantor* of deterrence of the other side and of *mutual deterrence*." (My emphasis.) Of course, "its own unilateral military strength" guarantees only "deterrence of the other side."

I do not wish to suggest that all of the analysis in Ambassador Garthoff's paper is at this level. For example, he quite correctly says (p. 122) that: "It is not accurate, as some Western commentators have done, to counterpose Soviet military interest in a 'war-fighting' and 'war-winning' capability to a 'deterrent' capability;

the Soviets see the former capabilities as providing the most credible deterrent, as well as serving a contingent resort if war should nonetheless come." But the main thrust of his paper is simply wrong. I have not, in this commentary, nearly exhausted the quotations that illustrate this fact.

Of course the Soviets "accept the concept of mutual deterrence," in the obvious sense in which any informed person who understands contemporary reality must accept it, which is the sense in which I accept it. But that is a very limited sense indeed. On present evidence, neither the Soviets nor I believe in MADvocracy. And *that* is what the argument is about.

Mr. Brennan's letter was received too late to permit Ambassador Garthoff to respond.

Correspondence

ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

To the Editors:

After reading the 56-page "debate" between Kenneth Adelman and Gerald Bender, I am left with the impression that this is a classic example of personal biases determining the choice of the facts that are examined as well as the conclusions that are reached. Perhaps sophistry is essential to winning debates but it is also a way to prevent understanding.

Both of the protagonists in this "debate" began by denying the importance of Rhodesia to the United States—of "minimal strategic importance" (Bender — p. 67), "marginal United States investment," and "no real strategic significance" (Adelman, p. 68). They then go on to argue that, in effect, we should support the Patriotic Front of Nkomo and Mugabe (Bender) or the "internal settlement" of Muzorewa, Sithole, Chihau, and Smith (Adelman)! If the issue does matter to United States foreign policy, then why it matters should be clearly spelled out and should be beyond vague threats of domestic (U.S.) political instability or superpower confrontation.

A much more useful starting point would involve an assertion of the elements of a satisfactory basis for American foreign policy. This should address a number of issues that might include, among other elements: (a) the relationship of domestic to foreign policy goals; (b) America's relationship with other nations, including the issue of superpower confrontation; (c) protection of American interests abroad; (d) issues of human rights; and (e) perhaps the most important issue, the support of political systems that are consistent with America's sense of justice, fairness, and equality. There is no intent to imply that a list such as this means that U.S. foreign policy should only support countries that "look like us" or are, at least, not antagonistic to the political values that America represents. But it does imply that the short-run opportunism that seems to dominate both this "debate" and perhaps much of U.S. Africa policy is unsatisfactory.

There are a number of statements that misrepresent the situation or occasionally are incorrect in this debate. For example, "over 1,000 Soviet generals to direct ground operations in Ethiopia." This is absurd (Adelman, p. 114); the percentage of Gabon's population that is white is substantially higher than Rhodesia's, not about the same (p. 95); Nigeria, as of September, 1978, has lifted the ban on political activity on schedule under the Obasanjo regime's publicly-stated calendar for return to civilian rule in 1979 (p. 80); the statement on Rhodesia's "dismal human rights record" is pretentious nonsense that is ethnocentric and ahistorical (p.

80)—note the largely ignored records of a substantial number of independent black African states. The reader is left with the impression that 56 pages are devoted to saying "I want my side to win."

As Lloyd Etheredge's new study of the psychological bases of U.S. foreign policy formation (*A World of Men*—MIT Press, 1978) indicates, world peace may be more endangered by the personalities of individuals involved in policy formation than by any other source. If Rhodesia is not significant to the U.S., then perhaps the U.S. should follow the normal procedures to recognize the regime that is in effective control of the territory, as was done in Angola. But whatever choices are made, they should be consistent with U.S. policy elsewhere, and informed by the interests of U.S. foreign policy objectives—not by the personal biases of the observers.

—Donald G. Morrison
Instructor of Political Science, MIT

ON MUTUAL DETERRENCE

To the Editors:

Several readers have inquired—after reading "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy" in the Summer, 1978 issue of *International Security*—whether there are similarly authoritative Soviet military reaffirmations of mutual assured retaliation and mutual deterrence appearing in the period since the SALT I accords. Since the Soviet General Staff organ, *Military Thought*, is not open for subscription, availability is a problem. There is, however, now available an issue from April, 1973 which includes a most interesting reaffirmation of this very point. In an article on "Military Strategy and Military Technology" (*Voen-naya mys'*, Number 4, April, 1973), Major General Mikhail I. Cherednichenko, a well-known Soviet military theoretician and collaborator of the late Marshal Sokolovsky, described the evolution of mutual deterrence as a product of the 1960s—implicitly admitting that previously only the United States had an assured retaliatory capability. In his words:

The Sixties were characterized by the further development of weapons and military hardware . . .

Possessing powerful strategic nuclear weapons which were kept at a high state of combat readiness, the Soviet Armed Forces acquired the capability of delivering

a devastating nuclear response to an aggressor under any and all circumstances, even under conditions of a surprise nuclear attack, and of inflicting on the aggressor a critical level of damage. An unusual situation developed: *an aggressor who would initiate a nuclear war would irrevocably be subjected to a devastating retaliatory nuclear strike by the other side. It would prove unrealistic for an aggressor to count on victory in such a war*, in view of the enormous risk for the aggressor's own continued existence. (pp. 41–42; italics added.)

This discussion, published nearly a year after the SALT I agreements were concluded, sees mutual deterrence mainly as the product of advances of military technology leading the Soviet Union to match the long-standing United States retaliatory capability.

General Cherednichenko also now argues implicitly for the need to maintain Soviet military efforts "to prevent the military superiority of aggressive [Western] forces"; he notes that one way is "to prevent the possibility of unexpected major technological achievements on their part." This, of course, was one of the main contributions of SALT I for both sides. The general also argues that "the United States was compelled to face up to the constantly growing international prestige, economic and military strength of the Soviet Union, its policy of strengthening peace and the security of peoples . . .," and he specifically notes: "Definite successes have been achieved in strategic arms limitation negotiations" (p. 42). SALT I is not seen as central, but it is depicted as *contributing* to mutual deterrence by reducing the uncertainties generated by unlimited strategic technological competition.

I believe this additional datum will be of interest to other readers, as well as to those who have expressed an interest in this particular point.

—Raymond L. Garthoff
U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria

Notices

The Duke University-Rand Graduate Institute Public Policy Curricular Materials Development Program solicits proposals for the development of cases and other curricular materials in the field of defense studies and arms control. Proposals should include teaching notes and be relevant for use in advanced training in defense policy analysis. With funds from The Ford Foundation, grants up to \$10,000 may be made to faculty members, graduate students, or public-sector practitioners to cover salary, fringe and travel costs, and supplies.

The deadline for the spring, 1979 round of proposals is March 15, 1979. Proposals must receive formal endorsement by the deans, directors, or other administrative representatives of institutions with which authors are affiliated. Proposals should be submitted to Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., The Rand Graduate Institute, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406.

For further information write or call: Dr. Joel Fleishman, Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27706 (919/684-6612); or Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., at the above address (213/393-0411).

We would like to note that Fritz Emnarth's essay in the last issue, "Contrasts in Soviet and American Strategic Thought," was a revised version of a paper undertaken originally for Harvard's joint seminar on Soviet military doctrine. The seminar series was sponsored during 1978 by the Center for International Affairs, the Program for Science and International Affairs, and the Russian Research Center.

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
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
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Turning the Supertanker: Arms Transfer Restraint

Lucy Wilson Benson

One of the more controversial foreign policy initiatives of the Carter Administration has been its conventional arms transfer restraint policy, which was launched four months into the Carter Administration and is now well into its second year of implementation.

It is controversial to a number of groups for a number of reasons:

- to some in industry, who believe the policy is discriminatory, inconsistent, and an arbitrary restraint of trade;
- to some in the foreign policy establishment who see it as a recurrent irritant in our bilateral relations with friendly foreign governments, and potentially damaging to our security relationships with several specific countries;
- to some in the defense establishment who are concerned about the impact of arms transfer restrictions on our own and allied mutual defense interests;
- to some members of Congress who see the policy as wholly inadequate, and so surrounded with artful exceptions and ingenious arithmetic as to make meaningful restraint impossible;
- to other Members of Congress who see arms exports not only as an essential instrument of foreign policy, but also as an important component of our foreign trade and U.S. domestic employment—all of which the restraint policy puts at hazard;
- and, finally, to informed sectors of the public at large which probably share some, perhaps all, of these concerns but which seem to accept arms transfer restraint as a generally desirable proposition, and the policy as a laudable effort to do something about it.

Much of this commentary appears to spring from either an imperfect knowledge of the policy's provisions or from exaggerated expectations (and fears) of what their effects would be. But the fact that both still exist after two years of experience with the policy suggests that it would be useful to take a retrospective look at what has been accomplished and what may be expected for the future.

When President Carter came into office in January, 1977, he did so against an explicit campaign commitment to control and reduce U.S. participation in the international arms market and to try to negotiate multilateral agreements which would follow the United States' lead. The campaign promise was a

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natural consequence of two developments: first, the enormous growth of the arms market in the mid-1970s, following the British withdrawal from East of Suez in 1970-71, the Arab-Israeli War, and the oil price rise, and second, the dominant position of the United States in that market which had generated considerable concern and controversy within the United States.

At that time, the world trade in arms was running at something over \$20 billion a year. The United States was doing about one-half of this business, much of it in sophisticated weapons. Moreover, the greatest growth in the market was centered in the most sensitive and unstable area in the world—the Middle East. Three countries in particular—Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—together were buying each year \$6 billion worth of weapons, equipment and military-related services. Their purchases have constituted about 60 per cent of all U.S. arms transfers over the last several years.

The Growth of Arms Exports

The origin of U.S. dominance in the arms market is one of the results of a basic decision made a generation ago to use a grant military assistance program (MAP) to support the formal mutual security agreements the United States had put together in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America. In the eighteen years from 1950 through 1967, \$33.4 billion was disbursed under MAP, with half of that sum allocated to NATO members, and much of the remainder to East Asia.

By the late 1960s, however, virtually all of our major allies had become prosperous enough to support their military establishments without large infusions of grant aid. And thus MAP began to decline in importance in the ten years from 1968 to 1977. By 1977, the grant military assistance program had fallen to \$200 million a year, while foreign military sales (FMS), that is, the credit and cash sales of defense articles and services made on a government-to-government basis, had risen to an annual rate of well over \$10 billion.

Most allies who formerly had been MAP recipients continued to depend on the United States as a source of military supply, not, as some argue, because we had become masters of the hard sell, but because the buyers had learned from long experience that the U.S. Government and industry provided not only excellent products, but also the best follow-on support and training.

There was also a political spur that contributed to the vigorous international arms market, and that was the gradual but significant contraction of the U.S. military presence abroad that began in the late 1960s and continues to this day. As the following table shows, the reduction in U.S. military manpower deployments was dramatic:

	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>1977-78</u>
Europe	380,000	300,000
Asia	222,000	129,000

This contraction was, in part, a direct result of the growing capabilities of allies and friends to do more for themselves, but in part it was also a clear signal that the United States *expected* its allies to do more. President Nixon made this point explicit in a press conference on Guam in the summer of 1969, when he noted the United States would look to countries directly threatened to take primary responsibility for their own defense. Implicit in such a policy was a readiness on the part of the United States to see that the countries in question had access to the necessary military hardware to allow a credible self-defense effort.

Finally, the two events mentioned earlier—the 1973 War and the oil price rise—really pushed U.S. arms exports into domestic and world prominence. The combination of the U.S. resupply of Israel following the war and the Saudi and Iranian purchases made 1974 a record year—\$10.6 billion in FMS sales, double the total of the previous year.

This high level of arms exports, which continued into the next two years, generated in the public mind, and certainly in the Congress, a growing belief that much was amiss—that the U.S. Government had somehow lost control over the supertanker-sized operations of the American arms export industry. Many people believed that the Government deliberately and unwisely was using arms sales to soak up petrodollars, or to promote American exports, or to reduce the unit cost of equipment for the U.S. military services—purposes, it seemed to them, that had little to do with our basic military security objectives, which were supposed to be the justifying reason for U.S. arms exports. To many, it appeared that the long-term consequences of pouring arms into the volatile underdeveloped world were being ignored for the sake of short-term economic benefits. President Carter's campaign promise, therefore, to change American arms transfer practices, struck a responsive chord.

The Carter Policies

Soon after his inauguration, the President ordered an interagency study of arms transfer activities. It was a complex study, involving almost a dozen agencies of the federal government, each with a particular responsibility and expertise to offer—State for foreign policy, Defense for military security, AID for development, ACDA for arms control, Commerce and Treasury for international trade and monetary matters, and so on. There were many competing but legitimate interests involved. To reconcile them and produce a coherent policy was a monumental task, but by April it was done and on the 19th of May the President publicly announced a new policy based on that study.

The Presidential statement is worth studying carefully, both for what it said and what it did not say:

The virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world. Total arms sales in recent years have risen to over \$20 billion, and the United States accounts for more than one-half of this amount. Each year, the weapons transferred are not only more numerous, but also more sophisticated and deadly. Because of the threat to world peace embodied in this spiralling arms traffic; and because of the special responsibilities we bear as the largest arms seller, I believe that the United States must take steps to restrain its arms transfers.

... the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests. We will continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But, in the future, the burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it.

To implement a policy of arms restraint, I am establishing the following set of controls, applicable to all transfers except those to countries with which we have major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). We will remain faithful to our treaty obligations, and will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the State of Israel. These controls will be binding unless extraordinary circumstances necessitate a Presidential exception, or where I determine that countries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance . . .

In formulating security assistance programs consistent with these controls, we will continue our efforts to promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries. Also, we will assess the economic impact of arms transfers to those less-developed countries receiving United States economic assistance.

I am initiating this policy of restraint in the full understanding that actual reductions in the worldwide traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation. Because we dominate the world market to such a degree, I believe that the United States can, and should, take the first step. However, in the immediate future, the United States will meet with other arms suppliers, including the Soviet Union, to begin discussions of possible measures for multilateral action. In addition, we will do whatever we can to encourage regional agreements among purchasers to limit arms imports.

The policy statement made it explicitly clear that the United States would remain faithful to its treaty obligations, and to "its historic responsibility to assure the security of Israel" and that our major treaty allies—NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand—would not be subject to the policy's controls. Thus it carried no implication that the United States was preparing to withdraw from its defense commitments or from the arms market. Rather, the emphasis was on restraint, not only on our own behavior in the arms export market but also on the behavior of others as well—both suppliers and recipients. The President recognized that the United States could not long maintain a unilateral restraint policy if other suppliers rushed in to fill orders that the United States had refused.

In the statement the President underscored the importance of this aspect of restraint by noting: "I am initiating this policy of restraint in the full understanding that actual reduction in the worldwide traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation," a thought he has reiterated several times since, most recently in his November 29, 1978 announcement of the dollar ceiling for 1979, the second fiscal year of the policy.

The policy statement laid out a set of specific controls. The first was that the dollar volume of government-to-government arms transfers to non-exempt countries would be reduced in Fiscal 1978 from what it was in the previous fiscal year. (Transfers to NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand were to be exempt from this ceiling stricture as were commercial sales, which are controlled by other regulations. Non-weapons-related transfers, such as Corps of Engineers construction services in Saudi Arabia, were also excluded.)

In addition to this ceiling, there were six qualitative controls, again exempting NATO, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan:

1. *The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly-developed advanced weapons which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability.* This control is aimed at reducing pressures for regional arms competition, as, for instance, in the subcontinent, and was one of the reasons

for turning down the recent Indian and Pakistani requests for long-range strike aircraft.

2. *The United States will not sell such weapons until they are operationally deployed with U.S. forces.* There have been occasions in the past when a weapon has been sold abroad before deliveries to U.S. forces had taken place, thus affecting delivery schedules to the latter; or a weapon has been promoted for foreign sales in the hope of giving it a competitive advantage in the U.S. defense market.

3. *The United States will not permit development of advanced weapons solely for export.* This control was designed to reduce incentives for industry to try to enlarge the foreign market for U.S. equipment.

4. *The United States will not permit co-production by other countries of significant weapons, equipment or major components.* While a limited number of items will be considered for co-production, the thrust of this control is to try to limit the spread of advanced military technology and the increase in the number of arms suppliers.

5. *The United States will not allow U.S. weapons or equipment to be transferred to third countries without United States Government consent.* The transfer of certain weapons will be prohibited altogether. The purpose of this control, which is, in fact, not only a policy requirement but a legal one of long standing, is to maintain tight control of U.S. weapons technology.

6. *The United States will not permit U.S. Embassy, military or industrial representatives abroad to promote the sale of arms.* The Department of State has revised the International Traffic in Arms Regulation to require commercial firms to obtain prior State Department approval for sales activities involving major commercial sales, and both State and Defense have issued instructions to all U.S. Government personnel not to engage in any activity which might be construed as promoting the sale of conventional arms.

Taken together, these controls and the other requirements of the policy represented an ambitious program. They responded to an obvious and long-overdue requirement to lay out a comprehensive and coherent policy for an important foreign policy activity that until then had never had one.

To ensure that the policy was made to work and the controls enforced, the Department of State established an advisory board called the Arms Export Control Board. Ten federal agencies are represented on the Arms Export Control Board, whose Chairman is the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. Through its several interagency working

groups, the Board has written new regulations and devised clear and consistent definitions for use in applying the controls. The Board has also developed new interagency review and clearance procedures, provided new guidelines to industry and U.S. Government officials for dealing with foreign governments on arms transfer matters, and established a management system to ensure that the dollar volume ceiling and the other controls established by the President's policy are adhered to. In addition, the Board is responsible for developing the annual security assistance budget and for setting up procedures for reporting to the Congress on arms transfers as required by law.

The Results

Although the machinery is complicated, it has worked quietly and well and it has been the basic mechanism by which we have gotten control of the supertanker. In particular, it has made possible a more distinct separation of the sales policy responsibility which, by law, rests with the Department of State from that of sales management, which is the Defense Department's.

With respect to the specific controls, the first and most notorious—the dollar ceiling—has proven to be not only feasible to live within, but more powerful as a disciplinary tool than ever its staunchest supporters had hoped.

The President set the fiscal 1978 ceiling at \$8.551 billion—an 8 percent reduction from the fiscal 1977 arms sales total. The final year-end total of ceiling-related transfers was \$8.538 billion. For the current fiscal year, i.e., fiscal 1979, the President has established another 8 percent cut, which, when adjusted for inflation, provides for a FY 79 ceiling of \$8.43 billion.

The ceiling has been subjected to considerable criticism, some of it legitimate, some of it not.

The most telling argument against the ceiling is that it is an arbitrary and indiscriminate way to restrain arms transfers. The critics point out that ceilings derived mathematically as a percentage of past activity, must, of necessity, ignore military requirements and broad national security interests. It is these latter considerations, they argue, not dollars, that should be the basis of arms transfer decisions.

The counter argument is that, initially at least, a ceiling is essential as a management tool to focus bureaucratic attention on the new policy and to force the decision-making machinery and the people who manage that machinery to think and act in new ways, reflecting the shift in the burden of

persuasion from the opposers to the proposers. A ceiling is no more arbitrary than a budget. The State and Defense Departments have to live within their appropriated funds and they do so by careful ordering of their foreign policy and defense priorities. So also, by analogy, should the managers of the arms transfer policy. Moreover, by exempting NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand from the ceiling, ample attention was paid to security needs and the President provided the safety valve of an exception if circumstances warrant.

Obviously, however, neither defense budgets nor arms transfer ceilings can continue to be reduced indefinitely, in the absence of fundamental political changes or disarmament arrangements. But, there is a range in which a ceiling is both feasible and useful and the effects of the first year's ceiling were generally positive. Among these effects are:

—*The positive requirement for analysis and long-range planning.* The ceiling restriction has required the arms transfer community to improve its sales forecasting process and to ask itself not only what the United States might be requested to sell over the next few years, but also how approved sales would be handled, and in what order of priority.

In fact, last year's Foreign Assistance Act requires the Executive Branch to inform the Congress annually by November 15 of all arms transfers it "considers eligible" for submission to Congress during the fiscal year. Using that list, the Administration will establish priorities, within the \$8.43 billion ceiling. These will be based on the security needs of the requester, the political and military importance the United States and the requester each attach to the transfer, the potential impact on the region, human rights, economic impact, arms control considerations and relevant technical elements. These latter include such things as equipment availability, the potential for compromise of sensitive technology, and the capacity of the recipient to absorb and maintain the equipment. These are, it seems to me, quite reasonable conditions to put on arms exports and most have long been part of the arms transfer decision process, but because they are now explicit elements of a public policy, they come into sharper focus.

—*The requirement to tighten up the bookkeeping.* For ceiling management purposes, it has been essential to keep track of each major sale proposal in greater detail and with more precision than before. The Defense Department, which is responsible for keeping the books, is now capable with computer help, of tracking each of the 20,000 or so FMS transfers that are made each year from the point the request is made by a foreign government, through the complicated Executive Branch approval and Congressional review phase, up to the signed contract almost on a day-to-day basis.

—*Evidence to other suppliers that the United States was serious about restraint.* While the other restraint controls in the policy are in the long run clearly more important than the ceiling, the ceiling is the most unambiguous reflection of the policy's intent and thus important to underpin our multilateral efforts to negotiate a restraint regime. A successful U.S. initiative to control and reduce its own transfer activities worldwide is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to demonstrate the credibility of the policy and our own commitment to put into practice those restraints that we are urging others to adopt.

—*The inhibiting effect on questionable transfer proposals.* The very existence of the ceiling, in concert with the other controls, has acted as a coarse filter for stopping transfers of dubious merit at the start of the process. Foreign governments are unlikely to propose, nor the U.S. Government seriously to entertain, arms requests that cannot seriously be defended on their merits, in the face of a fixed ceiling.

The basic weakness of the ceiling, of course, is its unilateral nature. Over time, if other suppliers cannot be brought into some form of multilateral restraint agreement, the ceiling will become untenable; other suppliers will simply pick up whatever sales opportunities the United States chooses to forego because of its ceiling restriction. This problem, however, was explicitly recognized by President Carter from the beginning. In his initial policy statement and as he made clear in his November, 1978 statement, maintenance of the ceiling "will depend on the degree of cooperation we receive from other nations, particularly in the area of specific achievements and evidence of concrete progress on arms transfer restraint."

In summary, the ceiling is not an idol to be worshipped (or cursed) but a tool to be used. So long as it contributes usefully in the arms restraint effort, it should be maintained. If and when it ceases to do so, it should be abandoned. That time has not yet come.

However tempting it may be to do so, arms transfer restraint cannot be looked at merely as a ceiling problem. Rather we must look to the other controls, which are the real substance of the President's policy, if we are to get at the qualitative elements of restraint which in the long run will be the most important.

This point is worth stressing because there exists in American society a great preoccupation with large numbers, which are often treated as revealed truth. The total value of U.S. Foreign Military Sales, i.e. all defense articles and services sold to exempt as well as non-exempt countries, is a very large number indeed—\$13.8 billion in Fiscal 1978. But in fact, this number reveals

little about the structure of U.S. arms transfers. To focus only on the money side of arms sales is to obscure those qualitative elements of arms transfer activity that touch most directly on our international security interests, on our political relationships abroad, on regional military balances, and on regional stability.

To illustrate, in the four year period from 1974 to 1977, the United States sold \$44 billion worth of arms. But only 35 percent of the U.S. sales were actual weapons—airplanes, guns, armored vehicles. 65 percent of the U.S. sales were support and services.

By contrast, the Soviet total for the same four years was about \$15 billion. But of that sum, 60 percent were weapons and only 40 percent of their sales fell into the categories of services. Moreover, the Soviet figure does not include sales to Warsaw Pact countries, on which we lack good data, whereas the U.S. figure includes all NATO countries. But nothing in the gross dollar figure comparisons would suggest these asymmetries.

The qualitative controls described earlier involve questions about what and how we sell and to which countries. They are far less visible to the public than dollars totals and much more complicated. Unlike the dollar ceiling, which is simple and easily understood, the qualitative controls involve sophisticated, often subjective judgments about specific weapons and countries. They are seldom obvious, and therefore much more difficult to use as a ready measure of the policy's effectiveness.

Moreover, arms are politically sensitive and when we refuse to make a sale on the basis of one or another of these qualitative controls, tensions in our relations with the country concerned are almost impossible to avoid. Our willingness to sell arms is seen by many, indeed most, friendly governments, as a litmus test of our bilateral relationships. Since national security is a prime concern of all governments, a refusal to sell invariably touches an extremely sensitive nerve, and tends to raise doubts in the minds of the affected country about the assumed strength of the bilateral relationship in security affairs and about the future reliability of the United States as an arms supplier.

Given the political tension that refusals can generate, neither the United States nor the affected governments like to publicize them, although several have been widely reported by the press. For example, we have turned down a Swedish request to sell the Viggen fighter, which has an American engine, to India; an Israeli request to sell the U.S.-engined KFIR aircraft to Ecuador; a Pakistani request to buy the A-7; and an Iranian request to purchase the F-4G Wild Weasel (an aircraft designed to suppress anti-aircraft defenses).

The U.S. Government has avoided wherever possible discussing publicly the vast majority of turn-offs or turn-downs, which in FY 1978 totalled well over a billion dollars. The denials ranged far and wide geographically and included almost every conventional weapons system produced by the United States—advanced aircraft, air to air and air to ground missiles, armed helicopters, artillery, tanks and small arms.

Problems and Successes

Looking ahead to 1979 and beyond, our most pressing preoccupation will be the refinement of the qualitative controls and the pursuit of multilateral restraint arrangements with the Soviet Union and Western European suppliers.

On this latter point, the United States has been carrying on discussions with other principal suppliers of arms for over a year to explain our policies and to seek their cooperation in practicing restraint. There have been four meetings with the Soviets, the most recent in Mexico City in December, 1978. Our objectives in these talks are to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on a framework for negotiating supplier restraint and to move as quickly as possible to concrete proposals. The framework consists of criteria and their regional application and reflects an effort to develop guidelines that all suppliers could follow in making their unilateral transfer decisions. It is a complicated negotiation whose swift completion is not to be expected.

The United States also encourages recipient efforts to develop regional restraints; just such an initiative is underway in Latin America. The final documents of the recent UN Special Session on Disarmament called on suppliers and recipient states to consult on arms transfer limitations. Eight Latin American countries subsequently signed a declaration reaffirming their intentions to seek a conventional arms limitation agreement in Latin America. In August, Mexico also hosted a meeting of twenty Latin American countries to discuss a conventional arms restraint regime for the entire region. It is premature to predict the outcome, but the Latin American initiatives are a step in the right direction.

These are, of course, major difficulties to be overcome before either supplier or buyer restraints are likely to be widely accepted. The Europeans, for example, depend far more heavily on arms exports than either the United States or the Soviet Union to keep their defense industries healthy. Most European governments have fairly permissive arms export policies and are, themselves, active promoters of the arms trade.

The problems of the buyers' side in organizing a restraint regime are obvious, the basic one being how to get all the regionally relevant countries to agree to restrain arms purchases.

With respect to the controls themselves, I believe, on the basis of more than eighteen months' experience, that they are conceptually sound. We have tried to apply them with prudence and ordinary common sense and to avoid arbitrary or rigid interpretations.

Because the controls are so important and are what give the policy its real operative meaning, it is worth looking, in an illustrative way, at some of the interpretative and other problems we have uncovered in administering them. They will need to be resolved over the future months.

One of the controls is that we will not allow industrial representatives to promote major arms sales abroad without prior authorization by the Department of State, and will not permit U.S. Government personnel to engage in sales promotional activities.

This is a perfectly sound regulation and one that is being carefully observed. But it has its side effects. The industry has described the implementing regulations that the State Department issued to Embassies as the "leprosy directive." The effect of the regulation is to deny to defense industry representatives abroad the right to make any presentation or proposal to a foreign government or foreign national "designed to constitute a basis for a decision to make a major purchase." The same regulation denies certain facilitative services to these representatives that U.S. Embassies routinely provide other U.S. businessmen, unless prior authorization has been granted by the Department of State.

It is clearly in everybody's interest that the U.S. Government make a tentative assessment of proposed sales before a company and a foreign government become deeply committed to a proposal that has little prospect of approval by either the Executive Branch or the Congress. But the defense industry understandably resents the implication that they are somehow tainted, and finds onerous the time-consuming procedures to get the requisite advance approval—a procedure, they are quick to point out, that none of their foreign competitors is burdened with.

The "non-promotion" control also has had the effect of limiting U.S. participation in international trade fairs—like the Farnborough and Paris air shows—since the Defense Department now requires that all costs of showing U.S. military aircraft be assumed by the industry (earlier the Defense Department was prepared to lease aircraft back to the manufacturer at cost, except for risk of loss, for demonstration purposes). While many applaud

this result, others—including the entire industry and many in Congress—do not. They argue that events like the Paris air show are not just designed to sell major items of equipment like airplanes, but to demonstrate the general technological competence of American industry—a showcase, if you will, for competitive free enterprise across the spectrum of advanced technology. And not just in weapons, but in such diverse areas as metallurgy, electronics, machine tools, computers, optics, and instrumentation. For those whose business it is to keep the United States in the forefront of technological innovation, it is demoralizing to be officially discouraged by the Government from displaying that technology whenever it is contained in a piece of military hardware.

These regulatory problems are real, but generally manageable and where there is good argument for change, the argument will be listened to. In fact, we have the air show issue under review at this writing.

There are other more substantial issues, however, that are not so amenable to simple regulatory change, and are going to require of policy managers a great deal of careful thought.

One example involves the control prohibiting the development, or significant modification, of advanced weapons systems solely for export—a sensible control, with whose broad objective no one surely would quarrel. However, back in the late 1960s, the United States developed a fairly inexpensive, simple airplane of good but limited capabilities, specifically for the export market. It was called the F-5E. Some 1700 of the F-5E in its various models have been sold to twenty-two countries.

The idea behind this airplane was to have something to offer countries, particularly in the developing world, which faced only a modest external threat, and had only limited funds to spend—countries, in short, who neither needed nor could afford advanced fighter aircraft.

When the time comes for these countries to look for a replacement for some of these 1700 aircraft, they will probably look first to the United States. The problem is that the aircraft now entering the U.S. inventory are the top-of-the-line F-14s, 15s, 16s, and 18s—all of which represent the most sophisticated technology and very high capabilities in speed, range, and weapons. Not only is that a level of capability we would be reluctant to introduce in a number of sensitive areas, but it is also very expensive. Relative low cost was a virtue in the F-5 series and it will remain a virtue in any successor. As a general proposition, none of these advanced aircraft is suitable as an automatic exportable replacement for the simple, low cost F-5 series.

There is a clear policy choice before us—accept the no-development-for-

export-only control of the policy as binding, and abandon the F-5 replacement market to Western European aircraft manufacturers and the Soviet Union, or re-examine the objectives we are trying to promote in the restraint policy. The question is whether we have an interest in fulfilling this requirement with a follow-on export-only-fighter—a move that can be defended in terms of the spirit of restraint so long as we are clear that the goal is to provide minimum capability at minimum cost.

Some argue that the F-5E still has many useful years left to it as a first line fighter aircraft and that there is no urgency in developing an export-only successor. Moreover, the argument goes, by the time a successor is necessary, say in the late 1980s, an aircraft like the F-16 or F-18 will be "old" technology and will look far more appropriate than as follow-on fighters than they look today.

Others argue that the replacement requirement is already on us and that while the F-5E will be suitable for many countries for years to come, for others it is a rapidly obsolescing system that needs early replacement with more capable aircraft. This debate is now actively going on and should be resolved in the course of the year.

The no-co-production control raises a similar set of legitimate but conflicting objectives. On the one hand, weapons co-production not only encourages the spread of advanced military technology, which is generally undesirable, particularly in the developing world, but it also raises intense pressures from the co-producers to enter the international arms trade. When national needs for co-produced items are filled, pressures rise to find third country markets in order to keep workers employed and the plant productive. Unfortunately, many of these markets are in the third world. These are the basic reasons that led to this control in the first place.

On the other hand, co-production offers a number of advantages to the United States and its allies. Indeed, it is a basic element in our NATO policy to encourage both standardization and interoperability of equipment as well as a fairer division of military production between the United States and Western Europe, the so-called two-way street. Such co-production arrangements as the F-16 consortium and the U.S.-French-German arrangement to co-produce the French-Roland air defense missile are a reflection of this explicit NATO policy.

It is crystal clear that if we want the Europeans to standardize on equipment—and from a military efficiency point of view it is important that they do—we must offer them economic incentives, that is, access to technology, production know-how, and above all, jobs and balance of payments relief.

For big ticket items, it has become increasingly difficult to sell off-the-shelf. In order to sell any major weapons system to a developed country, an attractive co-production arrangement or offset of some kind is almost always a necessary part of the agreement.

But the liabilities of pursuing the co-production route remain, and they are precisely those just noted, that is, what markets, if any, are we prepared to offer co-production partners when their own needs are filled?

To give just one example of the problem, Italy is co-producing or producing under license a broad range of U.S. military equipment from armored personnel carriers to helicopters. At the same time, one of Italy's good military customers is Libya. Few would feel comfortable today seeing U.S.-designed military equipment freely supplied to Libya by Italy or any other country purely for the sake of advancing NATO standardization.

Although by law the United States retains control of every third country sale, each co-production and licensing agreement carries with it this potential for recurring diplomatic irritation. How we can best handle the issue of NATO-co-production arrangements and what kind of agreements we can reach that will satisfy the objectives of our NATO policy on the one hand, and arms restraint on the other, cannot be answered in the abstract. The nature of the agreement will depend in part on what is being co-produced and what the potential market is, and in part on the resource investment the co-producer will have to make in order to participate in the program.

These are but two of the examples of the kind of interpretative problems that this policy, like most new policies, creates. They are not unexpected, particularly in a policy that plows as much new ground as this one. Neither are they particularly difficult to resolve, provided only that they are given careful thought and dispassionate analysis.

Looking back over the last two years, I am struck by the degree to which the arms transfer community, both government and industry, has been sensitized to a new set of concerns and to the fact that the arms business is not like other businesses. Exporting precision guided munitions, high performance aircraft, and heavy armor is not a casual operation—it is something that deserves constant oversight and scrupulous attention to the whys, the wherefores and the likely consequences. I am satisfied that this lesson has been absorbed; that the arms transfer community takes the policy seriously and wants to make it work efficiently and well. I am equally convinced that where changes are needed, they can be worked out without sacrificing the policy's basic objectives. In short, the supertanker is well under control and that, perhaps, is our most important accomplishment.

Will the Soviet Union Be an Autarky in 1984?

Marshall I. Goldman

As interest in trade with the Soviet Union soars and sinks, the underlying suspicion persists that even under the best of circumstances, this is a short-run affair. Even if somehow the United States should decide on a consistent policy and separate trade from politics, Most Favored Nation treatment, and Export-Import Bank credits from emigration and SALT, many suspect that the Soviets would take what they could for a few years, and once they had mastered Western technology, they would retreat back into the splendid isolation of the Eurasian continent. Trade volume would shrink, and the Soviets would revert to their autarkic policy of the 1930s and 1950s. What are Soviet intentions? How much choice do they have in these matters?

Trade in this era of advanced technology and depleted resources serves to increase interdependence even among political rivals, but it will only do so if both parties meet their obligations. On the Soviet side the obligations include regularizing foreign trade; that is, making trade a regular rather than a sometime activity and keeping trade deficits at a minimum. But the obligations are not unilateral. The Western world will also have to accept some responsibilities if it expects to regularize trade with the Soviet Union. It will have to concern itself with more than just export sales to the Soviet Union; it will also have to begin absorbing imports as well. As the imports offered by the Soviet Union move beyond the raw material stage to include products with value added, this increased flow of Soviet imports is not likely to be warmly received. Yet we cannot expect to encourage Soviet interdependence on the world economy if we focus solely on export sales.

Playing By the Rules of the Game

One of the most striking developments in recent East-West trade is how the Soviets have sought to reduce their trade deficit. As indicated in Table 1, the Soviets found themselves in 1975 and 1976 with a trade deficit of unprecedented proportions. For the most part they were caught unaware by what happened. True, \$2.5 billion of their \$3.9 billion deficit in 1975 and \$2.9 billion of the \$3.3 billion deficit in 1976 were due to the grain they had to import to make up for their disastrous harvest. But in 1972-73 during an

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earlier crop failure, they also went into foreign grain markets without generating anything near the same size trade deficit.

The reason for the difference between 1972-73 and 1975-76 is that like so many other nations, the Soviets in 1975-76 were affected by the recession. However, the impact was intensified because the Soviets were victimized by their own rhetoric. For decades their economists boasted that the Soviet Union with its insular economy was immune to capitalist recessions. At the same time, Soviet planners had concluded that the 1973-74 surge in raw material prices benefited not only the OPEC countries, but the Soviet Union. After all, in 1974, exports of raw materials accounted for almost 75 percent of total Soviet hard currency earnings, of which petroleum alone brought in close to 40 percent. It was this raw material bonanza that made possible the record trade surplus of almost \$600 million in 1974. [See Table 1.] To the Soviets, there seemed little reason to doubt that the trend would continue into 1975. Consequently in 1975, they continued to import on a business

Table 1
Soviet Trade Balances With Hard Currency Countries
(in hundred million dollars)

in hundred million dollars							
Capitalist Data	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Imports from USSR	2,553	2,915	4,561	6,839	7,166	8,803	10,548
Exports to USSR	2,251	3,328	4,894	6,258	11,086	12,106	12,112
Balance for USSR	+302	-413	-333	+581	-3,920	-3,303	-1,564
Soviet data	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Exports to West	2,319	2,491	4,327	6,739	6,346	8,420	10,187
Imports from West	2,429	3,565	5,254	6,910	11,419	12,574	11,845
Balance	-110	-1,074	-927	-171	-5,073	-4,154	-1,658
Exchange rate: 1971, 1 ruble = \$1.11							
1972, 1 ruble = 1.21							
1973, 1 ruble = 1.34							
1974, 1 ruble = 1.34							
1975, 1 ruble = 1.32							
1976, 1 ruble = 1.34							
1977, 1 ruble = 1.37							

cycle—as usual basis. It was much too late before they discovered that they were not as immune as they had thought. According to the statistics of the International Monetary Fund, while Soviet hard currency imports in 1975 almost doubled from the \$6.3 billion of 1974, Soviet exports rose by less than \$350 million. (Soviet statistics actually show a decline of almost \$400 million in hard currency exports.) As a result, within one year's time, the Soviet trade balance moved from a record surplus to a record deficit. The 1975 poor grain crop plus the recession proved too much for the Soviet economy. As Soviet planners now know, they must heed not only Mother Nature, but Father Capitalism.

As the 1975 trade deficit continued into 1976, Western bankers began to express their fears about the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's own position was compounded by an equally serious situation in Eastern Europe. While the Soviets had never openly committed themselves, it was widely assumed that the Soviet Union had signed on as a guarantor for Eastern Europe's debt as well. Inevitably some bankers became more hesitant about lending. Interest rates for loans to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union began to rise and the Soviets were forced to reassess their foreign trade situation.

Once they realized the seriousness of their situation, the Soviets began to take appropriate measures. It was almost as if the man from the International Monetary Fund had been sent to Moscow to prescribe his usual rehabilitation prescription: decrease imports and increase exports. Aided by a good harvest in 1976, the Soviets were able to cut back on grain imports in the last quarter of 1976. As a result Soviet imports for 1976 were held to an increase of \$1 billion while Soviet exports increased by over \$1.6 billion. The belt-tightening continued into 1977 when total imports actually fell by about \$700 million from the preceding year (according to Soviet data—held constant according to Capitalist data), while in contrast, exports increased by about \$1.7 billion. [See Table 1.] As a result the hard currency trade deficit was reduced to \$1.6–\$1.7 billion, about \$2 billion dollars less than in the preceding year.

An import contraction of this magnitude means that someone is selling less to the Soviet Union than he did the year before. Nor was it only the grain dealers. Exports from West Germany and Japan also were reduced. This is worth noting, especially because some American observers focused only on the drop of American exports, which fell by about \$550 million. Grain exports alone accounted for \$500 million of this. While American machinery exports did diminish, the fact that similar exports from Germany,

Japan, Sweden and Switzerland also fell, suggests that in part the American reduction was the result of a general cutback and not due purely to Soviet political pique over human rights.

This effort to reduce the size of their trade deficit was the Soviet way of demonstrating to Western financiers that Soviet credit was good. But it also indicates something else. Whether they realize it or not, Soviet trade authorities are playing by the rules of the world trading system. They may have backed into such a position inadvertently, but there is clear evidence that the Soviets have had to alter their preferred way of conducting foreign economic affairs.

At the simplest level this has meant they have had to reduce and even cancel orders for imports. That has not only had an impact on consumers, who now find fewer goods on the shelves, but on factory managers, who are hoping for foreign technology to increase their productivity. At the same time the increase in exports since 1974 is due almost entirely to a dramatic increase in energy exports, particularly petroleum. In 1975 and 1976, the Soviets increased their petroleum exports to hard currency countries so that exports in 1976 had increased by 18 million tons over 1974 or almost 400,000 barrels a day. That resulted in almost \$2 billion more in hard currency earnings in 1976 over 1974, which accounted for virtually the entire increase in Soviet export earnings in that period. [See Table 1.] The trend continued into 1977. Hard currency petroleum exports brought in yet almost another \$1 billion.

Inevitably exports of such magnitude have had an impact on the domestic economy. Thus in 1976, domestic petroleum consumption rose by less than 3 percent, the first time this has happened since World War II. Until 1975 and 1976, the increase normally was at least 7 percent a year. It was not that there was a substantial fall in the rate of growth of petroleum production in 1976. On the contrary, production increased by 29 million tons, almost as much as in 1975. But two-thirds of that 1976 production increase was diverted to the export sector. Undoubtedly the reduced availability of petroleum contributed to the fall in the growth rate of the Soviet GNP. Presumably this would not have happened if the Soviet Union had chosen instead to flaunt the obligations that a country assumes when participating in international trade.¹

1. So far the Soviet record seems better than the American one in this respect.

That the Soviets have changed their ways is not to deny that some of the Western companies doing business in the Soviet market have also had to make changes. In other words, the Soviets have made some concessions to the Western way of conducting business but in no way can it be said that they have succumbed to the lures of the free market or forsworn regimentation and state control. Multinational corporations in Moscow do not operate as they do in London or even Tokyo. For instance, some Western businessmen have agreed to accept repayment from the Soviet Union in bartered goods at low interest rates over extended periods of time; terms they seldom if ever extend to any other country. Some have also agreed to participate in joint ventures even though quality control cannot be absolutely assured. Finally, many of them have also agreed to limitations on the way they run their day to day affairs in Moscow that would not be tolerated in other countries. For example, they are told who they can hire and fire and whether or not their Xerox machine is being used for anti-Soviet purposes. None of this should be too shocking because American businessmen pride themselves on their flexibility and the way they can adopt to new modes of doing business.

The significance of these developments is on the Soviet side. The Soviets are not usually noted for their flexibility. Such adaptations, even if rather limited in our eyes, from the Soviet vantage point are far reaching. They are unusual not only from the economic and ideological points of view, but from a cultural and historical standpoint.

Slavophiles vs. Westernizers

There have always been insistent voices in the Soviet Union decrying almost any Russian involvement in international trade or intercourse. Any step, they argue, toward increased Soviet economic interdependence with the capitalist world is ultimately bound to be economically disadvantageous and also may be disruptive to the traditional Russian cultural and social structure. The diversion of Soviet petroleum from domestic to foreign markets does nothing to allay the first set of such fears. This exploitation, some call it rape, of Russian natural wealth for the benefit of Western multinational corporations is exactly what these opponents of increased trade have campaigned against. Moreover, the benefits of increased entanglement with the West are ephemeral. The technology purchased becomes outdated quickly while the Russian raw materials, wastefully squandered by aliens in the West, are lost forever

to future Russian generations. Finally, reminiscent of the Slavophiles, their spiritual predecessors of a century ago, today's "isolationists," warn that involvement with the outside world will probably lead to social and economic corruption at home as the Russians are exposed and then tempted and even forced into adopting the alien ways of the liberalized and generally decadent West.

Perhaps these sentiments were most forcefully spelled out by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in a letter he wrote to the Kremlin leaders dated September 5, 1973. In it he called for a halt to "the exhaustion of our natural resources" in large scale industrial production at home as well as in their exportation. This is too large a price to pay for the "scientific technical progress" imported from the West. He calls for an end to the sale of "natural resources, natural gas, timber, etc.," and a return to economic self sufficiency and isolationism.²

Obviously Solzhenitsyn is not an official spokesman for any faction of official government opinion, yet there is no doubt that he reflects a widely held view among both Soviet civilians and officials. This is reflected not only in private discussions, but publicly. For example, Professor Surovov in *Pravda* insisted that Lenin's program as adopted at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party in 1925 called for a policy of "economic independence for the Soviet Union from the world of capitalist economies."³ Similarly, American sponsors of the Neftegas (oil and gas) exhibition of American petroleum and gas equipment held in Moscow in October, 1977, were unprepared for some of the questions asked by reporters at a press conference called specifically to promote the sale of such equipment. What does one say when a Soviet questioner asks, "Won't the use of this equipment lead to the depletion of our Soviet resources?" The conference organizer assumed he had misunderstood the question and asked that it be repeated.

Given their concern about the danger of such interaction, some proponents of this point of view do all they can to hamper or even prevent such trade. Undoubtedly this in part accounts for the periodic harassment and on occasion the arrest of Western businessmen. Such incidents dampen the enthusiasm of foreign businessmen for such trade and probably make other Soviets more cautious and doubtful about pursuing increased interchange.

Countering such attitudes, those who favor increased interdependence

2. *The New York Times*, March 3, 1974, p. 26; *The New York Review of Books*, June 13, 1974, pp. 3, 4.

3. *Pravda*, December 18, 1975, p. 2.

insist that the Soviet Union cannot hope to keep abreast of the technological growth of the West without such trade. They also recognize that since for now the Soviet Union cannot produce manufactured goods that are salable in hard-currency markets, the Soviet Union has no choice but to finance its purchases through the sale of Soviet raw materials. The most articulate spokesman for this school of thought is Andrei Sakharov. As he put it, "Our country cannot exist in economic and scientific isolation without world trade, including trade in the country's natural resources, or divorced from the world's scientific-technical progress."⁴ He too is hardly an official spokesman, but from conversations with Soviet officials in Moscow his views also reflect those of a large number of others. Similarly, these arguments are in many ways identical to those advanced in the nineteenth century—in this instance by the Westernizers, the main opponents of the Slavophiles. Today's Westernizers defend themselves in part by insisting that Lenin favored rather than opposed such interaction. Moreover, they rationalize that foreigners will have access to only a minute portion of the known deposits of oil, gas, and coal.⁵

A Growing Interdependence

Whatever the merits of the debate, Soviet officials, even if inadvertently, are involving the Soviet economy in an ever growing entanglement with the capitalist world. Amid starts, stops, and some retreats, overall there seems to be movement. More importantly, this movement seems to be qualitatively different from what happened in the late 1920s and 1930s when a similar phenomenon seemed to be occurring. Then, as now, the Soviets had embarked on a massive drive to modernize their industrial structure. Hundreds of American and other Western technicians and engineers were sent by their employers to the Soviet Union to help the Soviets master industrial procedures long used in the Western world. Those corporations involved included Ford, which built the automobile plants at Gorky and Moscow; International Harvester, which built the Stalingrad Tractor Plant; General Electric, which built the Khemz Turbine plant at Kharkov; and Dupont, which built the

4. *The New York Review of Books*, June 13, 1974, p. 4.

5. Keith Bush, "Soviet Economic Growth: Past, Present and Projected," *Radio Liberty Research Supplement*, September 12, 1975, p. 8.

Kalinin and Shostka Nitric Acid plants.⁶ Simultaneously the Soviets sent out dozens of their technicians to study Western factory methods.

Many were convinced that this turn to the capitalist world heralded a new and irreversible era in Soviet economic development. However, by the mid-1930s, Stalin severed virtually all trade and personal ties. Soviet imports from the United States fell from over 200 million rubles a year in 1930 to 25 million rubles in 1932. Similarly, imports from Germany fell from 322 million rubles in 1931 to 23 million rubles in 1934. It was at least a decade before the Soviets began to increase their trade volume to any appreciable extent.

Therefore, why should we believe that some future Soviet leader will not revert to the same course of action again? The Soviets may have needed spare parts and new infusions of technology, but from the best we can gather, economic growth did not unduly suffer in the 1930s. It should be remembered that not only were Western products virtually cut off, but that Stalin threw a large percentage of his country's own technicians, both those trained overseas and those not, into prison. Since the economy seemed to flourish with almost no foreign interaction, could it be that the modern Slavophiles are correct and that if they have their way, the pattern can be repeated?

As careful analysts of the Soviet system learned long ago, when predicting Soviet behavior, no course of action, no matter how seemingly irrational, can be ruled out. Indeed, the "impossible" happens all the time in the Soviet Union. If anything, it is the "possible" that causes the trouble. Yet there does seem to be something different about the way Soviet planners are using foreign trade and technology today. While it would be rash to assert that the Soviets have reached the point of no return, there is good reason to believe that the Soviets have already so deeply entangled themselves in the world economy that each day it becomes more and more difficult to return to autarky. Of course if there were a hot war, all ties would be broken quickly. Certainly many ties would be broken even if there were a return to the cold war tension of the mid-1950s. But each day that the present type of interaction continues, the cost of severing existing interrelationships increases and thereby generates its own dynamic toward maintaining the status quo.

This is not meant to suggest that foreign trade insures there will be no war. On the contrary, foreign trade as often as not is the source of tension.

6. Anthony Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930-1945*. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1971, pp. 100, 185, 246-248, 343.

Nevertheless, the present makeup of Soviet foreign trade is different from that of the 1920s and 1930s. A continuous supply of spare parts is more important today than it was previously. The technology of the 1930s was not especially sophisticated. Indeed the Soviets were able to replicate many of the factories both inside the Soviet Union and outside after World War II, as part of their own foreign aid program to both their Communist allies in China and Eastern Europe and to the third world. One steel mill then was not all that much different from another.

Today, however, technology is much more complicated and in need of continuous servicing and upgrading. For example, if an American computer breaks down today, it will normally not help to call in the local blacksmith, and let him hammer away until the computer is repaired. The same is true for the wide range of advanced electronics, petroleum and mineral extracting equipment and chemical manufacturing processes which the Soviets are purchasing abroad. Once purchased, this equipment must be maintained and spare parts supplied. True, the Soviets have neglected the maintenance of some Western equipment, but these are usually discreet pieces of equipment that stand or fall by themselves and do not feed into other processes. Where there is a flow process, continual maintenance is particularly important. Ironically, their passion for gigantomania means that they must rely more heavily than even we do on such interrelated processes and on systems type operations and industrial process controls which of course involve even heavier reliance on computers and other feedback mechanisms. For example, the Fiat-built automobile plant at Togliattigrad as well as the massive Kama River Truck plant are organized around computers. The Kama River Truck plant in particular is on real time and if its IBM computer breaks down, the plant will be in chaos. It is too big and complicated to run any other way. Since the Soviets are unable to develop their own hardware and software for such massive operations, they must turn to the West if they are to obtain the increased productivity they need so badly.

Similarly, the Soviets have to rely on the West for large control ball valves as well as turbines to operate their natural gas pipelines. Reflecting the immensity of their operation, the Soviets have purchased 242 of the General Electric designed and licensed units out of a total of 500 in existence all over the world. The "card" or transistor panel in each turbine must be serviced and repaired periodically. The Soviets have not been able to do this so General Electric has had to station a full time manager in Moscow to insure the proper functioning of these "cards" and turbines. Ultimately the Soviets

may be able to duplicate these "cards" themselves, but so far it has been very difficult and expensive for them to do so. Given that their prime consideration now is to keep the pipelines operating, they have apparently concluded that this cannot be done by relying on their own makeshift repairs.

In the same way, the Soviets badly need Western technology to increase their productivity. Given their dependence on petroleum exports, they are in particular need of the latest technology for increasing exploration, drilling, pumping, and secondary recovery: areas where their own technology has not kept abreast of development in the West.

There is also a strong probability that the Soviets are no longer self-sufficient in food. Like so many other countries of the world, the Soviets have decided that a heavy cholesterol count is the sign of an affluent society so they too are seeking to increase their consumption of meat. To do this they are attempting to build up their livestock herds which in turn means they must have feedgrains. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is ill-suited climatically for growing corn, the most efficient feed grain. Consequently the Soviets must depend heavily on foreign purchases. Since the United States is the only country that can produce a large exportable surplus, that means they must come to us. The magnitude of this shift is impressive. Whereas corn imports seldom exceeded one half million tons a year prior to 1970, they rose rapidly to an average level of 4.5 million tons from 1972 to 1975. Now they have doubled to an average of 10 to 11 million tons a year, necessitating an expenditure of over \$1 billion annually. These purchases can be reduced or even terminated, but the Soviets know that the savings in lower import expenditures will be immediately offset by the cost of slaughtered livestock herds. In addition, the recoupment period is slow. Based on the trend over the last decade, the Soviets seem to have made themselves dependent on the outside world for feedgrain imports regardless of whether or not there is a good wheat harvest.

Finally, while the Soviet Union may have the world's largest reserves of raw materials, it does not have them all. For instance, as Theodore Shabad has pointed out, imports are needed to provide at least 40 percent of the bauxite and alumina consumed in the Soviet Union.⁷ Based on important new contracts that have been signed recently, that percentage is likely to be

7. Theodore Shabad, "Raw Material Problems of the Soviet Aluminum Industry," *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, The Joint Economic Committee, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, October 14, 1976, p. 661.

increased in the years ahead. Indicative of their long run intentions, they have also decided to build a bauxite processing plant near Odessa to process this growing flow of imports. This plant is to be built by the French for about \$300 million, thereby adding to the ever more intricate pattern of interrelationships.⁸ There are an increasing number of such examples.

The Soviets may even be vulnerable to a cessation of imports even where they are net exporters. While the Soviets are now exporting over 32 billion cubic meters of natural gas, they are also importing 12 billion cubic meters. Almost 10 billion cubic meters of that import normally come from Iran and, rationally enough, is used by consumers in Soviet Georgia and Armenia which are nearer to Iranian fields than to Soviet fields. During the 1978 troubles in Iran, the Soviets were shocked to discover that the strikes in Iran affected not only the deliveries of oil to the West but of natural gas to the Soviet Union; an unexpected demonstration of how the Soviet economy has become interwoven with its neighbors.

Pipes and Ports

When evaluating interdependence, the normal custom is to concentrate on imports. However, interdependence may also come about because of an increase in exports. For example, the Soviets are building an extensive and expensive infrastructure intended almost solely to serve the international export market. If exports should be halted, this billion dollar investment in mining, production, and transportation would become worthless. One of their most expensive ventures in recent years has been a series of natural gas and petroleum pipelines, stretching thousands of miles westward from Siberia into and through Western Europe. Initially the Western consumers of these resources bear most of the cost of financing these lines, but as the loan is repaid, the Western companies recoup their investment and the pipelines then become almost entirely a Soviet burden. At that point, presumably the Soviets will feel extra pressure to maintain their flow of exports in order to increase their return on such projects. It should be remembered that Austria has been importing Soviet gas through such a pipeline for ten years. It will not be long before the Soviet Union will have to worry about its investment, and not only to Austria, which will have already been repaid

8. *Moscow Narodny Bank Bulletin*, May 5, 1976, pp. 3, 4.

with gas. Other export-oriented pipelines have been built by the Soviets for petroleum and ammonia and there seems to be a good chance that another natural gas pipeline will be built from Yakutia, heading east to the Japanese and American markets.

While the externally-oriented pipelines are perhaps the most locked-in of Soviet investments intended for a continuing program of foreign trade, the Soviets have also increased their stake in other long-term export projects. Kosygin has called for the development of industries designed specifically to produce for export markets.⁹ Of course most of the projects produced in such factories could easily be rerouted inland. For example, more than once I was approached by Muscovites to buy them Soviet produced radios that have been set aside for export markets and hard currency stores and therefore are difficult if not impossible to find in stores accessible to ordinary Soviet citizens with rubles. Since such goods are of higher quality than the goods normally intended for Soviet consumers, the demand is there should the government ever decide to keep the goods at home rather than export them. Yet the prime intent of the Soviet government in making the investment to produce such goods is to generate hard currency in foreign markets. It would be considered a waste if that were not the end result. In the same way, the Soviet Union has built up an extensive ocean-going merchant marine as well as a land route container and port system designed to carry cargoes destined primarily for foreign markets. It might be possible to salvage some use from these facilities for purely domestic purposes if necessary, but basically the investment would be wasted if the Soviets decided to withdraw or were forced from the field of foreign commerce and cut themselves off as they did in earlier less interconnected times.

Leverage Interruptus

There is a danger in exaggerating the extent of this growing Soviet interdependence with the capitalist world, but there is no doubt that it exists. Already some of the implications of this relationship are becoming apparent. Most of them impose restraints on the Soviet Union and therefore are to the long-run advantage of the West and the United States in particular.

While it is not always easy to pinpoint, there are an increasing number of

9. *Sotsialisticheskaiia Industriia*, March 2, 1976, p. 3.

officials and managers in the Soviet Union with a vested interest in continuing trade relations with the West. These include not only those in the Ministry of Foreign Trade whose jobs depend on such trade as well as those with already installed Western equipment, but those who hope that some day they too will be beneficiaries of this technology. Paradoxically, Western observers opposed to such trade have pointed out that some of the partisans of increased interaction include representatives of the Soviet military forces (a body normally strongly supportive of the Slavophile cause) who count on the Western technology to increase the military effectiveness of the Soviet armaments industry.

At the same time, we should recognize that in any truly interdependent situation, there are not only Soviets who are interested in increasing their trade relationship with the West and the United States, but vice versa. For some time the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council has served as such a forum for the business world while the Committee on East-West Accord has set itself up as a more generalized lobby. While both organizations periodically may lose their perspective, on the whole their existence is to be welcomed. In the past the only ones who ventured to speak out for a less cold war type response to Soviet initiatives were members or supporters of the Left. Now there is a group of respectable members of the Establishment who are willing to take on their counterparts in the Committee on the Present Danger, or at least to suggest a more complex analysis than that which used to emerge in such one-sided debates.

On the whole, however, it would seem that for the near future the Soviets are more in need of trade with the West than the West is in need of Soviet trade. This is reflected in terms of the share of American exports and imports from the Soviet Union as a percentage of total American foreign trade versus the comparable figure of Soviet exports to and imports from the United States for the Soviet Union. It can also be judged by the importance of what each country buys from the other. If the Soviet Union were to declare an embargo on the sale of goods to the United States, we might be hard pressed and have to turn to Rhodesia for chrome and to find some other precious metals for use as catalysts in our automobiles, but no sector of the economy would be crippled. By contrast, if a similar decision were made to hold back American exports, as indicated above, certain sectors in the Soviet Union would be badly hurt. It may be, of course, that it is no longer possible for the United States Government to impose embargoes on the Soviet Union. When it comes to grain, we discovered in 1975, our farmers may not stand

for it and when it comes to technology and equipment, we find that our allies are all too eager to sell the same or if need be, a second best good. So where is the leverage?

Certainly it is not easy to satisfy those skeptics who wonder how and where leverage has forced the Soviets to circumscribe their behavior. Yet as aggravating and frustrating as recent Soviet actions have been at home, and in Central Europe and Africa, there is evidence to suggest that occasionally the Soviets have been forced to alter their behavior significantly from their usual pattern. There are three major examples of this. The first has to do with the emigration of Soviet Jews. We take the phenomenon for granted now, but we should remember that this is not a usual Soviet practice. That they should allow as many as 4000 a month to emigrate in late 1978 would have been regarded as a pipe dream before 1968. The earlier peak was reached in 1973 and early 1974 when the Soviets were seeking to curry favor with the U.S. Senate, so that it would grant the Soviet Union most favored nation (MFN) status.

Subsequently the rate fell to 1,100 a month. Presumably the higher rate in 1978 was related to Soviet desire to facilitate the passage of the SALT Treaty and the further hope that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment will then be repealed. It is unfortunate that we cannot always be on the verge of deciding about MFN or holding the Olympics; a policy of "leverage interruptus," as Edward Keenan has called it.

The second and third examples occurred at a time of a serious Soviet need for American grain. In the spring of 1972, when the Soviets were in short supply of wheat, they swallowed their pride in an unprecedented fashion and renewed their invitation to President Nixon to visit even though he had just announced the bombing of Hanoi and the blockade of Haiphong Harbor. Bread was more important than principle.

The third instance took place during the May, 1975 embargo on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had an even poorer harvest in 1975 than in 1972. Again the United States was the only country with supplies sufficient to satisfy Soviet needs. In retrospect it is not surprising that the Soviets during this period maintained a low political profile. Yet their quiescence came during the period of Kissinger's intense shuttle negotiations which led to the second Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. This was a process that the Soviets had opposed. As it turned out, their political position in the Middle East did suffer significantly in the aftermath of the withdrawal. Yet because they badly needed the grain, they were quiet for fear of provoking

an even more negative reaction from the United States. The agreement was negotiated with a minimum of Soviet interference.

Of course there are relatively few instances where the trade lever can be exercised so effectively. Based on our experience so far, for leverage to work, the Soviets must want something that only we in the United States are in a position to provide and that might be provided. It would be nice if we could also enlist our allies to back us up when necessary in a united front. However, given their current attitude toward the extension of long-term and low interest credits and their reluctance to restrict the sale of strategic equipment, there seems to be little hope of any restraint on their part. Nor will it become any easier to take a hard line on the sale of goods to the Soviet Union when everyone is racing to see who can sell the most of everything to the Chinese. Nevertheless, even where the political payoffs are more tenuous, there seem to be more advantages than disadvantages to a policy which seeks to entangle the Soviet Union in world trade.

At the other extreme, when the Soviets are in an autarkic mode and indifferent to world opinion, there are fewer direct pressure points to exercise, and therefore there is less reason for them to respond to international public opinion. Not everyone is convinced of such reasoning. But whether we like it or not, there is not much we in the United States can do to halt the process of interaction even if we want to do so. But the exercise of leverage becomes a more and more indirect procedure, since, unfortunately, we are able to exercise a monopoly over fewer and fewer goods; and except for grain, the Soviets will, if need be, turn elsewhere.

What Goes Out Must Come Back

Difficult as the debate on the political effectiveness of the trade weapon is to resolve, the issue is soon to become even more complicated. The nature of the East-West import-export picture is beginning to change. Heretofore the Soviet Union has really been an ideal foreign trade partner, at least in the traditionalist's view of foreign trade. Since 1969, the United States has exported more than it has imported from the Soviet Union. In 1976 the surplus was as high as \$2 billion in our favor. Of course a good portion of that was grain. Unlike the Japanese and West Europeans, when we shipped industrial technology to the Soviets, they did not send it back by return ship in the form of competitive products or in an improved version. With few exceptions, the only products the Soviets could find to sell that were acceptable in Western markets were raw materials which in 1976 brought in as much as 83



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
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
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percent of their earnings. The Soviets still have not mastered the process by which innovations are converted into mass production. Consequently there seems little reason to fear a Soviet threat in markets where technology changes rapidly.

However, while there are markets where technology changes may be safe, Western producers of less sophisticated products may be in for competition from the Soviets for the first time. Belatedly the Soviets have recognized that the road to economic development is to start with raw materials and to increase gradually the amount of processing or value added applied to these products, particularly where technology change is not important. In the past the Soviets often sought to compete at the more complicated end of the production spectrum, but given their difficulty with innovation, that was too big a leap for them. After a long learning period, they have decided to concentrate their efforts at the lower level of the production sphere. After much effort, some of their investments are finally beginning to pay off. The Soviets along with their East European allies are beginning to increase their output of semifabricated raw materials. For years they have been purchasing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of machinery in order to take advantage of Soviet and East European petrochemical feedstocks. Much of this machinery has been obtained on a counterpurchase basis. Under this arrangement, the Western exporter of the machinery agrees to accept repayment in the form of products which ultimately will be produced by that machinery. This spares the Soviet Union the need of having to come up with the hard currency needed to pay for the purchases and at the same time, it relieves them of the need to develop a market for their products.

Commodities already or about to be produced on such a basis include methanol, urea, phosphoric acid, ammonia, iron ore pellets, synthetic fiber, synthetic rubber, polyethylene, polyvinyl chloride, polypropylene, styrene and aluminum.¹⁰ As more and more of these factories come on stream, the flow of such goods should increase markedly. Indicative of what lies ahead is the fact that 20 percent of all the synthetic rubber imported by France and 30 percent of all imports by The Netherlands now come from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.¹¹ Of even more concern is the fact that the price of such products is generally set 20 percent to 30 percent below the market.

It is unlikely that the Soviets and the East Europeans will desist from

10. *Foreign Trade*, December 1975, p. 10; September 1977, p. 30; *Ekonomicheskaja gazeta*, No. 5, January 1977, p. 21; No. 18, April 1978, p. 21; *The Wall Street Journal*, December 1, 1977, p. 45.

11. *The Financial Times*, December 29, 1977, p. 10.

undercutting the market. The pressure is too great to increase their exports. Under the circumstances, they are mystified when we insist that they reduce the size of their foreign trade debt and simultaneously charge them with dumping when they try to correct the situation by expanding their production efforts to include these new products.

This problem is likely to become more rather than less serious. Whereas we saw that the Soviets were not likely to be much of a competitive threat in world markets where technology changes rapidly, in other fields (such as those involved in counterpurchase where the resulting products are virtually unchanged over the years), the Soviets have a significant advantage. This is largely because they are not bound by the same price considerations that bedevil Western manufacturers. Given their urgent quest for hard currency, a transaction is a profitable one for them as long as they earn more in hard currency than they pay out. Except for the repayment of foreign equipment, almost all Soviet costs of production are in rubles. Consequently the absolute lowest price the Soviets might be willing to charge is quite low. They seldom go that low because they want to earn as much as they can, so they price just enough under the market to attract buyers, but no lower. This is best illustrated by a story often told by Eli Goldston, the late chairman of Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates. He found that no matter what price he quoted on coal exports to Japan, the Soviets always underbid his price by something like 50 cents a ton. The night before one bargaining session, he encountered his Soviet counterpart in a Tokyo bar. "Why is it that I always end up bidding first? Why don't you offer a bid and then give me a chance to counter?" His Soviet friend responded by saying that would be fine for he already decided on his bid. "What is it?" Goldston asked. "Fifty cents below whatever you bid!" In weak markets such practices are likely to provoke anguished cries of dumping as is now happening in Europe, and just beginning in the United States.¹²

Gluts and Shortages

The solution to this growing problem is not easily found. Conceivably the countries which will be the ultimate targets of these semi-processed goods could band together to discourage the sale to communist countries of the

12. Ibid., *The New York Times*, August 10, 1977, p. 37. There are early signs of the same reaction in the United States. *The Wall Street Journal*, June 5, 1978, p. 13.

manufacturing hardware that makes these semi-processed goods. So far such an approach has not been too successful. On the one hand there is a nagging fear that even if a few countries agree not to facilitate the sale of such production potential to the Soviet Union, there will always be at least one country that will be unable to hold firm. On the other hand, even though everyone agrees that continued hardware sales of technology are likely to increase the anguish of Western chemical manufacturers and their employees, governments like Germany, France, and Italy are determined to encourage their indigenous hardware manufacturers to compete actively for such contracts. If need be, these governments are prepared to sweeten their export terms. They have reasoned that they can afford to do so because such subsidized exports will make it possible for them to eliminate the unemployment compensation they would otherwise have to pay in the hardware and steel industries.¹³ While this may lead to the future distress of the chemical industry and an increase in the future in unemployment compensation, this will presumably be the worry of some future government.

It is possible, of course, that the anticipated problems may solve themselves. Significantly, there is a historical precedent. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the big seven oil companies along with NATO and the U.S. Congress were deeply concerned about the dumping of petroleum by the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Partially as a result of Soviet actions, the world price of petroleum did fall. (Incidentally, in reaction to this weakening of world prices, the oil producers decided in 1960 to form OPEC.) Congressional hearings were held and dire warnings broadcast that such Soviet actions would spell the downfall of NATO, the oil companies, and ultimately the entire capitalist system. Undismayed by such predictions, the Soviets kept exporting. Yet as market conditions changed, the Soviets found they no longer had to force their way into the market and therefore there was no or less need for them to cut prices. By 1973 and the advent of the 1973 Yom Kippur oil embargo, the Soviets leaped at the chance to charge as much as \$17 a barrel.

In the same way, conceivably, poor harvests could affect market conditions for petrochemicals and fertilizer products so that demand and prices will

13. *Business Week*, May 1, 1978, p. 46; *The Review of Sino-Soviet Oil*, April 1978, pp. 49-50.

14. United States Senate, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of Judiciary, Export of Strategic materials to the U.S.S.R. and other Soviet Bloc Countries: Problems Raised by Soviet Oil Developments*, 87th Congress, second session, 1963, Part 3, pp. 386, 406.

firm. Similarly, since the feedstocks are mostly energy related, another energy crisis would affect the price and availability of the petrochemical by-product. In other words, it would be rash to predict that the problems will never be solved.

It is Not a One Way Street

While it has brought with it complications as well as benefits, there seems little doubt that the Soviet Union finds itself interacting in an ever increasing fashion with the OECD economies. To some extent this involvement has been an inadvertent or involuntary one. At the same time it has not gone so far as to be totally irreversible. The Soviets are not yet beyond the point of no return. Despite what appears to be a leap into the twentieth century, it is shocking to learn just how insulated the Soviet economy remains. Yet each day the entanglement seems to grow and a decision to sever existing ties has become increasingly expensive and disruptive.

In the political context this trend seems more positive than negative. Yet there are some obvious disadvantages for the West in such a relationship. In particular there are some emerging economic difficulties that we would do well to prepare for. Our ability to digest or accommodate the flow of goods, particularly the petrochemicals that are beginning to emerge from the machinery already sold to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, will not be easy. It may necessitate both monetary and social adjustment that could be painful. That would be unfortunate. At a time when there is already enough tension in the American-Soviet political relationship, failure to prepare for this impending economic problem will only exacerbate that tension. We would do well therefore to face up to our responsibilities in this interdependent era so that the process of entangling the Soviet economy with the West may continue.

The Implications of Sino-American Normalization

Jonathan D. Pollack

China in early 1979 is poised on the edge of a new political era. Nearly three decades after the formal establishment of the People's Republic, full diplomatic relations with the United States have finally been achieved. A Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan, signed in October 1978, has consummated an equally historic process of rapprochement, with Tokyo prepared for the first time to align with one of the principal disputants in the Sino-Soviet conflict, at obvious cost for its relations with the other. In a broad range of international initiatives, China's leadership is now pursuing concrete, long-term ties to the West and to Japan in foreign trade, purchases of advanced technology (both military and civilian), and diplomatic measures aimed at countering Soviet political and military power. Party-to-party relations with Albania and Vietnam, both close Chinese allies in the past, have been vituperatively severed, along with all economic and military agreements. Peking's sudden military assault into Vietnam's northernmost provinces in February, 1979, furnishes even more potent and revealing evidence of the magnitude of the departure from past policies. As old allies have been discarded and even invaded, China has made its peace with still older antagonists. Thus, party-to-party ties with Yugoslavia, scorned for nearly two decades as the principal source of modern revisionism, have been fully restored, with President Tito and Hua Kuo-feng, China's new Party Chairman, exchanging highly publicized visits. Finally, many of these changes have diminished China's long identification with and focus upon the third world. With a speed and apparent finality that few observers would have thought possible, the People's Republic's leadership seems determined to pursue an international course in the coming decade that at best bears only partial resemblance to the professed ideals of the past.

Changes underway in China's domestic politics and economics since the death of Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung in September 1976 hold even more potential significance. While comparisons to Soviet politics following the death of Stalin are inevitable and perhaps somewhat facile, they are not wholly inapt. A remarkable range of political, economic, and institutional initiatives, launched under the aegis and active guidance of Party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-p'ing, have progressed farther and faster than most ob-

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servers would have dared predict. Decisions made in late 1978 to restore a number of Mao's bitterest rivals to political respectability have conveyed to the Chinese populace that very little associated with the late Chairman should still be considered sacrosanct. At the same time, clear signs of openness in voicing opinions and airing grievances—both among Chinese and between Chinese and foreigners—suggest a political system in considerable transition, with old norms now subject to intermittent but at times cogent challenge. The manner and ultimate extent of this political evolution are very difficult to gauge at this point. But at least some of China's new leaders—beginning with Teng Hsiao-p'ing himself—are not inclined to interfere too strongly with such increased expressiveness. No matter how modest this political breakthrough might appear, the contrast with previous policy is extraordinary.

Wherever the People's Republic might be headed, greatly heightened attention to economic modernization is already a principal consequence of this transition. China's industrial and scientific development, so long stymied by divisive internal politics and a frequently doctrinaire pursuit of self-reliance, has been launched on its most ambitious course in two decades. Achieving the "comprehensive modernization" of the nation's agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (labeled the "four modernizations") by the year 2000 has been enshrined in the new Party constitution. Growth targets in various economic sectors border on the grandiose, most being premised on the rapid introduction and assimilation of advanced foreign technology. Between 1978 and 1985, China plans to spend approximately \$600 billion to achieve an initial economic breakthrough, with over \$40 billion committed to purchases of technology from abroad.¹ The bulk of these purchases will be intended to contribute to the expansion and enhancement of China's overall economic and industrial infrastructure, in particular the purchase and development of integrated modern complexes in basic industries such as iron and steel. Even the campaign of criticism against the despised and deposed "gang of four" has been declared closed, with 1979 being deemed the "appropriate time" to shift the focus of Party work to the tasks of modernization and scientific and technological development.²

1. *The China Business Review*, September-October 1978, pp. 36, 65.

2. See the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, December 22, 1978, in *Peking Review*, #52, December 29, 1978, pp. 6-16.

Higher education, badly decimated during a decade of extreme domestic conflict, is also being revamped in the service of the nation's ambitious economic goals. Educational planners envisage sending thousands of Chinese students abroad to acquire scientific and technical training not available within China. Past insistence that a substantial percentage of students' time be devoted to political education has been submerged in calls for serious, sustained professional development. In Teng Hsiao-p'ing's characteristically pithy phrase, there must now be "less idle talk and more hard work." Such sentiments are likely to undo much of the political handiwork crafted by Mao over the course of nearly two decades. While the ultimate results of this process are difficult to foresee, historic choices have clearly been made in Peking that seem certain to exert a major influence not only on China's future, but on regional and global politics as well.

China's Security in Transition

China's recent diplomatic breakthroughs cannot be dated from Mao's death or the political disgrace of his widow Chiang Ch'ing and her political allies. Rather, they are among the more telling results of a process of political and strategic realignment begun nearly a decade ago. Any residual ambiguity about Peking's determination to pursue far closer ties to the West and to Japan (thereby reducing China's political, economic, and military vulnerabilities) has nevertheless been eliminated by the results of the Chinese succession.³

Though Teng Hsiao-p'ing's rise to political preeminence has accelerated the pace and broadened the scope of this realignment, many of the assumptions underlying such change have been apparent throughout much of the 1970s. Chinese assessments assert that the P.R.C.'s security reorientation dates from changes in the international system first evident during the mid and late 1960s.⁴ The onset of Soviet military pressure against the People's Republic at that time coincided with China's political and diplomatic isolation in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. The coincidence of these circumstan-

3. A more detailed discussion of this issue may be found in my "Political Succession and Foreign Policy in China," *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall-Winter 1978.

4. For the most comprehensive and revealing official assessment, see "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," *Jen-min Jih-pao* [People's Daily], November 1, 1977, trans. in *Peking Review*, #45, November 4, 1977, pp. 10-41.

ces was clearly pivotal in motivating Peking's overtures to the West and to Japan early in the 1970s.

Since that time, however, the tenor and terms of Chinese concerns have undergone a pronounced change. As the American political and security threat to China diminished, Peking's efforts shifted to countering the worldwide growth of Soviet power and its resultant effects on the security of third parties more than its impact on China. In 1973, for example, Chinese officials began to warn about possible Soviet aggression against the West, even asserting that the Soviet military presence along the Sino-Soviet border was more a diversionary tactic than a serious threat to China. These concerns were later broadened to include attacks on "the forces of appeasement" who were prepared to acquiesce to Soviet global ambitions, thereby contributing to the possible onset of "a new world war." Calls for strengthening NATO's conventional and nuclear armament as well as support for the U.S. role in regional security arrangements in both Europe and Asia have also become more pointed and explicit. The forces of "German revanchism" and "Japanese militarism," reviled in the most extreme terms as late as 1971, are now warmly greeted in Peking. Even discussions of conflict in the third world are posed in almost alarmist terms, with the expressed fear of Moscow gaining control of various unstable situations and revolutionary movements.

For all of Peking's foreboding talk about the expansion of Soviet power, however, the readiness of the P.R.C. leadership to do more than talk about this issue is open to serious question. The actual military measures undertaken by China to counter the Soviet Union suggest a far less alarmist view of the international situation. Thus, U.S. government estimates indicate that Chinese military expenditure (including hardware procurement, manpower costs, and funds for research and development) remained virtually constant between 1972 and 1977, even though industrial productivity during this period grew by more than one-half.⁵

Why did P.R.C. defense spending not increase at a time of extreme military vulnerability and when (according to Mao) "the danger of war was visibly growing"? Several explanations are possible. The suspicions and possible antagonisms between civilian and military leadership in wake of the Lin Piao affair of September 1971 offer a possible clue. It was at that time that Lin,

5. This estimate derives from an analysis of trends in Chinese defense expenditure undertaken by the Office of Strategic Research of the Central Intelligence Agency, to be published in 1979 by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress.

then Minister of National Defense and constitutionally designated successor to Mao, died in a plane crash while fleeing China, after exposure of an alleged plot to overthrow Mao. Retrenchment in what had been a rapidly increasing defense budget in the late 1960s may thus have been a direct result of Lin's death and political disgrace. Continuing, and at times very divisive, internal political conflict throughout much of the early and mid-1970s may also have prevented or impeded the long term investment decisions that defense allocation would have required. For example, both Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were intent upon strengthening China economically and militarily to counter Soviet pressure, but domestic political circumstances seriously interfered with this effort until after the resolution of the Chinese succession. Only now, more than two years after Mao's death and the ouster of the "gang of four," has this process begun to gather real political momentum. Given the length of time required for integrating new technologies and ideas into an existing institutional base and industrial infrastructure, rapid changes remain rather unlikely. Nevertheless, the incongruity between China's actual defense effort and the pervasive anxiety about Soviet intentions conveyed by Chinese officials is worth pondering.

While technological, economic, and organizational constraints are only amenable to long-term modification, political conditions can exert a substantial impact in the shorter run. Since Mao's death, the disparity between what the Chinese wish others to do in the realm of national security and the steps Peking itself is prepared to undertake has begun to narrow. In the place of past assurances that any prospective attack on the P.R.C. was already deterred, more worrisome assessments about China's vulnerability to political and military pressure are now being voiced. Planning for the future of Chinese military power is increasingly posed in terms of the inadequacies and even outright dangers of relying on past defense strategies and technologies. There is, for example, the incongruous sight of Chinese military officers inspecting Leopard tanks and Royal Air Force Harriers, learning of technological breakthroughs in warfare that they have so long disparaged or ignored. Though actual weapons sales have been slow in coming to fruition, past strictures against acquiring advanced military technology from the West have been greatly reduced. Chinese military doctrine, so long cast (at least in its public form) in the tenets of "people's war," has shifted ground, with increasing attention to what is euphemistically termed "people's war under modern conditions." While such discussions remain very guarded and convey only the broadest outlines of debates over defense strategy, it is now

possible to consider in serious fashion China's present and future security needs.⁶

China's new relationship to the United States and the other major non-communist industrial powers is best viewed in this context. At a number of levels, China's present leaders seem determined to challenge and revise the premises underlying their past diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements with the outside world. The recent breakthroughs in both Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations have clearly culminated a key part of this process. But what are the potentialities of this possible strategic realignment? Can we identify the specific expectations that China's leaders currently have of an American connection? To what extent are Chinese and American perceptions of this issue compatible? What do such expectations portend for Soviet-American relations and the future of arms control? Though it is far too soon to offer conclusive judgments on such questions, the recent Sino-American negotiations offer some instructive insights.

Sino-American Normalization: Process and Impact

It is not our intention to review in great detail the specific events and circumstances leading to the sudden culmination of the Chinese-American negotiations for full diplomatic recognition. Many of the relevant details related to decision-making in both Peking and Washington are still lacking; indeed, the implications of the agreements themselves remain the object of considerable dispute. For the present, it seems more important to identify some of the broader calculations which ultimately led to the normalization agreement as well as consider their possible implications for both regional and global security issues.

Notwithstanding the protestations of the Carter Administration, the rapid acceleration of the normalization process during 1978 derived in good measure from a belief that the prospect and achievement of full diplomatic relations with Peking would prove nettlesome or worse for the Soviet Union. In early 1979, the worst fears of Soviet policymakers of a condominium among the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan arrayed politically and militarily against the Soviet Union can no longer be considered wholly hypothetical or alarmist. No matter how overstated such anxieties might seem,

6. For greater detail, see my "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1979, pp. 22-33; and "Rebuilding China's Great Wall," *ibid.*, forthcoming.

they derive from far more than a few intemperate remarks by Zbigniew Brzezinski on his visit to Peking in May 1978. Both the circumstances and possible consequences of Sino-American rapprochement are compelling Soviet officials to raise a singularly vexing question: are normalized United States-China ties based principally on a shared intent to oppose in active, concerted fashion the exercise of Soviet political and military power? If events should confirm this premise, what will remain of expectations in Moscow related to Soviet-American détente?

Even to raise this possibility is laden with its share of irony. For much of the 1950s, the "unshakable unity" of the Sino-Soviet alliance was based substantially on a shared sense of an American threat. During the subsequent decade, Soviet officials seemed intermittently persuaded that the United States and the Soviet Union might jointly array against China. Moreover, Moscow has always sought to contrast the concrete achievements of Soviet-American cooperation with the pervasive negativism and incitement to global tensions and conflict supposedly preached by the Chinese. But since President Nixon's initial overtures to the People's Republic, the prospects for what Peking once deemed a "U.S.-Soviet holy alliance against China" have been remote at best. At the same time, however, the inability or unwillingness of leaders in Peking and Washington to narrow their remaining differences for a full half decade may well have persuaded Soviet officials that there were inherent limits to an American-Chinese connection. In addition, President Carter's interest in (and identification with) the China issue was at best perfunctory prior to assuming office and for some months thereafter.⁷ When combined with China's highly divisive internal politics throughout the mid-1970s, it seemed wholly possible that a Washington-Peking quasi-alliance would not progress much farther, or (under the Chinese assault against détente and arms control) might even erode.

Whatever the wisdom or wishfulness of such thinking, a radically different and more worrisome assessment of Chinese-American relations must now exist in Moscow. Both Chinese and American accounts of the negotiations make clear that real forward movement began to develop only in the wake

7. It is worth recalling, for example, that as late as June 1977 the President asserted in a press conference that "my hope is that we can work out an agreement with the People's Republic of China, having full diplomatic relations with them, and still make sure that the peaceful life of the Taiwanese, the Republic of China, is maintained." *New York Times*, July 1, 1977. These remarks contrast with the President's later sensitivity to Peking's preferred descriptive labels (for example, "the people of Taiwan" and "the Taiwan authorities").

of Zbigniew Brzezinski's visit to Peking in May 1978. The substantial souring of Soviet-American relations evident at that time, and the national security adviser's identification with a much harsher view of Soviet policy than that associated with Secretary of State Vance, was surely not lost upon the Chinese. To be sure, Brzezinski's public assertions in Peking that "the President of the United States . . . is determined to join you in overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way to full normalization" and that "the United States has made up its mind on this issue" were intended to convey that the hiatus in Sino-American relations had ended, and were so construed by Chinese policymakers. But the underlying basis of these statements involved the "shared concerns" and the "long-term strategic view" that drew Washington and Peking together. The declared American interest in "a secure and strong China" and the presumed Chinese interest in "a powerful, confident, and globally engaged United States" had meaning for Peking's leaders only in relation to their obvious preoccupation with Soviet power. Without question, these assumptions provided the critical impetus for moving U.S.-Chinese ties forward, ultimately culminating in the announcement of full diplomatic relations seven months later.⁸

Indeed, the contrast between the events of the latter half of 1978 and the political context surrounding Secretary of State Vance's visit to Peking in August 1977 is very revealing. While President Carter sought to describe the Secretary's visit as a success which moved normalization closer, major Chinese officials (including Teng) quickly disabused American officials of any such belief. Pointed and contemptuous references to American concern for their "old friends in Taiwan"; assertions that the sale of arms to Taiwan after normalization would be "intolerable" and would "compel China to take Taiwan by force"; and that the presence of "such a heap of counterrevolutionaries on Taiwan that it [national unification] cannot be managed without a fight" all appeared in the weeks and months following the Vance visit.⁹

8. All the above quotations are taken from the official White House text of Dr. Brzezinski's toast at the welcoming banquet in Peking, May 20, 1978. The content of the private discussions with Chinese officials during the Brzezinski visit greatly strengthens these judgments. For details, see, Bernard Gwertzman, "Brzezinski Gave Details to China on Arms Talks With Soviet Union," *New York Times*, May 28, 1978, pp. 1, 6.

9. The above references are taken from interviews given by high Chinese officials such as Party Vice Chairman Li Hsien-nien to visiting newsmen following the Vance visit. See, Harrison E. Salisbury, "China 'Quite Unhappy' With Carter Over Taiwan, a Top Leader Says," *ibid.*, August 30, 1977, pp. 1, 3; "Formulas for Taiwan Accord With U.S. Flatly Rejected by High Official in China," *Wall Street Journal*, October 3, 1977, p. 5; and "China's Vice Premier Reaffirms

The abrupt shift from these opinions to the far more flexible views aired at the time of the normalization agreement is potent evidence of the Chinese capacity to radically alter political directions when conditions either allow or encourage such change. Inasmuch as neither the harsh sentiments of 1977 nor the conciliatory overtures of late 1978 and early 1979 represent formal political commitments, the possibility of a return to previous views cannot be excluded.

Even more striking, however, was the Chinese decision to intrude far more bluntly and unambiguously into U.S. domestic debate on American policy toward the Soviet Union. References immediately following the Vance visit by implication placed the Secretary of State in the camp of those supposedly appeasing the Soviet Union. Such allusions continued throughout the fall and early winter of 1977. The most vitriolic of these commentaries, appearing in late November, reflected an infrequently acknowledged but critical Chinese belief that forward movement in Soviet-American relations would ultimately pose severe political and military dangers to China. Although the author detailed the various ways in which the advocates of appeasement would only end up strengthening the Soviet Union militarily and economically against Western Europe, the key implications concerned the effects of détente on China:

Today, in the face of the grave threat of war by Soviet social imperialism, the trend of appeasement similar to that of the 1930s has emerged in the West. . . .

The core of the appeasement policy championed by Chamberlain and his like in the 1930s was to maneuver to divert the peril to the East. Their smug calculation was to induce Germany by compromises and concessions to halt in the west and drive to the east, that is, stabilization vis-à-vis Britain and France in the west and attack on the Socialist Soviet Union in its east. . . .

Like their precursors, the advocates of appeasement try to divert the Soviet peril to the east, to China. Helmut Sonnenfeldt . . . frightened the Soviet Union with the groundless prediction of "the arrival of a third superpower, China, in 20 years or so . . ." The Soviet Union, he clearly implied, should shift its focus of aggression from Western Europe to the east . . . Historical experience and the dangers that exist at present tell us what appeasement

Rigidity On Taiwan, Calls Use of Force Inevitable," *ibid.*, October 4, 1977, p. 10. Although Teng Hsiao-p'ing's remarks in the wake of the Vance visit were similarly negative, Teng (unlike the others) did acknowledge that "in finding a solution to the Taiwan problem the Chinese would take into consideration the special conditions on the island." Louis D. Boccardi, "Teng Says Vance Trip Set Back Normal Ties," *New York Times*, September 7, 1977, pp. 1-2.

will bring to the world's people. Not peace nor security but infinite sufferings and havoc. . . . The fact that Soviet social imperialism is doing its utmost to encourage illusions about "détente" and foment the trend of appeasement in the West makes things clear to all. To oppose imperialist war and put off the outbreak of a new world war, it is necessary to combat appeasement with might and main.¹⁰

It is hardly surprising that such concerns underlie the Chinese critique of détente. Quite clearly, Chinese diplomatic strategy in the 1970s has been premised on a "seamless web" conception of international security. Certain Chinese had expressly linked dissatisfaction over the absence of progress in Sino-American relations to a more earnest desire on the part of some American officials to negotiate Soviet-American agreements, thereby candidly revealing the most basic aspect of their dealings with and expectations of the United States.

These conclusions are further underscored by events leading up to the December 15 agreement, and subsequent interpretations accorded Sino-American normalization by American spokesmen. President Carter, to be sure, has placed great emphasis on the commitment of successive administrations to full relations with Peking as well as "recognizing simple reality." His arguments, however, leave a key question unanswered. Given the increasing public evidence of Chinese patience on resolving the Taiwan question (especially during Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to Japan in October), why did such urgency attach to reaching agreement, almost wholly on P.R.C. terms, by the end of 1978? Although it is not the purpose of this article to analyze the politics of U.S. decisionmaking, several key considerations are apparent and deserve mention. First, the Carter Administration may well have hoped for three major foreign policy triumphs (China, SALT, and the Egyptian-Israeli agreement) in rapid succession. Second, as noted earlier, Sino-American normalization was expected to prod the Soviet Union into more cooperative behavior at SALT and with reference to other key bilateral issues. Neither consideration, however, offered sufficient cause nor the guarantee of certain success for rapidly culminating the negotiations. A third factor has received the least public attention, but it may well have been critical to American policy calculations. Indefinite prolongation of Sino-American ties without full and final diplomatic recognition was not felt to provide the basis

10. Jen Ku-p'ing, "The Munich Tragedy and Contemporary Appeasement," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 26, 1977, p. 5, trans. in *Peking Review*, #50, December 9, 1977, pp. 6, 8-10.

for stable, long-term relations, and might even undermine the political standing of those Chinese leaders closely identified with an American connection.

What evidence exists to support this conclusion? Teng's personal and political stake in the normalization agreement and in closer alignments with the West and Japan were premised on at least two basic assumptions. He obviously expected that an enhanced U.S. tie would contribute significantly to China's security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Positive relations with America would also greatly facilitate China's long-term industrial, scientific, and technological development. However, American policymakers apparently deemed such tangible benefits insufficient to sustain policy momentum in Peking. How could Teng and his allies continue to uphold the value and necessity of an American connection if the United States could not "deliver" on the most basic issue—that is, an enduring, irrevocable commitment to the unity of all of China, including Taiwan? Indeed, less than three weeks prior to the final agreement, Administration officials were voicing public concern that the heightened domestic instability evident at that time (including widespread expectations of high level purges which failed to materialize) was undermining the prospects for a Sino-American accord. Even the broader Chinese effort to align with the West and Japan might be threatened.¹¹ Teng's advanced age and American uncertainty and uneasiness about the political inclinations of his possible successors heightened these fears. Concern about the risks of an uncertain future, therefore, weighed more heavily than whatever immediate criticism the President would have to withstand for severing formal relations with Taipei. America's interest in China might be cast publicly in a strategic, long-term perspective, but now rather than later was the time to cement such a relationship.

If our analysis is reasonably accurate, Sino-American normalization is cast in a somewhat different light. In particular, the fact that the critical negotiations were directed from the White House and not from the State Department could only strengthen Chinese convictions of a "struggle between the two lines" in American foreign policy circles.¹² Nor are Chinese views necessarily that wide of the mark. On the eve of Teng's visit to Washington, inescapable if subtle differences in emphasis were still apparent in the weight

11. "U.S., Fearing New Instability in China, Views Events With Concern," *New York Times*, November 28, 1978.

12. For a detailed account of the negotiations, see Martin Tolchin, "How China and the U.S. Toppled Barriers to Normalized Relations," *ibid.*, December 18, 1978, pp. A1, 12.

and significance that Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski separately accorded the China agreement. The Secretary's continued maintenance of a public posture of evenhandedness in the Sino-Soviet competition contrasted pointedly with the national security advisor's far greater willingness to describe the China relationship in terms of its potential for a major realignment of global political forces and the corresponding gains for American security interests.¹³ In terms of one of Mao's favored political dichotomies, the test of American China policy in the coming period will be whether such a "contradiction" proves "antagonistic" or "nonantagonistic."¹⁴

In a more immediate sense, these differences in emphasis and orientation are suggestive of how Chinese policymakers presently or potentially view the strategic and political value of an American connection. The importance attached by the P.R.C. to the normalization agreement in the period following its announcement is revealing in this regard. Although attention in Chinese statements was quickly drawn to the ending of "the prolonged abnormal state of affairs" between America and China and to the agreement's "vital significance to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large,"¹⁵ the accord's implications for global security alignments quickly emerged as the key element in P.R.C. commentaries. Teng Hsiao-p'ing explicitly noted this fact in his interview with a group of American reporters in early January:

In reaching agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations, both sides approached this from a global viewpoint. . . . There is much in common between us on matters of global strategy and on political questions. . . . The anti-hegemonic principle . . . is our greatest common point politically.¹⁶

The significance of allusions to opposition to hegemony is a telling indication of Chinese perceptions of their recent agreements with both Japan and the United States. (Chinese statements use the term as a general codeword for opposing the Soviet Union.) Although there has been little evidence of Soviet

13. See the excerpts of the Vance and Brzezinski speeches on China policy appearing in *ibid.*, January 16, 1979, p. A11.

14. Mao, "On Contradiction," August, 1937, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol I, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, pp. 311-347.

15. The quotations are drawn from the *People's Daily* Editorial of December 17, 1978, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—People's Republic of China* [FBIS-PRC], December 18, 1978, p. A9.

16. These remarks are drawn from the official text of Teng's January 5 interview, in *Beijing Review* [formerly Peking Review], #2, January 12, 1979, pp. 17-18.

objection to the inclusion of such a clause in past or present Sino-American agreements, its intent is widely understood.

It is still too soon to judge whether the consummation of diplomatic relations on the basis of shared strategic concerns will rapidly lead to unrealistic Chinese expectations about the concrete meaning and benefits that can in fact derive from a U.S. tie. Though Hua Kuo-feng pointedly indicated in his press conference of December 16 that the emergent American-Chinese-Japanese relationship "is neither an alliance nor an axis," there is pervasive evidence that Peking's leaders have staked a great deal on the value of such ties.

The Chinese, to be sure, are already subtle and sophisticated enough in their understanding of the American political process to have turned their attention quickly to shared concerns unlikely to provoke a critical reaction in the United States, while avoiding issues which remain unduly sensitive. For example, Chinese spokesmen have long focused attention on SALT and superpower efforts at arms control more generally as testimony to the supposed deficiencies and dangers inherent in Soviet-American détente. There is no evidence that the People's Republic of China has significantly reconsidered this pervasive critique of strategic arms control.¹⁷ Major assaults on the SALT negotiations, however, have receded from public view in recent months, and attacks on "appeasement in the West" have also become more muted. At the same time, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and other Chinese leaders have focused attention on issues of mutual interest to Peking and Washington. Approving calls for an enhanced American naval presence in the Western Pacific and for a strengthened Japanese role in regional security arrangements in East Asia accord with shared U.S. and Chinese concerns about Moscow's increasing emergence as an Asian military power.¹⁸ At the same time, skirting or ignoring issues such as SALT, where profound Chinese and American disagreements are readily apparent, minimizes any potential political problems that might complicate fuller development of an American-Chinese relationship. Given that no conceivable SALT agreement could garner Chinese assent or approval, however, an eventual treaty will meet with displeasure in Peking, unless China simply chooses to remain silent. Such considerations

17. See, for example, Foreign Minister Huang Hua's address to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, May 29, 1978, in *Peking Review*, #22, June 2, 1978, pp. 5-13.

18. Such concerns were very much apparent in Teng's discussions in early January with a visiting group of American Senators. See, Linda Mathews, "Teng Says Taiwan Could Keep Its Army, Autonomy," *Los Angeles Times*, January 10, 1979, pp. 1, 10.

suggest some of the inherent limits in U.S.-P.R.C. dealings which could ultimately prove troubling for perceptions and expectations on both sides.

The thorny, sensitive issue of Taiwan's future quite clearly represents a special case. From an optimistic perspective, one can point to China's acquiescence to continued arms sales to Taiwan, as well as to other recent and seemingly remarkable overtures from Peking to Taipei. Foremost among such offers has been Teng Hsiao-p'ing's pledge that (in exchange for accepting Peking's claim to the island and flying the P.R.C. flag) Taiwan could indefinitely retain its distinctive political identity, its vastly higher standard of living, and even its armed forces.¹⁹ Similarly accommodating was a New Year's Day message to the "compatriots in Taiwan" issued in conjunction with the cessation of the bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu:

Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and will respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses.²⁰

These and similar statements demonstrate sensitivity both to conditions on Taiwan and to the strong U.S. preference for peaceful resolution of the island's future, and are no doubt encouraging to the Carter Administration. However, several points must be borne in mind. These overtures have occurred at a time when all the political incentives argue for P.R.C. demonstrations of reasonability and magnanimity. There have been previous instances, in particular during the mid-1950s, when Peking has made peaceful overtures to Taipei (though never of this extent and explicitness) which were ultimately jettisoned when leaders on Taiwan showed utterly no interest in them. Thus, there is a symbolic but also highly manipulative quality in such pronouncements, given that reunification by any means would require Taiwan's acceptance of formal P.R.C. sovereignty over the island. That China presently has neither the military capabilities nor the determination to seek an early or forceful solution to the Taiwan issue seems obvious. That recent steps suggest an irrevocable break with the past and an explicit understanding of long-term arrangements on the island's future is much less certain.

Indeed, though attention has focused on the apparent willingness of Chinese leaders to acquiesce indefinitely to American arms sales to the island,

19. *Ibid.*

20. Message to Compatriots in Taiwan from the National People's Congress Standing Committee, January 1, 1979, in *Beijing Review*, #1, January 5, 1979, p. 17.

Hua Kuo-feng's fuller statement on this issue conveys a rather different impression:

During the negotiations the U.S. side mentioned that after normalization it would continue to sell limited amount[s] of arms to Taiwan for defensive purposes. We made it clear that we resolutely would not agree to this. In all discussions the Chinese side repeatedly made clear its position on this question. We held that after the normalization continued sales of arms to Taiwan by the United States would not conform to the principles of normalization, would be detrimental to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue and would exercise an unfavorable influence on the peace and stability in the Asia and Pacific regions. So our two sides had differences on this point. Nevertheless, we reached an agreement on the joint communiqué.²¹

Teng Hsiao-p'ing's later assertion that the possibility of peaceful unification was "a very complex question" further confirms the impression that the Chinese side will make no firm commitments on this issue: "We cannot commit ourselves to use no other than peaceful means to achieve the reunification of the motherland. We cannot tie our hands on this matter. If we tied our hands, we would obstruct the realization of the good intention to solve the matter peacefully."²² Such disclaimers surely suggest that expectations for stable, favorable relations between the United States and China must be tempered by a recognition that potentially divisive considerations between the two states remain, especially when current leaders have passed from power. Some other possible complications become clearer by considering certain key assumptions guiding China's defense and security planning for the foreseeable future.

Chinese Power and International Security in the 1980s

The sudden culmination of both the Sino-Japanese and Sino-American negotiations and China's determined drive for industrial and military modernization have contributed to substantial flux (if not disarray) in both regional and global security arrangements. While predictions of wholesale strategic realignment still seem premature, they are no longer farfetched. At the same

21. Hua Kuo-feng Press Conference, December 16, 1978, in *FBIS-PRC*, December 18, 1978, p. A7. In this regard, Carter Administration officials have acknowledged that during the normalization negotiations the United States pledged that it would not undertake any new supplies of arms to Taiwan during the coming year beyond those already pledged. Whether there have been additional informal pledges with respect to future U.S. deliveries is unknown at the present time. ("U.S. Concedes It Promised Peking Not to Sell Taiwan Arms this Year," *New York Times*, January 13, 1979, p. 3).

22. Teng Hsiao-p'ing interview with American reporters, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

time, the specific configurations of international power remain complex and unsettled. For example, will the emergent strategic system be genuinely multipolar, or will the confrontation of more than three decades between Soviet and American power simply find expression in more diverse global coalitions? What are the implications of these arrangements for regional security considerations? And how will the further development of Chinese military and political power contribute to this process?

This essay can only raise these issues, not answer them. Nevertheless, particular policy directions are already apparent that reduce some past uncertainties and ambiguities. A key determinant of international political change in coming years will continue to be Chinese perceptions and expectations of their political and security relationship with the United States and other major non-communist powers. For example, Chinese assumptions about the degree and nature of political, economic, and scientific and technological assistance the United States might furnish could rapidly expand beyond all reasonable possibility. Do China's leaders fully comprehend the complexity and multiplicity of American diplomatic and security objectives? Are they prepared to accept a long-term political relationship with the United States, even if key U.S. foreign policy goals are deemed anathema by Peking? Is there any Chinese recognition of the need to reciprocate American cooperation with China on any basis other than opposing the exercise of Soviet political and military power and offering American corporations greater commercial opportunities in China? Very little evidence yet suggests a positive response to any of these questions.

For the present, the Chinese leadership has yet to make clear in any systematic or comprehensive way the dominant assumptions underlying their new relationship with the United States. In previous years, Peking has made explicit how the absence of an active military threat from the United States was turned to Chinese advantage. Similarly, the possible gains for Chinese security of dealing with Washington as a quasi-ally have also been delineated. Hua Kuo-feng, quoting Lenin, has reminded other Chinese leaders that "the more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by . . . making use without fail of every . . . 'rift' among the enemies . . . and also by taking advantage of every . . . opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional."²³ If

23. Hua Kuo-feng, Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, August 12, 1977, in *The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1977, pp. 60-61.

such a conception still holds in Peking, then it is not encouraging for either the stability or longevity of the Sino-American rapprochement.

However, various indications suggest that, in both word and deed, the Chinese now want the U.S. relationship to be qualitatively different. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, for one, has suggested to visiting newsmen that "the third world, the second world, and even the first, that is, the United States" should jointly resist both militarily and economically the Soviet "war plan."²⁴ Teng has also indicated that he basically agrees with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield that China, by tying down over forty Soviet divisions, serves as part of the "NATO of the East."²⁵ Such sentiments reflect an expressed Chinese belief that the containment of Soviet power must be a global arrangement among concerned parties; only then can the "Soviet war schemes" be frustrated and the supposedly inevitable third world war delayed.²⁶ Whether the United States wishes to be drawn into such arrangements, however, is a decidedly different matter.

Thus, notwithstanding the frequently ominous tone of Chinese views of war and peace, Peking's assessments on the international situation can and do shift dramatically. Beginning in 1973, for example, Chinese officials first argued that the "focus of superpower contention" and the principal object of Soviet military designs was found in Europe. The major industrial powers of the West were supposedly coveted by Moscow, with serious preparations underway to gain decisive Warsaw Pact superiority over NATO. The regularity and almost alarmist qualities of these views throughout the mid-1970s conveyed an impression that the outbreak of war was imminent.

What happened? During 1978, a major strategic reassessment appeared in Chinese publications. No longer did Chinese analysts speak of a frontal military assault on the West. The Soviet Union's "global strategic plan" was now intended "to outflank and encircle Europe and isolate the United States" by gaining control of various strategic locations and routes, abetted by regional surrogates such as Cuba and Vietnam.²⁷ By year's end, a major com-

24. Teng made these remarks to an Agence France-Presse group in October 1977. Jim Browning, "Teng Renews Peking's Moscow Diatribe," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 25, 1977. For a further amplification, on the eve of his American visit, see "An Interview with Teng Hsiao-p'ing," *Time*, February 5, 1979, pp. 32-35.

25. H. L. Stevenson, "Teng Sees Soviets Bent for War," *Washington Star*, May 20, 1978, p. 5.

26. The revision in Chinese views on the inevitability of war was first apparent in Hua Kuo-feng's Political Report to the Eleventh Party Congress, *op. cit.*; it now appears routinely in Chinese policy formulations.

27. The above citations are drawn from Commentator, "The Soviet Strategic Intention as Viewed From the Vietnamese Authorities' Anti-China Activities," *Hung-ch'i* [Red Flag], #8, August 1978, in *FBIS-PRC*, August 1, 1978, p. A14.

mentary in *People's Daily* asserted that, although "the situation [in Europe] has always been fraught with danger," the present situation suggested that "the two sides are essentially at a stalemate," thus explaining Soviet attempts to "outflank Western Europe on a grand scale."²⁸

No doubt Chinese strategic analysts periodically must come to grips with altered political and military circumstances. However, by shifting the focus of argument away from Europe to a global conception of Soviet power and policy, Chinese decisionmakers now have a more diverse and differentiated political argument by which to justify official policy. More importantly, concern over Soviet activity in Asia has again become widespread and much more fully developed. In so doing, Chinese writings concentrate on the far more appropriate and meaningful context for assessments of P.R.C. security: the regional environment that has preoccupied Peking's security planning since the earliest years of the People's Republic. It is precisely this context where Peking seeks the requisite political, technological, and security assistance to avoid the unwelcome prospect not of Europe's encirclement, but of China's.

This shift has an additional implication: it exposes Chinese vulnerability and weakness. The increasing attention to improving China's security circumstances, both diplomatically and militarily, has emerged as a central theme of policy-making in Peking. In the diplomatic realm, the gains are already quite tangible. In more concrete military terms, the results range from modest to negligible. The reasons for the absence of significant progress at the latter level are complex and need not be treated here at any length.²⁹ The constraints of technology—both in access to advanced defense items and their assimilation into Chinese industries—are not easily overcome. At the same time, arguments favoring basic industrial development have taken precedence over calls for immediately increasing defense expenditure. Security planners also have not been able to agree fully on the order of China's defense priorities. China's current military needs span a highly diverse technological and doctrinal spectrum; they cannot all be met simultaneously or equally.

Thus, not unlike Soviet debates on foreign policy and military strategy during the mid-1950s, Chinese decisionmakers are slowly coming to grips

28. Commentator, "The Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, December 30, 1978, in *FBIS-PRC*, January 2, 1979, p. 11.

29. For fuller discussions, see my articles in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *op. cit.*

with numerous changes apparent in modern warfare. This process of adjustment is in many respects painfully slow. Not only must institutional traditions be overcome; the entire topic represents a virtual political mine-field. Continuing doubts about the efficacy of undue reliance on military power as an instrument of foreign policy still persist. The American military threat to China was ultimately removed without firing a single shot, and some leaders no doubt are wondering whether comparable results could obtain vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

However, the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement occurred only after America's unhappy experience with two land wars in Asia. The Soviet Union's activities in the Asia-Pacific region are waxing, not waning; indeed, Chinese depictions of Soviet conduct in the area are increasingly reminiscent of labels first attached to the United States more than two decades ago. Thus, China's leaders may feel that they cannot long remain exposed in the face of far superior military power that increasingly threatens them by sea as well as by land and air. To be sure, it remains difficult to foresee circumstances leading to a major Sino-Soviet war. Military planners, however, need to prepare for bad as well as worst cases, and it is to such intermediate defense needs that Chinese effort seems increasingly devoted.

It is impossible to speak authoritatively about whether Chinese planners fully understand the long term nature of decisions related to military modernization. Though numerous P.R.C. military delegations have traveled to Western Europe, few actual agreements have been consummated. A large amount of technological and doctrinal innovation requires assimilation, and Peking has fully utilized the opportunity to examine and explore abroad. Yet the extent of Chinese learning is still an open question. For example, the substantial Chinese interest in the purchase of the Harrier jump jet flies in the face of the considerable difficulties that far better trained U.S. and British pilots have had both in maintaining and flying the aircraft. Chinese plans to purchase upwards of fifty such aircraft as well as the facilities to manufacture them may not be expected to achieve full results until well into the 1980s.³⁰ Indeed, it is conceivable that, like Great Britain, China's principal long-term expectations include plans to employ the aircraft in a naval mode, rather than wholly for various conflict situations along Peking's vulnerable northern frontiers.

30. Dinah Lee, "China Harries the Opposition," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 24, 1978, pp. 19-20.

The latter possibility, of course, raises the most sensitive of issues. How unconstrained (within the limits of available resources) will Chinese access be to advanced defense technology from the West? What will be the attitude of smaller states in Asia to a major effort of the non-communist world to assist China's emergence as a global power over the next several decades? If the felt imperatives of Chinese vulnerability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are the principal basis for undertaking this effort, what are the possible consequences of Peking ultimately producing and transferring Western-supplied weaponry to whatever states they might wish? And, even in the short run, how will these possibilities affect the future of détente and strategic arms control?

While Soviet observers are hardly disinterested third parties in this process, unduly close American identification with Chinese security concerns will surely undermine continuing Soviet commitments to détente and to SALT.³¹ Alternatively, if real restraints on access to sensitive technologies are maintained, will Chinese decisionmakers view such a policy as undermining their felt expectations of their accommodation with the West? Even assuming that China is relatively unconstrained in its effort to acquire such technology, what are the possible Chinese reactions when (as seems quite likely) even enhanced military capabilities leave China's armed forces well behind the sophistication of their potential adversaries? At a political level, what if leadership sentiment in the United States and elsewhere ultimately coalesces around a more expressly neutral posture toward the Sino-Soviet conflict? Will such a step compel the Chinese to rethink their ties to the non-communist world?

It is obvious that none of these questions can be conclusively answered at the present time. A pivotal issue in future Sino-American relations will therefore be how expansive a conception either Chinese or American leaders adopt about the possible contribution of their opposite numbers toward key foreign policy goals and security concerns. The American need for a judicious balancing of the emergent relationship with China against the ongoing stake in stable if competitive dealings with Moscow is likely to prove particularly difficult. The flow of demand and expectation in the immediate future will surely be far more from Peking to Washington than the reverse. American policymakers may quickly face the most difficult of choices in relation to

31. See, in particular, Georgiy Arbatov's candid and detailed interview with Jonathan Power in *The Observer* (London), November 12, 1978, pp. 15-17.

expressed Chinese security needs. For example, how might the Carter Administration react to Chinese requests for sensitive "dual use" technologies or even outright access to American defense items?³²

Not all U.S. policy dilemmas are restricted to the technological realm. China's recent military campaign against Vietnam and its attendant complications for U.S. decision makers, is an unexpectedly sudden indication of Sino-American divergence of views.

In a similar vein, what are the conceivable U.S. reactions to a hardening of Peking's position on the Taiwan question should Taipei remain defiant in the face of P.R.C. inducements to cooperate, or even assert its independence from the Mainland? What are the possible implications of Taiwan embarking on a nuclear weapons capability, whether covert or overt?³³ Such circumstances could severely test the stability and strength of American-Chinese ties. Past American policy offers few precedents for these situations; history will therefore not be able to serve as an adequate guide to the most appropriate political steps to take. The Carter Administration's preoccupation with the potential leverage afforded by a China connection has failed to consider adequately these and other possible complications. Quite clearly, the great expectations of global and regional stability created by recent events have only begun to be tested by the dangers as well as the opportunities inherent in Sino-American rapprochement.

32. In his January 5th press conference, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was asked directly whether China was interested in purchasing American arms. His response indicates that such requests may indeed be forthcoming: "We would like to absorb all things advanced. But so far as we know, the United States does not have any intention to this effect." (Teng interview, *op. cit.*, p. 18).

33. This issue is considered in greater detail in my "The People's Republic of China in a Proliferated World," in John Kerry King, ed., *The International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C., National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979).

The Military in a Democracy

Forrest Pogue

A Review:
American Caesar

Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1978; 793 pp. \$15.00

My first impulse upon agreeing to write this review was to call it "Flawed Warrior". After carefully reading and checking the sources of *American Caesar*, I decided that "Flawed Biography" might be better. Ultimately, the present title seemed best to join a review of the book with some observations on MacArthurism, which are presented both in the biography and in the various volumes Manchester has cited.

It is disappointing that despite Manchester's ability to write, he has fallen short of the scholarly standard that he apparently set for himself. Far more discouraging is the extravagant reception with which several scholars, who should know better, have greeted this book; some of them ignoring the far more careful and authoritative work of D. Clayton James (whose first two volumes, covering MacArthur's life through World War II, are singled out by a grateful Manchester as "scholarly, perceptive, objective, and in its accounts of battles, extraordinarily detailed.").

Handling Small Matters

If one counts footnotes, Mr. Manchester has done a scholarly study. But if one counts the works that he lists—and evidently failed to read carefully, or at all—one soon recognizes that his book merely follows in the wake of others. Furthermore, in Manchester's list of abbreviations for the repositories containing his most frequently cited works, there are notable omissions, namely the National Archives, the Roosevelt Library, and the Truman Library. Although Manchester might argue that the MacArthur Library at Norfolk has a "priceless collection," those who have used it know that the collection is far from complete. Secondary sources can be used safely where there are two volumes of James to follow. It is in the period after World War II, where there are no such volumes to rely on, that one finds additional gaps in Manchester's writing.

Manchester might argue that it is not necessary to look at the frightening

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bulk of documents found in the National Archives, if the best secondary sources are cited. But it is difficult to understand his scanty reference to the numerous official volumes of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, which cover World War II, the occupation of Japan, and the Korean War. Maurice Matloff's two volumes on strategy in World War II and Louis Morton's *Strategy in the Pacific* are not even listed; and although Manchester refers to Morton's *Fall of the Philippines* a few times, on several occasions it is noted only as "cited in James."

Far more interesting than the volumes that are not used are some three or four that are cited repeatedly. Next to James, the most frequently cited books are those of Courtney Whitney, a member of MacArthur's staff in the Pacific and his aide in retirement, and Frazier Hunt, a newsman who spent a number of months at MacArthur's headquarters. Neither of these two books has footnotes. Manchester warns us that "certain passages in Whitney must be read skeptically and confirmed elsewhere." Then what are we to make of more than a hundred citations from such a source, especially when it is often the sole basis for a charge of antagonism by Washington? Manchester also recommends Hunt's book for further reading, despite Hunt's sustained record of unsupported statements—many of which find their way into *American Caesar's* generalizations. Hunt himself has, on occasion, hesitated to make the flat statements that Manchester adopts. Even MacArthur recognized that Hunt's credibility was suspect. In an interview that I held with General MacArthur on January 2, 1961, I mentioned that some of MacArthur's biographers were not helping his reputation; my notes (he did not permit me to tape the conversation) reflect MacArthur's response: "'Spike' Hunt [is] of extreme right."

The extent to which the author worked in the files at Norfolk is not clear. His footnotes list such items as "RG 4; RG 6," which refer to various large sections of files in that library. James' book and the official histories, on the contrary, indicate who wrote the messages and who received them. But the reader of Manchester must be content with mention of one of twenty-four categories of documents.

Graduate students are warned by their professors of the dangers of improvising on a theme from an account based on documents which the author has not seen. Several illustrations of these dangers may be selected at random from Manchester. James, in writing of MacArthur's days at Fort Leavenworth (1908-12), listed a number of men who later became well-known; he mistakenly added the name of Robert L. Eichelberger (later commander of the

Eighth Army under MacArthur). James' slip did no damage because he drew no conclusions from it. Manchester, however, saw the collected letters of General Eichelberger to his wife, *Dear Miss 'Em*, edited by Jay Luvaas. Luvaas' brief foreword referred to Eichelberger's reflection on MacArthur in 1911. Manchester makes this observation of the Leavenworth experience: "Lieutenant Robert L. Eichelberger was impressed. Like lieutenants Walter Krueger and George C. Marshall, Eichelberger was a fellow officer of MacArthur's at Leavenworth." (Manchester, p. 71). But page four of the book from which Manchester cites his quotation makes it clear that Eichelberger, who had graduated from West Point in 1909, was actually stationed with the 10th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana—he did not attend Leavenworth until after Marshall and MacArthur had left. Eichelberger's letters had recalled instead his first sighting of MacArthur during a maneuver at San Antonio in 1911.

A more interesting example is the problem which arose sometimes because Manchester simply followed James' footnotes—apparently without noting that they refer to several paragraphs in James, which Manchester reduces to one paragraph. In one example of this, Manchester writes of MacArthur's assignment to a new job in Washington, a statement that MacArthur was waiting to pick up the standard recently laid down by his father, a three-line summary of the Vera Cruz incident, and MacArthur's assignment to a particular task in Mexico. In footnoting the paragraph, Manchester makes reference to Hunt, Quirk, Elting Morison, Weigley, Hagedorn, James, and Alfred Steinberg. All of these are pertinent to James' longer statements, but the bulk of them have little to do with the paragraph in Manchester for which they are cited. Elting Morison's life of Stimson and Hagedorn's life of Leonard Wood deal with the Ainsworth case, which was bothering both Stimson and Chief of Staff Wood about the time MacArthur came to Washington. Weigley's book refers more to Wood's work for preparedness than to Vera Cruz, while Quirk's twenty-five pages, which should have been cited as suggested reading to make up for the omission of background material discussed in James' book, appear to represent detailed research for Manchester's one paragraph:

One would like to hear more of the men who made MacArthur's headquarters function, contributions that are described in James but which rate few citations in Manchester. For example, his able Chief of Operations, Stephen J. Chamerlin, is scarcely mentioned at all.

Manchester too often becomes involved in the fear and dislike of Wash-

ington that run through books written by MacArthur and his close staff members. Although Manchester recognizes elements of paranoia in these reactions and clarifies the support that George Marshall in particular gave MacArthur, he ultimately makes even more unsupported statements about some of these fears than does Frazier Hunt. In *American Caesar* one finds the thread of controversy leading to a final earth-shattering confrontation between MacArthur and Marshall.

Manchester starts this ball unraveling with a statement on Marshall's and MacArthur's first years together at Leavenworth: "The only officer to stay at arm's length from MacArthur was Marshall, even then the two future five-star generals rubbed each other the wong way." (Manchester, p. 71). Both James and I have noted in our books that the two men were rarely thrown together because Marshall was an instructor in the School of the Line and MacArthur an officer in the Post Engineers' Complement. This general explanation was based on MacArthur's statement to me, which seemed not to need any further elaboration. But Manchester apparently depends on yet another statement by Frazier Hunt, who cites no source: "He [Marshall] had no particular gift for friendship, and his relationship with MacArthur . . . was forced and without warmth." (Manchester, p. 42).

Manchester next picks up the legend of "the Chaumont crowd." Soon after MacArthur arrived in France, near the end of 1917, the General Headquarters officials at Chaumont (Pershing's HQ) decided to use troops of the newly-arrived 42nd division for replacements in units already in France. MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the division, a member of the War Department while the division was being organized, helped send messages to influential individuals and got the proposal changed. Thereafter, runs the tale, the "Chaumont crowd" was out to get MacArthur. Manchester's contribution to all this is the extraordinary statement: "It is worth noting that Chaumont's brightest young colonel was George C. Marshall. In France the antagonism between the two men would grow, with grave consequences for the country both served so well in other ways." (Manchester, p. 84). As a source, there is another portmanteau footnote with citations gathered from James' much longer discussion—this one concerning the situation in France and on the American Army about the time the 42nd Division arrived. Manchester presents a scholarly listing with references to works of Pershing, Frederic Paxson, Basil Liddell Hart (some 70 pages cited), and U.S. official records. None of these original sources mention any controversy between the two officers. To this list, Manchester adds James (who also makes no reference to such a

problem) and Hunt, who says only, "At the end of the war the little G. H. Q. crowd that had never been quite reconciled toward the brilliant young MacArthur was joined by the then Colonel George C. Marshall." (Hunt, p. 81).

At the time of which Manchester writes (1917), Marshall was a major at 1st Division. He remained there until the middle of the following July, when he was sent briefly to Chaumont to work on war plans; he was detached within a few weeks to work with First Army on plans for the fighting in the St. Mihiel salient and then assigned to help prepare for the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In the final stages of the war, he was Chief of Operations at First Army. Assigned then as Chief of Staff of the VIII Corps to prepare plans for occupation duties in West Germany, Marshall did not go to Chaumont until May, 1919, after MacArthur had returned to the United States. Later that year Marshall returned to Washington with General Pershing and was his Senior Aide until 1924. MacArthur has said that he saw Marshall from time to time when he sought Pershing's advice.

Manchester unearths yet another old canard—that Pershing reprimanded MacArthur for a minor matter after MacArthur married a widow once dated by the Chief of Staff; Manchester writes: "the four-star general [Pershing] had his eye on a woman, and the dashing brigadier had heisted her." (p. 127, Manchester). He also cites the lady's suggestion that this was why MacArthur was sent overseas. Under the rules for officers then prevailing, a system of rotation required foreign service (China, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama were the chief posts) at regular intervals—and MacArthur was number one on the list. Marshall went to China the next year under the same rule; but Manchester fails to remove the suspicion that Pershing acted on a personal basis.

Surely, the critics who have praised the book will say, "All this is pedantry. It does not affect the solid portions of the book." But it is this slippage in accuracy in the handling of small matters that makes one wonder about Manchester's treatment of the broader issues. Especially disturbing is the elevation of books long discredited to sources for damaging allegations about MacArthur's associates and superiors, or for excessive praise of the Pacific Commander.

Nevertheless, Manchester has much in his favor. His personal experience as a Marine, severely wounded in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945, gives him a feeling for the horrors of the jungle and protracted or needless fighting. This is forcefully expressed in Manchester's graphic descriptions of "the

green war." He has a gift for distillation and an overall grasp of MacArthur's personal contradictions that are described in the striking introductory paragraphs that, I imagine, convinced some of his laudatory critics of deep scholarly perception.

In dealing with many disagreeable charges by MacArthur and his followers, he rejects some of their more extreme allegations about the plots in Washington, the incapacity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the errors of the Europe First Strategy. He describes well the many weaknesses in MacArthur's makeup: his vanity, his extreme ambition, his attempts to manipulate public opinion, his failure to give credit to subordinates, his efforts to pit members of his staff against each other, his virtual hatred of the Navy, his constant insinuation of an intention to appeal to the general public over the heads of political and military superiors, and his encouragement of boomlets of his candidacy for the presidency. But then Manchester concludes by adopting some of the clichés of an anti-MacArthur Washington plot.

Perhaps because Manchester continued to read the biased volumes from MacArthur's staff, he began to accept them as evidence. Basic research in MacArthur's headquarters files would exaggerate the General's role in the planning and making of strategy. These files would fail to show in detail the patience of the men in the White House and the Pentagon, and give a false perspective to the Navy's role in the Pacific and the part played by MacArthur's forces.

Reaching for an Effect

A better perspective for judging General MacArthur's strategic judgment would have been achieved by: a more careful look at the tasks of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the world strategic picture, the distances from the United States to fighting fronts in the Pacific and in Europe, the importance of saving from German domination the fighting forces and productivity of the Soviet Union and western Europe before their manpower and industrial capacity were absorbed into the Reich. Manchester would then be able to rate more sagely the tributes to the Pacific commander by Field Marshal Alanbrooke, Liddell Hart, and Field Marshal Montgomery. Alanbrooke was willing to praise MacArthur to spite Marshall and Eisenhower, Liddell Hart was willing to name someone in preference to Eisenhower or Montgomery and Montgomery was certainly prepared to praise MacArthur as the greatest American Commander if it downgraded Eisenhower, Bradley,

and Patton. But the reader is never told exactly what they were praising. If by calling MacArthur the great strategist of the war, Alanbrooke meant the setting of the priorities in the war, it is hard to see how Manchester reconciled Alanbrooke's characterization of the Pacific Commander's last-ditch opposition to the Europe First strategy that Alanbrooke fiercely demanded. Perhaps he had in mind MacArthur's advocacy of the indirect approach, favored by Churchill and Alanbrooke in the Mediterranean.

Another problem with Manchester's perspective is his tendency to see everything constructive in the Pacific as inspired exclusively by MacArthur. In the late spring of 1943, he says, "[MacArthur] probably knew more about the geography of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands than any other man before or since." (Manchester, p. 33). He knew the coral reefs, the coves and inlets, the mountain passes. The list continues. It presumes MacArthur's omniscience with no suggestion of the involvement of Intelligence, a diligent map service, reconnaissance teams, and coordinated planning staff.

I recall that the first group of combat historians brought to Washington in March, 1944 to be briefed for the European theater were given to study the documents concerning the Buna operation. We noted the paucity of information about the coves and inlets and mountain passes, and the great amount that remained to be done by reconnaissance to remedy that situation. We were impressed by the careful supervision of the forward commanders and of the later Army Commander, General Eichelberger, whose accounts contradict Manchester's notion that MacArthur's control reached down as far as battalions. In fact, Eichelberger liked to tell how the Pacific Commander tried to impress newsmen by implying that he and Eichelberger had been together at Buna.

Manchester is on surer ground in praising MacArthur's role in the occupation of Japan. He cites familiar evidence of MacArthur's skilled use of the Emperor's support and notes the way that MacArthur used his own emperor-like postures to impress the Japanese. But Manchester does not give proper credit to the able men who helped write the Japanese constitution. He tells how a Japanese committee, asked to prepare a suitable draft, produced an unsatisfactory document and, then, how MacArthur asked Whitney to help in the process. When the second draft proved unsatisfactory, MacArthur acted. According to Manchester, "He decided that the only way he would get the version he wanted would be to write the key sections of it himself . . . as it happened, he had become interested in democratic constitutions

and over the holidays he had read all of those then in force. Tearing off a sheet of yellow legal paper from a pad, he wrote his first memorandum on the subject, starting 'Four Points for a Constitution.' By the middle of February, we learn, he had what he wanted." (Manchester, p. 499). There is no footnote but apparently this version comes from a statement by MacArthur.

Certainly, the MacArthur Library contained a copy of the Report of the Government Section, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). This was incorporated in a larger report made on the occupation by General MacArthur. Less dramatic, and more appreciative of the work of the staff, is the statement that when General Whitney presented the Government section with three major points that MacArthur wanted incorporated, a steering committee and several special committees were assigned to write sections of the constitution. "Working steadily, the Public Administration Division completed its work on February 10 Approved with only one significant change by General MacArthur the draft was mimeographed on February 12." (Report of Government Section, SCAP, p. 105). This version gives the General full credit for his important intervention but makes it clear that the main changes were in accord with Allied Arrangements at Potsdam and the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many hands were included in writing the constitution.

With all the emphasis on personal planning (which ends by obscuring the work of Army commanders and high command staffs), one is reminded again and again of the enemy in Washington. Manchester deplores such paranoia but adds his bit to the myth. He writes of General Marshall's trip to Goodenough Island in December, 1943 to visit MacArthur. In the course of a long conversation (which MacArthur indicates ended with the promise of more assistance from Washington), Manchester says that when at one point MacArthur mentioned his staff, Marshall said, "You don't have a staff, General, you have a court." I was startled to find that my own book is the sole source cited for the paragraph in which this statement occurs. The first part of the paragraph, dealing with the visit, I accept. But I am not responsible for the Marshall quote (which I doubt if he made). And I know of no one who would accept authorship of the next sentence: "It was true, but it was equally true that the Chief of Staff had been off horseback riding when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and tactful officers never reminded him of it." (Manchester, p. 352). This is reaching for an effect. Marshall had finished a morning ride, had come to his office, had read the last part of Tokyo's intercepted instructions to her diplomats, and had warned Short and

MacArthur of the possible meaning of the timing. He was having lunch when word of the attack came in the early afternoon.

The persistent recurrence of statements that have been set right in numerous books that appeared before this volume suggests that for some of the sections Manchester has drawn on some of his own earlier writing and that he has not added corrections which are easily found. My Volume III, which covers November, 1942 to May, 1945, is not included in his bibliography, although it appeared five years before this book. It would have saved Manchester some errors as would have Schnabel's official volume on the Korean War and other books he should have been aware of.

It remains for the most dramatic sections—those dealing with the MacArthur relief and the crashing confrontation of the old adversaries from Leavenworth, to Chaumont, to Sedan, and to Goodenough Island—to illustrate some of this author's most unusual handling of sources. The story reaches its climax when Truman summons Marshall, Acheson, Harriman, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ask how they reacted to his view that MacArthur must be recalled from Korea. After summarizing the play-by-play account (which could have been more accurately written had he consulted Truman's personal papers at the presidential library in Independence), Manchester adds that when Truman found that all agreed with his earlier secret decision to relieve MacArthur, he gave the job of drafting the message to Marshall and Acheson. "That was a mistake," concludes Manchester. "Both men [Marshall and Acheson] were hostile toward the Supreme Commander [MacArthur] and he reciprocated. The author continues that Acheson, who would have been the more tactful drafter, was too occupied to have a hand in the writing. "The version which would reach MacArthur was Marshall's, gruff and abrupt." (Manchester, pp. 641-642). The sources cited for this paragraph are: Acheson [*Present at the Creation*], Payne [*The Marshall Story*], and Fournier [*Napoleon*]. Fournier at least cannot be held responsible for the mistakes which seem to sprout from Manchester's description of the "Chaumont crowd." His description of the treatment of Napoleon after his 1813 defeat is used by Manchester to suggest that he was treated better by his opponents than MacArthur was treated by Truman and Marshall.

At least, Manchester writes, Napoleon's enemies gave him Elba. Acheson merely says that Truman asked the various participants to appear the next day, Tuesday, with the necessary drafts. And Payne's 1951 volume on Marshall was a quickie designed to cash in on the MacArthur removal and the

consequent congressional hearings, as well as on Marshall's September 1 retirement from the office of Secretary of Defense. Although Payne did not study Marshall's papers, he ventures the opinion that the language of "the curt dismissal" was remarkably in the style of Marshall (Payne, *The Marshall Story*, p. 319). Truman's explanation (which is not noted by Manchester) is by far the most complete account in print, and is based on documents at the Truman Library, which can be examined. Truman says simply, in a volume published in 1956: "I then directed General Bradley to prepare the orders that would relieve MacArthur of his several commands and replace him with Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway . . . I instructed him to confer with Secretary of State Acheson, since the office of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, was also involved." (Truman, Volume II, p. 448).

Finally, the definitive word on this matter can be found in General J. Lawton Collins' *War in Peacetime*, page 284. The Chief of Staff of the Army at the time of the recall writes: "After the decisive meeting with the President, Secretary Marshall met with General Bradley and me and asked me to draft the messages that would have to be sent to Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, and James A. Van Fleet, who was to succeed Ridgway." The draft orders were submitted to General Marshall, who presented them at the next meeting with the President and his advisers. Collins' book, published in 1969, is not included in Manchester's bibliography nor cited in connection with the incident.

The normal process was followed in the case of MacArthur's relief. There was nothing sinister in Marshall's testimony when he said that he believed the drafts were written partly in the Department of Defense and partly in the Department of State. There was nothing extraordinary about Truman's action. The relief order was, of course, terse, in accordance with Army practice. The language would be the same if Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, or Douglas MacArthur issued it. But the announcement which accompanied it could have been written by Marshall or Acheson. There was nothing harsh. It announced with deep regret fundamental differences between MacArthur and the United States Government and the United Nations which made necessary his relief. And it stated, "General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional services which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take at this time." (Truman, Volume II, p. 523). The whole drawn out

business of the confrontation might play well with Gregory Peck as the much-abused good guy sat upon by the villainous denizens of the striped pants State Department and the Chaumont-crowded Pentagon. It is a great script to make the flesh creep, but it is not history. And the scholarship tends to fade away into some excellent rhetoric as well as some fustian, which close students of MacArthur would recognize.

The Limits of Military Authority

Whatever the quality of his research and his handling of evidence, Manchester sought to make some important points about military leadership and civilian-military relations in the twentieth century. In the confusing elements of MacArthur's character and actions, he finds a symbol which is alternately deplorable and appealing. The author's true sympathies may be with the flawed commander, rather than with his superiors. MacArthur was willful but he was brave; his opponents were administrators, not warriors; he went too far but he should have been reined in earlier; his actions in Korea called for punishment but he should have been brought back for a talk (a possibility which Marshall momentarily entertained, only to be met with Acheson's chilling reminder that it would afford MacArthur an opportunity to make strong public appeals while still in command). Although it was the American tendency to give the general in the field considerable freedom to fight his battle within the broad directives sent from Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service secretaries in doing so are depicted as timorous and indecisive. And the final recall is somehow reduced to a spiteful act of little men.

This is the type of reaction that makes it impossible to present MacArthur's relief as a classical tragedy.

Samuel Huntington, in his brilliant study, *The Soldier and the State*, pictures vividly American attitudes toward the role of the military in a democracy, and the highly important matter of civilian control. With a few exceptions, he sees liberal conceptions of the military dominating American thinking from the end of the Revolution to the middle of the twentieth century. The people of the United States, according to Huntington, feared and distrusted a standing army, a professional officer class, large military budgets, and overseas commitments. There was a feeling that a fighting force could be improvised when needed, and that militia units and reserve elements were sufficient to keep order and to provide the basis for later military expansion.

In the face of these views and the swift reduction in the fighting forces after the Civil War, the small group of Regular officers, underpaid, widely scattered to isolated posts, and often regarded with hostility by the general population, turned inward to create a professional officer class devoted to the defense of the state and strongly subject to civilian control. The fact that Grant was a professional turned president, or that civilian soldiers-turned-politicians held public office, did not affect the conviction of the Regular officers that they must avoid both public statements on political matters and political activity.

These acts of political self-denial, imposed more by the Regular officers than by civilian regulations, helped to avoid conflicts with authorities in Washington. This was fortunate since the framers of the Constitution in their search for separation of powers had erected barriers to the firm imposition of civilian control on the military services. The President was the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy but the budgets had to be approved by Congress and appropriations could not be made for more than two years. The President nominated officers by and with the consent of the Senate. The President could not declare war but he could dispose his units in such a way as to require the approval of Congress. If the legislative and executive branches differed on military policy or were politically divided, it was possible for a popular military leader to appeal to a part of the legislative branch against the directives of the executive and excuse his failure to obey orders on his right—or even duty—to carry his fight to the true representatives of the people. Douglas MacArthur used that procedure in 1951 when he provided civilian authority over the military with its most severe test in recent American history.

Nineteenth century France had seen a highly popular general, Georges Boulanger, become active as a proponent of military reform. He was courted by radical political elements, and then by less liberal groups. He got support from various sectors by his fiery advocacy of *revanche* against Germany. Although not eligible for election to the Chamber of Deputies, he allowed his name to be entered for a vacant seat, which he won. Later, when he was dismissed for disobedience of army rules, he was elected from three constituencies, with a large proportion of votes coming from Paris. He then called for various reforms and asked that the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved and new elections held. Alarmed, the government secured a warrant for his arrest and he fled the country. Soon fallen from public favor, he committed suicide in Brussels. Boulangerism is spoken of as the threat of the man on

horseback who appeals to factions in the legislative body, and to the masses by saber-rattling and personal popularity.

No such challenge bothered the United States after the Civil War. Most officers judged unfavorably General George McClellan's ill-timed but wholly constitutional opposition to President Lincoln in the election of 1864. Washington used reassignment or reprimand to deal with those officers who challenged legitimate authority. Thus the nearest thing to a challenge to presidential authority, for a half century, came from Leonard Wood—a former army doctor and later cavalry officer who as a volunteer colonel headed the Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War, and then rose rapidly to the post of Army Chief of Staff in Taft's Administration. His early efforts at American preparedness drew no opposition from President Taft, but were later frowned upon by Woodrow Wilson who disliked the use of the Chief of Staff's office as a base for General Wood's preparedness propaganda. Although he was backed by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and other advocates of preparedness, Wood failed to gain presidential approval. He lost his foothold when his term as Chief of Staff expired but in his new post in the First Military District he continued his efforts, thereby earning the opposition of the President and of a number of professional officers, including Generals John J. Pershing and Peyton C. March.

World War I saw no contest of wills, inasmuch as Pershing was allowed wide control over operations and training of troops, and Washington for the most part backed Pershing's policy toward the Allies. The later clash of Billy Mitchell with Army chiefs on the question of airpower involved the army hierarchy more than the President or Secretary of War; and a military court martial condemned Mitchell's actions. Even Mitchell's good friends among airmen agreed that he had been fairly dealt with, although they admired his courage in seeking a sounding board for his views.

The 1930s, a period of social and economic unrest, and pervaded with fears of both left-wing and right-wing extremists, found some officers in opposition to governmental policies. George Van Horn Moseley, a friend of MacArthur's, was ultimately eased into retirement by President Roosevelt because of Moseley's strong right-wing and racist views. George Patton wrote in private to Pershing and others of his violent dislike of politicians and pacifists in the country. Some ROTC officers and National Guard instructors stirred unfavorable reactions by their denunciations of subversive elements on campuses and in the country. But military men saved this talk mainly for their private clubs. The loud talking was done by men like William Pelley, Gerald L. K. Smith, and Father Coughlin, some of whom later joined

the appeal to MacArthur to save the country by running for the presidency, but the Regular Army remained professional and loyal under civilian control.

In their appeals to MacArthur, the dissidents sought more than his military prestige and able leadership for their own political purposes. They found evidence that he was willing to listen to promotions of his presidential candidacy. It was noted that members of Congress, who had been exposed to his lectures on the errors in Washington's strategy, came back from the Pacific with proposals that MacArthur be put in sole charge of the conduct of the war.

To judge from numerous instances cited by Manchester, the General's tendency to challenge anything that would interfere with his advancement or ambitions arose initially from his natural dislike of authority. Later, he would assume that his wishes or the needs of his theater were those best suited to the good of the army or the nation. His most recent biographer notes the paranoia that greeted Washington's allocations of manpower or supplies, or its proposed strategy for Japanese defeat.

Manchester suggests that MacArthur's distaste for civilian authority came from his great devotion to the memory of his father, the young Wisconsin officer who became a temporary colonel before he was twenty, winning the Medal of Honor for his gallant action at Missionary Ridge. There was the recollection that his father had been removed as military governor of the Philippines because of his clash with the president of the Philippine Commission, William Howard Taft. Although the elder MacArthur felt that he deserved the office of Chief of Staff of the Army because of his seniority; Taft, now Secretary of War, thought otherwise. Any prospect of appeal was ruled out when Taft became President. Bitterly disappointed, MacArthur retired in 1909. He died three years later while attending a reunion of his Civil War associates.

The younger MacArthur liked to speak of his father. He sometimes told the story that when in 1864 a government representative came to Arthur MacArthur's unit to collect the votes of eligible soldiers for the presidential candidates, the young officer's ballot was declined because he was under age. As Douglas MacArthur told it, his father placed a pistol on the table and said "The Colonel votes or nobody votes." Manchester perhaps goes too far in saying that the removal of Arthur MacArthur from the Philippines at the turn of the century planted the seed that would bear extraordinary fruit fifty years later. But at least the father left the tradition of dislike of civilian control.

This aversion to civilian authority was more than a personal peculiarity.

As a young officer, MacArthur may have seen a newly published book by Emory Upton, a veteran of the Civil War who had left a manuscript on his views of a professional army. The book, with many good suggestions for the strengthening of the Army, was published in 1904. His contempt for civilian control and the concept of the citizen soldier had some appeal, but his narrowness defeated his purpose. Russell Weigley, in *Towards an American Army*, p. 110, notes: "Because Upton never really attempted to understand the civilian view of military policy, he failed utterly to formulate a military policy in harmony with the American natural genius . . . He began with fixed views of military policy and then despaired because he could not shape the nation in accord with their demands."

One must not make assumptions about the influence of Upton's book on MacArthur's thinking. He was not averse to political influence if it aided his advancement. Manchester tells how MacArthur's father's hand reached from the grave to aid his son's assignment. In 1912, Leonard Wood suggested to Secretary of War Stimson that something should be done for Arthur MacArthur's son. Douglas was brought to the War Department where he was at once given special assignments by the Chief of Staff. Wood's departure did not affect the young officer's relationship with the Wilson Administration. Assigned to public relations duties, he came to the attention of Secretary of War Newton Baker, who accepted his proposal of a Rainbow Division, made up of men from various states; Baker announced that MacArthur would be its first Chief of Staff, and then promoted him to colonel so that he could fill the position.

MacArthur also contradicted the older professional army view that a Regular officer must not engage in politics. He always denied his ambition to be president, but it was astonishing how he encouraged trial balloons by supporters. Senator Arthur Vandenberg concluded in 1943 that MacArthur might be the one man who could defeat Roosevelt for the presidency in 1944. Through intermediaries, he sounded out MacArthur. Vandenberg noted that the Republican nomination could be reached only through a real draft movement, and warned the general to leave political moves to the Senator. The Senator wrote that the Administration's policies on strategy might "easily martyrize him into a completely irresistible figure." (Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 82). But MacArthur was drawn into presenting his views by two letters from a conservative representative from Nebraska, A. L. Miller, who suggested that the General had to save the Republic. Instead of a bland reply, MacArthur implied that he shared at least some of Congressman

Miller's concerns. Thinking he was aiding MacArthur, Miller released the letters. Vandenberg complained that this rash action killed MacArthur's chances. When the Pacific commander later said that he would not permit his name to be used in partisan politics since it would be unseemly for a high commander in the field to be engaged in a presidential campaign, Vandenberg confided to his diary that this was not the real reason; it was the adverse effect of the Miller letters. It seems strange that MacArthur did not remember the danger of writing to politicians when he penned the famous letter to Joseph Martin that hastened his recall.

MacArthur was more careful in 1948, when he permitted his name to be presented at the Republican convention. Some polls showed grass roots strength, but the party managers had other men in mind. At the Republican convention, his nomination by Jonathan Wainwright was proffered in the small hours of the morning when few delegates remained. (As one of the few auditors left in the great hall, this reviewer recalls the loneliness.)

MacArthur's continued willingness to allow his name to be used in a political challenge apparently rested on a conviction that he alone could save the situation in the Far East. He seems to have taken seriously some of the assessments of his staff as to his magic powers. Apparently it is from reading too much of their works that Manchester writes (p. 143): "MacArthur never accepted the implied sacrifice [of the Philippines in case of a Japanese attack], and from 1928 onward the chief obstacle to Japanese conquest of the Philippines was his implacable will."

The climate in which MacArthurism flourished was created by the division of civilian authority which followed the Republican congressional victory in 1946, by the fierce election of 1948 which found Truman narrowly returned to office, and a strongly partisan Congress in which both parties sought advantage for the 1952 presidential contest. In this atmosphere a disgruntled general or admiral would find ample opportunity to criticize the Administration. Even more disturbing was the public disappointment and fear following the defeat of the Nationalist Chinese, the end of American atomic monopoly, fears of the growing strength of Communism, belief in widespread subversive activity in the United States, and strong opposition to further financial assistance to Europe. In such a situation, there was likely to be strong public support for resistance to Washington officials who were charged with being too soft on communism.

Manchester's title, *American Caesar*, suggests at first glance the possibility that he was writing of a great proconsul, long absent from Rome, who

became concerned over deteriorating conditions at home and a lessening of support for his campaigns. Informed of growing dissatisfaction, he returned home to seize power or dominate the government. The subject deserves examination beyond the lurid Sunday supplement treatment. It is unlikely that MacArthur ever entertained any such idea of a Boulangist approach, although his closest advisers included several strong right-wing supporters. Certainly, he could not have expected to depend on his soldiers in such an effort. Walter Millis, in his perceptive *Arms and the State*, which appeared a few years after MacArthur's recall, makes it clear that the soldiers, under a system of rotation, were not disgruntled at civilian control. Although the generals might be strongly frustrated, as he suggests, the army commanders associated with MacArthur had been trained in old army precepts and all had strong ties to Marshall, Bradley, and Collins; they felt no desire to mount strong opposition to civilian authority. Unlike the Caesars, who returned at the head of their loyal legions, MacArthur had to seek his supporters in the Congress and among the general public.

Perhaps MacArthur hoped for a great surge of support from Republican leaders in Congress who were willing to use his arguments to bless their opposition to the Administration. But he had been too long away from the United States to gauge adequately the temper of his political backers. Since 1935, he had been absent from home—first as Quezon's field marshal, then as Far East commander in the Philippines, then as victorious commander in the Pacific and the virtual uncrowned emperor of Japan. All this made him an inspiring ally on the campaign trail. But that was all. Robert Taft and others who had waited for so long to lead the Republicans back to a long denied victory had no intention of stepping aside for MacArthur any more than they did for that other general who waited in Europe.

MacArthur's speech to the Congress, after his return, met with an outpouring of approval that may have held, for a few hours, an element of danger for the President; but that threat soon evaporated. It seemed too evident that MacArthur's eloquent testimony would assure Truman's defeat in 1952. There would be no need for any disruption in the constitutional succession even if MacArthur had been inclined to make a serious campaign. The shift in attitude was subtle, but it became clear that MacArthur was to be feted, consulted, exhibited as an example of Truman's ingratitude and ineptness. That was all, however. He could make the keynote speech, and there was the hope that he could offset Ike's glamor, but there would be no stampede of Taft Republicans to his banner.

Furthermore, MacArthur's vanity and tendency to believe that his former aide in Washington and Manila could not possibly be presidential timber, blinded him to the fact that Eisenhower's calm approach, the European Commander's avoidance of attacks on the President, and his stand above politics were winning more than the stormy rhetoric of the old warrior. As Manchester shows, at the great moment in the Republican convention, when MacArthur had a last chance to sweep the delegates by his eloquence, his appeal fell flat. After that, he could only make a separate peace. MacArthur could criticize Eisenhower to his friends and rejoice that the mountain named for his former subordinate was only a small one; he could accept the respectful plaudits of those who saw in him a symbol of what was right with America; and then he could say to interviewers, "You know Eisenhower worked for me for years," or "Jack Kennedy was one of my boys," as if to suggest that he was a power still to be reckoned with.

It was not the challenge to civilian control that was the most unfortunate lasting effect of the 1951 crisis. It was the reactions to MacArthur's war cry, "There is no substitute for victory." When he was summoned to lead the UN and U.S. forces in Korea, the general had been aware that the United States was committed only to a limited action to restore the status quo or to contain the North Korean thrust. The communist attack came when the United States was woefully unprepared for a showdown battle in the Far East, and when it was gathering its strength to shore up western Europe's defense against possible Soviet attacks. This was no time for a great crusade against communism or a total commitment of forces in the Far East. Inasmuch as some UN forces were involved, there had to be some effort to work with nations whose active support America sought for NATO.

Later, MacArthur would argue that there had been no restrictions set on his actions in Korea. Particularly after his early restoration of the situation, some of the early inhibitions had been removed. But his hopes for a quick victory were dashed when the Chinese Communists intervened and threatened to turn his triumph into a rout. He began to ask for greater extensions of the war, for naval blockade, for bombings, for destruction of Communist China's industrial capacity to make for the unleashing of the Chinese Nationalists.

Despite warnings from the White House and the Pentagon, MacArthur continued to press his campaign. His replies seemed increasingly to be raw appeals against civilian authority. His letter to Joseph Martin seemed to demand anti-Administration intervention on his behalf. Recalled, he went at

once on the attack with a ringing statement for unlimited warfare—one to be conducted almost without restraint on the authority of the commander in the field. This blatant appeal initially scored the most points. Senators Knowland and Cain, two of the strongest anti-Administration leaders, saw to it that he had ample opportunity to make his case in the Senate hearings which followed soon after MacArthur's relief.

MacArthur's reply to a request for his views on politics and war may have been based on a misinterpretation of Clausewitz. MacArthur declared in the Senate hearings:

The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that a war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control, the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily . . ." [Senate Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East, Part I, p. 45].

General Marshall disagreed. Although he had always favored great latitude among his commanders, they were expected to fight in accord with political directives and to conduct occupation duties in accord with carefully designed regulations. He declared:

The fundamental divergence is one of judgment as to the proposed course of action to be followed by the United States. This divergence arises from the inherent difference between the position of a field commander, whose mission is limited to a particular area and a particular antagonist, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States, and who . . . must weigh our interests and objectives in one part of the globe with those in other areas of the world so as to attain the best over-all balance.

It is their responsibility to determine where the main threat to our security lies, where we must fight holding actions, and where and how we must gain time to grow stronger . . . (Hearings, I, 325).

The latter was the sounder view but not the one that appealed to public opinion and to many in Congress. And it made no impact on MacArthur. His statement showed that in Korea, as in the Pacific, he had never really looked at matters globally and never considered that anything really mattered save his own area of operations. Many Americans saw no outcome, once engaged, but all-out victory. To them there was something ignominious in Marshall's line of reasoning. A few weeks later, Joseph McCarthy was en-

couraged to charge that Marshall was taking a soft line on Communism and playing the Soviet game. The more extreme advocates of this all-out view in Asia were never convinced of the need to save U.S. strength for the problems in western Europe. For years, many opponents of American involvement in Europe favored strong measures in the Far East. MacArthur's case before Congress supplied these critics with the arguments they desired.

At the moment, the situation was saved for the Administration by the reaction of a number of genuine conservatives who liked MacArthur's patriotic fervor but condemned his challenge to the President. Among these men were conservative Democrats as well as Republicans. Manchester does a disservice to Senator Richard Russell by implying that the committee he headed was set up to protect the Administration. One of Russell's more liberal colleagues said that his admiration of Russell grew because, despite strong championship of MacArthur in the Pacific, he kept the sessions on a balanced course. One can draw satisfaction from the fact that most senior officers agreed with the constitutional correctness of Truman's action.

But in a sense MacArthur won a victory—one which did not coincide with his later appeal for the abolition of war. His impassioned attack on the concept of limited war and limitations on the power of the field commander to expand the conflict years later haunted political leaders and officers who considered holding down increasing commitments in Vietnam. Although MacArthur is widely quoted as warning President Johnson against involvement in Vietnam, his own formula for victory contained the element of greater expansion in Asia. His proposal to unleash the Chinese Nationalists would have guaranteed such a commitment.

Hereafter, it would be difficult for political leaders to ask for limited operations. Hereafter, it would be difficult for younger commanders to accept limits to their campaigns or avoid all-out use of planes and ships and tanks. For future candidates to ponder, there was the fact that Truman had ultimately decided that he could not stand again for election. For several commanders, there was the feeling that they had to ask for another 50,000 or 100,000 men. The hands of those who called for new crusades without stint were strengthened.

The great consolation in 1951 was that the officers who might have turned the balance against civilian control were men trained in the allegiance to that type of authority. The cautionary element about the experience is that one can only hope that the appeal to a divided Congress against a president or civilian officials will not find the type of division that existed in France when

French officers in Algeria posed a military challenge to the policy of de Gaulle. On that occasion only tremendous prestige of de Gaulle prevented a military coup against the government. The lesson is not so much to the military as to the civilian politicians who must learn the danger of stirring potential constitutional crises in the hope of gaining political advantage.

At last we come to Manchester's claim that MacArthur was the most gifted man-at-arms the United States has produced. What does it mean? Some critics assume he is proclaiming that MacArthur was the greatest American general.

If he speaks of America's greatest warrior, a term Manchester believes is peculiarly applicable to MacArthur, he must establish his case against the claims of at least a dozen others, including Summerall in World War I, Patton and Truscott in World War II, or Ridgway in Korea. If he is referring to a great leader of armies, inspiring his troops, appearing among them frequently, assuring them of his care, winning their respect by his lack of showiness, allowing his commanders great initiative, supporting them in their difficult hours, backing them in their battles and sharing the credit fully with them, then we must think of an Omar Bradley.

Does he mean the commander in a coalition, bringing together with minimum friction the services of his country with forces of various allied countries with their different interests and ambitions? Clearly, Eisenhower was MacArthur's superior here.

Or do we speak of a general who had to see the war whole, who looked at the entire globe without a parochial view, who assessed the position of the United States and acted in international conferences to support his own Commander in Chief, and his various commanders, never forgetting any theater, who strove to see the other side and to subordinate his own desires for field command to victory. Here, Marshall has the advantage. First among equals, as a British official historian puts it, he won the respect of his civilian superiors while protecting the interests of the military and without damaging any part of the fragile fabric of the society in which he lived. Reserved about a public parading of his overwhelming patriotism, he proved it by quiet performance of duty and the laying aside without complaint or frustration of the supreme command he wanted above all else to have.

Selecting the greatest, the best, the most swashbuckling, the most loyal is a futile exercise. So far as MacArthur is concerned, it is notable that he deserves well of his country. He proved his courage on many fields in several conflicts. He contributed great skill and planning and fighting ability to the

execution of military designs. He succeeded brilliantly as proconsul in Japan, and he deserves great praise for his Inchon strategy.

But he and certain members of his staff contributed to virtual conflict with the Navy in the Pacific. In fact, Marshall had to remind him that they and the Navy were on the same side. They seemed never to have recognized that the Navy helped move the troops and the arms and supplies that MacArthur's troops used, that it mounted their amphibious attacks, cut the supply lines of the enemy, sank his ships with submarines, pounded his forces with aircraft from carriers, furnished support by Marines, and aided in the final defeat of Japan by a strategy that was in some cases superior to that of the Southwest Pacific commander.

When one says greatest in leadership, he is dealing with a strong word. Greatness not only implies deeds but strength of character. And strength of character involves self-control. With all of MacArthur's excellent qualities went his conviction that he alone knew best—a view made worse by the unalloyed praise of some of his subordinates. In a sense, he established a separate headquarters which could be negotiated with but not commanded. As the great proconsul in Japan, he seemed almost to have concluded a separate peace.

In Korea, he scorned military and political superiors. He acted as if Marshall, who had commanded 8⅓ million men in the Army and Army Air Forces, who appeared regularly before Congress to get the support needed for his forces around the world, who dealt with the President, Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and with independent minded commanders around the world, who managed to supply his own troops and helped to find guns and planes for British, French, Russian, Chinese and Polish contingents, had no concept of concern for the war in the Pacific. Bradley, who led four armies to MacArthur's two, and Collins, whose abilities as a corps commander were unsurpassed in the war, were looked upon almost as schoolboys. Eisenhower, who superbly blended together the diverse efforts of one British, one Canadian, one French and five American armies plus Polish, Dutch, and Belgian units, drawing cooperation from men with varying concepts of victory, MacArthur dismissed as a general who let others do his fighting for him.

Despite his great abilities and contributions, he posed political and military opposition to a well-integrated national and allied effort in time of war. In Korea, he risked adoption of a policy of adventurism in his disdain for presidential and high-level military decisions in Washington. He helped stir

dangerous dissension in the United States by his challenges to directives from that capital. These weaknesses and elements of pettiness and vain self-indulgence, depicted in detail by Manchester, tarnish the gloss of greatness claimed for him by the author. That other great proconsul of the late 1940s, General Lucius Clay, once said that he never understood why MacArthur was held up to West Point cadets as a model. Clay was not denying the general's great qualities or contributions, but questioning whether he should be regarded as the exemplar of the great military leader. Beyond deeds and dash, greatness requires inner strength born of self-discipline, a dedication to duty that transcends one's personal desires, and a selflessness that puts in first place the success of the common cause. Judged by these requirements, MacArthur falls short of the standard raised by such military leaders as Washington, Lee, and George C. Marshall.

Eurocommunism: Between East and West

Kevin Devlin

So-called "Eurocom-

munist"—like its lively younger brother, "Eurosocialism"—is a vague, inaccurate, and misleading term which veils rather than describes complex realities. It is vague and misleading because it does not refer, as one might suppose, to a clear grouping of West European communist parties with common positions, an agreed body of doctrine, or organizational links, but rather to a process of change, to recognizable transitional tendencies affecting certain communist parties. It is inaccurate because these tendencies are also found in some other communist parties outside Europe. But we need it: it is a word whose time has come, and the steadily increasing flow of articles, books, conferences, lectures and study courses on the subject in the past few years, on both sides of the Atlantic—though, of course, only on one side of the Iron Curtain—suggest that it is here to stay.

But what do we mean by it? The Eurocommunist phenomenon should be examined against the background of a wider historical process: the process of sociopolitical adaptation to environmental realities that has been developing—gradually, unevenly and in greatly varying degrees—among communist parties operating in advanced capitalist democracies over the past two decades (although its origins can be traced even further back, in the case of the Italian CP). And the first and most fundamental characteristic of that gradual, uneven process was the abandonment by these Western communist parties, at first in practice and then increasingly also in theory, of revolutionary Leninism. With the onset of the cold war and the consequent division of Europe into adversary camps, Leninism—the doctrine of the vanguard revolutionary party of the working-class—had become for Western communist leaderships a geopolitical irrelevance, even if for ideological reasons they could not admit this. The only exception to this practical abandonment of the revolutionary option was the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which did attempt to seize power, first through a *coup d'état* in late 1944 and then through a bitter civil war from 1946 to 1949. And one could perhaps describe as neo-Leninist the tactics of the Portuguese CP, in alliance with the ultra-

From 1976 through 1978, Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs sponsored a European Security Working Group, composed of faculty and fellows. This article is based on one of the chapters in their book, *European Security: Prospects for the 1980s*, Derek Leebaert, editor (D.C. Heath & Co., 1979).

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leftist military, from 1974 to 1975—behavior, we may note, which brought it sharp criticism from the Italian and Spanish CPs and fraternal support from the French CP.

The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict—revealed to the scandalized leaders of the minor parties at the 81-party Moscow Conference of November, 1960—gave decisive impetus to the post-Stalinist transformation of the international communist movement in general, and to autonomous tendencies among the Western parties in particular. The challenge to Soviet authority posed by the only communist regime with comparable revolutionary prestige, and the ill-advised efforts of the CPSU to meet that challenge by rallying loyalist parties for a collective condemnation of the Chinese at a world conference, offered other parties, ruling and non-ruling, an increased freedom of maneuver which some of them began to exploit. The ouster of Khrushchev in October, 1964, and the uncertain touch which his successors brought to inter-party and international affairs for a few years, considerably strengthened tendencies in many Western communist parties toward more independence, especially in domestic policies, and adaptation to national circumstances.

With the Italian CP in the vanguard, these parties were becoming more aware of their own political interests and opportunities in economically advanced societies of pluralistic, constitutional democracy, and also more conscious of the need to seek political allies and to extend their electoral base by presenting a more acceptable public image. Both considerations led them to stress that their goal was a national path to an indigenous type of socialism. This in turn led them, on occasion, to dissociate themselves from unpopular developments in Eastern Europe.¹ And this was, I think, not only a matter of political opportunism (although that was certainly often a factor): the extent to which genuine rethinking was involved was suggested by the often stormy internal ideological debates which went on in various West European communist parties in the mid-sixties (and sometimes, as in Sweden and Finland, led to a prolonged factional struggle between “progressives” and “dogmatists”).

At the same time a new sense of *regional* and not just national identity was affecting even conservative or pro-Soviet communist parties in Western Europe (and we note in passing that they have always constituted the majority,

1. One notable example of this was the chorus of criticism with which West European CPs met the Soviet trial of Siniavsky and Daniel in early 1966.

even if they have not included the most important). This sense of regional identity found expression in the conferences of West European CPs held in Brussels in June, 1965, and in Vienna a year later. More important was the more carefully prepared regional conference held in Brussels in January, 1974, because it has been followed by a prolonged series of thematic West European communist conferences on such subjects as agricultural policy, the motor industry or the condition of women, to which interested parties send delegations.

The Czechoslovakia Invasion

Between the two earlier West European conferences and the later one, however, the regional consciousness of the Western parties and relations between them and the Eastern regimes had been profoundly changed by another watershed event in the history of communism—the invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops of the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact allies in August, 1968. The unexpected and largely spontaneous flowering of “socialist democratization” in Czechoslovakia in April–August, 1968, and the coercive reaction of the probably divided Kremlin leadership (prodded by Ulbricht and Gomulka) to this infectious example revealed a deep and enduring divergence of political interests between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, which could brook no challenge to the power of the *apparat*, and nonruling parties, which had to compete for votes in open, pluralistic democracies.

With some exceptions—the Portuguese, Luxembourg, West Germany, West Berlin and Cypriot CPs, plus the Greek “Exterior” CP—the West European parties reached to the invasion with a chorus of criticism and condemnation. Ten years later, only the small Austrian CP has reversed its stand on the invasion (at the cost of losing its best and brightest), although some others have tacitly accepted the “normalization” of Czechoslovakia.

In July, 1968, three West European communist parties warned the Soviets in advance that they would publicly oppose any armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. Is it a coincidence that these three—the Italian, French and Spanish CPs—are now the major exemplars of Eurocommunism?

Yet there are significant differences between the three of them with regard to their record on post-invasion Czechoslovakia, and it is worth glancing briefly at these differences, because they fit into a wider pattern. A student of the Eurocommunist phenomenon finds that on other important issues

besides Czechoslovakia there is a significant gap in substance and style between the positions of the Italian and Spanish CPs on the one hand and those of the French CP on the other. For the first two, condemnation of the invasion was a matter of principle, and they demonstrated this by consistent criticism of the repressive "normalization" that followed. In the Italian case the sincerity of the PCI's sympathy for the "socialist opposition" in Czechoslovakia and the firm editorials with which *Unità* met invasion anniversaries received negative confirmation from the other side, through the Husak regime's expulsion of the Prague correspondent of the party daily, *Unità* (1972) and of Italian Communist employees of the Czechoslovak Radio (1976). But perhaps the most striking example of the PCI's attitude was the publication in 1977 of the book *Prague: An Open Question* by the leading (and persecuted) Czechoslovak dissident Zdenek Mlynar, with a preface by Lucio Lombardo Radice of the PCI Central Committee. With this book the Italian CP was in effect serving notice that it would continue to regard post-invasion Czechoslovakia as an "open question"—an unresolved problem—for the whole international communist movement.²

For the Spanish party (PCE), the invasion was a major turning-point—"the last drop that made the vase overflow," as Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo put it later in his book, *"Eurocommunism" and the State*. Since 1956 the Spanish CP had maintained "revisionist" (or what would later be called Eurocommunist) positions in domestic affairs—urging other anti-Franco forces, including even "the civilized right," to join it in a "pact for liberty" on the basis of "national reconciliation." But the PCE had combined all this with traditional pro-Soviet attitudes. After August, 1968, the PCE emphasized an independence which frequently involved vigorous criticism of the East European regimes for their lack of democracy, their repression of human rights, on their dealings with the Franco government. This stress on independence was strengthened by Moscow's covert and ultimately ineffective support of Enrique Lister's pro-Soviet splinter party in the early 1970s; it also found significant expression in the visit which a Spanish Communist delegation under Carrillo made to Peking in September, 1971, in an unsuccessful

2. The further significance of the book lay in the fact that it in fact consisted of the text of a long memorandum which Mlynar, a former secretary of the Czechoslovak CP's Central Committee, addressed to the leaderships of the European communist parties in early 1975, within the framework of the preparations for the pan-European conference, arguing that it would be in the interests of the very regimes that had taken part in the invasion to reverse the course of repressive "normalization in Czechoslovakia."

effort to re-establish normal relations with the Chinese CP. The lasting strength of the PCE's stand on Czechoslovakia is indicated by the fact that when it held its historic 9th Congress, it did not invite what Carrillo slightly calls "the official Czechoslovak party," although he had shortly before received exiled representatives of the "socialist opposition," Mlynar and Pelikan.

Contrast the record of the French party (PCF). It is true that it never withdrew its "disapproval" of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Again, it joined many other Western communist parties in criticizing the political trials held in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1972. But this and similar *ad hoc* stands, intended to dissociate the PCF from manifestly unpopular developments in Eastern Europe, could plausibly be regarded as "cosmetic" opportunism—at least until the historic change of course in late 1975, to which we must return later. Closer inspection reveals that the PCF actually played an ignoble role in the process of pro-Soviet normalization in Czechoslovakia during one crucial stage. In late November 1969 a PCF delegation led by Etienne Fajon visited Prague for talks with a solidly conservative CPCS delegation, and (it was learned later) took the occasion to hand over the protocol of Waldeck Rochet's discussion with Dubcek on 18–19 July, 1968. This material, the pro-Soviet spokesmen Alois Indra, Vasil Bilak and Pavel Auersperg made clear in statements in January, 1970, were then used against Dubcek by the Husak regime.³ It may be that an incident such as this should be borne in mind when it comes to considering the credibility of certain positions adopted in later years by the French Communist Party.

The Western communist reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia marked one important stage in a wider, uneven process—the post-Stalinist erosion of Soviet authority in the international communist movement. This erosion was partly due to Soviet efforts to reassert that authority in profoundly altered circumstances—notably, as mentioned earlier, by trying to rally other communist parties for a collective denunciation of the Chinese. It was an important sign of the changed times that the green light for the first post-

3. Waldeck Rochet, having just visited Moscow (with Italian CP envoys) to warn the Soviets against intervening in Czechoslovakia, went on to Prague to lecture Dubcek on the folly of overdoing liberalization! See Kevin Devlin, "Rewriting Secret History: the PCF and Czechoslovakia," *Radio Free Europe Research/Free World* No. 0583, Munich, 13 May 1970. For further testimony on the PCF's acceptance of normalization in Czechoslovakia see Roger Garaudy, *Toute la vérité* (Paris, 1970) and Pierre Daix, *Prague au coeur* (Paris, 1974). Garaudy was expelled from the PCF in May, 1970 and Daix left the party in 1974—both mainly on account of their anti-Soviet stand on Czechoslovakia.

Khrushchev world conference came from the Italian CP, in a series of articles (October–November, 1967) in which Secretary-General Luigi Longo in effect laid down the PCI's conditions for participating in such a conference.⁴

Even then, the conference was delayed, and the procedural conditions further changed; when the conference finally did take place in June 1969 after repeated editorial sessions and hundreds of amendments, it brought not a restoration of Soviet influence, but a further weakening of Soviet authority: the giant was now being increasingly restrained by a network of precedents of high tensile strength. The pro-Chinese and neutralist parties boycotted the conference, of course, but out of the 75 parties present, 14 expressed opposition to, or reservations about, a collective document that already contained important Soviet concessions—for example, the failure to assign any special status to the CPSU, the new interparty principle of non-interference in the affairs of others, and the statement that there was no longer any "leading center of the international communist movement." Five did not sign the text at all; four (including the PCI) signed only the section on anti-imperialist unity of action; and five (including the PCE) signed only after having expressed reservations of various kinds. Since the document was, in any case not binding upon the signatory parties, it could well be said that this 1960 conference marked the institutionalization of diversity, and even of dissent, in the international communist movement.

A salutary lesson for the Soviets, one would have thought; yet four years later they were off on the conference trail again. This time the vicarious calls that came from pro-Soviet leaders beginning in late 1973 were for a pan-European conference of communist parties, to be followed by a world conference, the calls coming within the context of attacks on Maoism. The Soviets eventually got the first conference, the European one—although I doubt very much that they would have wanted it if they had known in advance the price they were going to pay for it. They never did get the

4. The PCI's main conditions were that the conference must be consultative, with no binding programmatic content; the principle of the autonomy of each party must be strictly respected; nonattendance must not affect a party's status as part of the international communist movement (i.e., no "excommunications"); any party must have the right "not to accept, or to accept only partially or with reservations any eventual (collective) decision"; and a basic purpose of the meeting should be to establish "new forms of unity and collaboration," which should extend to noncommunist forces. All of these conditions, with the exception of the latter part of the last one, were in fact implemented at the Moscow Conference of June, 1969. In retrospect, it seems hardly an exaggeration to say that Soviet acceptance of them marked the initiation of a new era in the history of the international communist movement.

second, even though more than two-thirds of the world's communist parties had backed the project by June, 1975.

The Emergence of Eurocommunism

With regard to the second pan-European conference,⁵ the Soviets wanted to cast their net as widely as possible. In particular, they wanted—with an eye to the approaching post-Tito era—to obtain the return of independent, non-aligned Yugoslavia to what one may call “conciliar communism.” The main price they paid for Yugoslav participation was the adoption, at an initial, consultative meeting in Warsaw in October, 1974, of a new procedural rule of “decision-making by consensus.” From the Russian viewpoint, that turned out to be a disastrous mistake.

There followed a prolonged struggle between an independent minority and the conservative majority of the 28 parties represented, a struggle fought out behind closed doors in at least 15 “editorial” sessions over 20 months—so that the conference finally took place a full year behind the original schedule. Against the pro-Soviet majority was ranged an alliance of convenience grouping two independent Eastern regimes, Yugoslavia and Romania, and the Western nonruling communist parties of Italy (plus San Marino), Spain, Great Britain and Sweden—later to be joined, at least on some issues, by the French.

Taking their stand upon the new principle of consensus, this independent alliance resisted successive attempts (made by the East Germans, who as hosts were charged with producing the successive drafts for a collective document) to impose upon the European parties something like a “general line,” expressed in ideological terms.⁶ Against this pressure to close the ranks, the independent parties stood by their demands: if there was to be a collective document at all, it must be based upon genuine consensus; it must emphasize the principles of autonomy, equality and noninterference in interparty relations (the corollary being that no special status should be granted

5. The first pan-European conference of communist parties was held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April, 1967. It was boycotted by the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Romanian parties from the East, and by the Dutch, Icelandic, and Norwegian parties from the West, while the independent Swedes sent only an observer.

6. In an interview given to the Rome weekly *Espresso*, August 31, 1975, Sergio Segre of the Italian CP's delegation to the preparatory meetings said that the second East German draft (unacceptable as the first) said of the communist parties that “they play a vanguard role, pursue identical objectives, and are guided by a single ideology.”

to the Soviet party); it must contain no criticism of any party, present or absent (for example, the Chinese); it must deal with political action, not with ideology; and in any case it was not to be binding upon any party.

In this long struggle over the character and content of the collective document, which ended in East Berlin at the end of June, 1976, the old Field Marshal Tito out-generalled the new Field Marshal Brezhnev, so to say: the independent alliance had their way on almost every point of importance, even to the extent of getting the sacrosanct formula, "proletarian internationalism" replaced by an anodyne reference to "voluntary co-operation" between equal and autonomous parties. But during the process there had been several developments of importance to our theme. One was that the independent Western parties had acquired a greater sense of their community of interests, of what they had in common ideologically and politically, of the goals which they could set before members and electors within the framework of national and regional realities and, not least, of their ability to resist Soviet pressures. At the East Berlin Conference Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI insouciantly used the new term "Eurocommunism"⁷ in noting that other West European CPs now shared the PCI's perspective of a socialist society based upon "the principles of the secular, non-ideological nature of the state and its democratic organization; the plurality of political parties and the possibility of alternation of government majorities; the autonomy of trade unions; religious freedom, freedom of expression, of culture, and of the arts and sciences."

The other important development was the French CP's quite abrupt shift in the closing months of 1975 from its traditional solidarity with Moscow to an ostentatious independence that found expression in unprecedented criticism of the Soviet regime—for example, the PCF Politburo's condemnation of Soviet labor camps in December, 1975, the later attacks upon Soviet cultural policies, or the denunciation of individual acts of repression.

Despite the French CP's habitual stress on continuity, there was no doubt that this dramatic change did take place. In May–July, 1975, the PCF was on the pro-Soviet side of a balanced "subgroup" of four loyalist and four independent parties which vainly tried to reach a compromise agreement on the pan-European conference text. In September a Central Committee mem-

7. There has been some controversy over the origin of the term "Eurocommunism." It seems to have been coined in June, 1975, by the exiled Yugoslav journalist Frane Barbieri, former Editor-in-chief of the Belgrade weekly *Nin*, and then writing for the Milan newspaper *Il Giornale Nuovo*.

ber, J. Chambaz, signalled the change with an article rejecting the Soviet spokesman Zarodov's criticism of what were about to become known as "Eurocommunist" positions. In mid-November Secretary-General Marchais and Secretary-General Berlinguer signed in Rome a "Eurocommunist" communique expressing their common commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties. Both signed similar communiques with Secretary-General Carrillo of the Spanish CP, and the bilateral network subsequently spread to include others, such as the British and the distant Japanese CP.

From the first, the French CP wore its revisionist rue with a difference; and we shall have to consider later the credibility of its Eurocommunist commitment. At this point we may pause to consider the term briefly again, to see what and whom it covers.

Eurocommunism implies a certain consensus among the communist parties concerned about what the characteristics of a "socialist" (i.e., post-capitalist) society in an advanced Western country ought to be—and, equally important, ought not to be. On the positive side, the extract from Berlinguer's East Berlin speech cited above listed most of the bourgeois liberties that were to be maintained and extended in a pluralistic regime with full opposition rights, no official ideology or philosophy, etc. On the negative side, this pluralistic-libertarian perspective also involved the explicit rejection of existing "models" of a communist society—a rejection to be made credible (especially in the case of formerly loyalist parties like the PCF) by "principled," and preferably also systematic, criticism of the undesirable aspects of these regimes.

It is when one applies this second criterion—independence of Moscow, rejection of the East European model and readiness to criticize the Soviet regime—that the number of Eurocommunist parties is reduced to some half-dozen in Western Europe: the Italian, French, Spanish, British, Swedish, Icelandic and San Marino CPs. There are, in addition, a few more with the same characteristics in other parts of the world: the Japanese and Australian CPs, the dissident-communist MAS (Movement to Socialism) in Venezuela and perhaps the Mexican CP.

As far as Europe is concerned, the ones that matter—the ones that present a serious challenge both to the capitalist West and to the bureaucratic-authoritarian East are the "Big Three" of Italy, France and Spain. Their pre-eminence was symbolized by the "Eurocommunist summit" of Berlinguer, Marchais and Carrillo, held in Madrid in early March, 1977 (when the Spanish host-party was still formally illegal!). That meeting, however, also drew

attention to limitations in the Eurocommunist evolution and differences between the three parties. Thus, the challenge to the "real socialism" of the regimes was muted—significantly so, in view of the fact that the Central Committee secretaries of the East European ruling parties were holding what had to be viewed as a rival conference on the same days, March 2–3, in Sofia. The Berlinguer-Marchais-Carrillo communique did, indeed, stress commitment to an impressive list of bourgeois liberties within the framework of the "will to build socialism within democracy and freedom"—but it said nothing at all about the lack of these liberties in Eastern Europe. To journalists covering the Madrid summit it was an open secret that this reticence was reluctantly accepted by Santiago Carrillo under pressure from his French and Italian guests; and, indeed, the three made this plain enough at their press conference.

During the past two years the differences in the national situation of the three major Eurocommunist parties have been accentuated, as have been their differences with regard to ideology, politics, foreign affairs, interparty relations, internal life and what one might call collective temperament. During the year the Italian CP took on greater responsibility for tackling Italy's profound crisis in collaboration with other political forces, without entering government or achieving the full "historic compromise" with Christian Democracy. The French Communist Party, which had seemed certain to return to governmental power in March, spent much of the year feuding with its Socialist ally/rival, with the result that the expected leftist victory was transformed into defeat, with far-reaching consequences for France and Europe. The Spanish CP, legalized in April 1977, did disappointingly in the June elections, but rallied to become an important force in the process of post-Franco democratization, gaining ground particularly in the trade union area, and ended the year with an historic congress at which, amid an unprecedented display of internal democracy, it outraged the Kremlin once more by formally abandoning Leninism. A brief survey of some of these developments may provide guidelines for discussing tendencies and limitations of the Eurocommunist evolution, as well as the nature and extent of the challenge that these parties pose to the capitalist West and the communist East.

Spain: Defying the Kremlin

In an article published in January, 1976, on the new triangular relationship between the Italian, French, and Spanish CPs, the Austrian dissident-communist Franz Marek said: "The Spanish say what the Italians think; and the

Italians say more than the French think." The quip has lost much of its point, largely because some French communists have been thinking and saying rather startling things since then. It is nevertheless true that of the three the Spanish Communists are the most outspoken—particularly when it comes to saying what they think of the Soviets.

The most famous example of this is Santiago Carrillo's book, *Eurocommunism and the State*, which he wrote during 1976, while in hiding in Madrid. Published in April, 1977, just as the PCE was legalized shortly before Spain's first elections since the Civil War, this was the first attempt by a Western European Communist leader to examine at length the ideological, political and international implications of Eurocommunism. It is also, and not at all incidentally, a principled critique of the Soviet "model," which Carrillo rejects because of its "deformations and degenerations" (*inter alia*). Despite some progress since Stalin's time (offset by persisting "forms of oppression and repression"), the Soviet Union still cannot be considered a "workers' democracy"—at best, Carrillo suggests provocatively, it may "represent an intermediate phase between the capitalist state and the authentic socialist state." After describing Stalinism he declares: "This system has not been transformed, it has not been democratized, and it still retains many coercive aspects in its relations with other Eastern socialist states, as was brutally demonstrated by the military occupation of Czechoslovakia."

An important point is that in Carrillo's perspective the double challenge of Eurocommunism—to Western capitalism and to the authoritarian Eastern regimes—must be kept in harmony with a continuation of that East-West balance of power in Europe which alone (he indicates justly) has made the emergence of Eurocommunism possible. Not only must Eurocommunism try to demonstrate that "democracy is not the same thing as capitalism, but that its defense and development demand the passing of that system": it must also demonstrate that

the victory of socialist forces in Western Europe will not in the least augment Soviet state power, or mean the extension of the Soviet model of the one-party state: it will be an independent experience, with a more advanced socialism which will have a positive influence on the democratic evolution of the existing socialist regimes . . . In this connection, what is essential is the independence of the communist parties with respect to the Soviet state, and the development in theory and practice of an unequivocally democratic way.⁸

8. While visiting Rome in February, 1976 (instead of attending the 25th Congress of the CPSU) Carrillo gave an interview in which he spoke of the "primitive stage" of socialism in the USSR.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the Carrillo affair did have the useful effect of revealing some fissures in the Eurocommunist front. The Italian Communists criticized the "tone" of the Soviet rejoinder, as the French did with considerably less emphasis, but neither of them defended the substance of Carrillo's argument: he had gone a good deal further, it seemed, than either Berlinguer or Carrillo was prepared to go. It should also be noted, however, that the PCI issued an Italian translation of Carrillo's book through its own publishing house—which is more than the French CP did.

Over the past two decades the Italian CP has built up, sporadically and piecemeal, a more impressive body of dissociative criticism of the Soviet regime than the other two major Eurocommunist parties; but no single authoritative and systematic critique that can be compared with Carrillo's book comes to mind. This could perhaps be linked with the PCI's habitual tendency to follow a *politica di presenza* (policy of presence) not only in Italian and West European institutions but also in the international communist movement. If it refuses to contemplate the "excommunication" of the Chinese Communists or anyone else, it equally refuses to consider anything like a "break" with the Soviet party.

As for the French CP, it seems to me that since its dramatic shift in late 1975 (which surely involved a decision henceforth to give its own political interests consistent priority over those of the Kremlin), its criticism of the Soviet regime has largely been expressed either by *avant-garde* individuals, like Jean Elleinstein, or in small-circulation publications like *La Nouvelle Critique*, or in ostentatious gestures, as when Georges Marchais refused to attend the 25th CPSU Congress because of differences between the two parties on socialist democracy and French foreign policy, adding that the conditions for a meeting between himself and Brezhnev "do not exist today." Similarly, Marchais has frequently stressed that for the French CP socialism and liberty are indivisible; he has sometimes deplored the lack of liberty in the Soviet Union; but he cannot go on from major and minor premise to the syllogistic conclusion that the Soviet Union is not a true socialist society.

Even the most radical French Communist critic of the Soviet regime, the anti-Stalinist historian Jean Elleinstein, deputy director of the party's Center of Marxist Study and Research, has the same difficulty. In a long interview which he recently gave to George R. Urban of Radio Free Europe/Radio

Asked if he did not fear that such ideas would be condemned by Moscow, he replied: "By what right can they condemn us? They can criticize us, as we criticize them. Condemnation is excommunication from a church, and the communist movement was a church but now no longer is one."

Liberty, Elleinstein said flatly: "There is in the Soviet Union no democratic opposition, no free press, no freedom of association, no freedom of assembly, no freedom of opinion." But then a little later, discussing "the question of whether or not the Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern Europe are socialist countries in our definition of the term," he said: "I would say they represent a certain type of socialism—I would hesitate to say that they are *not* socialist."⁹

That hesitation in a man of Elleinstein's intellectual courage—shown most recently in his articles in *Le Monde* after the French Left's election defeat, criticizing his party's policies—may perhaps be seen as reflecting a wider problem of identity among Eurocommunists. They may be taking a reformist, constitutional road paralleling that of the social-democrats, but it then becomes psychologically all the more important for them to preserve their *communist* identity as part of a world revolutionary movement that has its historical origins in the Leninist October.

France: The Lessons of a Defeat

Political developments during late 1977 in Italy, France and Spain brought out important differences between the three major Eurocommunist parties, with particular reference to their relations with non-communist forces, of the Left and of the Center. Briefly put: the Italian and Spanish parties were moving, if unevenly and hesitantly, in roughly the same direction, while the French CP was on a clearly divergent course. Or again: the first two, in different ways and for different reasons, had rejected (at least for the time being) "the leftist alternative"; the French, having for more than a decade based their political strategy on the idea of a leftist alternative, were about to be responsible (as most observers now agree) for blocking its advent.

Consider the events of fall, 1977. The PCI, having kept a minority Christian Democratic government in office for more than a year, and supporting an austerity program, until its own supporters began rebelling, was calling for a further step toward sharing power *and* responsibility with the traditional adversary through the "historic compromise"—while being prepared to settle

9. Compare this with Elleinstein's earlier statement in his book, *Le P.C.* (Paris, 1976): "We want neither Gulag nor the banning of artistic exhibitions, nor the censorship of literary works, nor psychiatric hospitals for political crimes, nor the persecution of Christians or Jews, and we condemn that with as much firmness as anyone, even if we do not reduce the whole reality of the socialist countries to these facts." (p. 154).

for entry into a "programmatic majority." In Spain—only half a year after the Communist Party was legalized—Secretary-General Carrillo was insisting on the need for an all-party "government of democratic concentration" to tackle the country's problems; failing that, he enthusiastically accepted as next-best the all-party programmatic agreement known as the "Moncloa Pact," which he had also urged, and which he aptly described as a Spanish version of the *compromesso storico*. The PCE has shown itself considerably more ready to co-operate with the centrist UCD of Premier Suárez than the Socialist PSOE, and has actually complained of the latter's efforts to work for a "leftist alternative."

While the Italian and Spanish CPs were thus trying to build up their image as reasonable and responsible partners in a broad and substantially co-operative array of forces covering most of the political spectrum, the French CP was behaving in a very different manner. It was displaying toward its own Socialist and Left-Radical allies an aggressive militance which in late September caused the collapse of the negotiations over the updating of the Common Program signed in 1972—and this only six months before the crucial elections of March, 1978, that until then had seemed certain (according to opinion polls) to bring the Union of the Left to power with a clear majority.

The PCF promptly launched a massive publicity campaign aimed at demonstrating that it was in the right and had always been in the right: that, as *the* party of the working class (by communist definition), it was the only guarantee and the indispensable instrument of genuine social change in France—change which the Socialist Party (PS), having "swung to the right," was blocking through its refusal to update and implement the Common Program. Now the differences between the PCF and the PS—notably over the number of firms to be nationalized and the degree of control over management—should have been open to settlement by negotiation, if the will to reach a settlement had been there. But the bitterness of the polemic (especially on the Communist side) and the efforts of each side to outmaneuver the other were such that many observers saw the central issue not as a dispute over the program on which the Left hoped to win the election, but rather as a struggle for predominance of power within the alliance. To put it more plainly: by mid-1977 it had become fairly obvious that the Communist leadership was concerned over the prospect that the PCF would be the *junior* partner in a *leftist* government—and that, entrenched behind the dogmas of its "proletarian vanguard" tradition, it was prepared to put a leftist victory in question in order to avert that outcome.

This was, indeed, what happened. Contrary to the opinion polls, the Union of the Left failed to gain its expected victory, and the Socialist Party failed to gain a commanding lead over the Communist Party. The first round on March 12 showed the French electorate to be divided into two roughly equal camps—each of which in turn consisted of two major components of roughly equal strength: Socialists and Communists on the left facing Gaullists and “Giscardian” centrists, with only a few percentage points separating all four. The most disappointed were the Socialists, with only 22.6 percent instead of the 28 or more percent that recent polls had indicated. Having for years been regarded as the strongest party not only in the left but also in France, the Socialist Party was now shown to be only slightly ahead of the PCF (20.6 percent) in electoral strength, while the latter remained much stronger in terms of organization, finances and trade union influence. The second round, with its direct confrontations between Left and Center-right, showed more clearly how the leftist alliance had suffered electorally both from its open disunity and from the widespread distrust of the Communist Party when it became a question of its entry into national government. The “majority” vindicated its title, if narrowly, by taking 50.49 percent to the Left’s 49.29 percent, with a more decisive margin of 290 to 201 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

From the Communist leadership’s viewpoint, the trouble was that the ally it ended up with was not the one it had started out with. Foreign observers who commented on “the advance of the Left” in France in recent years should really have been speaking of the advance of the Socialist Party—or more precisely, of the “new” Socialist Party founded in 1971 under Francois Mitterrand. When the Socialists and Communists signed their Common Program in June, 1972, the Socialist Party was by a considerable margin the weaker of the two—but within a few years the power relationship was reversed. While Communist electoral strength stagnated at around 20–21 percent,¹⁰ the Socialist Party drew in other leftist elements and steadily increased its electoral appeal. As a result, Communist attitudes to the Socialists shifted back and forth in accordance with the party’s perceived polit-

10. The myth of Communist political progress in France fades in the light of one striking fact: the PCF’s *best* electoral performance under the present Fifth Republic (22.5 percent in March, 1967) has been worse than its *worst* performance under the Fourth Republic (25.6 percent in January, 1956), and this despite a general shift of the electorate to the Left, and despite the PCF’s energetic efforts over the past decade to build up its image as an independent, progressive, trustworthy party committed to democratic liberties, etc.

ical needs—bitter polemics from the fall of 1974 to the fall of 1975, fairly good relations until both parties had profited from partnership in the local elections of March 1976, then a gradual shift back to the feuding which ended the Left's chances in last year's elections. Now the Common Program lies on the scrap-heap of history; and, as for the disunited Union of the Left, the recriminations flying back and forth between the Communist and Socialist leaders indicate that it may be impossible to put Humpty Dumpty together again.

We may be less surprised at this if we recall that the centrifugal strain was there from the beginning; from the first each ally also saw the other as a rival. This competitive element in the partnership was demonstrated by the events of three successive days in June, 1972. On June 27 Mitterrand and Marchais signed the Common Program. On June 28 Mitterrand said bluntly in an address at a meeting of the Socialist International in Vienna that "our fundamental objective is to demonstrate that, of the five million PCF voters three million might vote for the Socialist Party." On June 29 Georges Marchais delivered at a PCF Central Committee meeting a "secret" report—published by the Communists three years later, in a context of anti-Socialist polemics—in which he expressed strong and distrustful criticism of his new ally.

Marchais warned against "the least illusion" that the Socialists could be trusted to stand by the Common Program and not "break the Union of the Left after the elections to go over to an alliance with rightwing parties"; the "only guarantee" against that was the action of the PCF among the masses. Rejecting any idea of "*ideological rapprochement*" between the two parties, he said that basically the PS remained "absolutely reformist . . . totally alien to scientific socialism"; its permanent characteristics included fear of working-class action, hesitation to join in the fight against big capital, "the tendency to compromise with the latter and to engage in class collaboration."

Attitudes of this kind, whether openly expressed or not, account for a widespread mistrust of the PCF which, in the last analysis, dragged down the Socialist vote. The mistrust emerged clearly from a poll conducted for *Le Nouvel Observateur* in January, 1976—as the PCF's propaganda machine was incessantly proclaiming its liberal-independent commitment in preparation for its 22nd Congress. The key question asked for reactions to the proposition that, if the Union of the Left came to power, the PCF "would seek to govern alone by eliminating the other parties"; and 46 percent agreed with this brutally Leninist hypothesis as against 31 percent who disagreed, while 23 percent were undecided. Similarly, only 33 percent thought that the PCF

was "a party like the others," while 48 percent judged it "very different from the others," with 19 percent undecided. In these figures we find the most obvious explanation of the defeat of the Left two years later.

For the PCF leadership, of course, the party line was correct all along; but this habitual triumphalism is beginning to prove counterproductive in more ways than one. Immediately after the elections the Politburo announced that the Communist Party had no responsibility whatever for the defeat of the Left—all the blame was to be assigned to the Socialists. But this produced an unprecedented ferment of protest and indignation in the ranks of the party, among both intellectuals and workers. Marchais admitted that "a debate of unprecedented scope" was going on, but explained lamely that according to the statutes, contributions to such a debate could only appear in the party press before a congress. So they appeared in the non-party press—a flood of challenging letters and articles that criticized the party's policies with regard to the Socialists and other matters, and complained of the lack of internal democracy. In the past, such rebellion, by outstanding figures like Jean Elleinstein and the philosopher Louis Althusser, would have been met by expulsion; but now Marchais had to promise that "no heads would roll." Creaking at every sclerotic joint, digging in calloused heels, the PCF *was* moving jerkily along the Eurocommunist road, if a considerable distance behind the other two.

Meanwhile, these other two were justifiably concerned over events in France and the behavior of the PCF *vis-à-vis* the Socialists. Manuel Azcárate of the Spanish CP was more outspoken than the diplomatic Italians: "The French Communists have not applied the basic principle of Eurocommunism, which consists in seeking a very wide agreement between the most underprivileged classes and the middle classes." For the defeat of the French Left cast shadows also over Italy, where the Communist Party is much stronger than the Socialist Party, and over Spain, where it is considerably weaker. The question remains unanswered: Can a Communist party collaborate loyally and on mutually profitable terms with a social-democratic party of comparable strength?

Italy: The Regional Option

The prolonged drama of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades is a reminder that Italy's profound and complex crisis manifests itself on many levels—societal, economic, political, moral and administrative (to list

the more obvious categories). This systemic crisis has been aggravated in recent years by more widespread problems affecting the capitalist countries in general, particularly since the Arab oil boycott of late 1973 (high inflation and unemployment rates, trade imbalances, etc.), but in Italy its national roots are deep and intertwined: the cultural-economic gap between North and South, the parasitic bureaucracy, the anachronistic institutions, the dense network of corrupting customs that lies behind such phrases as *clientelismo* or *sottogoverno*, the chaotic frustration of higher education, the ludicrously inadequate tax system, the growth not only of lawlessness but of random violence—these are some of the more obvious surface manifestations.

The Italian Communist Party's slow and cautious approach to positions of political power on the national level (as distinct from the local and regional levels) is now based primarily on the claim that its contribution is needed if the country's formidable socio-economic problems are to be tackled with any prospect of success. One should perhaps note here, however, that to a considerable extent this is already happening, and has been happening for years. Even before the local elections of June, 1975, brought the Communist vote to within a few percentage points of the Christian Democratic Party and gave Communist-dominated coalitions new power bases in most large cities and in many regions and provinces, the PCI was in effect already helping to govern Italy, since its parliamentary collaboration (particularly in the closed legislative "commissions" of both chambers) had become necessary for the passing of important laws. The present "programmatic majority" is simply another step in a process that has been going on for years.

The PCI has a supplementary argument of international relevance, and that is that it is in the interests of Italy's Western allies that the country's social and economic decline be halted and reversed—which again (it is said) means Communist entry into government. Whatever validity there may be in this argument—and one can accept the need for the PCI's contribution to the government of an Italy in enduring crisis while still regarding it as a *potential* threat to pluralistic democracy—it is clear that the problems which the political advance of the PCI pose for the Western community of nations lie mainly on the level of foreign policy, and this with particular reference to the EEC and NATO.

But these are two very different issues. The PCI's positions with regard to the EEC (and to West European integration in general) are much clearer and, more important, have been established for a much longer period, than with

regard to the Atlantic Alliance, and by this time I see little reason to question the credibility of its "regional option." It is more than a decade and a half since its positions on this began to diverge substantially from those of the Kremlin and of the other West European communist parties (notably the French). As early as 1962 its program for the 10th party congress accepted West European integration through the EEC as an "irreversible reality," and acknowledged that it had been "a fundamental factor in Italy's economic leap forward," as Luigi Longo put it. True, this increasingly positive attitude to the EEC (responding to the perceptions of the Italian electorate) contained a marked anti-American element, and specific EEC policies (notably regarding relations with the Comecon) were frequently criticized. Essentially, however, the new line adopted in the early 1960s—and developed steadily in the face of direct and indirect Soviet and French Communist criticism—represented an effort to transfer to the regional level and the domestic strategy of a "long march through the institutions," through gradual involvement in decision-making processes.

In this process of adaptation to regional realities, Communist trade union leaders went ahead of the party itself. In 1963, the Italian Communist-Socialist CGIL labor federation set up an office in Brussels to seek liaison not only with the EEC bureaucracy but also with the local headquarters of the "free" (non-communist) and Christian international labor organizations; a few years later it sought and got representation on the economic and social bodies of the EEC Commission. For several years the PCI itself knocked at the door of the European Parliament, so to speak, but its application was vetoed by the Italian government. In 1969 the Christian Democrats finally gave way to persistent communist pressure, and the PCI sent an active delegation under Giorgio Amendola to Strasbourg, where it was joined in 1973 by a distinctly less enthusiastic delegation of the French CP. It appears that the Italian Communist contribution to the European Parliament (as also, since 1976, to the Western European Union) has on the whole been a distinguished and useful one, and it is significant that it was one of the first delegations to give strong support to the proposal for direct elections to the Parliament—unlike the French CP, which vigorously opposed direct elections, until 1977, without warning or debate.

The belief that the PCI's efforts to involve itself in West European integration—for its own political purposes, of course—is strengthened by the contributions made to a private seminar on foreign policy held at the party's Palmiro Togliatti Institute of Communist Studies in December, 1972, and

particularly two interventions by Giorgio Amendola. The party's policy, he said, was "to participate in the Community to make it an open Community, organized democratically . . . not dominated by the bureaucrats and the 'Eurocrats' . . . nor dominated by the national executives of the governments . . . with a Parliament elected by universal suffrage." Later Amendola said that "the final objective is . . . a Socialist Europe, truly united from the Atlantic to the Urals." But he immediately stressed that this could only be a "historic"—that is, a longterm—objective; and it was, moreover, a goal that could be reached eventually only through "a profound process of transformation—a transformation of the capitalist countries, and also a transformation of the institutions of the socialist countries . . . more socialism in the West and more democracy in the East." Against this longterm, "ideological" background he presented a more immediate regional goal: "Western Europe . . . faces the objective of arriving at political unification and also economic and monetary unification."

(It might be added that on this as on other issues there is a gap between the positions of the PCI and PCE on one hand and those of the PCF on the other. Carrillo declares that for Spain there is no alternative to West European integration; the PCI supports the candidacies of Spain, Portugal and Greece; the PCF warns zealously against any encroachment by the EEC on French sovereignty, and opposes the entry of all three countries into the Community.)

Compared with its stand on the Common Market, the PCI's present (outwardly) accommodating attitude to the Atlantic Alliance is a relatively recent development—and to that extent invites scepticism. As this decade opened the PCI's slogan was still: "NATO out of Italy, Italy out of NATO." At the 13th party congress in 1972, Berlinguer was still speaking of "the struggle against the Atlantic Pact," and stressing the need to free Italy from "the bond of subordination which links it to NATO," as part of a broader struggle to "liberate Europe from American hegemony." But in 1974 there were signs of rethinking, and at the 14th party congress in March, 1975, Berlinguer announced that the PCI was "not raising the question of Italy's departure from the Atlantic Pact," and was in fact opposed to "any other unilateral departure from one bloc or the other"—a stipulation that he explicitly applied to nonaligned Yugoslavia, expressing his party's "profound interest" in having that neighboring country stay out of the Warsaw Pact.

The opportunistic element in this new position was obvious enough. But it should also be noted that Berlinguer affirmed this position subsequently

at international communist gatherings, notably in his speeches at the 25th CPSU Congress in February, 1976, and at the pan-European communist conference in June, 1976. On the latter occasion he stressed that the Italian road to a socialist society lay "within the framework of the international alliances to which our country belongs." This reassuring message was emphasized during the campaign for the crucial elections of June, 1976, and was symbolized by the presence among the independent candidates on the party's lists of Air Force General Nino Pasti, who for several years had been responsible for nuclear affairs at SHAPE headquarters. During this campaign Berlinguer touched upon another thorny argument—that only the existence of NATO made it possible for Western Communists to speak plausibly of struggling to achieve a democratic socialism. In an interview he said that he had no fear of meeting the "unjust" fate of Dubcek, because "even if the [Soviet] will were there, there does not exist the least possibility that our road to socialism can be hindered or conditioned by the USSR . . . I feel that since Italy does not belong to the Warsaw Pact, there is absolute certainty that we can proceed along the Italian road to socialism without any conditioning"—and he even accepted the description of NATO as a "useful shield" for this purpose.

While this argument rests on political logic, it is equally true that the NATO allies have still cause to be concerned about the PCI's eventual role as a governing party. One solid reason for this is the fraternal link that still exists between the Italian CP and the Soviet regime. Does the "critical solidarity" of which Italian Communists like to speak mean that eventually solidarity will prevail? In particular, is it true that the PCI has always supported Soviet *foreign* policy (as is often said of the Eurocommunist parties in general)?

During a discussion with Sergio Segre at PCI headquarters in Rome in the autumn of 1976, I received from him two booklets containing the unpublished texts (compiled for internal distribution) of contributions to two party seminars held in December 1972. In one of them I found an illuminating passage in which Segre himself (the Central Committee official responsible for foreign affairs) had suggested the need to work for a convergence with other Italian parties on foreign policy. He said:

It seems to me, then, that we must examine how, even in this area of Atlantic policy, within a perspective which clearly calls for the dissolution of the blocs, we can indicate intermediate phases, so that this problem may no longer be a cause of vertical division between the [Italian] political forces . . .

If we want to go ahead along this line, we must at a certain point develop a dialogue with the forces of the West, with the democratic forces of the Left, with the West as a whole.

Within a few years his call at that seminar for the development of "what might be called our Westpolitik" began to be answered by international and national events which together promoted a process of convergence among Italian parties on foreign policy. Thus, the drastic effect of the Arab oil boycott of late 1973 on Italy led the Christian Democrats quietly and gradually to revise their positions on the Middle East—until they became substantially compatible with those of the Communists. On the other hand, the grave deterioration of Italy's economic situation made it clear to all but the political extremists on either flank that the country's international situation was, and would continue to be, one of "asymmetrical interdependence"—the weak partner in a network of economic and political relationships.

Thus, as the Communists modified their stand on some issues (the EEC, the Atlantic Alliance) the Christian Democrats modified their position on others (the Middle East and the Third World) until the convergence became unmistakable. In a lecture given in August, 1976, Signor Segre was able to rephrase his remarks of December, 1972, but this time as a public affirmation, not a tentative and private proposal: "In recent years the PCI has made an effort, even through revising its own previous attitudes on some major questions of international policy, to contribute to the construction of an Italian foreign policy which would be a factor of national unity and no longer, as in the lacerating years of the cold war, a factor of vertical division between the political forces of this country." Nor was this only a Communist opinion. It was a Christian Democratic Foreign Minister, Arnaldo Forlani, who told the U.N. General Assembly on 1 October 1976 that "on the basic options [of Italian foreign policy] there exists a full measure of agreement in our national parliament, between our political forces and throughout the country." This consensus was given institutional expression six months ago, when the Christian Democrats, the PCI and the four smaller parties of the "constitutional arc" adopted a common statement on foreign policy.

We have already noted how the PCI diverged substantially from Soviet foreign policy positions on the Common Market. Other divergences have dealt with the international communist movement—Yugoslavia and China, for example. More recently the list has been growing. The PCI took up a neutralist attitude toward the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, in which the Soviet Union was involved on the Ethiopian side, and apparently made a vain attempt at mediation. Similarly, the Italian Communists have remained on

good terms with the Eritrean rebels, and declined to join the Soviets (and the PCF) in attacking President Sadat's peace initiative.

In the spring of 1978, the PCI's Central Committee emphasized the growing importance which the party now places—or at least wishes to be regarded as placing—on “consensual” foreign policy by setting up a new “Center for the Study of International Policy.” On this level, as on that of domestic affairs, it seems to be a safe bet that the Italian CP will give primacy and priority to its own political interests, even when they conflict with those of Moscow.

Eurocommunists Between East and West

The defeat of the *Union de la Gauche* in the French elections of March 1978 drew attention, as we have seen, to significant differences in the political and ideological positions of the three major Eurocommunist parties—or, rather, between the Italian and Spanish CPs on the one hand and the French on the other. It also gave relieved Western policy-makers occasion to ponder the nature and extent of the threat which the PCF, whether alone or as part of a leftist alliance, posed (or might one day pose) to the existing order in France, and hence to the wider community of economically advanced Western democracies.

The central question here is not whether the French Communist Party is now “independent” of Moscow (a term which in this context would need careful definition). It is whether the advance of the PCF toward at least a share of national power would in practice promote Soviet strategic interests by weakening or destabilizing the NATO alliance in particular and the West in general. The potential threat which the PCF poses to the existing order in France and in the Western community can, of course, be considered on various levels—for example, the strategic level, the international, the economic or the societal. The most obvious of these, though not necessarily the most important, is the strategic level; and here we must deal with the possible effect of the party's rise to power, or partial power, on France's defensive strength, on its relations with the Atlantic Alliance and on the East-West balance of power in Europe.

On this as on other levels we find marked differences both in substance and in style between the positions of the PCF on the one hand and those of the Italian and Spanish CPs on the other. The changes in the PCI's attitude to NATO may legitimately be regarded with caution or even scepticism by

Western governments; but one cannot deny the party's present efforts to persuade all concerned that the alliance has nothing to fear from its participation in government. Similarly, Santiago Carrillo would allow U.S. bases to remain in Spain as long as Soviet troops are in Czechoslovakia (whereas the Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez demands their removal); and, while he is against Spain's entry into NATO, he says that he would accept even this if a majority of the population votes for it in a referendum.

As against the Eurocommunist evolution of the Italian and Spanish communist parties with respect to the Atlantic Alliance, the hostility of the PCF to the alliance has hardly diminished. With regard to NATO (and, indeed, foreign policy in general), it might be more fitting to speak of the PCF's "Gaullo-communism." This PCF concept reflects a Gaullist emphasis on French national sovereignty combined with an emotional "anti-imperialism" directed particularly against the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

This traditional, not to say visceral, hostility to the "imperialist" West was quite clearly expressed in Marchais' "secret" Central Committee speech of 29 June 1972 on the signing of the Common Program. The concession obtained from the Socialists that France must be ready to face *any* aggressor meant, he said, that "the military policy and the very orientation of France's foreign policy would escape, in an essential area, from the global strategy of imperialism," adding later that the PCF would profit from the fact that in international affairs "the socialist system is henceforth the real determining factor."¹¹

Recent shifts in the party's positions—notably the sudden acceptance of the *force de frappe* and of direct elections to the European Parliament—had to be viewed against the background of Communist-Socialist maneuvering for political advantage, and in any case hardly amounted to substantial change in a bloc orientation that for so long was an essential element of the PCF's identity. Similarly, the PCF's habitual hostility to the United States and West Germany is hardly veiled by its blatant appeals to Gaullist sentiment—accusing President Giscard d'Estaing of betraying the General's heritage by "creeping atlanticism," and making French sovereignty its watchword with regard to defense as well as West European integration. The PCF has, indeed, said for many years that it is for France staying in the Atlantic Alliance but against its return to the military organization. Yet on all questions where Communist defense policies differ from those of the Socialist Party (PS), the

11. *Le Monde*, 9 July 1975.

Communist positions would in practice seriously weaken Western defense capabilities if implemented.

Thus, the PCF now says that it favors the maintenance of France's nuclear force, but calls for a defense strategy *tous azimuts*, with missiles targeted against *all* potential aggressors—including, party spokesmen have specifically said, the Federal Republic of Germany. It also wants the use of the nuclear weapon to be subject to a "collegial" decision by the government (which might be one way of ensuring that the deterrent did not deter). Again, the PCF rules out the possibility of a West European defense community, while the Socialist Party keeps this option open—and Santiago Carrillo, for his part, has expressed interest in it.

If this is a potential threat to the security of the West, however, it is one which should be viewed in its true proportions. We are dealing here with a strategically and economically important country whose development in recent decades has been decisively affected, through a network of interdependent relationships, and despite the distorting pressures of Gaullism, by its memberships in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Even if the Left had won an inevitably narrow victory in the March, 1978, elections, is it reasonable to suppose that a party representing only one-fifth of the electorate could have imposed, against the opposition of a stronger coalition partner, such serious changes in defense and foreign policy?

If the Union of the Left had won, France and the Western community of nations would, indeed, have faced a serious threat, but it would surely have come to the socioeconomic level (through the flight of capital, inflation and social conflict) rather than on the military-strategic level. On both levels, moreover, the Communist leadership suffered from an inability to shed dogmatic attitudes and respond adequately to new realities (and here, perhaps, we come to the most significant difference between the PCF and the other two major Eurocommunist parties). The PCF's visceral anti-Americanism on one level was matched on the other level by a visceral anticapitalism which prevented it from adopting a rational and realistic approach to France's economic situation: while Italian Communists were urging on the working class the need for austerity, their French comrades were lapsing into the crude simplicity of "Let the rich pay!"¹²

12. In an early Italian Communist commentary on the result of the French elections Claudio Petruccioli said in *L'Unità* of 21 March 1978 that the French Left had failed to "make its candidature for government entirely convincing to the electorate," and that it would have to abandon the illusion that the country's grave economic crisis "can be resolved through the simple substitution of the ruling class."

The process of adaptation to the sociopolitical realities of the advanced, pluralistic democracies of Western Europe, which we take to be the core of Eurocommunism, imposes upon the Eurocommunist parties a convergence with social-democratic positions in many areas (the commitment to the preservation of bourgeois liberties and to respect for constitutional democracy). Yet this very convergence emphasizes the need for the Eurocommunist parties to maintain their *communist* identity and the demarcation between themselves and the social-democrats. While pursuing in practice policies of gradual reformism, and doing so (if they are to have any hope of success) in collaboration with social-democratic and/or centrist forces, they must insist that their ultimate goal remains the social revolution, giving political power to the working class, even in a multiparty democracy, and ending capitalist exploitation.

In accordance with this latter imperative, it is also of basic importance for them to continue presenting themselves as part of an international movement of revolutionary "Marxist-Leninist" parties, some of which have already come to power and, by Communist definition, introduced "socialism." But here lies the other arm of the dilemma. The Eurocommunist commitment to pluralistic democracy and human rights involves explicit rejection of the Soviet/East European model of socialism—a rejection that must be made credible to electors by "principled" and continuing criticism of the repressive aspects of these regimes and of their lack of democracy. At the same time, however, there are other reasons for West European communist parties to be cautious about undertaking such systematic criticism. One is that criticism draws public attention to the pro-Soviet and Stalinist past of the Western communist party concerned, and also to its continued fraternal links with the regimes being criticized so that the political profit to be gained is questionable. Secondly, the criticism, if it is sufficiently vigorous and sustained, may cause divisions within the party by offending conservative or pro-Soviet elements—a situation which the Soviets may attempt to exploit by encouraging these elements, examples being the Kremlin's all but overt backing of the Spanish secessionists headed by Enrique Lister in 1969-74, or of the Swedish "Workers' Communist Party" founded in 1977.

There are, of course, corresponding restraints on the Soviet side. The victory of the strategic alliance between the Eurocommunist parties and the two independent East European regimes in the prolonged struggle over the pan-European conference document (1974-76) demonstrated the continuing erosion of Soviet authority. The fact was that the international communist movement was no longer an international communist organization: there

was no center of authority, no guardian of orthodoxy empowered to deal with heretics by expelling them from the Marxist-Leninist "church," and no means of obliging other communist parties to subordinate their own interests to those of the CPSU.

In these circumstances, the uneven process of adaptation to Western sociopolitical realities which we call Eurocommunism seems likely to continue, and to affect in particular those West European communist parties that have already become important factors in national political life—which, we recall again, means a very small minority of them. Their chances of making political progress within the framework of constitutional democracy might be strengthened by a continuation or intensification of the general Western economic crisis, but probably only to a limited extent: in the event of anything like a catastrophic collapse of the Western economic system, they too would surely be among the victims, as the Italian Communists are quite ready to admit—and the Eastern regimes would not be spared either. Meanwhile, as the 1978 French elections demonstrated, the Eurocommunists carry the burden of their past, and must repeatedly seek to establish their credibility.

Maintaining credibility means subjecting the Soviet Union and other Eastern regimes to at least sporadic criticism. The level of generally indirect ideological polemics between Eurocommunists and regime dogmatists will rise and fall: a direct confrontation (let alone anything like a formal split) would not be in the interests of either side. But, even if the polemics were to cease altogether, the challenge which Eurocommunist ideas represent for "real socialism" would remain. In the past few years the "subversive" effect of these ideas upon East European societies has combined with the unexpected impact of the Helsinki Conference ("Basket 3") to produce a new wave of dissent and unrest in most East European countries.

The fact is that both parts of a divided Europe are constantly being subjected, in very different ways and in varying degrees, to destabilizing influences. Perhaps the question to ask is which system is better equipped to withstand pressures that cannot be entirely eliminated—which is better fitted to cope with the inevitable challenges of change? One thought seems relevant: that rigidity has a hidden weakness, and flexibility a hidden strength. In a time of trial, the Western democracies can surely draw comfort from the memory of a contrast—between the way NATO reacted in 1975 to the presence of the strongly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party in the government of a member-state, and the way the Warsaw Pact reacted in 1968 to Communist Czechoslovakia's ill-starred experiment in "socialism with a human face."

French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization

Pierre Lellouche and
Dominique Moisi

A year ago in May, French intervention in Shaba focused international attention on France's commitments to Africa—commitments that establish France as the only Western power with a large military involvement in the African struggle. Currently, France has some 14,000 troops deployed in more than twenty African states and territories (the second largest "foreign" contingent, after Cuba's 40,000 troops [see Table 1]); it has sophisticated military hardware such as Jaguar fighter-bombers in Mauritania and Chad and Mirages in Djibouti; and it is directly involved on four "fronts": on the Western Sahara, Chad, Zaire, and in the latent conflict in Djibouti and the Horn.¹

France's policy of repeated military interventions in Africa is the most controversial and widely criticized aspect of President Giscard d'Estaing's "new" foreign policy. Internationally, the strongest criticisms have come from non-French-speaking African states, particularly during last July's Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference in Khartoum.

Even Nigeria has denounced France's intervention in Shaba as a modernized form of nineteenth century imperialism. According to General Obasanjo,

A new Conference of Berlin is not the appropriate answer to the type of problems raised by the recent and unfortunate Kolwesi episode. Just as our ancestors could not accept the gunboats of the last century, we cannot accept the dropping of paratroopers in the twentieth century.²

At home, French African policy has been criticized both by the Left, particularly the Communists, and by Gaullists. Criticism by both parties have been strikingly similar in both form and substance; at the same time that the Communist daily, *L'Humanité*, described France as the "Gendarme Otanien de l'Afrique,"³ ex-Gaullist Prime Minister Pierre Messmer warned that "France must not be a gendarme in Africa."⁴ Other Gaullists also denounced

1. In addition, French troops are also deployed in Southern Lebanon under the UN flag until spring, 1979.

2. *Le Monde*, 21 July 1978.

3. *L'Humanité* described France as "the spearhead of the Atlantic Alliance, 1, 2 June, 1978. See also an interview of George Marchais, leader of the PCF, denouncing France as "the gendarme of Africa" in *Jeune Afrique*, 6 December 1978.

4. *Le Monde*, 26 August 1978.

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Table 1
Deployment of French and Cuban Military Personnel in Africa

Country	French Military Personnel	Cuban Military Personnel
Algeria	90	
Angola		21,000
Benin	(**)	
Burundi	30	
Cameroon	90	
Central African Empire	(**)	
Chad	1,800	
Congo	10	300
Djibouti	4,500	
Ethiopia		12,000
Gabon	500	
Guinea		200 to 300
Guinea-Bissau		70
Guinea (Equatorial)		20 to 30
Ivory Coast	500	
Lybia	25	100 to 125
Madagascar	50	30
Mauritania	100	
Mayotte	2,000	
Morocco	250	
Mozambique		300
Niger	60	
Reunion	2,000	
Senegal	1,300	
Sierra Leone		100 to 125
Tanzania		20 to 30
Togo	80	
Tunisia	40	
Uganda		20 to 30
Upper Volta	20	
Zaire	70	
Indian Ocean Islands*	80	
Total	13,695	
with estimated figures**	500	
	14,195	34,000 to 34,500

* Iles Glorieuses (10), Tromelin (10), Juan de Nova (50), Bassas de India, Europe (10)

** Estimated figures: 500

Source: Derived from estimated figures obtained by René Backman and published in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 22 May, 1978.

President Giscard's African policy as "a betrayal of earlier Gaullist policy and a return to "la politique des blocs."⁵

One of the greatest problems facing French policy in Africa is the traditional one of change or continuity, a dilemma which has plagued policy makers since the end of the Gaullist era. Change, in French African policy, has been manifested in and affected by the ferment within Africa, the new French military doctrine (elaborated since 1974-75), and the personality of the president. The continuities arise from earlier Gaullist policies. It is the intention of this article to examine, primarily through a study of political/security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, the implications of these policy changes within the context of the Gaullist continuities.

The Gaullist Era: From Decolonization to Coopération

From the early colonial days to de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, Africa has been a key instrument of French diplomacy.⁶ Following France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the conquest of Africa took on the character of a national compensation through which the country could regain its rank in the European concert. It was with Europe in mind that France went to Africa.⁷ As a result, the defense of Africa—the largest part of the French Empire—became closely associated with the defense of France itself. Before World War II, French strategists had developed a series of naval and military facilities in both North and sub-Saharan Africa. That geo-strategic association was reinforced during the war when Africa became a major theater of operations and a crucial source of manpower and support for de Gaulle's Free French Forces.

After 1946, the new Fourth Republic emphasized the role of Africa in rebuilding the Metropole as a great power. During the late 1940s and the 1950s, military presence in Africa continued to increase; and when NATO was formed in 1949, France extended the protection of the Alliance to Algeria.⁸ During that period, French strategic writings stressed the importance

5. *Le Monde*, 8 June 1978.

6. It is interesting to note that the main tool of such diplomacy has been military: the French Army itself was involved in the acquisition and administration of the colonies to such an extent that in the Metropole's deep rooted "Images d'Epinal", Africa remains to this day associated with the glory of the "Légionnaire bringing "civilization" to the heathens of the desert."

7. Henri Brunschwig, *Mythes et Réalités de l'Impérialisme Colonial Français*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1960.

8. See Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa*, New York, Praeger, 1969, p. 115.

of Africa for the defense of Western Europe.⁹ They warned that since the Soviet Union was being contained by NATO in the European theater, it might attack the West through Africa.

De Gaulle and Africa: Independence and Coopération

De Gaulle, "The Man of Brazzaville," believed that the new Fifth Republic had to maintain its special influence in Africa, despite the process of decolonization. Once re-established, through decolonization and *coopération*, the old Franco-African relationship could constitute one of the pillars of de Gaulle's global foreign policy ambitions.¹⁰ At the military level, this went into effect in the Fifth Republic's endeavor to maintain France's tradition of a military presence in Africa. To a large extent, this effort was successful, for, contrary to the situation of other colonial powers, French decolonization never meant the end of a military presence; rather, it meant an adjustment of such a presence.

The main device for the adjustment was the notion of *coopération*—a key word in French-African policy for the last twenty years. *Coopération* was aimed at avoiding the replacement of the exclusive competence of the ex-colonial power in such important areas as the economy, defense, foreign policy, and education. France proposed to its former colonies a kind of joint management through special *coopération* agreements in each of the fields involved. Where the earlier—and ill-fated—*Communauté* proposal would have given France sole responsibility in such areas as defense and foreign policy,¹¹ *coopération* was intended to provide more than just assistance or aid. Its true aim was to maintain privileged links in spite of international sovereignty. In this context, the defense agreements were (and to some extent still are) an essential part of the complex network of economic, cultural, and political pacts concluded between the Metropole and its ex-colonies. [See Table 2.]

In defense, France offered two simultaneous forms of *coopération*. The first,

9. These ideas could be found in particular in the articles published in the 1950s by the *Revue de Défense Nationale*, the officious organ of the French military establishment.

10. Guy de Carmoy, *Les Politiques Étrangères de la France*, Paris, éd. de La Table Ronde, 1967. In De Carmoy's words "General De Gaulle's ambition is to lead, in the name of France, a world policy. Cooperation is in his eyes an instrument of power, rather than a duty of solidarity," p. 297.

11. Henri Grimal, *La Décolonisation*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1965, pp. 355-364.

Table 2
Major Cooperation Agreements Between France and the African States Signed in the Early 1960s

Political	Economic and Financial						
	Foreign Policy	Defense	Strategic Raw Materials	Monetary, Economic, Financial	Postal and Telecommunication	Civil Aviation	Merchant Marine
Central African Republic	18 VIII 60	13 VIII 60	13 VIII 60	11 VIII 60	—	—	—
Congo-Brazzaville	15 VIII 60	15 VIII 60	15 VIII 60	13 VIII 60	—	—	—
Gabon	17 VIII 60	17 VIII 60	17 VIII 60	7 VIII 60	—	—	—
Chad	11 VIII 60	15 VIII 60	15 VIII 60	15 VIII 60	—	17 VIII 60	17 VIII 60
Madagascar	27 VI 60	27 VI 60	27 VI 60	27 VI 60	27 VI 60	—	—
Senegal	22 VI 60	22 VI 60	22 VI 60	22 VI 60	—	27 VI 60	27 VI 60
Ivory Coast	—	24 IV 61	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	22 VI 60	22 VI 60
Dahomey	—	24 IV 61	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	24 IV 61
Upper Volta	—	24 IV 61	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	24 IV 61
Niger	—	24 IV 61	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	24 IV 61
Cameroon	—	13 XI 60	—	13 XI 60	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61
Togo	—	10 VII 63	—	10 VII 63	—	13 XI 60	—
Mauritania	—	19 VI 61	—	19 VI 61	19 VI 61	—	—
Mali	—	—	—	9 III 62	—	19 VI 61	19 VI 61
Guinea	—	—	—	22 V 63	—	—	—
Rwanda	—	—	—	4 XII 62	—	—	—
Burundi	—	—	—	11 XII 62	—	—	—
Congo-Kinshasa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table 2 (cont.)
Major Cooperation Agreements Between France and the African States Signed in the Early 1960s

Legal	"Establishment" Conventions			Social and Cultural		
	Judiciary	Consular Conventions	Cultural Cooperation	Higher Education	Technical Cooperation	
Central African Republic	12 VII 60	13 VIII 60	13 VIII 60	15 VIII 60	17 VII 59	
Congo-Brazzaville	18 V 62	15 VIII 60	—	15 VIII 60	23 VII 59	
Gabon	31 XII 59	17 VIII 60	—	18 XI 59	18 XI 59	
Chad	12 VII 60	11 VIII 60	—	16 VIII 60	29 XI 59	
Madagascar	27 VI 60	27 VI 60	25 IV 63	22 VII 59	{ 27 VI 60 5 IV 62 7 VII 59	
Senegal	14 VI 62	22 VI 60	—	4 II 60	{ 22 VI 60 5 VIII 61 14 IX 59	
Ivory Coast	24 IV 61	—	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	
Dahomey	24 IV 61	—	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	
Upper Volta	24 IV 61	—	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	
Niger	24 IV 61	—	—	24 IV 61	24 IV 61	
Cameroon	13 XI 60	—	13 XI 60	13 XI 60	13 XI 60	
Togo	10 VII 63	—	—	10 VII 63	10 VII 63	
Mauritania	19 VI 61	—	—	19 VI 61	19 VI 61	
Mali	9 III 62	—	9 III 62	9 III 62	9 III 62	
Guinea	—	—	—	22 V 63	22 V 63	
Rwanda	—	—	—	4 XII 62	—	
Burundi	—	—	—	11 II 63	11 II 63	
Congo-Kinshasa	—	—	—	17 VII 63	—	

Source: *Notes et Etudes Documentaires*, Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, Paris, October 25, 1966.

Source: *Notes et Etudes Documentaires*, Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, Paris, October 25, 1966.

a bilateral defense agreement (*accord de défense*), provided for French military intervention—conditional upon the request of the local government and at the approval of the French authorities. In the early 1960s, eleven sub-Saharan states signed such defense pacts.¹² At present only five still maintain them: Central African Empire, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Senegal. Following its recent independence, Djibouti also signed such an agreement,¹³ while Comoros adhered to a similar pact in November, 1978, after a successful pro-French coup d'état.

In addition to bilateral defense agreements, France offered military/technical assistance agreements (*accords d'assistance militaire technique*) which provided for French aid in the organization, equipping, and training of the national armies and police forces of the new African states. In the early 1960s, all Francophone states (except Mali and Guinea) signed such agreements, of which sixteen remain valid today, including those signed in the early 1970s by Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire. [See Table 3.]

The Evolution of French Policy in Africa After 1963

1963 marks a turning point in French policy toward Africa. From that time, which coincided with the end of the Algerian war and the true beginning of de Gaulle's foreign policy, the Fifth Republic started a progressive *désengagement* from Africa. France's new economic, military, and diplomatic interests lay increasingly with Europe, while the end of the Algerian war opened the way for a new French Mediterranean policy. Thus, while interest in the Arab world was renewed, there was a corresponding decrease of interest in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, French leaders began to loosen the tight network of cooperation that had been built only three years earlier.

At the same time, France's full partnership in the European Economic Community (EEC) led to a remarkable loosening of economic ties with the ex-colonies, and to a steady decline of trade with the Franc Zone.¹⁴ In

12. Sénégal, Mauritania, Madagascar, Togo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, Niger and Dahomey.

13. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey*, London, 1977, p. 16; Général Méry "L'Avenir de nos Armées" *Défense Nationale*, June 1978, p. 21.

14. It is significant as an example to note that the share of French Trade with the Franc Zone which represented in 1958, 37.5 percent of French exports and 27.6 percent of imports fell in 1971 to a low 5.9 percent (exports) and 4 percent (imports). (See for a further analysis of such a decline: Comité Monétaire de la zone Franc, *Rapport 1971*, pp. 30-82). Such a deterioration of trade relations led to a serious political crisis in the early 1970s and particularly to the

Table 3
Military Technical Assistance Agreements in Force in 1977

States	Date of Signature
Benin	February 27, 1975
Burundi	October 7, 1969
Cameroon	February 21, 1974
Central African Empire	August 13, 1960
Chad	March 6, 1976
Congo	January 1, 1974
Gabon	August 17, 1960
Ivory Coast	April 24, 1961
Madagascar	June 4, 1973
Mauritania	September 2, 1976
Niger	February 19, 1977
Rwanda	July 18, 1975
Senegal	March 29, 1974
Togo	March 23, 1976
Zaire	May 22, 1974

Defense Agreements in Force in 1977^a

States	Date of Signature
Central African Empire	August 15, 1960
Gabon	August 17, 1960
Ivory Coast	April 24, 1961
Senegal	March 29, 1974
Togo	July 10, 1963

^a Two more states signed similar agreements in 1978; Djibouti, after its accession to independence in June, 1978, and Comoros, in November, 1978, following a coup d'état which restored to power a pro-French government (note: Comoros also signed a military technical assistance agreement providing for the training of its 1,000-man armed forces).

Source: Ministère de la Coopération, Service de presse et d'informations: *La Coopération Française en Afrique Noire, dans l'Océan Indien et à Haiti, Dossier Economique*, Paris, 1978.

addition, the burden of providing economic aid to the new African states, set forth in the 1960 *Accords de Coopération Economique* rapidly became too heavy for France to bear alone. French leaders consequently multilateralized their links with Africa through a new regime of Euro-African Association. By this regime—formalized in the Yaoundé Convention of 1963 and the Lomé Convention of 1974—France's burden of aid was, and is, shared by other developed countries. However, France retained its privileged position in the African monetary system and its quasi-exclusive access to uranium and other strategic minerals.¹⁵

In the defense area, several strategic and economic factors in the 1960s caused another shift in France's priorities away from Africa and toward Europe. The redirection of the overall French defense policy toward nuclear deterrence and the creation of the nuclear *Force de Frappe* led to a rapid decline in the strategic importance of Africa for the defense of the metropole. The new defense budget priority, the *Force de Frappe*, required large financial allocations, and made it increasingly difficult to maintain a strong conventional army,¹⁶ much less a large permanent one overseas. In addition, the end of the Algerian War resulted in the withdrawal, from 1962 to 1964, of 300,000 French troops from Africa and the demobilization of African troops serving with the French forces. The end of the war also reduced the strategic importance of many military facilities, particularly in Niger and Mali. All this, as well as new economic conditions, led French leaders to close most of the historic military bases. Only four were retained: Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Fort Lamy, now N'Djamena (Chad), and Diego Suarez (Madagascar).¹⁷

withdrawal of Mauritania and Madagascar from the Franc Zone in November, 1972. These events were followed by a series of "renegotiations" of the cooperation agreements signed in 1960.

15. A little publicized fact is that the defense agreements signed in 1960 also contained special provisions concerning French privileged access to strategic raw materials such as oil and gas, uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium and helium. These agreements provided in particular for priority sales to France and to possible embargoes to other countries if required by "the interests of common defense"; See: "La Coopération militaire Franco-Africaine" in *Europe-Outre-Mer*, April-May 1977.

16. Lothar Ruehl, *La Politique Militaire de la V^e République*, Paris, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, p. 429.

17. Following the renegotiation in 1973 of the defense agreement with Madagascar which led to the closing of Diego Suarez, France was forced to redeploy its land and naval forces in the Indian Ocean mainly to La Réunion, Mayotte, and a series of "points d'appui" in five small islands: Juan de Nova, Europa, Bassas de India, Tromelin and the Glorious Islands (sovereignty over these islands is strongly disputed between France, Madagascar and Mauritius for military and also economic reasons [i.e., the 200 miles economic zone]).

France replaced its traditional permanent overseas forces with a less costly, more flexible corps—the *forces d'intervention extérieures*, created in 1963-1964. This force, composed of specialized and mobile troops stationed in the metropole, would be ready to intervene for the defense of the French Departments d'Outre Mer (DOM) and Territoires d'Outre Mer (TOM),¹⁸ as well as to respond to requests for military interventions from African countries linked by an *accord de défense*. In addition, a doctrine of *couverture à distance*¹⁹ was adopted. This meant that three "layers" of forces—the national African armies (trained and equipped by France), the small French contingents still deployed in Africa (6,000 in late 1964), and the new *forces d'intervention extérieures*—would perform the tasks traditionally entrusted to French colonial troops.

The history of military interventions during the early 1960s illustrates the change in France's defense policy in Africa. The period immediately following independence (1960-1964) was one of great instability (for the new and weak regimes) in sub-Saharan Africa and France was called repeatedly to intervene to protect the new states—more often from internal threats than from external ones. The French usually responded positively, both to preserve the viability of friendly regimes and to retain French rights to intervene.

In explaining France's role of protecting these new regimes—rather than defending the *states* from external aggression—the then Information Minister, Alain Peyrefitte,²⁰ stated:

It is not possible that a few gunmen be left free to capture at any time any presidential palace, and it is precisely because such a menace was foreseen that the new African states have concluded with France agreements to protect themselves against such risks.²¹

According to Mr. Peyrefitte, between 1960 and 1964, French military forces intervened as follows:

- in Cameroun, in 1960 and 1961 to reestablish order;
- in Congo Brazzaville, in 1960 to end tribal warfare;
- in Congo Brazzaville and Gabon in 1962, to reestablish order;
- in Chad, "several" times between 1960 and 1963;

18. Nielsen, *Op.Cit.* p. 117; *Le Monde*, 21 February 1964; *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1975.

19. *Le Monde*, 21 February 1964.

20. *Le Monde*, 28 February 1964.

21. *Le Monde*, 28 February 1964.

- in Niger, in 1963, to quell a military uprising against President Hamani Diori;
- in Mauritania, in 1961, to help the government control tribal agitation;
- in Gabon, in February, 1964, to restore friendly President M'ba to power after he had been removed by a military coup.

According to Mr. Peyrefitte, France declined to intervene in Togo in 1963 (following the assassination of President Olympio) because Togo did not have a mutual defense agreement with France at the time.²² Mr. Peyrefitte also stated that in Congo-Brazzaville in 1963, "our troops began to intervene but President Youlou having himself signed his resignation, our troops stopped their intervention." In October, 1963, France also did not intervene in Dahomey because President Maga voluntarily gave up the presidency.

Mr. Peyrefitte's statements and the controversial Gabonese intervention of 1964 provoked a wave of protest in Africa and the non-aligned world. France consequently reduced the visibility and increased the selectivity of such military actions. From 1964 to 1974 their number decreased dramatically; in fact, during that time France conducted only two "overt" military interventions (in the Central African Republic in 1967, and in Chad, between 1968 and 1971) and one "covert" action (the shipment of French Arms to Biafra in 1968).²³

ASSESSMENT

French policy in Africa between 1963 and 1974 is best characterized as a slow *désengagement*, which led to a "lesser and more limited kind of involvement."²⁴ Indeed, the early concept of *coopération* had evolved into a classic one-way street: while the dependence of the African states persisted (and in

22. It has to be pointed out, however, that Cameroon had no defense agreements with France but this did not prevent French troops from intervening in 1960 and 1961. Similarly, France has no defense agreements with Mauritania, Zaïre and Chad: but again this was no obstacle to French military actions in these countries. Conversely, it is also significant to note that France voluntarily refrained from rescuing a threatened regime in several other cases: this was the case in particular with President Hamani Diori of Niger in 1974—who incidentally had been saved once in 1963—President Tombalbaye of Chad in 1975 and President Ould Daddah of Mauritania in 1978—In such cases, passivity is also a form of intervention or as Jean-Paul Sartre could say: "Ne pas agir, c'est encore agir."

23. According to one interesting interpretation, France's aid to the Biafran secession was prompted by the desire to weaken the Nigerian "Giant" which was perceived as a potential threat to its small francophone neighbours. See Paul-Jean Franceschini: *La Politica Africana della Francia*, *Affari Esteri* (Rome), July 1977, p. 438.

24. Nielsen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.

fact increased), the metropole had recovered complete freedom of action beyond its "privileged links."

The most striking example of France's freedom of action is its extensive assistance (particularly military assistance) to South Africa. From the 1960s to 1977²⁵ France was the primary supplier of military hardware to the Pretoria regime; in addition to most modern types of weapons, France sold many licenses for their technologies. The French government refused to acknowledge a contradiction between the policy of *coopération* with eighteen African states and this relationship with South Africa. Political commitments and commercial deals were not to interfere with each other. In essence, Gaullist France had managed to maintain, at a modest cost, a predominant influence in the Francophone countries, including ex-Belgian territories, without impairing any of its freedom of action elsewhere—particularly in South Africa.

Given the extent of nationalist feelings in Africa, it is remarkable that the system of *coopération* survived so well.²⁶ Only the unique community of culture that exists between the French and French-speaking African elites could allow Africa to accept the French mantle without feelings of inferiority. Such a relationship would have been unacceptable to the larger, richer, and stronger anglophone African nations.

French policy of "benign neglect" in the 1960s toward its African clients could occur because Africa, unlike Asia and the Middle East, was not a major theater in superpower confrontation.

Giscard and Africa

The Soviet-Cuban penetration in Africa, which began in 1975,²⁷ challenged the continuation of traditional French policy. Such penetration was limited

25. Following the events of Angola in 1975 and in the face of growing criticism against French arms sales to South Africa, Giscard d'Estaing announced in 1975 and in February 1977 a series of limited arms embargo. Total cessation of arms transfers to Pretoria only took place however in late 1977 following the adoption by the United Nations of an international arms embargo against South Africa.

26. Indeed, most observers in the early 1970s thought that the whole system could collapse in particular because of de Gaulle's withdrawal from power. See Nielsen, *Op. Cit.*, *World Today*, and Kaye Whiteman, "Pompidou and Africa: Gaullism after de Gaulle" *The World Today*, June, 1970, pp. 241-249.

27. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse Soviet policy in Africa since 1975: this analysis has been performed elsewhere. See in particular: John A. Marcus "Lessons of Angola" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 54, April 1976, and Tom Farer, *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, a Crisis for Detente*, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976; "The Horn of Africa" in Ian Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa, an Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies*, London, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1977.

to Angola, southern Africa, and the Horn (areas outside the traditional realm of French influence—with the exception of Djibouti). But the new Soviet policy was perceived in France as a direct threat to French interests in Africa. In the French view, the new Soviet influence exacerbated the structural weaknesses of the African continent and created a “climate of instability” affecting the historic “responsibilities” of France in Africa.²⁸

The Soviet-Cuban presence also raised—for the first time since the colonial competition of the late nineteenth century—the prospect of great power rivalry. The French suddenly realized that their African clients, whom they had taken for granted for so long, were the prey of a rival great power. It was therefore essential that France reassure its African allies and reestablish a solid front against the Soviet threat—particularly since no other Western nation was ready to enter the African struggle. To do so, President Giscard offered both a new economic relationship with Francophone Africa, and a clear military guarantee to protect the physical integrity of the African states. The military aspects of this new posture were spectacular and controversial, and they embodied the implementation of the new French strategic doctrine that had been elaborated since 1974–1975.

THE NEW STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The new strategic doctrine emerged in France from late 1974 to 1976, remarkably (though cautiously) different from the defense policy defined by General de Gaulle. It advanced a new concept of *bataille de l'avant* which envisaged the participation of French troops in battle in the European theater. Both Giscard d'Estaing and General Méry repeatedly stressed the need to reorganize and modernize the conventional forces, rather than the *Force de Frappe*.

The Gaullists (and the Communists) denounced the new defense policy as a betrayal of the concept of deterrence and as a clear indication of France's “return in NATO.”²⁹ This debate (one part of the internal political struggle that typified the immediate post-Gaullist period) focused on the role of the *Force de Frappe* and France's involvement in Europe.³⁰ As a result, the other aspect of Giscard's policy—the need for France to respond with a new range of military capabilities to third world conflicts—was ignored until the first

28. General Méry, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 20–21.

29. See for example Michel Jobert's statements, quoted in *Le Monde* 5 June 1976.

30. See in particular Pierre M. Gallois, “French Defense Planning—The Future in the Past,” Volume I, Number 2 (Fall 1976).

Shaba intervention of 1977. A November, 1974 statement by Giscard typified his vision of France's new military requirements:

in the present world France's defense relies on two tools. On the one hand, a tool of nuclear deterrence . . . to protect France from a nuclear attack. The second aspect of our defense *in a world which is a very unstable world with conflicts of all kinds*, is that France must have its own mobile, special force corresponding to its dimension as a modern State.³¹ [Emphasis added.]

In 1975, Giscard ordered a complete reorganization of the French armed forces. In a major televised speech, he defined the new French strategic doctrine in greater detail:

In my view, these forces must have two characteristics: they must be available and they must be mobile. In fact, until now—this was probably inherited from the cold war—French military doctrine focused on the East, but I think that in the present period the dangers of the world are dangers which can emerge from various areas of the world, and our military forces must be mobile forces.³²

In June, 1976, he refined his vision of the two threats:

Our world is an over-armed world in a case of an East-West conflict and a world which is looking for a North-South balance. On the other hand, it is a very unstable world regionally for a series of reasons ranging from ideology to under-development, which explains that everywhere we witness a general destabilization of security.³³

Thus, Giscard rejected the notion that only one defense system (the *Force de Frappe*) was enough to cope with the double threat of East-West conflict and general third world destabilization. He advocated the development of modern conventional forces that would cope with the North-South threat, and he emphasized the need for increased "mobility of the Army," "surface strength of our Navy," and "modernization of our Air Force."

THE NEW DOCTRINE APPLIED TO AFRICA

The elaboration and definition of the new French military doctrine and the vision of a "general destabilization" in the "South" was undoubtedly influenced by events occurring in Africa from 1975 onward. Africa provided an opportunity to test and implement the new doctrine.

31. Speech made on board of nuclear submarine "Le Terrible" on November 8, 1974 (*Le Monde*, 10-11 November, 1974).

32. *Le Monde*, 27 March 1975.

33. *Le Monde*, 4 June 1976.

The most spectacular implementation occurred in a series of interventions carried out in Shaba and Mauritania in 1977, and again in Shaba in 1978. During that time, reinforcements were also brought into Chad, where French troops had been involved in guerrilla warfare since 1968.³⁴ Similarly, reinforcements of France's naval presence in the Indian Ocean were conducted beginning in 1974;³⁵ this included the creation of a new series of *points d'appui*.³⁶

Although it is too early to draw all the political and military lessons from this series of decisions, it is possible to offer a tentative analysis of what appears to be a renewed French military presence in Africa.

1. The French military response has generally been carefully limited to the traditional areas of influence in the continent, namely, Western Francophone Africa (Chad, Mauritania), as well as those areas of the Indian Ocean which were also historically placed under French influence (Djibouti, Mayotte). However, the quest for "stabilization" also served France's ambitions in neighbouring states (Zaire) and territories (the new *points d'appui* in the Indian Ocean).

2. The form of French military interventions also varied according to local situations and to operational and structural constraints in the French Army itself. Generally, however, with the exception of Chad, France has relied on the military framework inherited from the Gaullist *coopération* policy. In particular the largest part of French interventions has been conducted by the *forces d'intervention extérieures* with an emphasis on short "punctual operations" (Zaire), rather than on permanent deployment. Even Chad, which is presently the most difficult and long lasting front, involves only 1,800 French troops (including a large number of advisers—*coopérants militaires*). By contrast, Cuba has resorted to a classic "colonial" strategy involving a large and durable deployment of troops, particularly in Angola (21,000 troops) and Ethiopia (12,000 troops). Similarly, an effort was made to make use of bases retained since decolonization (Dakar in particular), rather than creating new military bases *à la soviétique*.

3. Despite President Giscard d'Estaing's own vision of a "general destabilization," the French interventions are carefully presented as case by case

34. *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 8 May 1978.

35. Greig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 29. As part of France's unenforced presence in the region, the French Air Force has deployed in September, 1978, a squadron of twelve mirage fighters which will eventually be given to Djibouti's national Air Force (see *Le Monde*, 28 September 1978).

36. See Note 17.

responses to special situations, rather than as a general military counter-offensive against further Soviet-Cuban moves. It is significant that Giscard d'Estaing's explanation in June, 1978³⁷ of France's simultaneous involvement in several areas of conflicts in Africa carefully distinguished between:

- a "humanitarian" operation (Zaire)
- a kind of show of force to prevent repeated kidnappings of French nationals (Mauritania)
- the need for restoring peace after repeated violation of cease fires (Chad).

At the same time, however, Giscard d'Estaing emphasized the basic links between all of these interventions. According to him, French military "actions" in Africa "led to three results. First these actions . . . helped stabilize Africa. Second they also proved to the world that France has the means to act and thinks that it has the willingness to honor its commitments." One can thus perceive a dual policy: that of "drawing the line" beyond which further Soviet sponsored destabilization would not be tolerated³⁸ and that of the traditional case-by-case policy established by de Gaulle after the Gabonese intervention of 1964—closer to the original concept of *coopération*.

This ambiguity is at the heart of the current French posture in Africa: as such, it explains the importance of such a policy on a global scale, but also sets its inherent political and military limits. It is therefore necessary at this stage to analyze these political and military constraints which will determine the future of France's role in Africa.

THE LIMIT OF STABILIZATION: POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSTRAINTS

At a time when strong third world nationalism combines with a certain reluctance in the West to use military intervention, it is remarkable that France's repeated military undertakings of the last few years have incurred so few political costs and have even attained a degree of success. Indeed, in the aftermath of the second Shaba intervention, the prestige and credibility of Giscard's France was reinforced—at least in the short term—both domestically and internationally. In a domestic climate dominated by traditional indifference to foreign policy as well as deep divisions of the Left (a result of the electoral defeat of March, 1978), it is interesting to note that the French

37. Press Conference, *Le Monde*, 16 June 1978.

38. General Méry, *Op. Cit.*

have not only accepted but to a degree supported Giscard's military actions in Africa.³⁹

In the West, no negative reaction was recorded, except in the Danish government.⁴⁰ In fact, the British press analyzed the French policy with a mixture of "envy and admiration."⁴¹

France's policy in Africa should not, however, be assessed solely on the basis of the apparent success of the second Shaba operation, because this particular intervention provided an all too perfect case of political Manichaenism, in which human concerns superseded all other considerations.⁴² In fact, serious political and military constraints exist which drastically limit Giscard's margin of maneuver in Africa.

The most important political constraint on French policy in Africa—manifested both domestically and internationally—is that within the present international context, France's military actions cannot be dissociated from overall Western interests. With Africa as the new East-West theater of confrontation at a time when the West (the United States in particular) is unwilling or unable to directly respond, France is bound to appear in the front line against a Soviet threat.

For a variety of reasons, ranging from Watergate and Vietnam to the claims of détente, the United States has chosen a non-interventionist posture. This policy has been justified in the Andrew Young school of thought⁴³—by the notion that if the Soviets are left alone in Africa, they will be expelled *in the long run*, as was the case in Egypt and Somalia. In the short run, however,

39. According to an IFOP poll published in *Le Point* (12 June 1978) 48 percent of the persons interviewed approved French policy in Africa (with 34 percent against), whereas the Zaire intervention was supported by 50 percent (with 37 percent against), because of its "humanitarian aspect." Interestingly, a poll taken in November, 1978 (and published in *Jeune Afrique*, 6 December 1978) shows that only 26 percent of the French population thinks that France should not intervene militarily in Africa under any circumstances, while 56 percent approve military interventions for humanitarian reasons, and 8 percent are in favor of interventions in all cases upon request of the local government.

40. The Belgian Government was not altogether pleased by France's military interventions in Shaba: this however did not stem from moralistic concerns, but rather from political frustration.

41. See, among others, "We used to behave like French" *The (London) Times*, 24 May 1978; "Don't look now, but France is doing a grand job in Africa", *The Economist* 13 May 1978; "The role France wants in Africa", *The (London) Times*, 12 June 1978.

42. It is unfortunate—but not surprising—that a certain amount of racism was not absent from the West's appreciation of the atrocities of Kolwesi.

43. For a discussion of current American policy in Africa, see: Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, the Cubans and Americans Anxieties", *Foreign Policy*, No. 31, Summer 1978, pp. 3-30; Chester A. Crocker: "The Quest for an African Policy" *The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies* Vol. 1, No. 2, April, 1978, pp. 65-77.

the West is perceived—and perceives itself—as losing another battle against the spread of Communism; thus, it feels the need to draw the line now. By an assertive policy, French military interventions are objectively serving overall Western interests. However, the cost of such interventions is borne by the intervening state alone.⁴⁴

This is the main point of Gaullist and Leftist attacks against Giscard's policy found in the famous formulae of *Gendarmisme*⁴⁵ and *otanisation*;⁴⁶ it is also the cause of François Mitterand's denunciation of France as the "Cuba of the West."⁴⁷ The Socialist Party, and to a lesser degree, the Gaullists, have stressed the risks of escalation or "Vietnamization" of French military actions in Africa.⁴⁸

In addition, France has to bear the costs incurred in taking sides in local conflicts in Africa. This is particularly true in the Western Sahara, where France is seriously jeopardizing its relations with Algeria by openly supporting Morocco.⁴⁹ The same is true in Chad, where France opposes Libya's territorial ambitions.⁵⁰ And because of France's own colonial past, it must also pay the special cost of arousing the vivid nationalist and anti-neocolonialist feelings in Africa and the third world. For this reason some Africans apparently view interventions by Cuba as being more tolerable than those by France or by any other ex-colonial power. The Khartum Conference of July, 1978 amply demonstrated this. Nigeria's President Obasanjo stated:

We should not worry too much about the presence of those whom we have only invited to fight for precise causes. We have no right to condemn the Cubans together with the countries which have deemed necessary a Cuban assistance in order to strengthen their sovereignty or their territorial integrity. But the Cubans should not overstay, Africa not being ready to exchange one colonial rule for another.⁵¹

44. Indeed, this lesson has painfully been learned over the years by the U.S. as a result of its "active" policy during the 1950s and 1960s.

45. Maurice Duverger: "Le Gendarme Africain de l'Occident" *Le Monde*, 28 December 1977.

46. Yves Guena (Gaullist), *Le Monde*, 8 June 1978; Georges Marchais (PCF) *Le Monde*, 6 June 1978.

47. *Le Monde*, 13 June 1978.

48. See *Le Monde*, 9 and 13 June 1978.

49. Although some improvement of Franco-Algerian relations has taken place during the Summer of 1978, following the demise of Ould-Daddah régime in Mauritania.

50. In this respect, Colonel Qadaffi's appreciation of French policy deserves mention. In June 1978, he warned: "France should beware of another Dien Bien Phu in N'Djamena or Zouérate . . . She should beware of the swamps and deserts of Africa" (Quoted in *Le Monde*, 20 June 1978). The current situation in Chad does in fact resemble a "swamp," with French forces being caught in the middle of a civil war between President Malloum and Prime Minister Habré.

51. *Le Monde*, 21 July 1978.

France's interventions were subjected to a much harsher treatment by Mozambique's leader, Samora Machel:

Those who presently occupy Mayotte . . . have committed the massacre of Sakiet Sidi Youssef, have massacred the Tunisian people when the latter wanted to get rid of the base in Bizerte, led a seven and a half year war against the Algerian people, have aggressed Morocco when it was offering a brotherly support to the liberation of Algeria, have backed the secession in Katanga and Biafra, have invaded Egypt when the Suez Canal was nationalized, have aggressed Guinea in 1972, have organized and armed the mercenaries who invaded Benin (January 1977), have supported aggression against the Saharan people and attacked everywhere where people are fighting for their dignity . . .⁵²

These criticisms are all the more serious when viewed in the context of President Giscard d'Estaing's well-publicized ambition to establish a new North-South relationship. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile Giscard's new *mondialist* doctrine and his initiatives in North-South economic dialogue with an active military presence in Africa. The problem with French military interventions is that they fail to address the key North-South problem, which is *economic* stabilization. Paradoxically, Giscard d'Estaing, because of his previous career as Finance Minister and his keen personal interest in Africa, is more aware than his predecessors that the source of African destabilization is economic in nature.⁵³

However, France's limited resources put a constraint on what it can do to offset such destabilization, particularly since the 1973 crisis. President Giscard d'Estaing's call for Western (particularly U.S.) participation was intended to solve this problem.⁵⁴ In the meantime, the French military intervention has the useful effect of compensating for the decrease of financial resources devoted to *coopération*, as if the newly asserted "right of every African nation to security"⁵⁵ could be substituted for the right to economic development. One particularly significant illustration of this is the 1979 budget of *coopération* recently presented before the National Assembly: whereas the total sums

52. *Ibid.*

53. See Giscard's speech at the Franco-African Summit of Paris in June, 1978, *Newsweek*, June 5, 1978. See also Giscard's interview in *Jeune Afrique*, 6 December 1978.

54. As early as May 1976, Giscard endeavoured to convince the U.S.—though in vain—to participate in the financing of a new 100 million francs "Franco-African Solidarity Fund". See P. J. Franceschini, *Op. Cit.* pp. 442-442. Similarly, efforts to obtain U.S. financial assistance were made in June, 1978, following the second Shaba war. In view of the urgency of the situation in Zaïre, these efforts were slightly more successful (Conference of Paris and Brussels, June, 1978).

55. Speech of Giscard d'Estaing at the Franco-African summit of Dakar of 1977 (*Le Monde*, 23 April 1977). See *Le Moude*, 5 November 1978.

devoted to *coopération* come to only 0.51 percent of the entire budget of France (0.13 percent of the GNP), the share attributed to military assistance is up 23 percent from 1978, reaching 470 millions of francs.)

Military constraints impose an even greater limitation on France's policy in Africa than do political considerations. Several constraints emerged from results of the 1977-1978 interventions. In effect, the interventions have shown the limits of 1) the defense system inherited from the policy of *coopération*, and 2) the present organization and means of the French armed forces for operations overseas.

The three "layers" of *couverture à distance*, adopted in 1963-1964, have already revealed their insufficiencies. In the first layer, the national African armies have been totally incapable of coping with modern threats: in 1977 and 1978, the Shaba experiences revealed the collapse of the Zairian Army, which, on paper, was one of the most impressive armies in Africa; Mauritania's army is similarly incapable of coping with Polisario raids, because of inherent weaknesses; and the Chadian Army suffered near collapse several times. These weaknesses are largely attributable to the failure of France's military/technical cooperation policy. In Chad, for example, the problems of the local army persist despite ten years of French presence and training. Beyond the strictly military dimensions, problems can be attributed to the fact that the armies did not have clearly defined political allegiances to the regimes in power.

As a major consequence of these weaknesses, France must now make increasing use of its overseas defense system's second and third layers, composed only of French troops. This could lead, however, to a more serious involvement and the risk of escalation (*engrenage*). The second layer—the French bases and troops stationed permanently in Africa—has already been used extensively. Dakar, in particular, has become the central base of operations for air support to Mauritania and for the supply of troops in Chad. However, in the case of long-lasting conflicts, such as the Saharan or Chadian wars, this local support system has been insufficient. As a result, France sent reinforcements and additional hardware, including Jaguar fighter-bombers, Breguet Atlantic reconnaissance planes, and Transall transport craft. These reinforcements transformed the limited base system—established after decolonization—into a much heavier, permanent form of involvement.⁵⁶

56. According to certain estimates, a total of 18 Jaguars, 12 Mirage IIIs, 12 Transall, 4 Breguet Atlantic long range reconnaissance planes, and 3 Boeing KC 135 tankers were deployed in 1978

Finally, the third layer, the *forces d'intervention extérieures*, have also reached their height of achievement in France's defense structure.⁵⁷ The troops are limited in number (14,000 to 15,000 men, compared to the overall French Army of 300,000 troops—including 214,000 conscripts).⁵⁸ At present, most of these troops are committed in Africa; only a few units remain in reserve in the metropole.⁵⁹

The interventions also highlighted the weaknesses of French logistics.⁶⁰ The fact that paratroopers going to Zaire have had to fly on U.S. transport planes⁶¹ is a clear illustration of France's urgent need for a long-range aircraft.⁶² Finally, it must be noted that the armament of the *forces d'intervention* is insufficient in relation to the supply of heavy, sophisticated weapons provided to local rebels by the Soviet Union via Algeria (Polisario), Lybia (Chad), or Angola (Zaire). France also has lost at least one Jaguar over Mauritania and another fighter-bomber over Chad,⁶³ to surface-to-air missiles.

These limits illustrate the basic traditional dilemma of France's defense policy—high objectives versus limited means. This gap—already apparent during the Gaullist period with the *Force de Frappe*⁶⁴—takes on a new dimen-

as well as several Noratlas. These figures are quite significant when related to the total capabilities of the French Air Force. For example, the number of Jaguars deployed in Africa represents more than 10 percent of the total fleet of such planes, whereas in the case of the Transall this proportion reaches 25 percent.

57. Technically speaking, as a result of the reorganization of the Army which began in 1975, the "Forces d'Intervention Extérieures" have been canceled. The objective of the reform was precisely to confer to the entire Army a new mobility and homogeneity which would bring all units to the level of the Forces d'Intervention Extérieures. In practice, however, the latter do remain very much alive for one basic reason: these Units (the 11th Division Parachutiste and the 9th Division d'Infanterie de Marine) are the only ones to be exclusively composed of professional soldiers, not draftees, which allow their use in combat overseas. (See *Défense, Armée, Nation: "Forces d'Intervention"*, Supplement No. 1 to No. 10, July 1978)

58. For the composition of the Forces d'intervention Extérieures see: *Défense, Armée, Nation, Ibid.*

59. See Charles Hernu's statements in *Le Monde* 25 May 1978 (Mr. Hernu is the defense expert of the Socialist Party).

60. These insufficiencies were openly admitted by General Méry himself. (See: "L'Avenir de nos Armées", *Op. Cit.*, and *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 12 June 1978)

61. It can also be noted that France's reliance on U.S. logistic support had the political result of committing the United States in a military operation in Africa, even in a limited way.

62. Less known is the fact that for reasons of lack of space the troopers could not take their parachutes with them and had to use Zairian equipment to jump over Kolwesi. While illustrating the traditional French "panache" and bravery, this episode also reveals the less honorable weaknesses of the back-up, supply and transportation means of the French Army in operations of this type.

63. The latter was apparently shot down by a Soviet supplied SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile.

64. Ruehl, *Op. Cit.*, p. 429.

sion as France attempts to add a new defense role outside the European theater. In 1976, the then Deputy Minister of Defense General Bigeard admitted:

It is a true *tour de force* today to develop at the same time a nuclear strategic force while maintaining conventional forces.⁶⁵

One must ask what new *tour de force* will be required if, in addition to its two costly armies, France attempts to develop a third—tailored to fight “destabilization” in the developing nations.

The Future of French Policy in Africa: French, Western, or Pan-African?

French policy in Africa is at a crossroad. Although it will be increasingly difficult to continue *la politique de la France seule*, a multilateralization of French policy raises enormously difficult problems. Internally, there are limits to what the French public can accept. In May, 1978, the public supported the Kolwesi operation because of its evident humanitarian dimension; the same cannot be expected for protracted wars with a clear risk of escalation and *engrenage*. This was profoundly demonstrated in a June, 1978 public opinion poll.⁶⁶ The extension of French military action in Africa would also meet increasing resistance from both the Gaullists and the Left; and the latter could find a very handy political theme in the French adventure in Africa.

Internationally, France necessarily risks jeopardizing its global diplomatic objectives by its actions in Africa—even if it disregards the criticisms of the third world. In this respect, there are certain diplomatic limits to what France alone can do in drawing the line beyond which the Soviet ambitions in Africa would not be tolerated. By overstepping these limits, France would jeopardize the very policy of détente which it was instrumental in creating in the 1960s.

For these reasons, French leaders have given increased attention to the

65. Quoted in Ruehl, *Op. Cit.*, p. 450.

66. It is significant that 37 percent of Frenchmen disapprove of the French policy in Chad and Mauritania while 31 percent are for, and 32 percent have no opinion. It is also important to note that 45 percent of French public opinion is against sending troops to protect “friendly African regimes” while 40 percent are for and 15 percent without opinion (See poll IFOP, *Le Point*, *Op. Cit.*) This is confirmed by a later poll taken in November, 1978 (*Jeune Afrique*, 6 December 1978) in which only 8 percent of the population approved military interventions in all cases, whereas 56 percent were in favor of interventions for “humanitarian reasons,” with the condition that French troops withdraw as soon as their mission is completed.

possibilities of a multilateralization of French policy in Africa. President Giscard and General Méry have emphasized the need for such a solution to Africa's problems, saying, "France does not wish to solve alone all the problems of Africa."⁶⁷ Multilateral alternatives are attractive for at least three reasons:

1. France could maintain a predominant role in Africa without exposing itself to the dual accusation of a) having purely neo-colonialist ambitions in protecting its own interests and its own area of influence, and b) fighting alone a war by proxy for the interests of the West (the "Cuban of America" or the *gendarme otanisé*).
2. Economically, a multilateral solution would compensate for France's limited resources and help solve the long-lasting crisis of *coopération*. In the Giscardian vision, this new economic relationship would constitute the model for the future North-South dialogue, and act as the first pillar of a new Euro-African Solidarity Pact.
3. The multilateralization of French military actions would then constitute the second pillar of this new Solidarity Pact, and compensate for the limited capabilities of the French Army. General Méry stated:

The cooperation which is already under way in the economic area through the Lomé agreements . . . could be extended to security in accordance with the President of the Republic's suggestion of a solidarity pact between Europe and Africa. For we are at the moment, on the western side, rather alone in our action.⁶⁸

WHAT MULTILATERALIZATION?

In devising a multilateral formula, two questions must be addressed:

1. With whom should France embark on a multilateral policy?
2. In what areas should the policy be implemented?

French leaders have tried to develop a series of multilateral alternatives, attempting to establish a new, global West-African relationship, in which France would be the natural leader. In so doing, Giscard, though in the true tradition of the Gaullist approach to foreign policy, was destroying one of the last remnants of the Gaullist heritage—the "privileged" and exclusive relationship between France and its African protégés.

67. *Le Monde*, 16 June 1978.

68. Général Méry, *Op. Cit.*

In practice, the attempt largely failed. In part, the failure was due to the position adopted by the Carter Administration. As early as 1976, the French appealed to the United States to provide financial resources;⁶⁹ in the aftermath of the second Shaba operation, the French also called for a clear American military commitment to France's intended security structure in Africa. Despite the (limited) support that the United States did provide during the Shaba operation, the Carter Administration announced during the Paris and Brussels meetings of June, 1978—after some hesitation—that it would limit its participation to the economic area only.

The U.S. decision destroyed the possibility of establishing a viable military response to the destabilization of Africa, especially when no other major Western European power was ready to join France in its African ambitions. It is notable that Giscard's appeal to other states "with an African experience" to "involve themselves in the policy of stabilization and development in Africa"⁷⁰ received no positive response.⁷¹ The French ambition of a global approach (both military and economic) to the stabilization of Africa was doomed, and France was condemned to only partial solutions.

In the economic area, France has managed to secure some limited Western participation in Zaire. However, this coordination was obtained because of the urgency of Zaire's situation; it is not a valid precedent for a new global approach to Africa's economic issues.

Indeed, six months after Kolwesi, this economic coordination clearly showed its limits with the reunion of the second Brussels Conference of the "Western Consortium" for Zaire. During that meeting, all participants (except France and Zaire) refused to grant more financial support to the Mobutu regime beyond the \$90 million already allocated during the first conference in June.⁷² Two weeks later, Giscard publicly "regretted" the attitude of his western partners. He said:

69. See: Franceschini, *Op. Cit.*, p. 442.

70. Quoted in *Le Monde*, 16 June 1978.

71. It is unclear, however, whether such call on Western powers "with an African experience", namely Britain, Germany, Belgium and Italy, can have a concrete result. Britain is really out of the business of "stabilization" since the 1960s; Italy was never in; Belgium on the other hand is clearly competing with France to regain some influence in Zaire—"Katanga"—as the recent events of Shaba have clearly shown. The only serious "candidate" would be therefore Germany, which has both the economic and military resources to assist France in the new Western mission of "stabilization and development" of Africa.

72. Three international organizations (IMF, World Bank, EEC) were represented in Brussels, along with eleven countries: Belgium, Germany, Canada, The United States, France, The United Kingdom, Japan, Iran, Holland, Italy, and Zaire.

I regret that, at the present time, there should be no massive action to support the economic and social development of Zaire, and I intend to raise this issue with our main partners.⁷³

France's grand design for a multilateral solution was most unsuccessful in the military area. Following the Western rebuttal of a multilateral approach, France settled for the old and questionable concept of a "pan-African" military formula.⁷⁴

La France Seule?

The French hope for multilateralization has ended in disappointment. However, the divisions in the West and the diversity and contradictions of the various states' interests would make any other result surprising. Every one of the potential participants had different reasons for not entering France's design.

In the first place, America could not participate in such a venture without jeopardizing its own current regional policy in Africa as well as its own global interests as a superpower. In Africa itself, the U.S. priority lies in the southern part of the continent, not where French interests are at stake. Furthermore, the implementation of the American mediating ambitions in Southern Africa presupposes the strict adherence to a low-key, non-interventionist policy. At the same time, however, in order to afford the luxury of such a moralistic policy at a time when the Soviet Union chooses to bear no such restrictions, the United States badly needs someone in the West to do "the dirty job" at least in the short term. For this very reason, the United States could not be expected to join in a multilateral scheme, which could only have been politically costly, while militarily not substantially more efficient than what the French Legionnaires alone are doing.

Similarly, France's European partners also had few incentives to join a multilateral scheme, particularly in the economic area. While the Association

73. Press Conference of 21 November 1978, *Le Monde*, 23 November 1978.

74. The idea of such African Force was introduced by President Senghor of Senegal during the Franco-African Summit of Dakar, in April, 1977; the summit immediately followed the first Shaba affair in which Moroccan troops intervened in Zaire. However, the notion that francophone African nations should unify their armies is an old theme that dates back to decolonization. This nation was included in CEAO (*Communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*) and even led to the creation of the UAMD (*Union Africaine et Malgache de Défense*). UAMD's Headquarters still exist today, and are located at Bouaké (Ivory Coast). However, the *Union* has had no practical significance.

regime of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions provided a successful vehicle for France, it had little, if any, attraction for the other European states. They would have had to bear a large part of the cost without any of the benefits that France enjoyed in Africa. Thus, European powers such as Germany preferred the bilateral route, which would bring immediate political and economic rewards.

Even the Francophone African states had reservations about France's multilateral schemes. These reservations first appeared in the economic realm; the African states feared that multilateralization would be an excuse for providing less financial aid. They therefore preferred to preserve the old bilateral *coopération* system. In the military realm, the states were divided, but showed little enthusiasm for a "pan-African" force. In fact, during the June, 1978 Franco-African summit in Paris, some governments spoke openly against the French proposal.

With this background it is difficult to envisage any serious future for France's multilateral scheme. By late 1978, the Kolwesi operation had faded away; the "pan-African" force remained basically limited to a few Moroccan units in Zaire and Mauritania;⁷⁵ and the Western economic recovery plans, though limited to saving the Zairian regime, appeared to be in jeopardy.

The paradox of French African policy under Giscard d'Estaing lies in the fact that although it is basically faithful to Gaullist principles, it has been perceived as a departure—even a betrayal—of de Gaulle's heritage. In fact, in resorting to military actions in a spectacular series of specific but simultaneous operations, Giscard was trying to protect France's traditional sphere of influence in Africa, while also delineating France's role in a world still dominated by the superpowers. Because the African context itself had changed as a result of Soviet competition, there was an inescapable coincidence between France's own traditional interests and those of the West as a whole.

This classic debate between continuity or change in France's foreign policy should not, however, obscure the limits of French capabilities. Clearly the policy of *la France seule* corresponds decreasingly to the new dimensions of Africa's problems.

75. Franceschini, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy

Michael MccGwire

The Soviet Navy has become a significant factor in the debate about intentions, detente, and arms limitations, because its submarines carry a large part of the Soviet missile inventory, and because of the navy's involvement in trouble spots around the world. The West has encouraged this Soviet emphasis on seabased strategic strike systems but is deeply suspicious of the naval activism, claiming that there is no legitimate requirement for the Soviet Union, a land power, to deploy such forces.

The Soviets have always admitted this asymmetry of interest by stressing that a major change in the international situation after World War II was that Russia's potential opponents were now the "traditional maritime powers." But we, the maritime powers, have found it hard to comprehend the naval requirements that flow from their geopolitical circumstances, or to interpret the means which the Soviet Union adopted to meet these requirements. As long as the Soviet navy remained tied to home waters and offered no direct threat to North America, this lack of comprehension was not serious. But now that the Soviet navy has become a factor in our diplomatic calculations, it is important to understand what motivates these developments and to understand the different types of political commitment that underlie various aspects of Soviet naval policy.

A further reason for understanding Soviet naval developments is that they provide a case study that illuminates the wider debate about the Soviet Union's military posture and its willingness to wage nuclear war. I have therefore approached this subject through a discussion of Soviet naval doctrine, a term which I use in its broad Western sense.¹ The evidence for such doctrine comes from what the Soviets say and write, from how they deploy, operate, and exercise their forces, and from the number and characteristics of their ships, submarines, and aircraft. Taken together, these data provide

1. Matthew Gallagher characterizes Soviet Military Doctrine as ambiguous and highly generalized guidelines about the nature of future war, which have been adopted by the political and military leadership as a basis for the development of the armed forces. It has little in common with the Western term and does not provide a key to Soviet strategic policy, except in the broadest sense. See "The Military Role in Soviet Decision Making" in *Soviet Naval Policy; Objectives and Constraints* (henceforth *SNP*), MccGwire, Booth and McDonnell (Eds.), Praegers, 1975, pp. 56-57.

a reasonable body of evidence, particularly when public pronouncements can be evaluated against the more concrete types of data, although the quality of understanding will always depend on the depth of hindsight. Warship building programs are particularly important in this context since procurement decisions can often be dated with some confidence and ship characteristics give a fair idea of the then-prevailing force requirements and operational concepts.²

Background Factors

Doctrine is the product of an evolutionary process, and it is relevant that for the last 200 years or so the Russian Navy has generally been the third or fourth largest in the world—although its effectiveness has fluctuated widely. Russia used naval forces in the eighteenth century to gain control of her Baltic and Black Sea coasts, and four times between 1768 and 1827, she deployed sizable squadrons to the Mediterranean for a year or more. For three of these deployments, during the third, fifth, and sixth wars with Turkey, ships were drawn from the Baltic Fleet and were used in operations against the southern side of the Black Sea exits.

Increasingly thereafter, Russia found herself confronting predominantly maritime powers. In the Black Sea, Britain used her naval strength to prevent or reverse Russian gains at the expense of the failing Ottoman Empire; Britain intervened directly in the seventh Turkish war (1853–56, Crimea) and the peace treaty forbade Russia a Black Sea Fleet; in the eighth Turkish war (1876–77), British pressure ensured that Russia would not gain control of the Straits. In the Far East, Russo-Japanese rivalry culminated in a disastrous war and the loss of two Russian fleets. In 1918, the Western navies provided vital support to the forces of counter-revolution. As a consequence, Russia's naval policy was increasingly dominated by the requirement to defend four widely separated fleet areas against maritime powers who could concentrate their forces at will.

It is therefore wrong to suggest that Russia has only recently awoken to the significance of sea power. She used it in the past to her own advantage,

2. For a summary description of this analytical method, see my "Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy" in *Soviet Naval Developments: Context and Capability*, (henceforth *SND*), McGwire (Ed.), Praeger, 1973, pp. 176–209.

and has more often seen its long arm used against her. Over the years she committed very substantial resources to naval construction, and the major warship building program which was initiated in 1945 was the fourth attempt in 65 years to build up a strong Russian fleet. But national strategy involves setting priorities and balancing competing claims for scarce resources. Russia was predominantly a land power; the only threats to her territorial existence had come by land; the army was the basis of security at home and influence abroad. Naval forces were indeed required to defend against assault from the sea and to counter the capability of maritime powers to dictate the outcome of events in areas adjacent to Russia. But these forces were seen as an expensive necessity rather than a preferred instrument of policy.

This ordering of priorities and the army's domination of military thought persist today,³ and are enshrined in the concept of a combined arms approach to military problems. This bias was, if anything, accentuated by the reorganization of the armed forces into five branches. It is characterized by the fact that out of twenty Full Members on the Central Committee, fifteen come from the Ground Forces,⁴ and that the naval share of the Soviet defense budget is estimated to be only about 18 percent, and this includes the cost of the ballistic missile submarine force.

Certain tendencies in Russian naval doctrine can probably be ascribed to this persistent state of affairs. Limited resources and the relative imbalance of naval power have encouraged a spirit of technical and conceptual innovation, and a readiness to adopt new but unproven technological advances. This is exemplified by the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope using highly explosive shells in 1853, the daring use of torpedo boats in the eighth Turkish war in 1876, the very early emphasis on submarines, and in the mid-1950s, the application of cruise missiles to maritime platforms. Usually start-

3. There was only one naval title among fifteen books in the "Officers Library" series announced in 1957, and not a single naval title in the 17 books of the new series announced in 1964. There were probably only two naval titles among 50 important military books published 1960-69. See *Soviet Military Doctrine: Its Formulation and Dissemination*. H. F. Scott, Stanford Research Institute, June, 1971, pp. 81-92. The Naval Academy is only one among fifteen arm-of-service academies at the Command and Staff level. During the period 1965-70, the navy achieved its proportionate share of Candidates of Science from the Lenin Military-Political Academy (i.e. at the Commander level) but achieved no Doctors of Science (*Ibid.*, pp. 120-124).

4. The other four branches and the Main Political Administration rate one apiece. See John McDonnell, "The Soviet Defense Industry as a Pressure Group," in *SNP*, p. 104. Those figures apply to the 1971-76 period, but there was no change in the Committee elected at the XXV Party Congress.

ing from behind in terms of conventional capabilities, and with little chance of overhauling from astern, the naval leadership has frequently sought to get ahead by taking a different (and unexpected) tack.

This tendency to innovate was reinforced by the post-revolutionary emphasis on original, "proletarian" solutions to strategic problems, and by the more enduring ideological commitment to "scientific objectivity." Current writing stresses the need to assess naval requirements from first principles and the fallacy of mirroring an opponent's capability. However, innovations are not always successful. And, during the last 20 years this combination of restricted resources, a faith in objective assessment and a belief in innovation has sometimes led to the development of task- and scenario-specific capabilities which have lacked the flexibility to cope with changes in the nature of the threat. The mid-fifties decision to place primary reliance on long-range cruise missiles (which had yet to be developed), carried by surface ship and diesel submarine, had just that result. It is also an example of the army-oriented political leadership—taking decisions against specific naval advice. Kuznetsov's objections to this ill-founded concept cost him his job as Commander in Chief of the Navy, and 45-year-old Gorshkov was brought in to implement the new policy.

But it should not be assumed that the effect of this land forces orientation has been, or is, all bad. It can of course be argued that it has led to the hobbling of naval forces by army commanders, from the scuttling of the fleet before Sevastopol in 1854, to operations in the Baltic and Black Sea during the Second World War. But several of these examples lose their force when analyzed in terms of relative capabilities and practical objectives, rather than classical naval theory. It is also true that army dominance encouraged the centralization of command and a rather rigid approach to battle planning. But "unified command" is now the fashion, and modern warfare demands close command and control. It so happens that Russia's traditional centralized command structure is well suited to contemporary requirements, in principle, if not always in practice. Its deficiencies lie more in its style of operation than its organizational structure.

A good case can be made that the emphasis on a "combined arms" approach and the existence of an army-oriented political leadership did in fact have an invigorating effect on the development of Soviet naval doctrine, not least by saving it from the fallacy that naval strategy was a universal science, whose rules had been discovered by Colomb, Corbett, and Mahan. A pragmatic approach, combined with strictly limited resources, introduced a

healthy realism to naval planning and, for example, encouraged the emergence of the "small war" doctrine in the early thirties, based on the limited types of warship that could then be built. More pertinently, when it did become possible to plan for capital ship construction at the end of the thirties, Stalin refused Kuznetsov's request for carriers, on the grounds that the Red Fleet would not be operating off distant shores. Naval procurement was to be tailored to Russia's particular requirements, and not to some idealized perception of what "a navy" should be.

The army-oriented leadership has required the navy to undertake tasks which have violated its traditional assumptions about naval operations, and forced the development of radical concepts. A particular example was the shift to forward deployment in the early sixties, whereby ill-armed Soviet naval units were required to maintain close company with U.S. forces in the Mediterranean, an area where the West enjoyed overwhelming maritime preponderance. The idea of relying on "the protection of peace" to safeguard such exposed deployments was a daring concept, given the general tenor of the Western strategic debate at that time. The decision to ignore the survivability of such units and exploit the characteristics of nuclear-missile war was a major departure from traditional naval thought.

More specifically, ground force thinking can be seen in the concept of close-shadowing Sixth Fleet carriers with a gun-armed destroyer. In artillery terms, that unit was acting as a Forward Observation Post, and in the event of war would call down fire from Medium or Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles emplaced in South West Russia.⁵ A similar concept was spelled out in Grechko's statement in December, 1972, that the wartime mission of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) included the destruction of "enemy means of nuclear attack, and troops and naval groupings in theaters of military operation on land and sea,"⁶ although by now, target data would be provided by satellite surveillance systems.

On balance, the injection of army concepts, the emphasis on combined

5. Although there was no firm evidence of such targeting, this was inferred at the time from the persistence of close shadowing, whether or not there was any sea-borne counter-carrier capability present; such a capability was not achieved on a sustained basis until the end of the sixties. Russia-based aircraft were not suitable for this strike role, since their response time was too long, and they first had to breach the NATO air defense barrier. There were, however, sufficient land-based missiles to cover this requirement, and the task was technically feasible. The existence of such a concept is supported by the subsequent claim for a more extensive capability of this type.

6. A. A. Grechko "A Socialist Multinational Army", *Krasnaya zvezda*, 17 December 1972.

arms, and the common development of weapon systems like missiles and aircraft have been fruitful in terms of capabilities and doctrine. Even when a new idea was initially unsuccessful, as was the long-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM), it often served the purpose of breaking with traditional concepts and opening new avenues for development. It is true that the leadership's perception of the navy as an expensive necessity has often led to the definition of naval requirements in narrow terms of countering specific threats, instead of more general capabilities, and that this has restricted the navy's flexibility. On the other hand, the sheer preponderance of ground force opinion engenders clearly defined priorities and a readiness to apply the resources of all relevant branches of the armed forces to meet any serious threat, including those that come from the sea.

Contingency Planning and the Reality of World War

Soviet military doctrine has evolved in response to what have been seen as a series of direct threats to the state's existence. The Soviet leadership has always taken the likelihood of war very seriously, and more importantly, it has been prepared to think through the implications and to take the measures necessary to secure ultimate victory should war come. This was demonstrated by the industrial relocation policies of the thirties, and by the contingency plans for physically removing industrial plants from the path of the German advance, measures which between them enabled the post-invasion build-up of Soviet military strength. This same approach persists today, and Soviet military doctrine can only be understood within the context of contingency planning for worst case situations.

At the end of World War II, the long term threat to the Soviet Union lay with America and its atomic monopoly. Within a few years this threat had extended to include the NATO alliance, with particular reference to Britain and Germany. The danger lay in nuclear attack. Soviet assessments of the probability that, sooner or later, war would come with the West have varied over the years, but the Soviet Union has never wavered in its belief that a strong military capability is the best way of making it less likely. In the first seven years after the war, the probability was almost certainly seen as high, as Russia struggled to restore her shattered economy and restructure her armed forces. Thereafter the fear of a deliberate attack receded, but national security was seen to depend on maintaining a strong defense posture, which was also necessary to prevent the United States from exploiting its military

strength to dictate the outcome of events. The probability of war was seen to rise sharply in 1961-63, as the result of Kennedy's assertive policies and the sudden build-up in American strategic weapons. At this period there appears to have been genuine Soviet concern that the United States was seeking to develop the capability for a disarming strike, which (if nothing else) would allow it to "negotiate from a position of strength." From 1969-72 the SALT process served to lower the probabilities, and it is possible that one of the more important side-effects of the negotiations was a shift in Soviet threat perceptions. It seems likely this led them to de-emphasize the danger that confrontation with the United States on non-vital issues would escalate to nuclear war.

Meanwhile, the possibility of war with China had emerged, and by 1969 this was probably seen as a more likely contingency than war with the West. It might, however, trigger such a war. In any case, the possibility of war with the West remained inherent in the opposing military postures, if only through miscalculation.⁷ However unlikely, world war is possible, and as such it must serve as the basis for contingency planning, with China and the West as Russia's principal opponents.

One of the problems in understanding Soviet military doctrine (and in disentangling their intentions) is that strategic thought in the West, particularly as concerns the possibility of war with Russia, has been conditioned by the concept of "nuclear deterrence." This started from the simple idea of defending Europe against a conventional attack by demonstrating the capability and resolve to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union. But over the years the original concept became increasingly complex, with its own vocabulary and body of doctrine, as on the one hand Russia developed a strategic nuclear capability, and on the other the theories were spun out to their logical ends.

The Soviets do not have an equivalent concept, and they even lack a proper term for it.⁸ Soviet military doctrine does not separate out the ideas of "nuclear deterrence" from the general concept of defense. Defense of the Soviet Union depends on the capability to repel (or at least absorb) any attack and then go on to win the subsequent war. The Soviets obviously hope that their defense capability will be sufficient to dissuade (or hold back—*sderzhi-*

7. See M. Mackintosh on this point; "Soviet Military Policy", *SND*, p. 61.

8. For a detailed discussion of this question see P. Vigor, "The Semantics of Deterrence and Defence," and G. Jukes "The Military Approach to Deterrence and Defence," in *SNP.*, pp. 471-485.

vat') an aggressor, which is of course deterrence in its traditional sense.⁹ But the crucial distinction between this and the Western concept of "nuclear deterrence" is implicit in the comment that "if the deterrent has to be used, it will have failed." The Soviets do not entertain such ideas. Should war come, their defense will only have failed if their armed forces are unable to recover and go on to final victory.

This emphasis on defense through war fighting has been central to Soviet military doctrine.¹⁰ While Western theory saw nuclear weapons as a means of threatening "unacceptable damage" to Russia, the Soviet Union saw them as adjuncts to its war-fighting capability. Where the West thought in terms of credibility, argued about the merits of counterforce and countervalue, or worried about stabilizing and de-stabilizing developments, the Soviet Union focused on achieving victory in war.¹¹ And even now that the reality of mutual assured destruction is increasingly acknowledged within the Soviet leadership, they will not adopt it as explicit policy, lest it undermine the fundamental doctrine of being prepared to fight and win any war which is forced upon them.¹²

The readiness to think through the implications of the nuclear arms race does not imply that the Soviet Union would willingly embark on general nuclear war with the West. Very much the reverse. Marxist-Leninist theory asserts that the *initiation*¹³ of war as a deliberate act of policy can only be justified if (1) the Soviet Union is virtually certain of winning, and (2) the gains clearly outweigh the cost.¹⁴ War with the West meets neither of these criteria. Communist theory and Soviet national interests coincide in this matter, and it is widely accepted by students of the Soviet Union that the prevention and avoidance of world war is a prime objective of Soviet foreign

9. I am not in disagreement with Garthoff and Ermarth, both of whom stress that deterrence has long been a central concept of Soviet defense policy (*International Security*, Summer 1978, pp. 121-123 and Fall 1978, p. 145, respectively). The point being made here is that although both sides rely on deterring the other, their concepts of how best to *achieve* such deterrence have been very different.

10. See T. W. Wolfe, "Soviet Strategic Policy" in *SND*, pp. 73-4.

11. The initial location of ABM systems illustrates the very different policies and priorities which flow from the different assumptions. The Soviet Union sought to protect Moscow, its center of government, whereas the USA sought to protect the ICBM fields, its "assured response".

12. See Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978, pp. 112-147.

13. This term does not cover launching a pre-emptive attack to weaken or prevent an inevitable enemy assault.

14. P. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality*, Routledge, Kegan Paul (1975). For a summary version see "The Soviet View of War," *SND*, p. 17-18.

policy. In fact, Malenkov and Khrushchev both expressed the opinion that there could be no winners in nuclear war, and at different times they both advocated some form of deterrence policy, as a means of reducing expenditure on defense. Neither of them was successful because the security-conscious collective leadership was unwilling to base the defense of the homeland on an unproven theoretical construct.

In his book *Military Strategy*, Sokolovskij did not discuss the Soviet strategic delivery capability in terms of "deterrent forces," but in terms of war fighting. He states that "strategic operation of a future nuclear war will comprise the coordinated operation of the branches of the armed forces, and will be conducted according to a common concept or plan . . . The main forces of such an operation will be strategic nuclear weapons . . ." ¹⁵ In discussing such nuclear missile attacks, he says that "the basic aim of this type of operation is to undermine the military power of the enemy by eliminating the nuclear means of fighting and formations of the armed forces, and eliminating the military-economic potential by destroying the economic foundations of the war, and by disrupting governmental and military control." ¹⁶ This is war-fighting with nuclear weapons.

Inevitably, such a war would be a "world war," which Marxist-Leninist theory defines as a fight to the finish between the socialist and capitalist systems; defeat would be synonymous with extinction, and victory with survival. ¹⁷ It is the catastrophic consequence of defeat which explains why, despite the admittedly low probability of such a war occurring, preparations to fight and win one are given such high priority within the Soviet Union. But, for victory in such circumstances to have any meaning, it is necessary to ensure the continued existence of (1) some kind of governmental apparatus, and (2) a social and economic base on which to rebuild a Socialist society. These minimum essential requirements, coupled with the concept of a fight to the finish, provide the framework for Soviet military doctrine.

On the evidence available, it seems likely that contingency plans to cover the possibility of world war provide for two equally important sets of objectives. The first set focuses on *extirpating the capitalist system*, the aims being to:

15. V. D. Sokolovskij, *Voenaya Strategiya* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 346-47. Explicit statements concerning the targets of strategic systems remained unchanged in the 1962, 1963, and 1968 editions.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 349.

17. P. Vigor, *op. cit.*, SND, p. 22.

1. Destroy enemy forces-in-being.
2. Destroy the system's war-making potential.
3. Destroy the system's structure of government and social control.

The second set of objectives focuses on *preserving the socialist system*, the aims being to:

1. Protect the physical structure of government and secure its capacity for effective operation throughout the state.
2. Ensure the survival of a certain proportion of the working population and of the nation's industrial base.
3. Secure an alternative economic base which can contribute to the rebuilding of society.

It is clear that the measures required to destroy certain types of enemy forces-in-being will simultaneously further the second set of objectives, by limiting the enemy's capacity to wreak destruction on the Soviet homeland. Other implications of these dual sets of objectives are perhaps less obvious.

—First, operations in NATO Europe. These come primarily under the *second* set of objectives, because of Western Europe's potential as an alternative economic base on which to help rebuild the socialist system. This has two corollaries: (1) Western Europe must be taken over,¹⁸ and (2) battle damage must be kept to the minimum. While it will be necessary to destroy those NATO forces-in-being which can strike at Russia, and to establish effective control throughout the area, the strategy is to limit the extent of devastation through selective weapons' policies, restricting military operations to essential areas, and using the diplomatic tools of bribery, blackmail and coercion to their fullest extent. The concept of operations therefore avoids "meat-grinder" tactics except where essential to break through the main battle front. The emphasis is on high mobility and deep penetration, on the ability to seize and hold areas in the enemy's rear, and on the extensive use of chemical rather than explosive weapons.

18. In strict war-fighting terms, it would be simpler, more certain, and more cost-effective to ravage Europe with nuclear weapons, as is clearly planned for North America. However, the Soviet military posture in Eastern Europe, Warsaw Pact exercise scenarios, and Soviet military pronouncements, all indicate a rapid advance into NATO Europe. Planning to seize this area only makes military sense if it is intended to make subsequent use of the territory and its resources. Those who argue that the present Soviet military posture indicates an intention to seize Europe in circumstances *other* than in a world war, ignore their Marxist-Leninist theory and the importance of the cost/benefit calculus. The occupation of Europe can only be expected to yield benefits in the surreal circumstances of a world war, which the Soviet leadership has been unable to avoid.

—Second, Western sea-based strategic delivery systems. When Polaris first became operational, its most vaunted characteristic was its invulnerability which (in deterrence theory) provided for an “assured response.” But from the Soviet point of view, the more important implication of this invulnerability was that these missiles could be held back from the initial nuclear exchange, with the fair certainty that they would remain available for use at a subsequent stage of the war. So, too, could carrier-based nuclear-strike aircraft.¹⁹ What was more, the United States appeared to be shifting its emphasis from land- to sea-based systems; to quote Gorshkov, one third of the West’s nuclear inventory was seaborne in 1966, and by 1971 the proportion would have reached one half.²⁰ These developments bore directly on the Soviet Union’s strategy of using Western Europe as an alternative economic base for the rebuilding of the socialist system. If Western seabased systems were withheld from the initial exchange, they would be available to deny Russia this use of Europe.

—Third, strategic reserves. Largely ignored by nuclear deterrence theory, the requirement for strategic reserves is integral to the concept of war-fighting with nuclear weapons. No one can foretell the course of such a conflict, but Soviet strategy must assume that the availability of nuclear weapons may be critical at certain stages. It must also assume that sole possession of a substantial capability is likely to determine the final outcome of the war and the political structure of the post-war world. The West has sea-based systems which can be withheld from the initial exchange, and the Soviet Union must at least match this capability for deferred strikes. But the Soviet requirement for strategic reserves goes beyond this basic requirement. By definition, world war is a struggle between social *systems* and the Soviet Union’s potential opponents are not limited to members of the NATO alliance, but extend throughout the world, at least to include the OECD countries and America’s military protectorates. Although there is no direct equivalent to the targets which an occupied Europe would offer the United States,²¹ Soviet strategy must allow that the conflict will become global,²² and provide against the emergence of capitalist power-bases outside the NATO area.

19. This was not just Soviet paranoia. A senior NATO Commander gave this as his policy in 1961.

20. *Morskoj sbornik* (henceforth *Msb*), May, 1966, p. 9; February, 1967, p. 16.

21. Europe only becomes a U.S. target zone once it has been occupied by the Soviets. Canada (and perhaps parts of Mexico) would be included in the Soviets’ initial strike plan.

22. Gorshkov stresses the global character of a future world war, but his statements can be read as referring to SSBN operating areas, rather than their targets on land. C. G. Gorshkov *Morskaya moshch’ gosudarstvo*, Moscow, 1976, p. 363.

—Fourth, China. Russia may hope that in a fight to the finish between capitalism and socialism, China would take its side. Nevertheless, Soviet contingency planners must assume that world war may also mean war with China. If Russia is to avoid being irrevocably committed to automatically devastating China at the outbreak of a world war²³ and thereby forfeiting the possibility of an alliance, then the nuclear weapons required to cover the contingency of war with China (or to compel its neutrality), must be of a kind that can survive nuclear strikes by the West.

—And fifth, strategic infrastructure. A world war will be fought mainly with the weapons and material that exist at the outset, and combat endurance will depend heavily on prepositioned stockpiles. Most of these need to be readily available to the main engagement zones²⁴, but in view of the global scale of conflict, stockpiles are also required in distant parts of the world. One way of achieving this is to supply a client state with more arms than it can absorb;²⁵ another is to acquire base and storage areas overseas.²⁶ The strategic infrastructure includes the *existence* of the physical facilities which will be required to gain access to distant areas and to sustain wartime operations there. Control of such facilities is not essential prior to the outbreak of the war, and where key pieces are missing from the strategic map (ports, airfields, roads), these can be provided in peacetime under the guise of economic aid.²⁷ Meanwhile, the growing possibility of war with China adds another dimension to this requirement.

The Genesis of Contemporary Military Doctrine

The essential framework of contemporary military doctrine appears to have crystalized during 1961. This of course was before the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was a by-product of the process and not its cause, although the

23. This could well be present policy, as the only way of ensuring that China does not emerge from the war stronger than Russia.

24. Leonard Sullivan observes that this would explain the stockpiling of superseded weapons and equipment in forward areas, after units have been re-equipped with more modern arms.

25. This idea was prompted by Avigdor Haselkorn "The Evolution of the Soviet Collective Security System." However, he sees such arms as being intended for redeployment to other client states in "peacetime" conflict situations.

26. The facilities established in Somalia were capable of supporting a much larger Soviet force than has operated in the Indian Ocean so far.

27. Development of the fishing port at Gwadar in Baluchistan, 100 miles from the Pakistan-Iranian border could be an example of such a strategy. The recent coup in Afghanistan lends pertinence to this idea.

outcome of the crisis would have served to reinforce the policy decisions which had already been taken.

The most interesting aspect of this framework was that it represented a significant step back from the new direction in Soviet defense policy which appears to have been agreed by the end of 1959, and which Khrushchev announced in January, 1960.²⁸ This included the formation of the Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), its designation as the primary arm of the nation's defense, and the cutting back of conventional ground forces. Given Khrushchev's faith in nuclear missiles and his belief that nuclear war would be suicidal for both sides, the new policy could only indicate a shift in emphasis toward the Western concept of nuclear deterrence, and away from the traditional reliance on balanced forces and a war-fighting capability.

It is important to identify the reason for this reversal of tack, which was not just a return to traditional military values, but involved a thorough reappraisal of what was involved in war-fighting with nuclear weapons, and the development of a whole series of consequential policies. It is too facile to answer that this backtracking reflected the strength of opposition from the ground forces. The policy announced in January, 1960 was the outcome of a thorough-going defense review which appears to have taken at least two years,²⁹ and included a substantial reorganization of military research and development, the constitution of a new branch of the armed forces, and an overall cut in their numbers. This process could only have taken place with, and through, the armed forces, who would have been closely involved in the shape of the final package. Doubtless there were disagreements with the political leadership on matters of substance, but one way or another military acceptance would have been secured; it was, after all, only three years since Zhukov's ouster. It is most unlikely that Khrushchev would have gone public with such a fundamental policy statement unless he had the support to secure its implementation, and the timing suggests that the policy was ratified at the December Plenum of the Central Committee.³⁰ Moreover, what rumblings there were in the military press focused on problems caused by the premature retirement of regular officers and the lack of suitable job

28. *Pravda*, 14 January 1960.

29. In 1958, Admiral Gorshkov solicited the opinions of Commanding Officers of Baltic Fleet units as to the future nature of warfare.

30. See J. McDonnell, "The Organisation of Soviet Defence and Military Policy Making" in *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (henceforth SNI), McGwire and McDonnell (eds.), Praeger, 1977, p. 64, where the year is misprinted as 1958.

opportunities; they were not primarily concerned with questions of high strategy.

The change of tack during 1961 represented a serious reversal of Khrushchev's efforts to emphasize a nuclear deterrent capability and reduce expenditure on the ground forces;³¹ it vindicated those who had argued that professional military opinion should prevail in matters of national defense. Only a change in threat perception can plausibly explain such a major shift in the recently established balance of opinion within the leadership. We can, however, rule out as proximate causes the growing conflict with China, the U-2 incident and consequential failure of the Paris summit, and the confrontation over Berlin and the East German peace treaty, since their roots all antedate the 1960 announcement. The only *new* development which could have engendered such a reevaluation of the threat and prompted the various measures which can be dated to this period, were the policy decisions made by President Kennedy shortly after taking office.

These measures included a sharp acceleration of the Polaris program³² and a doubling of the planned production rate of solid-fuel ICBM, which would be deployed in underground silos remote from existing centers of population. In other words, there was to be a very rapid increase in the numbers of missiles and their invulnerability. Perhaps equally important in terms of Soviet threat perceptions was the crusading rhetoric of the new Administration, with its willingness to go any place, pay any price, and the detached logic of the tough-minded academic strategists who were thinking the unthinkable, and developing theories of limited nuclear war. In the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the Soviet leadership decided that they could not rely on nuclear deterrence, despite its economic attractions, and applied themselves instead to the problems of fighting and winning a nuclear war, the likelihood of which appeared to have increased.

Traditional policy was reaffirmed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky, in his speech at the 22nd Party Congress in October, 1961. The 1962 edition of Sokolovski's *Military Strategy* was cleared for typesetting five months later, and the fact that a substantially revised edition of the book

31. It is noteworthy that Khrushchev returns to this theme in the final section of his memoirs, when he refers to the infantry as "the fat of the armed forces". *Khrushchev Remembers*, Little, Brown (Bantam), 1976, p. 612.

32. Between 1958-1960, fourteen Polaris submarines had been authorized. On taking office, President Kennedy authorized a further twenty-seven, of which fifteen were to start building within six months.

appeared in just over a year³³ suggests that the earlier version was prepared in some haste. Equally significant was the unprecedented decision to make the book publicly available, thus ensuring that the West was left in no doubt that the Soviet Union was prepared to wage nuclear war if need be.³⁴ This served to articulate the *Soviet* concept of deterrence and gave notice that Russia would not be intimidated by the build-up of U.S. strategic forces. The build-up was remarked on in the first edition of Sokolovski, which quoted from President Kennedy's message to Congress on 28 March 1961. The second edition had a table showing the sharp jump in ICBM from 200 at the beginning of 1963 to 1190 by the end of 1966, and noted that Minutemen would be emplaced in silos.

The most clear-cut policy response was the major reorganization of civil defense which was initiated in mid-1961. Responsibility was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to a central headquarters located in the Ministry of Defense.³⁵ This was headed by Marshal Chuikov, a Deputy Minister of Defense and CinC of the Ground Forces, an appointment he retained.³⁶ Civil defense was thus firmly established as a military problem, and part of the Soviet Union's warfighting posture. There continues to be heavy military participation in this nation-wide system, in terms of staff appointments throughout the country and of specialized military civil defense units.

A second policy response was the navy's move forward in strategic defense against the West's seabased delivery systems. The first substantial Soviet naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea took place in June, 1961 and became an annual event thereafter. In January, 1962, there appeared the first of a series of articles and statements rehabilitating the role of the much-maligned surface

33. See Harriet Fast Scott's invaluable source of reference, *Military Strategy (Third Edition); a translation analysis and commentary, and comparison with previous editions* (Stanford Research Institute, January, 1971). The different editions were cleared for typesetting and released to the press as follows: 1962-3/62, 4/62; 1963-4/63, 8/63; 1968-11/66, 11/67.

34. Hindsight suggests this simple explanation, which focuses on the *availability* of the book, rather than its publication. The book forms part of a substantial body of military literature which had previously been restricted to an official/professional Soviet readership, and was not publicly available, least of all to the West. Revised editions of these various books are published as required. For example, there have been three editions of *History of Naval Art* (1953, 1963, and 1969), but only the last one was made publicly available.

35. It is perhaps relevant that three months earlier (in May, 1961), responsibility for Civil Defense within the United States had been transferred to the Department of Defense.

36. Chuikov took over as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in 1960 and retained the title until it lapsed in August, 1964. He was appointed Chief of Civil Defense 17 August 1961 and remained in the job until he retired in 1972.

forces.³⁷ In February, 1962, Admiral Kasatanov, who had followed Gorshkov as CinC Black Sea Fleet in 1955, and would later join Gorshkov in Moscow as First Deputy CinC of the navy in 1964, took over the Northern Fleet, which was slated to play a key role in the shift to forward deployment. At about this same period, the decision would have had to have been taken to change the planned configuration-mix of the new generation of nuclear submarines (due to begin delivery at the end of 1967), to provide six SSBN a year. This represented a reversal of the decision to remove the mission of intercontinental strike from the navy.³⁸

A third development which clearly can be tied to the U.S. ICBM program was the shift in Soviet targeting philosophy from one of area devastation to a primary emphasis on counter-force point targeting. The initial trend in Soviet warhead development was to ever larger sizes. The 5 MT SS-7 and -8, whose warhead was probably tested in 1958, the missile being deployed in 1961-62;³⁹ the 25 MT SS-9 whose warhead was tested in September, 1961, the missile being deployed in 1966; and weapons in the 25-100 MT range, whose development was claimed in 1961 but which did not go into production.⁴⁰ The trend was then broken abruptly, and the 1 MT SS-11 began deployment in 1966. At the same time, the annual production of ICBM rose from about 60 to 260 a year and ran for four years at this rate, thus matching the tempo and duration of the Minuteman build-up.⁴¹

The original policy of using large warheads to achieve area devastation

37. See R. W. Herrick *Soviet Naval Strategy* (U.S. Naval Institute, 1968) pp. 72-74.

38. The decision to double nuclear submarine production from five to six to about ten per annum would have been taken in 1957/58. The exact date when the navy lost its strategic strike missions is uncertain, but would have been at about that period, by which time the inadequacies of the submarine strike force must have been apparent. Evidence of a subsequent change in the projected configuration-mix away from attack submarines in favor of SSBNs is provided by aberrations in the building programmes. See my "Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons Development" in *SNP*, pp. 429-432.

39. There was an accelerated test schedule in the fall of 1958, immediately preceding the test ban talks, which included explosions in the MT range. A. Kramish *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford University Press, 1959) p. 126.

40. Warning of the impending tests was given by *Pravda* 31 August 1961. Explosions of at least 25MT were detected by the West and these included the testing of a triggering device for what was reputed to be a 100MT warhead. See R. M. Slusser *The Berlin Crisis of 1961* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1973) pp. 183-203.

41. For a portrayal of this lagged matching reaction, see Table 27.1 in my "Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy 1955-70" in *SNP*, p. 494. Deployment dates and numbers have been refined subsequently by John McDonnell (Doctoral thesis in progress) and Robert Berman and John Baker (*Soviet Strategic Weapon Systems*, Brookings Institution, forthcoming), but their findings support the hypothesis in my original article.

took care of the full range of targets and can be seen as the most cost-effective means of meeting Soviet requirements, as the latter would have appeared in the period 1953-58.⁴² As such, the policy was a natural extension of traditional war-fighting doctrine. The decision not to persist with that targeting philosophy, but to adopt the much more costly one of matching the American ICBM build-up with an equivalent counterforce capability, clearly rejected the option of placing primary emphasis on nuclear deterrence, which the existing trend of development would have allowed.

As for other developments around this period, the escalation of the Berlin crisis can be seen as an effort to achieve Soviet objectives regarding East Germany before the balance of forces swung heavily against the Soviet Union. Similarly, Cuba can be seen as an ingenious attempt to mitigate the impending massive disparity in ICBM, by emplacing IRBM within range of the United States. In military terms, the success of both these ventures would have brought substantial gains, while nothing would have been lost if they failed. It would seem, however, that his successful orchestration of the long-drawn out Berlin crisis made Khrushchev over-confident of his ability to control the level of tension over Cuba. The nuclear testing which took place in September, 1961 cannot, however, be tied to the Kennedy initiatives. It is true that these tests became inevitable once it was clear that the United States was embarking on another round in the arms race. But they represented an essential stage in the existing Soviet weapons development program and, Kennedy or not, there would have been tremendous pressure to breach the test moratorium at this particular juncture.

The Navy as a Branch of the Armed Forces

Having established the general background we can now turn to consider the Soviet navy as a branch of the armed forces. It is fair to say that since the early twenties, the Soviet leadership has demonstrated a sustained awareness of the requirement for maritime defense. Stalin and Khrushchev both took a personal interest in naval matters, and given the geo-strategic circumstances and the scale of competing priorities, the navy appears to have had at least its fair share of scarce resources. The basic procurement and strategic policies have been well founded, if not always fully successful.

Stalin recognized the need for four operationally independent fleets and

42. *SNP*, pp. 492-497.

established the Pacific Fleet in 1932 and the Northern Fleet in 1933;⁴³ he sought to ensure their self-sufficiency by providing each with its own naval construction facilities, located at some distance from the open sea to be safe from enemy seizure. These two shipyards at Komsomol'sk, on the Amur, and Severodvinsk, on the White Sea, are now the two premier nuclear submarine building yards. He also set out to link the three Western fleets by inland waterway and established a submarine building yard at Gor'kij on the Volga, which was able to continue production throughout World War II. Curvatures on the Trans-Siberian Railway were calculated to allow the shipment of submarines (whole and in sections) to the Pacific by rail.

After the war, when the Soviet Union was faced by the "traditional maritime powers" the leadership responded with mass-production warship building programs to cover the threat of invasion, and the allocation of nuclear reactors to submarines intended for strategic delivery. It is true that when the threat of seaborne invasion was downgraded in 1954, there were savage cuts in conventional warship construction, but this was partly justified by the availability of long range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). And, when a new threat to the homeland emerged in the shape of seaborne nuclear strike systems, the leadership responded by doubling the production of nuclear submarines. Military publications acknowledge the importance of the navy's role. The 1962 edition of *Military Strategy* emphasized the great changes in maritime warfare since World War II, and stressed that in future war the navy's primary theater of operations would be the open ocean and that it must not be tied to ground force theaters of operation. Writing in 1971, Marshal Grechko noted that maritime combat was achieving a special significance and that navies could have an enormous impact on the entire course of a future war.⁴⁴

Of course there is a difference between what the navy thinks it ought to have and what the national leadership finds "reasonable" in the face of competing priorities. We have seen that the naval establishment lost its case in 1954-55, but it appears to have been more successful in 1960-64, during the debate which stemmed from the introduction of the new defense policy in January, 1960, and its subsequent modification in the wake of the Kennedy initiatives. Disagreement seems to have focused on the navy's role in nuclear

43. The Pacific Fleet was called "Far East Naval Forces" until January, 1935. The Northern Fleet was called "Northern Naval Flotilla" until May, 1937.

44. A. A. Grechko "The Fleet of our Homeland" *Msb*, July, 1971.

war,⁴⁵ with an extreme faction arguing that a fleet was no longer necessary, even in its traditional role of supporting the army ashore, and that land-based missiles could deal with enemy surface groups, and even with submerged submarines.⁴⁶ From its side, the navy was arguing that the threat from Polaris was being under-estimated, that the role of surface ships was being under-emphasized, and that undue reliance had been placed on ground and rocket forces to the neglect of other means of warfare.⁴⁷ However, by mid-1964 the threat from Polaris had been acknowledged as being the navy's first priority,⁴⁸ and the warship building programs provided explicit recognition of the surface ship's role, if perhaps not as generously as the navy might have wished.

In the opinion of many analysts, myself included, naval interests were again heavily engaged during 1969-73, in the wide-ranging debate about foreign and domestic policy, and about the dangers of war and the future roles of the armed services.⁴⁹ The initial evidence of naval involvement came from the series of eleven articles published during 1972-73 over Gorshkov's name in *Morskoy sbornik* under the title "Navies in War and Peace."⁵⁰ These articles were rich in information and contained a strong element of "educating the fleet," but the dominant tone was one of advocacy and justification, which extended beyond the contention that the Soviet Union needed a powerful navy for use in both peace and war, to criticisms of the formulation of naval policy and the composition of the fleet. The facts that halfway through the series *Morskoy sbornik* began to encounter unprecedented delays in being released to the press by the military censors (delays which extended

45. For a summary of this debate see H. Ullman "The Counter Polaris Task" in *SNP*, pp. 586-590; also D. Cox "Sea Power and Soviet Foreign Policy", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, June, 1969, p. 59.

46. S. G. Gorshkov "Razvitie Sovetskogo Voenno Morskogo Isskusstva", *Msb*, February, 1967, pp. 19-20. Gorshkov places this controversy in the middle fifties; but so too does he place the decisions which underlie the present structure of the navy, which clearly originate from a later period, although he would like to tie them to his appointment as C in C. This kind of argument is likely to have persisted throughout the later fifties, until resolved in the early sixties.

47. For a clear exposition of the navy viewpoint see V. A. Alafuzov "On the appearance of the work *Military Strategy*", *Msb*, January, 1963, pp. 88-96. Admiral Alafuzov had been Chief of the Main Naval Staff during the war.

48. V. D. Sokolovskij and M. I. Cherednichenko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 25 and 28 August 1964.

49. For evidence of this wider debate see Marshall Shulman's "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," *SNP*, pp. 8-10 (also published at greater length as "Towards a Western Philosophy of Co-existence" in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1973); also John Erickson, "Soviet Defence Policy and Naval Interests," *SNP*, p. 60.

50. *Msb*, 1972, Numbers 2-6, 8-12; 1973, No. 2.

into 1974), and that during the same period there were major turnovers of the journal's editorial board (again unprecedented), were seen as confirming the textual evidence of conflict.⁵¹

There are, however, other analysts who consider that the articles were authoritative. This is not an abstruse academic disputation, because the alternative assessments lead to very different conclusions concerning many important aspects of Soviet military policy. One particular school of thought considers that the articles represented a "concrete expression of doctrine,"⁵² and their purpose was to announce a Soviet political decision to withhold submarine-launched missiles from the initial strikes, in order to carry out deterrence in war, conduct inter-war bargaining, and influence the peace talks at the end of the war. The later analyses of this school use quotations from Gorshkov's book *Seapower and the State*⁵³ to support this viewpoint, making the tacit assumption that the articles served as the book's precursor.

The latter assumption is open to serious question. There was a three year hiatus between publication of the last article and the appearance of the book (32 months between typesetting dates), and while this is not the place for a detailed comparison of the two publications, it can be asserted that there are substantial differences between them in length, scope, coverage and the balance between topics.⁵⁴ Among the more obvious differences is the much

51. Publication anomalies were first identified by R. Weinland; see "Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's Navies in War and Peace", *SNP*, pp. 558-565. This analysis was refined and extended by John McDonnell in his "Bibliographic Analysis of *Morskoi sbornik* 1963-75" Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, September, 1977. There is additional circumstantial evidence which points to this same conclusion; see *SNi*, p. 55.

52. Doctrine is here used in its *Soviet* sense, implying authoritativeness. James McConnell is the leading exponent of this viewpoint; see his "Military-Political tasks of the Soviet Navy in War and Peace", pp. 183-209 of "*Soviet Oceans Development*", prepared by John Hardt for the Senate "National Oceans Policy Study" (henceforth *SOD*), US GPO, October, 1967. My "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy" in the same publication includes a rejoinder to the advocacy argument; See Apps. B and C, pp. 167-182. For a later exposition of McConnell's analysis see "The Gorshkov articles, the new Gorshkov book, and their relation to Policy" in *SNi*, pp. 565-620.

53. *Morskaya Moshch' Gosudarstva*, Moscow, 1976. Cleared for typesetting 1 August 1975; released to the press 27 November 1975.

54. The book comprises some 151,000 words, the articles about 54,000. The subject matter of about 80 percent of the articles is historical and is covered by Chapter II which comprises only 35 percent of the book; there has been substantial revision of this material from the articles including rewording, additions and omissions. Only a small part of the remaining 20 percent of the articles can be compared directly with material in the book. For example, the book devotes almost 11,000 words to marine transportation and the Soviet merchant fleet, whereas the articles cover the subject in seventy-five words. Some 45 percent of the book is concerned with the development of navies after the war. (Chapter III), and the art of naval warfare (Ch. IV), compared with only 16 percent of the articles.

greater attention paid to the non-naval elements of sea power; the articles treat these cursorily, whereas the book devotes 20 percent of its length to these aspects. Emphasis on marine transportation is particularly noticeable, and extends to injecting material on the Soviet merchant fleet into the section on World War II.

Although further research is needed, there is a strong case for concluding that *Seapower of the State* is the outcome of a compromise between major interests involved in the wider ranging debate which prompted (and enabled) the publication of the Gorshkov series. The latter presented a powerful argument. The dominant theme was the importance of naval forces as an instrument of state policy in peacetime and as a means of influencing the course and outcome of wars of all kinds; furthermore, this importance was increasing. Seapower was a necessary adjunct to great power status, which could not be sustained without a powerful fleet. But naval forces had to be shaped in response to specific requirements, and this demanded a conscious policy concerning the role of seapower in each nation's plans. Gorshkov asserted that the Soviet Union lacked such a policy. In consequence, the Soviet Union had an unbalanced fleet that was deficient in surface ships, both as to numbers and range of types, and the navy had been shaped too closely to a single, restrictive and largely defensive mission. If the Soviet Union was to exploit the potential of seapower as an instrument of policy, it must have a greatly improved world-wide capability. It certainly had the economic and industrial capacity to build and sustain such a fleet.⁵⁵

On a more specific note, Gorshkov, writing at the end of 1971, strongly opposed any weakening of Russia's position in the Eastern Mediterranean, whether through some kind of mutual agreement with the United States, or by withdrawing Soviet forces from Egypt, which would imperil the navy's access to Egyptian ports and airfields. The growing probability of such a withdrawal may well have been the precipitating cause of the series' publication.⁵⁶

The Gorshkov series provided a valuable insight to Soviet naval require-

55. For a convenient version of the analysis underlying this summary, see *SOD*, pp. 79-132. An edited version of my initial but more comprehensive analysis, May, 1973, appears in *Admiral Gorshkov on "Navies in War and Peace"* (Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, CRC 252, September, 1974), which also contains analyses by R. Weinland and J. McConnell.

56. Some 10 percent of the series is devoted to the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The second article (cleared for typesetting in January, 1972), includes a chapter, "The Russians in the Mediterranean," which is nominally about the period prior to 1855, but speaks clearly and at length about the strategic importance and political legitimacy of the present-day Soviet naval

ments. But the 54,000 words of sustained argument also provided a window on the wider debate and allowed certain inferences as to how opinion divided on particular issues, mainly in terms of attitudes but sometimes in terms of institutions and interests.⁵⁷ The listings (which are *not* intended to portray coalitions) are too complex to summarize here, but it is relevant to this discussion that among the inferred opponents to Gorshkov's advocacy were those who believed that the probability of world war continued to be high, that military power had limited utility as an instrument of state policy outside the Soviet Bloc, and that Soviet/U.S. confrontation risked escalation. The Merchant Fleet was inferred as an opposing institution⁵⁸ and Grechko was one of two individuals identified in the analysis by name.⁵⁹

Grechko's opposition was inferred from his article "The Fleet of the Homeland," published in the 1971 Navy Day issue of *Morskoi sbornik*, following the 24th Party Congress.⁶⁰ Grechko does not play down the Soviet Union's very real requirement for a navy, or its vital role in the country's defense. But his initial discussion covers all branches of the armed forces, the nuclear submarines being bracketed with the SRF. The emphasis is on the navy in war and on deterring attack on Russia. An article in *Morskoi sbornik* by the Minister of Defense on this occasion was itself unusual, but more importantly, the tone and substance read very differently to what appeared subsequently in the Gorshkov series. Further evidence that Gorshkov and Grechko had divergent viewpoints was provided by the latter's booklet *On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism*, which claims a direct link with the decisions of the 24th Party Congress.⁶¹ It placed primary emphasis on

presence in the area. Gorshkov returns to discuss the Mediterranean (and its contemporary significance) throughout the series, and it is the only area to have a chapter of its own.

57. See SOD, pp. 127-129. This tabulation was prepared in May, 1973 (i.e., 2-3 years before the book's appearance), on the basis of the initial analysis.

58. Hence the significance of the differences in the book's structure, favoring maritime transportation. See note 54.

59. The other was Brezhnev. His opposition to certain aspects of the articles was inferred from the fact that Gorshkov not only ignored his June, 1971 proposal for mutual restrictions on naval operations, but advanced a contrary line of argument, particularly as regards the Mediterranean.

60. *Msb*, July, 1971. Exercise OKEAN '70 is described as demonstrating the navy's readiness to repel attacks on Russia and to launch its own strikes. Only submarines, naval aviation, and the landings in the arctic receive special mention, with submarines singled out for a paragraph on their own. The non-mention of surface ships, by far the most numerous component in the exercise, seems pointed. Reference to U.S. imperialism is limited to South East Asia, Soviet support being limited to "fraternal aid".

61. A. A. Grechko, *Na Strazhe Mira i Stroitel'stva Kommunistizma* (Moscow, 1971). A 112 page booklet designed for a "broad range of readers" that "describes the great historical mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the increased tasks posed for them . . . by the 24th CPSU Congress."

combat readiness and discussed the Soviet Union's international commitments only in terms of other socialist states. This approach was poles apart from the argument in the Gorshkov series (which was written in the wake of the Party Congress but did *not* claim direct links with its decisions), for an assertive overseas policy based on military power, and for the navy's unique qualifications as an instrument of state policy in peacetime. Lying somewhere between the two viewpoints is *Military Force and International Relations* edited by Kulish. This book is linked explicitly to the Party Congress and would seem to reflect most accurately the Congress' endorsement of an expansion of the "internationalist function" of the Soviet armed forces. It discusses the increasing importance of a "Soviet military presence" in distant regions, but while it gives due attention to the navy's role (including mention of the Mediterranean squadron) it is concerned with the problem of strategic mobility and the more general requirement for "mobile and well trained and well equipped forces."⁶²

It seems possible that Gorshkov's opponents intended to rebut his arguments through a series of articles on military theoretical problems in *Krasnaya zvezda*. The series was announced in April, 1973 under the general title "The Defense of Socialism. Questions of Theory," but ceased without explanation after the second article in May, 1973.⁶³ This coincided with the temporary lifting of censorship delays on *Morskoj sbornik* and can be seen as an imposed truce, which may have been connected with the appointment of Grechko to the Politbureau in late April.⁶⁴

A compromise seems to have been reached by mid-1974. In an article published in May, Grechko acknowledged that the "historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not restricted merely to . . . defending the homeland and other socialist states" and that their external function had now been "expanded and enriched with new content."⁶⁵ This brought him into line

62. V. V. Kulish, *Voenmaya Sila i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 135-137.

63. Lt. Gen. I. Zavyalov "The Creative Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine", April 19; Maj. Gen. A. Milovidov "A Philosophical Analysis of Military Thought", May 17, 1973. Neither article addressed Gorshkov's arguments directly but both took issue with some aspect of what he said. Zavyalov stressed the primacy of political factors and the fundamental position of the political content of military doctrine. Milovidov emphasized that you cannot take examples from one historical period to support arguments in the contemporary period, which is, of course, what Gorshkov did.

64. This was the first time since Zhukov's ouster in 1957 that a professional military officer was co-opted onto the highest party body. Gromyko (Foreign Affairs) and Andropov (KGB) joined the Politbureau on the same date.

65. A. A. Grechko "The leading role of the CPSU in building the army of a developed Socialist Society", *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, May, 1974, pp. 38-39. Weinland has compared this with earlier

with the policies endorsed by the 24th Party Congress.⁶⁶ In July, Gorshkov acknowledged that the main naval mission in war was coming to be operations against targets on land, rather than combatting the enemy fleet.⁶⁷ He thus accepted the formal prioritization of missions which the military leadership appears to have been trying to enforce since 1966-67.

Compromise does not of course mean the end of disagreement. With this in mind, we can turn to consider the implications of three new and important sections of Gorshkov's book, which are headed "Fleet against Fleet and Fleet against Shore," "Problems of Balancing Navies," and "Command of the Sea."

Naval Dissatisfactions

There is unlikely to have been any dispute over the absolute (as opposed to relative) importance of the fleet-against-shore mission. The Soviet navy had led the world in developing submarine launched ballistic missiles, and it was the navy which had argued within the defense establishment that the threat from Polaris was being under-estimated. Throughout the 1960s, naval writing emphasized the fundamental nature of these technological developments and discussed their implications in terms of naval warfare.

Disagreement appears to have been (and continues to be) centered on the relevance to modern war of the navy's traditional role and of general purpose naval forces. Evidence of attempts by the military establishment to downgrade this role can be seen in the 1968 edition of *Military Strategy*, which placed the SSBN force on a par with the SRF.⁶⁸ For navies in general, it added the mission of "nuclear strikes against objects on the continents . . . and the active search for enemy naval forces, and their destruction . . .," but *deleted* from the section on structuring the armed forces the sentence:

pronouncements, including a comparable article in *Kommunist*, May 1973, and concludes there was a distinct shift in emphasis. See *SNP*, p. 569.

66. J. McDonnell notes that Grechko's 1974 article followed the same general line as one by A. A. Yepishev (Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces) in *Moguchee Oruzhie Partii*, which was released to the press at the end of 1972.

67. "Soviet National Seapower", *Pravda* July 28, 1974. One is tempted to tie Admiral Kasatanov's retirement in October, 1974 to this compromise, for the reasons given in my initial analysis (note 55 above).

68. This reflected the imminent availability of the Yankee SSBN. Additions and deletions are by comparison with the 1963 edition. See Harriet Fast Scott (*Op. Cit.*, note 33), pp. 235; 240-243; 319; 308, respectively. In the 1968 Russian edition, pp. 235; 240-243; 330; 308.

"Hence, the principal mission of our navy in modern war will be combat with enemy forces at sea and in their bases."

While the primary importance of the navy's strike and counter-strike missions is always acknowledged, this downgrading of the traditional role was not matched in contemporary naval publications.⁶⁹ Indeed, *The Combat Path of the Soviet Navy*, a book that went to typesetting the month after Gorshkov's final article, asserts that the navy must carry out "active operations" against enemy sea lines of communications, and goes on to say: "Nor will such tasks as the destruction of enemy surface groups, and cooperation with the ground forces on the maritime axes, by means of amphibious landings and other operations, be taken away from the navy."⁷⁰ The Gorshkov series only makes very brief reference to the navy's contribution to strategic strike and to its role in countering Western sea-based systems.⁷¹ The great bulk of his descriptive analysis focuses on the use of general purpose forces in both peacetime and war. He spends a substantial part of the articles demonstrating (by historical analogy) the importance of the traditional wartime role. Some 20 percent of the series is devoted to analyzing non-Russian world-wide naval operations in the two World Wars, and concerning the second one, he concludes that although the war was won in the continental theaters (primarily on the Russian front), naval operations had a significant effect on the general course of the war, and Western operations made an important contribution to the final outcome.

In his last article, Gorshkov does list the three tasks which comprise the navy's basic wartime mission:⁷² (1) contributing to strategic strike; (2) blunting strategic strikes by enemy units; and (3) "participating in the operations conducted by ground forces in the continental theatres of military operations." Apart from their order, Gorshkov does not distinguish between the tasks in importance, but he adds that the third one involves "a large number of complex and major missions." Within the context of the series as a whole, one can infer that he envisages a wide range of operations, comparable to those discharged by navies in World War II. It should also be noted that in *Combat Path of the Soviet Navy* (which was under preparation at the time of

69. For example, *Istoriya Voenno-Morskogo Iskusstva* (Moscow, 1969), p. 561.

70. *Bevoj put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota* (Moscow, 1974), p. 492.

71. These are listed and analyzed in Appendix B to my "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy" in *SOD*, p. 167.

72. *Msb*, February, 1973, p. 21.

the Gorshkov series), the tasks of strategic delivery and countering the enemy's naval strike forces are quite specifically assigned equal importance.⁷³

These well entrenched positions, coupled with the concept of *Seapower and the State* as a compromise, help to explain why the section in that book entitled "Fleet against Fleet and Fleet against Shore" pays lip service to the newly agreed priority, but devotes most of its space to illustrating the importance of the traditional naval role. This is achieved first, by extending the definition of fleet-against-shore to include landing operations (355/1)⁷⁴ and attacks on sea lines of communications (361/1-2). Next, by establishing two categories of fleet-against-fleet operations: the "pure" form, intended to gain and maintain command of the sea (352/5, 353/4); and those operations which are "tied to the simultaneous accomplishment of other missions" (352/4). It is then shown that this second category of fleet-against-fleet (which comprises the vast bulk of naval operations—354/2) is in fact supporting operations against the shore. This allows the navy's main objective to be defined as "securing the fulfillment of all missions *related* [emphasis added] to operations against enemy land targets, and to the protection of one's own territory from the attacks of his navy" (354/3). This clearly places attacks on the shore and defense against such attacks on the same level; a later formulation is less explicit, but the full context yields a similar interpretation (360/3-4).⁷⁵

Under the guise of exceptions to the general rule, the book smuggles in numerous examples of traditional naval operations which have had strategic significance (351/2), or have even been *more* important than the battle on land (349/3). The extensive definition of fleet-against-shore operations allows discussion of the traditional roles played by navies in World War II, including the importance of carriers as general purpose forces. But surely the nicest touch is the pointed criticism of Napoleon, who blamed his admirals for repeated failure, whereas the fault really lay with his "inability to make a timely analysis of the French navy's capabilities, and to use it in the struggle with the enemy" (356/3). Napoleon's failure to invade England was not

73. *Boevoj put'* . . . (*op. cit.*), p. 491. The tasks are referred to as "important" and "no less important" respectively.

74. Numbers in brackets refer to page/paragraph of the Russian edition, *Op. Cit.*, note 53.

75. The glaring internal contradiction in paragraph 360/4 is explained by the earlier division of fleet-against-fleet operations into two categories. Use of the term *borba* (cf. 352/5) confirms that the final sentence in this paragraph is referring to the "pure form", intended solely to gain and maintain command.

primarily due to Britain's unchallenged maritime superiority, but to his "one-sided strategy, which stemmed from his preoccupation with operations in the land theaters and his lack of understanding of the navy, his disregard for its capabilities in war, and as a result, his inability to use it in a struggle with a naval power, such as England was at that time" (355/4). The analogy with present day circumstances is striking.⁷⁶

Apparently, Gorshkov is able (with suitable obfuscation) to maintain his advocacy of the navy's wartime role and the continued importance of its traditional mission. It would seem, however, that he has not been able (or willing) to persist in his criticisms of the navy's structural characteristics. It is true that the section entitled "Problems of Balancing Navies" provides a critical analysis of great power fleet structures since 1905 in terms of their capacity to handle the unforeseen demands of war, and it can be inferred from his invariable condemnations that Gorshkov favors maximum flexibility. It is also true that his analysis provides examples that could be used to support almost any argument, and certainly Gorshkov stresses that a future war will be fought with forces-in-being (413/4, 439/5). And, as in his articles, he points to the limiting effect of Germany's concentration on submarines, which was exacerbated by its failure to provide anti-ASW forces for their support (429/1-2). He also puts in a good word for the carrier (443/3). But the more significant aspect is Gorshkov's retreat on what is implied by the term "balanced."

In the articles, the question of balance is touched on briefly, but to some purpose. When analyzing the main types of naval operations in World War II, Gorshkov points out that the task-specific fleets were severely handicapped in comparison with those which had a broad and more balanced capability, capable of carrying out large-scale and strategic-type missions. As unfavorable examples, he cites the German navy, which was virtually limited to attacking sea communications, and the Japanese navy, which had almost no ASW capability. By contrast, the British and American navies were able to carry out "broad strategic missions."⁷⁷ However, in the book, Gorshkov castigates the British and Americans along with the Germans and Japanese, and reverts to the restrictive definition of a "balanced fleet" (413/2), which

76. This analogy is comparable to (but much more pertinent than) the critical remarks in the Gorshkov series about those who fail to understand the significance of sea power. *Msb*, 72/3/20/2-21/2; 72/4/9/1; 22/9.

77. *Msb*, 72/11/32/5; 73/2/20/7-8.

was publicized in 1967.⁷⁸ In that version "balance" denotes the capability to carry out assigned missions in differing circumstances, but says nothing about the mission structure. The meaning which Gorshkov developed in his articles, sees "balance" as stemming from the *choice* of mission, which must be defined in as general terms as possible, in order to exploit the navy's inherent versatility and to allow for unforeseen eventualities. Unquestionably, the definition in the book represents a retreat, but its justification may lie in a change of official attitudes toward the surface ship role. At least, such a change might be inferred from the difference in tone between what he wrote in his final article,⁷⁹ and the comparable statement in the book. The latter notes that "the priority given to the development of the submarine and aircraft . . . presupposes a matching developing of the other arms of naval forces . . .," without which no mission can be successfully completed, and among which surface ships will play the most important role (412/6).

And finally, the section entitled "Command of the Sea." This was the first substantial discussion of the subject in recent years⁸⁰ and Gorshkov was concerned to demonstrate the continuing validity of the concept, rather than how to achieve it. He stresses its uniqueness to the maritime environment (unlike most theoretical categories such as mass, maneuver, etc., which are common to all aspects of military art), and asserts that it is the most "vital concept" in the art of naval warfare. The discussion provides powerful support to the arguments advanced in the other two sections for the continued relevance of the fleet-against-fleet role, and for the importance of general purpose forces, particularly the anti-ASW/pro-SSBN element.

The central theme of Gorshkov's discussion is that developments in nuclear missile war have increased the importance of ensuring local command of the sea in key areas for particular periods of time. The strategic significance of sea-based nuclear delivery systems makes it all the more essential to ensure a "favorable operating regime" for one's own forces. He argues that local

78. *Msb*, 67/2/20, n.1 " . . . able to discharge assigned tasks in both nuclear-missile and conventional war, and also to secure state interests at sea in peacetime."

79. *Msb*, 73/2/20/7-8, 2/21/1. See *SOD*, pp. 116-118 for a discussion of these paragraphs, which read like advocacy, or at least justification.

80. This constitutes a sub-section of "Some Theoretical Questions of Naval Warfare" which, in other respects, reproduces verbatim the greater part of Gorshkov's December, 1974 *Msb* article. "Command of the Sea" is a substantial addition, which takes almost as much space as all the other seven categories together. For a discussion of earlier references to Command of the Sea, see P. Vigor "Soviet Understanding of Command of the Sea", and my "Command of the Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy", in *SNP*, pp. 601-22 and 623-36.

command of the sea is essential to the successful discharge of the navy's primary mission (379/2), and that undoubtedly, the imperialists will seek to wrest such command for themselves at the very outset of war (380/2). Furthermore, gaining command of the sea has always depended on the necessary measures having been taken in time of peace (371/1) and (by implication), the suddenness of nuclear-missile war makes these preparatory measures all the more essential.

The book brings out all the classical advantages of gaining command of the sea, including the fact that the effect of a single engagement on the balance of naval strength will endure for the whole war, and he comes close to explicitly advocating the "pure form" of fleet-against-fleet operations. But two points are of particular interest in terms of Soviet contingency plans. Drawing on Soviet experience in World War II, Gorshkov observes that the occupation of coastal regions by the ground forces greatly facilitated establishing command of adjacent sea areas (379/3). Bearing in mind the significance of the Barents and Norwegian Seas to Soviet SSBN operations, one's mind inevitably turns to the Norwegian coast, Svalbard and perhaps Iceland.

The second point concerns the necessity of "establishing the conditions for gaining command of the sea (at the outset of war) . . . while still at peace" (371/1). The measures he lists include "forming groupings of forces and so disposing them in a theater that they have local superiority over the enemy, and also providing the appropriate organization of forces in the maritime theaters of operation (sea and ocean), and a system of basing, command and control, etc., as required by their missions." These requirements could well be used to describe the pattern of Soviet activity since 1964, when the navy first began to establish significant forces in distant sea areas, a process which is still in progress today.

In summing up the source and substance of naval dissatisfaction, we are drawn back to my earlier comment that traditionally the navy has been seen as an expensive necessity, rather than a flexible instrument of state policy. It would seem that much of this attitude persists today and the nub of the navy's complaint against the military leadership is summed up by Gorshkov in his indictment of Napoleon. The Soviet leadership's preoccupation with land operations, combined with a lack of understanding of the navy and a disregard for its capabilities (which it has failed to analyze properly), has resulted in a one-sided national strategy and an inability to make effective use of the navy in the struggle with its opponent, a maritime power (355/4, 356/3).

The dissatisfaction is over the unwillingness to recognize the navy's potentialities in peace and importance in war, and the inability to grasp the complexities of maritime warfare. The failure of the military leadership to understand or even to analyze properly the navy's role, coupled with its prejudices concerning particular weapons and platforms, has meant that on the one hand the fleet is configured for a relatively narrow span of specific missions, and on the other hand that it lacks the full range of forces with which to discharge these missions effectively. The most persistent criticism (which reaches back into the fifties), is of the army-dominated leadership's inability to grasp that task-specific naval forces, however deadly in themselves, require the support of general purpose forces (particularly surface ships) if they are to be able to accomplish their tasks. The need for support to the SSBN force is the most frequently argued example. In peacetime, this lack of comprehension leads to the under-utilization of the navy as an instrument of overseas policy. In a war with maritime powers, it could lead to national disaster.

The fact that the Gorshkov series of articles could be published, and the persistence of his criticisms in the subsequent book, suggest that he does not stand alone in his advocacy of the navy's role and exploiting the flexibility of seapower. But obviously there are important interests aligned against him, including those in the military who have always argued that too much is spent on the navy; the merchant fleet, where professional jealousy sharpens the competition for ship-building resources; and the many domestic interests who give priority to building up the domestic economy over adventures abroad. The argument is likely to persist and we will have to wait on future warship deliveries to assess the final outcome.

Naval Mission Structure

The Russian navy's traditional objective has been "to defend the homeland," from which were derived its two main missions of (1) supporting army operations on land, and (2) repulsing attacks from the sea. These twin missions could be discharged most effectively by maintaining command of contiguous waters, but this was frequently not possible. In times of duress, the second mission was collapsed into the first, with operations on land having overriding priority. In more favorable circumstances, the second mission was extended to carrying the war to the enemy, and the navy has a record of daring interdiction attacks on enemy forces in their ports and home waters.

In essence, this basic mission structure persists today, but in the years following World War II, the Soviet navy was faced with three developments. First, her most likely opponents were now the traditional maritime powers, who had just demonstrated their capability to project and support continental-scale armies across vast distances at sea. Second, a series of quantum jumps in the range, accuracy, and payload of maritime weapons introduced the capability of devastating one's opponents' territory with sea-based systems. And third, China joined the ranks of the Soviet Union's likely opponents. These developments increased the relative importance of the maritime components of warfare, requiring greater differentiation within the mission structure. At the same time, the development of a new range of land- and space-based weapon and surveillance systems for use against maritime targets meant that account had to be taken of the contribution to these missions by other branches of service.

On the basis of public pronouncements and other evidence, there is a fair measure of agreement in the West on Soviet naval missions in war, although there is some dispute about their relative priority. These missions can be labelled:

- Strike against shore
- Destruction of enemy naval forces
- Interdiction of enemy sea lines of communications
- Direct support of ground force operations
- Protection of own sea lines of communications

Before discussing these missions, we must focus on the concept of area defense, which is fundamental to Soviet naval operations. The concept is based on two main zones: an inner one, where superiority of force allows local command of the sea to be secured, and the outer zone, where command is actively contested.⁸¹ The greater part of Soviet naval policy and procurement since the 1920s can be explained in terms of their attempts to extend this maritime defense perimeter and, within it, the zone of effective command.

If the four widely separated fleets were to be ensured the superiority of force necessary to establish command in their respective areas, they would

81. The Soviets speak in terms of three zones, but the third one is beyond the defense perimeter. Robert Herrick discusses these in his book *Soviet Naval Strategy* (United States Naval Institute, 1967), and his current research is throwing further light on this concept.

need to deny the enemy the opportunity to concentrate his forces against any one fleet. This objective could most economically be achieved by denying him physical access to the fleet areas. In this respect, Russia was favored by her geography. Three of these areas comprised semi-enclosed seas, and access to the Northern Fleet was canalized by ice during much of the year; only Petropavlovsk, the naval base on Kamchatka, lacked any geographical advantage of this kind. Until 1961, therefore, the navy's primary concern was to extend the inner zone of effective command to the natural defensive barriers, which would be seized by Soviet forces in the event of war. The outer zones did not extend very far beyond these geographic constrictions and were primarily seen as areas for interdicting the reinforcement of the enemy who defended these natural barriers.

But after 1961, the outer zone was extended to take account of the qualitatively new threat to the Soviet Union posed by the Polaris submarine, as well as the continuing threat from carrier strike aircraft. In the Far East, the maritime defense perimeter was pushed out into the East China Sea and the Pacific. In the west, the outer zones were extended to take in the Norwegian and North Seas and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviet navy progressively contested the West's erstwhile maritime domination of these sea areas.

Maintaining command of contiguous waters, and contesting command of adjacent seas, is the precondition for discharging the majority of other naval missions, including the most important ones. Area defense will therefore be treated as a mission in its own right.

STRIKE AGAINST SHORE

The mission of strategic strike was first laid on the navy in the immediate post-war years, when the submarine-torpedo was the only available means of bringing an atomic weapon to bear on the continental United States. Soviet strategic delivery submarines were given top priority in nuclear propulsion, warheads, and ballistic missiles. But despite this, advances in American anti-submarine capabilities, coupled with Soviet technological inadequacies, meant that the first generation of series production units (comprising two diesel and two nuclear classes, one of each being armed with nuclear torpedoes, the other being armed with a surface-launched ballistic missile) were unable to meet the planned operational requirements. The mission was therefore taken away from the navy towards the end of the fifties.

This decision was reversed in the sixties, to match the shift in U.S. emphasis from land- to sea-based strategic delivery systems, and the 1968

edition of *Military Strategy* placed the SSBN on a par with the SRF.⁸² The SSBN force now has three overlapping roles, in that it can contribute:

1. Intercontinental strike;
2. Intra-theater strike;
3. The national strategic reserve.

The Delta SSBN can carry out *intercontinental* strikes from home waters. If Yankees are targeted in this role, they need to be within 1,500 n.m. of the U.S. coastline. Only three or four units are kept forward deployed, so the remainder would have to transit Western anti-submarine barriers to come within range.

The Yankee SSBN can cover a wide range of *intra-theater* targets from home waters; and for Northern Fleet units this includes "shore facilities which support the operations of the Western SSBN force, and those ASW forces and systems which constrain the free egress and open-ocean operations of the Soviet submarine force."⁸³ Six Golf II SSB were transferred to the Baltic in 1976, from where they can cover most naval facilities in NATO Europe.

In the event of world war, the ballistic-missile submarines represent an important component of the *national strategic reserve*, because of their relative invulnerability. While it is clear that the Soviets do in fact think in these terms, there are no means of knowing their exact intentions in this respect. But one must assume that their operational plans provide for the greatest flexibility in the use or withholding of these systems, as best to influence the progress and outcome of the conflict.

Endless permutations of targeting, deployment and timing in these overlapping roles are possible, but they all raise the same two requirements:

1. Until such time as the missile submarines have fired all their weapons, or deployed to the open ocean, they must be kept secure against attack. This has led to the concept of defended ocean bastions.
2. If the submarines are deployed, they must be able to transit Western anti-submarine barriers in reasonable safety, and to survive attempts to find them in the open ocean. This raises a requirement for support forces.

82. See note 64.

83. R. O. Welander, et al. *The Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine for Theatre Nuclear Warfare*. BDM Corporation, Washington, D.C.; Report No. DNA (Defense Nuclear Agency) 4434T, 30 September 1977, p. 41. This is a most useful study and I have drawn freely on the conclusions.

This mission therefore involves both the ballistic-missile submarines and the maritime forces assigned to their protection and support. This pro-SSBN mission, demanding that enemy ASW forces be countered at sea, is a force-consuming task and is an important function of the navy's submarine, air, and surface components. It is seen as one of the primary missions of the Kiev class ASW carrier and the post-1965 large anti-submarine ships.

DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES

The enemy's sea-based strategic nuclear strike systems present the primary maritime threat to the Russian homeland, and the task of countering these forces is on a par with the Soviet navy's own strategic mission.

In striving to counter this threat, the Soviets have been driven by two rather different concerns. The most immediate is damage limitation, both as it affects the Soviet homeland, and their ability to fight the land battle. But more important is the withholding of these systems as tactical and strategic reserves. In the short run they could then be used to deny Russia the use of Western Europe as an alternative economic base for rebuilding the socialist system. In the longer run, the sole possession of a residual nuclear capacity is likely to determine the final outcome of a world war, and hence the political structure of the post-war world. It was this potential as a tactical and strategic reserve which required that Soviet forces be within weapon-range contact at the onset of war, and necessitated the navy's shift to forward deployment.

COUNTERING THE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE By 1964, the Polaris submarine had replaced the carrier as the most dangerous component of this threat and overlapping concern for damage limitation and withholding focused attention on different aspects of the weapon system. To prevent their being withheld for use at a later stage, the SSBN must themselves be disabled, and this requires one to know their location. But damage limitation only requires that (preferably) all or (at least) some of the missiles should not reach their targets. The importance of this distinction is twofold: (1) once the submarine launches a missile, it reveals its position and renders itself liable to attack; and (2) the missile itself is vulnerable in its early stages.

Although the Soviets have been addressing the SSBN problem for over fifteen years, the final shape of their response is still not certain. Ideally, they would like to deploy a system which provides continuous location of all missile submarines, backed by a rapid-response kill capability. However, they will be prepared to adopt any approach which offers to reduce the overall threat from this direction, and their search for a solution has been on

a very broad front. The tracking capability required for continuous location can be provided by area surveillance or by trailing. The state of the art in the sixties meant the latter was the more realizable solution in waters closer to home, while methods of ocean surveillance had still to be developed. Russia's lack of open-ocean coastline complicates the use of fixed acoustic surveillance systems located in the water column, and combined with U.S. emphasis on submarine quietening, this directed attention to air- and space-borne systems, exploiting other forms of anomaly detection.

It seems likely that this approach distinguishes between the ocean expanses on one hand, and more confined waters like the Norwegian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean on the other, both because of their relative location to Russia, and because of the different problems of detection in these different types of areas. Confined waters lend themselves to some variant of the area defense concept, whereas the open ocean is more suitable for satellite surveillance. Surface surveillance satellites have now been in service for a decade and one must assume that a missile-launch detection capability has already been developed, if not actually deployed. Some analysts believe that non-acoustic methods of submarine detection are already operational in space.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, we must not ignore the potential attraction of direct tracking by specially designed submarines, a concept which becomes increasingly relevant when Trident enters service.

Assuming that the problem of location can be solved, the problem of attacking the submarine is comparatively simple. When Soviet forces are in direct contact, they will have available an array of long-range weapons. In the ocean expanses it seems probable that the Soviet Union intended to develop a common system for anti-surface and anti-submarine strike, using terminally-guided ballistic missiles, as described below.

If it is not possible to locate the SSBN until it launches a missile, the threat from those that are withheld for later use can be reduced if they are deprived of targeting, navigation, and command and control information by disrupting communication links and attacking the sources of such information. High

84. Especially K. J. Moore; see "Developments in Submarine Systems" and "Antisubmarine Warfare" in *SNL*, pp. 151-184, 185-200. Moore highlights the Soviet emphasis on non-acoustic methods of submarine detection, the use of satellites in this and related roles, and the concept of the extended ASW team, which includes satellites, air, submarine, surface ships and shore-based missiles. He notes discussion in Soviet journals of new methods of submarine propulsion and the development of wing-in-ground effect vehicles, suitable for high-speed area-search.

priority is therefore given to the destruction of SSBN base and operational support facilities at the onset of war.

COUNTERING THE CARRIER It appears that the Soviets feel they have developed an effective counter to the strike carrier, although it took them more than fifteen years to achieve this. The two components of this mission (target location and strike) are handled somewhat differently in each of the three main types of scenario, namely continuous company, meeting engagement, and distant targeting.

"Continuous company" describes the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, an outer defense zone. When carriers operate within this area, primary responsibility for providing target location data lies with the surface units, which remain in close company. They also provide local command and control and a secure communications link with headquarters ashore, and are therefore likely to continue in this role, despite their vulnerability. The main strike arm is now the cruise-missile-armed submarine, probably backed by IR/MRBM. Aircraft based in Russia lack the rapid response time essential to this scenario, and while they remain a threat to Western forces they are not critical to the operational concept.

The "meeting engagement" is best exemplified by the deployment of carriers from U.S. east coast ports to launch strikes against Russia from the south Norwegian Sea. In such circumstances, target location data are provided by a mix of forward pickets (AGIs, etc.), and aircraft and satellite surveillance. The force will be harassed by air and submarine attacks en route, but the main engagement will take place in the encounter zone. Here, the force will be subjected to successive, heavy attacks by air- and submarine-launched missiles at the same time that it is transiting a torpedo-attack submarine barrier. If the carrier force is configured for nuclear strike against Russia, the encounter zone is located to the west of the probable launch area; but should it be configured for operations in the Norwegian Sea (e.g. in support of counter-SSBN operations or flank reinforcement), the main encounter is likely to be north of the Gap. SSM-armed surface ships will probably be used in the latter case but will be held back in the former. It seems likely that the large anti-submarine ships will be deployed to hinder attempts by Western ASW forces to prevent the missile-armed submarines from launching their weapons. Variations of this concept apply in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean when U.S. forces are not already deployed in the eastern basin.

The "distant-targeting" scenario covers those carriers that do not imme-

diately threaten the Soviet Union at the outbreak of war but, if not disposed of, will contribute to the U.S. reserve. In these circumstances, target location information is provided by air and satellite reconnaissance. It appears likely that it was originally planned that strike would rely primarily on two different types of terminally-guided ballistic missile systems, one land-based and the other submarine-based. The SRF's capability to strike surface groupings was explicitly claimed in 1972 and, despite time-of-flight problems, there appear to be no insuperable reasons why ICBM should not be used against high-value naval targets. A submarine-based system would require the unit to remain within strike range of its target(s). A 400 n.m. tactical SLBM (SS-NX-13) was undergoing trials in 1972; it appears to have been shelved for reasons that remain unclear, and the present status of this system is uncertain.

The first two of these scenarios depend heavily on the concept of a defense perimeter and area defense. All three are applicable to high-value surface targets other than carriers.

AREA DEFENSE

Area defense is central to certain of the missions which have already been discussed. It is the way to secure the safety of home waters as SSBN bastions, and to prevent enemy carriers and missile submarines from closing Russia to launch their strikes. The success of these and several other missions will depend on the extent to which the Soviets can establish command of the sea in these areas. This is best discussed in terms of the inner and outer defense zones.

The Baltic, Black, and Barents Seas are inner defense zones and it can be assumed that the Soviets count on establishing effective command of these waters at the onset of war.⁸⁵ This will involve seizure of the Baltic and Black Sea exits and parts of arctic Norway. Command of these sea areas will automatically:

85. The concept of area defense is part and parcel of maritime theaters of military operation (MTVD). In a recent (unpublished) paper, James Westwood draws attention to the latter concept and its derivation from the army's land-based equivalent (TVD), and he itemized the various types of zone which can be found in such theaters. He notes that the concept of MTVDs is related to the defense of a few delimited geographical regions. He identifies five MTVDs, three of which are referred to as closed (Baltic, Black Sea and Sea of Japan), while the other two look out onto great oceans (Northern Sea and Kamchatka). There are also two ocean theaters of military operations (OTVD), one comprising the Eastern Mediterranean and the other the Arabian Sea.

- Secure the close support of army operations, including tactical landings and naval bombardment;
- Secure coastal communications, including logistic support of the land battle;
- Prevent the enemy from carrying out amphibious assaults and from providing close support to army operations ashore.

The concept of an inner defense zone also applies in the Pacific, although operational plans will be modulated by diplomatic considerations such as keeping Japan neutral. But parts of the Sea of Okhotsk are suitable for SSBN bastions, and one can also assume that effective command will be sought in the Sea of Japan and off Kamchatka.

The outer defense zone of the Baltic and Barent Seas takes in the North and Norwegian Seas, with the defense perimeter running from Greenland through Iceland and the United Kingdom. For several reasons this outer zone is of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union. Besides those which have already been discussed, the main NATO anti-submarine barrier is located in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, while the North Sea provides access to Denmark and northwest Germany for Western reinforcement and supply, and for Soviet amphibious hooks and flank support.

Gaining command of this area (particularly the Norwegian Sea and its approaches) has high priority, and maintaining command will be facilitated by seizing key stretches of the Norwegian coast and (more risky) Iceland and/or the Faeroes. As a way of tilting the balance in their favor, the Soviets will seek to pin down forces by mining and draw others away by diversionary attacks. It will still be a costly struggle, and there can be no certainty that shore-based air support will be available to Soviet forces.

In considering the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean as an outer defense zone, we must distinguish between peace and war. Its importance in peace-time derives from its use as a deployment area by Western strike systems targeted on Russia. This spurs the development of location and strike systems appropriate to the geographical conditions, and these would be used at the onset of war. Thereafter, there would seem to be no great urgency to gain command of the Eastern Mediterranean. In practical terms the Black Sea Fleet's outer defense zone is probably co-terminous with the Aegean, which provides a defensible perimeter and a haven for submarines operating against NATO communications.

The outer defense zone in the Pacific as importance as a shield both to

the SSBN bastions and against U.S. sea-based strike systems. However, if the bastions are located in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kuriles chain provides a natural defensive barrier. Meanwhile, there are no clearly defined geographical areas comparable to the North and Norwegian Seas and the Iceland/Faeroes gap, nor will the land battle have the same relevance. In such circumstances, effective command throughout the outer defense zone is unlikely to have a high priority.

There would seem to be a latent outer defense zone in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, covering the seaward approaches to the Persian Gulf. In the event of world war, the Soviet Union is likely to move south to control the Gulf, and will need naval forces to fend off assaults by U.S. strike carriers and amphibious groups. It may also have trouble from the regional navies.

Within the area-defense concept, anti-surface operations had overriding priority for the first 10 to 15 years after the war, but thereafter anti-submarine warfare became increasingly important, and today it has the highest priority in terms of force characteristics and research and development. The progressive improvement in the Soviet navy's ASW capability largely matched the seaward extension of the anti-submarine defense zones, and the Soviet approach to the problem continued to reflect the concepts developed when the zones were comparatively narrow. At that initial stage, shore-based systems played the major role, with the various sensors operated by the Observations and Communications Service providing detection data to shore-based helicopters carrying sonobuoys. The solution was still a combined arms one, with offshore defense units being vectored to join the hunt and to prosecute enemy contacts, while a proportion of the torpedo-armed diesel submarines (which had originally been intended to provide defense in depth against surface groups) were switched to the anti-submarine role. All these operations were controlled by the naval headquarters ashore, and procedures were developed for coordinating operations by the various types of units.

When it became necessary to extend the seaward limit of the defense zone beyond the effective radius of shore-based helicopters, it was natural to think in terms of placing them on a seagoing platform; hence the Moskva class of helicopter-carrying anti-submarine cruiser. Meanwhile, the demise of large surface ships as executors of the counter-carrier mission released destroyers to anti-submarine area defense, and methods of coordinating the various airborne, surface, sub-surface, and land-based systems continued to evolve.

While the concept of an anti-submarine defense zone is most effective in waters directly contiguous to one's coastline, similar procedures have been adopted in the outer zones, including the Eastern Mediterranean. Area defense *per se* is not possible in such areas, hence greater emphasis is placed on various types of detection barriers and on a Soviet variant of hunter/killer groups that involves surface ships and submarines working together. However, it appears that since the early seventies, priority in the employment of conventional ASW forces has been shifted from counter-SSBN operations in forward areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, to reinforcing the security of the Soviet SSBN bastions in the North and Pacific.

There are likely to have been two main reasons for this shift in emphasis. The most significant was reports in 1967-68 that the U.S. Navy was intending to develop two new classes of submarine for service in 1973-74, one very fast and the other very silent, the latter being specifically designed to operate against Soviet SSBN. This of course had major implications in terms of the Soviet decision to embody a substantial part of the nation's strategic reserve in ballistic missile submarines, and the Deltas were due to start entering service at just that period. Meanwhile, as more anti-submarine systems became available, mounted in surface ships, submarines and aircraft, it must have become increasingly clear to the Soviets that however innovative, these traditional ASW methods had inherent limitations, and an effective solution to the Polaris/Poseidon problem would have to wait for the results of research and development still in progress. Hence the shift in emphasis to extending the inner defense zones in the Northern Fleet area and in the Pacific off Kamchatka, and to providing them with watertight ASW defenses. Because ASW forces can be brushed aside by superior force, it would be necessary to maintain command of these two sea areas. And since shored-based air was unlikely to be available after the initial exchange, *sea-based air* would be needed to deal with enemy airborne ASW systems.

INTERDICTING ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS

The interdiction of enemy sea lines of communication is a traditional mission, although its importance has fluctuated with changing perceptions of the likely nature and duration of an East/West war. Recently, the possibility of protracted nuclear conflict or of conventional war has increased its relative importance, which is currently stressed by the Soviet navy. While attacks on sea lines of communication would appear to be less urgent than some other missions, they have the great advantage of tying down Western ASW forces

and diverting them from posing a threat to the SSBN strategic reserve. It therefore seems certain that although the anti-SLOC mission could in principle be deferred, sufficient forces will be allocated to ensure the diversion of Western ASW forces from areas of primary Soviet concern such as the Norwegian Sea.

In the initial stages of a war, intra-theater shipping (which will be particularly vulnerable to mining) will almost certainly be more important than trans-oceanic convoys, unless the latter are already closing their destination. It should, however, be stressed that the mission of interdicting enemy sea communications is viewed in its broadest sense and includes destruction of terminal facilities and distribution networks by air or missile strike, the mining of ports and assembly areas, and attacks on all types of escort force.

PROTECTING OWN SEA COMMUNICATIONS

Traditionally, Russian sea communications have been limited to coastal shipping and this came within the general concept of area defense, although escorts were provided. Soviet forces were barely involved in the protection of the ocean convoys which brought supplies to Russia during the World War II. However, in the event of a future war with China, the Soviet Union must be prepared to supply its Far Eastern Front by sea, and to protect such shipments against attacks by Chinese naval forces, which include the world's third largest submarine force. This is a time-critical requirement and the shortest route lies across the Indian Ocean. If possible, supplies would be shipped from Black Sea ports via the Suez Canal or even round the Cape. But if the Black Sea exits were closed to them, these supplies could pass down across Iran and out through the Persian Gulf, using the route established by the Allies in the two World Wars.

BACKGROUND FACTORS

Certain persistent factors help to explain various aspects of Soviet naval doctrine. Earlier in this article we discussed the emphasis on contingency planning and the reality of world war, but the point about war fighting needs to be re-emphasized. Undoubtedly there is argument in the Soviet Union about the nature of nuclear war, whether it will be long or short, and whether or not there will be a conventional phase. But the military planner must assume the worst and has to think not only of the post-exchange phase of such a war but of subsequent phases through to its resolution. They must at the same time take account of how to handle China in such circumstances.

This emphasis on war fighting, which must allow for the disruption of supply systems and base facilities, has major implications for the employment or withholding of forces in the initial stage of a war. It also heightens the awareness that war is in large part a matter of attrition and that victory goes to the side that gives up last. This awareness leads to the principle of never allowing an enemy weapon or force a free ride, and to the continuing use of sub-optimal and obsolescent weapons in order to complicate the enemy's problems. It may also explain various aspects of the strategic infrastructure that the Soviets are seeking to establish overseas.

A second background factor is the limitations which existing capabilities impose on the practical application of preferred operational concepts. A substantial proportion of existing naval assets were originally designed to operate in scenarios very different from the present ones. Some were designed for tasks different from those they now discharge, and many derive from building programs that were cancelled before the first units even entered service, because the original design-concept had been outflanked by technological developments. Even when the design-concept remains appropriate, competing priorities within the national economy mean that in certain key categories, insufficient numbers are being provided. As a further source of confusion to the analyst, the contemporary evidence will reflect what the Soviets are striving to achieve at some future date, what they are attempting to do with sub-optimal capabilities to meet existing requirements, and the inertia of past concepts which have been overtaken by events. When assessing Soviet priorities it is therefore necessary to distinguish between the evidence which reflects what present capabilities *allow* them to do, and that which reflects what they are *aspiring* to do. Soviet ranking of threats and/or requirements will not necessarily reflect their ranking of corresponding missions, which will be determined partly by available capabilities.

The third factor is the emphasis on combined arms. This approach to maritime defense evolved as much from historical necessity as from proletarian revolutionary doctrine, but this fact makes it all the more persistent. In the early '30s, area defense was only practicable within a relatively narrow coastal zone and depended more on coordinated operations by submarines, torpedo boats, and aircraft than on the capabilities of the pre-World War I surface ships. As more and larger surface new-construction units joined the fleet, tactical concepts were adjusted to include them, and the defense perimeter was progressively extended. But the principle of coordinated operations remained in force. Submarine, aircraft, and shore-based systems were

seen as an integral part of the main fleet, the emphasis being on defense in depth and on successive coordinated attacks. Meanwhile, the priority on providing support to ground force operations served to accentuate the "combined arms" approach, which extends beyond the different types of naval components to include other services.

The same driving principle is very much in evidence today, examples being the use of Long Range Air Force (LRAF) aircraft for maritime reconnaissance, the targeting of naval "groupings" by land-based missiles and the use of the merchant fleet for logistic support. But the most striking illustration is provided by their attempts to counter Western SSBN, which involves four out of the five branches of the armed forces, only the ground forces being exempt.

The emphasis on combined arms leads naturally to the last factor, namely that maritime operations are very much an adjunct to the battle on land, and that naval strategy is just a subset of broader military strategy.⁸⁶

The Navy's Peacetime Role

We can say with some certainty that the navy's shift to forward deployment in 1961 was prompted by the requirements for strategic defense against sea-based nuclear delivery systems, a conclusion that is evidenced by the timing of the change of policy, the areas chosen for deployment, and the operational employment of the forces within these areas.⁸⁷ Although the original rationale remains valid and continues to underly the main pattern of Soviet naval activity, some of the specific reasons for the shift to forward deployment have been eroded or overlaid with new ones, and among the latter we find the emergence of the navy's peacetime role.

The presence of naval forces in distant sea areas provided opportunities for their political exploitation, and this coincided with a hardening of Soviet attitudes towards the United States and its overseas involvements, and a progressive shift toward a more assertive Soviet global policy. This was probably outlined at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966;⁸⁸ the 24th Party Congress in 1971 appears to have extended the trend by addressing directly the

86. Welander and Westwood both stress this point.

87. See my "The Soviet Navy in the Seventies", Appendix, *SNL*, pp. 653-57.

88. I am indebted to James McConnell for this point.

role of a Soviet military presence, and Grechko's recantation in 1974 would seem to confirm the general direction.

The long-term prognosis is, however, still unclear. It seems likely that the decision to commit Soviet forces to the air defense of Egypt in 1970 was finely balanced and, even if there had not already been a reversal of opinion, the eviction of these forces in 1972 must have given pause for thought. It is true that the long drawn out SALT negotiations are likely to have engendered a progressive, but fundamental shift in Soviet threat perceptions, including a downward re-evaluation of the dangers of escalation from Soviet/U.S. confrontations in the third world. But while some in the Soviet Union would have argued that this, coupled with the improving correlation of forces, required a more assertive global policy, there would have been others who argued for shifting scarce resources to the domestic economy. Meanwhile, there would remain the unconvinced. The latter might well make up the great majority of the military establishment, who would doubt whether the threat had in fact changed and would continue to press priority for the direct defense of the Soviet Union and to argue the dangers of overseas adventure, unless they were intended to strengthen the strategic infrastructure for war-time missions.

It seems possible that some compromise was reached by early 1973, whereby it was decided that direct Soviet involvement overseas would be limited to the provision of advisers, weapons, and strategic logistic support, the combat role being delegated to the Soviet-equipped forces of "revolutionary" states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. It can be argued that this policy ensures the Soviet Union the best of all worlds; namely, being able to affect the outcome of an overseas conflict with direct battlefield support, while ensuring that political commitment and liability remain strictly limited. This is achieved by facilitating the arrangements and providing the lift to bring co-belligerents to the zone of conflict; by ensuring that the client state receives adequate military supplies in the course of battle; and by remaining relatively silent about Soviet involvement until after the event.

A result of these decisions has been the increasing readiness to use a "Soviet military presence" in support of overseas objectives. Between 1967-72, as warship-days in distant waters rose year by year, so too did the trend in the political exploitation of this naval presence. And since 1973, Soviet naval forces have been used in a number of ways including crisis management, latent interposition, logistic support, political pressure, and peacetime assistance. In a major study of the employment of Soviet naval

forces in peacetime,⁸⁹ Dismukes and McConnell concluded that they have been widely used for political purposes and that a significant proportion of their operations are driven by political considerations, rather than war-related requirements. However, questions still remain as to the level of political commitment behind those operations and as to the extent to which the navy's potential as a flexible instrument of overseas policy will come to determine future force requirements.

Soviet pronouncements refer to the navy's peacetime role in general terms such as "defending (or securing) state interests", a nebulous formulation, whose scope has yet to be systematically researched. They also speak of the navy's "international duty," of "increasing Soviet prestige and influence" and of "rebuffing imperialism." While not losing sight of the all-encompassing scope of "securing state interests," it is useful to distinguish between four types of objectives which underlie this peacetime employment, because each type involves a different level of risk and degree of political commitment.

At the low end of the scale of commitment, we have "Protecting Soviet lives and property." This objective is referred to but has received little priority to date. There is one clear example where a naval demonstration in February 1969 appears to have secured the release of Soviet trawlers from Ghanaian custody, but the more usual form is to have landing ships standing by to evacuate key equipment from conflict zones.

At the high end of the commitment scale we have "Establishing a strategic infrastructure to support war-related missions," which embraces the physical, political and operational aspects. This objective is not referred to directly, but can be inferred from the pattern of overseas military involvement during the last 20 years, and is implied in some of the more recent Soviet writings. I believe this task has provided the primary motive for a broad span of decisions ranging from promoting a coup in a client state, to acquiring base rights by barely concealed coercion. The pressure on Egypt (1961-67) for naval support facilities⁹⁰ provides a good example of this objective, although

89. B. N. Dismukes & J. M. McConnell (Eds.), *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, Pergamon Press (forthcoming). This book has been prepared by seven members of the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C. and comprises a comprehensive survey and analysis of the peacetime employment of Soviet naval forces. This whole article reflects my debt to the analysts at CNA, although I cannot claim that we agree on all points.

90. See G. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's quest for access to naval facilities in Egypt prior to the June War of 1967," *SNP*, 237-277.

the original impulse became obscured by wider involvements as the policy acquired its own momentum . . . and complications. Somalia is another example, with the initial interest in 1968-69 stemming from the Arabian Sea's potential as a patrol area for Poseidon submarines, but being overtaken in 1971-72 by the broader concerns of conflict with China and protracted world war. Because the task of establishing a strategic infrastructure concerns the security of the homeland, it is likely to be backed by a high level of political commitment, and the pattern suggests a willingness to incur high political costs in pursuit of this objective. However, so far the Soviets have not used military force to maintain their position when the host country has withdrawn its agreement to their presence, although on at least two occasions they have sought to engineer a coup to bring a more sympathetic regime to power.⁹¹ Of course, once such an infrastructure has been established, it can also serve peacetime policies, as we see most clearly in the case of Soviet-built airfields in Africa.

In between these extremes we have the general objective of "Increasing Soviet Prestige and Influence." Showing-the-flag increased sharply after 1968, but since 1972 the task has assumed new dimensions, extending to port clearance and minesweeping, and to providing support for revolutionary forces or to regimes threatened by secessionist elements. The Soviets are prepared to commit substantial resources to this objective but, although the propensity for risk-taking has risen steadily, the underlying political commitment is strictly limited.

Overlapping this general influence-building objective is the more restricted one of "Countering Imperialist Aggression." Despite much bombast in declaiming this task, I believe that in terms of risking a major confrontation with the West, Soviet political commitment is low. The first clear-cut example was the establishment of the Guinea Patrol in December, 1970, since when we have the deployments to the Bay of Bengal in 1971, to the South China Sea in 1972, and to Angola in 1975, as well as the three Middle East crises in 1967, 1970 and 1973. The latter series did show a shift from a narrow concern with the strike carriers towards a more general concern for the overall capability of the Sixth Fleet.⁹² But none of these examples provide evidence of Soviet readiness to actually engage Western naval forces, in

91. Albania and Egypt.

92. See R. G. Weinland, *Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War*, Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, Professional Paper No. 221, June, 1978.

order to prevent them from intervening against a Soviet client state. Indeed, it is a moot point whether the reactive deployment of a Soviet detachment during the Indo/Pakistan war in December, 1971 achieved anything at all. For instance, was the force authorized to attack the U.S. carrier group if it had launched its strike aircraft toward some unknowable target? What purpose was served by rushing a force to the South China Sea in response to the mining of Haiphong (which just hung around for a few days and then returned home), or was this the result of an inter-service argument in Moscow? And what of areas like the Mediterranean, where the urge to "counter imperialist aggression" is tempered by the dangers of confrontation and escalation to nuclear war?

What we do see is progressively greater involvement by the Soviet navy in the provision of logistic support both prior to and during third party conflicts. In 1973, Soviet landing ships carried Moroccan troops to Syria, with convoy escort. Landing ships were also used during the subsequent war to ferry military supplies from Black Sea ports to Syria. More significantly, SAM-armed naval units were stationed under the final approaches to the main resupply airfields in Syria and Egypt, as if to cover against Israeli air attack.⁹³ And most recently, we have the escorting of military supplies being ferried from Aden to Ethiopia.

The evidence suggests a policy of incrementalism, which explores opportunities as they occur or are created, a policy of probing Western responses and establishing precedents. The role of a "Soviet military presence" in support of overseas objectives will therefore be shaped by the scale and style of the Western response to the various Soviet initiatives. In this context the distinction which has just been drawn between the employment of Soviet naval forces to secure the safe arrival of logistic support and their employment to prevent Western intervention against a client state is important. So too is the distinction between the Soviet Union's willingness to risk hostilities with a third party state, and their continuing reluctance to engage U.S. naval forces. Meanwhile we should bear in mind that the Soviet navy's role in this more assertive overseas policy is secondary. The primary instruments are the provision of arms, military advice, and training; the transport of men, munitions, and equipment by merchant ship and long-range air; and direct participation by the combat troops of revolutionary states. The primary role

93. *Ibid.*

of the navy is to provide protection and support and to serve as an earnest of Soviet commitment.

This brings us to the question of whether there is some Soviet grand design driving a coordinated oceans policy in support of overseas objectives. The short answer is no, but we must distinguish here between the operational aspects and the setting of objectives. The military style organization of the merchant, fishing, and research fleets means that it is relatively simple to make use of their ships in peacetime for naval support tasks such as replenishment and forward picketing, and they all make some contribution to the generalized requirement for world-wide intelligence and information gathering. There are also the geo-strategic advantages to be gained in terms of a world-wide infrastructure, actual or potential. The latter includes the provision of improved harbor facilities in locations which would assume great strategic significance for Russia in the event of world war, as for example the fishing port at Gwardar in Baluchistan.

But when we turn to objectives, we see that the long-term interests of the three main ocean users frequently diverge. The build-up of the fishing fleet stemmed from a decision in the late forties that fishery was a more cost-effective source of protein than collective farming. The build-up of the merchant fleet reflected the post-Stalin shift in the middle fifties towards trade, aid, and arms supply, and the consequential requirement to earn hard currency and avoid dependence on foreign bottoms. The navy's shift to forward deployment reflected the qualitatively new threat to the Soviet homeland from distant sea areas. Inevitably there is some conflict between these divergent interests and, at the Law of the Sea negotiations the narrow domestic concerns of the Soviet fishing industry ran counter to the foreign policy objective of increasing Soviet influence. Similarly, national security concerns and the concept of strategic infrastructure have led the Soviet Union into political entanglements which would seem to be against its broader interests. Only the merchant fleet consistently serves these more general foreign policy goals, and I see it as the principal maritime instrument of Soviet overseas policy.

It is clear that the Soviets have progressively evolved a policy toward the employment of naval forces in peacetime, but in looking to the future the derivation of that policy becomes important. It stemmed from the availability in distant sea areas of naval forces which had been deployed forward in strategic defense. The presence of these forces was progressively exploited for political purposes and with changes in threat perception, risks, and

opportunities, the peacetime political role became increasingly important. Nevertheless, only a small proportion of the Soviet fleet is deployed forward and the continuing lack of effective afloat support to sustain such operations is notable. Meanwhile, there is still no evidence that ships are being procured primarily for the projection of force in peacetime, and while the Kiev's, the new landing ships and the "possible" nuclear cruiser will increase the navy's potential capability in this direction, there is a clearly defined, war-related requirement for such types in the outer defense zones or the oceanic theaters of military operation.

This presents a very different picture to the traditional British/American approach, where the navy serves as a primary instrument of foreign policy (as in Pax Britannica or the Nixon doctrine), and where this peacetime role is an important determinant of the navy's size and shape. On the evidence at hand, it does not appear that the Soviet leadership attaches a *comparable* importance to their navy's peacetime role. While they will continue to exploit its existence when possible, it does not appear that the navy is being specially developed as a primary instrument of overseas policy.

This does not, however, mean that we can ignore the possibility of naval confrontation leading to conflict. We know from Gorshkov's definition of a balanced fleet that the navy is prepared to "secure state interests in peacetime." Since an early reference to this task gave it as the particular responsibility of the submarine force,⁹⁴ one must assume that combat operations are not excluded.

Naval Arms Control

In his series of articles, Gorshkov uses the fact that there have been persistent attempts to control naval armaments as a further demonstration of the special significance of navies as instruments of state policy in peacetime. He discusses two different types of arms control: naval arms limitation at the end of a war, imposed by the victor on the vanquished; and the continual efforts to limit naval arms racing in peacetime, which can be seen as attempts by the various parties to freeze or to change existing relative strengths. Gorshkov's argument is diffuse and liable to different interpretations, but the most persuasive overall explanation is provided by Franklyn Griffiths. He points

94. S. Gorshkov, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 30 October 1962.

out that although at first glance Gorshkov appears to be opposed to arms control as such, he does in fact have several favorable things to say about it.⁹⁵ Griffiths concludes that Gorshkov sees arms control as a useful tactic which can: (1) inhibit the naval development of a more powerful adversary; (2) permit an internal redirection of development and building program, to reduce waste on forces and systems which are already over-provided for; (3) seal off areas of competition, such as the seabed; and (4) inhibit the growth of other branches of the armed forces. Griffiths suggests that Gorshkov's general argument runs as follows. Naval claims for additional resources for surface warship construction are being resisted. Russia cannot obtain the necessary naval capability without altering the balance between existing programs and/or achieving cutbacks in the programs of the other armed services. The United States is now basically deterred and SALT can hold offensive weapons frozen at their present level; funds can thereby be released from the SSBN force, from the SRF and the air force, and (by accepting MBFR), from the ground forces in Europe. Arms control will not stop the arms race but it will allow the navy to obtain the appropriations needed for surface construction and general purpose forces.

Running against the grain of this particular interpretation, we have the shelving of the SS-NX-13 tactical ballistic missile in 1973. There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviet navy may have intended to develop the tactical ballistic missile as a major element in its armory against carriers and missile submarines. If this were indeed the case, the Soviet leadership must have decided to sacrifice this tactical system in the wider interests of the SALT accord.

Moving on from naval arms control as an instrument of bureaucratic politics to wider international considerations, we are faced by the reality of Soviet contingency plans. The inventory of inter-continental systems will depend primarily on Soviet requirements to fight and win a war, and only incidentally on what might be considered sufficient to deter an American attack. The number of SLBM will depend on the global concept of operations, on the need for strategic reserves and on the demands of theater warfare. The requirement to defend SSBN bastions and secure their deployment will partly determine the number of general purpose forces. Although defense against Western sea-based systems is moving steadily towards satellite and

95. F. Griffiths, "The Tactical use of Naval Arms Control," *SNP*, pp. 637-660.

land-based systems, any surplus naval forces will be needed to bolster area defense. The asymmetry of naval warfare, where like does not fight like, means that as a general rule mutual force reductions make no sense if restricted to single systems, and must be across the board.⁹⁶ And this will have to wait on changes in risk and threat perceptions.

The same type of strategic considerations are likely to apply to the limitation of naval operations in distant waters. If this would achieve an effective reduction of the threat to the homeland, that factor would weigh heavily against the possible political gains from a naval presence in the area. But the world wide strategic infrastructure is a different matter and brings us back to perceptions of the risk of world war. While it may be possible to demonstrate a net gain to Russia from a mutual renunciation of certain overseas facilities, the Soviet Union can expect to secure unilateral U.S. withdrawals by generating local political pressures. Meanwhile, there remains the problem of China, which reinforces the need for a strategic infrastructure outside Russia's borders, particularly in the regions of West, South, and South East Asia.

Overview

It is useful to distinguish between the navy as a separate force, the navy as part of the Soviet Union's broader capability, and the navy as an indicator of Soviet intentions and aspirations.

Looking at the navy in isolation, we see that Admiral Gorshkov and his supporters have been dissatisfied with the strength and structure of the fleet. The failure of the military leadership to appreciate fully the navy's role,

96. The exception involves submarines, where three opportunities for controlling armaments make up a package that could engender a shift by both sides from war-fighting doctrines (which fuel the arms race), to policies of mutual assured destruction based on MAD. The leverage in this direction is provided by the role of sea-based systems as strategic reserves in world war. Two of these opportunities, the mutual limitation of SSN forces and foregoing the strategic version of Tomahawk, form a conventional arms control arrangement, built on reciprocal fears and interests. The third and more important opportunity involves transferring the Trident SLBM inventory from large nuclear submarines to a spartan diesel submarine force, operating within the protection of American home waters. Besides improving U.S. security, such an initiative would have a catalytic effect, and the synergism of the complete package could induce a major change in attitudes, break the action/reaction cycle, and open up new opportunities in other fields, including strategic weapons. The domestic obstacles to such an initiative are probably insuperable, but if they could be overcome, it would start the essential process of bringing the military postures of the two sides into line with middle-of-the-road political perceptions of threat.

coupled with prejudices concerning particular weapons and platforms, has meant that on the one hand, the fleet is configured for a relatively narrow span of specific missions, with a consequential loss of flexibility, and on the other hand, it lacks the full range of forces to discharge these missions effectively. Gorshkov's judgment parallels official U.S. assessments, which note that the Soviet navy's mission is limited to sea denial, whereas Western navies have the broader strategic mission of securing the use of the sea for a wide range of purposes.

Gorshkov's most persistent criticism has been of the military leadership's inability to grasp the fact that task-specific naval forces, however deadly in themselves, require the support of general purpose forces (particularly surface ships), if they are to be able to accomplish their task.⁹⁷ He argues that army dominance has meant that the importance of seapower in a struggle with maritime states has been de-emphasized and a relatively low priority has been given to traditional naval roles in war and in peace. Again, this would seem fair comment, and is supported by official U.S. assessments which continue to credit an overall margin of superiority to the U.S. Navy, while making no allowance for the other forces that the Soviet navy would have to face in the event of world war.

It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Western assertions that the Soviet Union, as a land power, has more naval forces than it "needs." Any attempt to allocate Soviet forces among the various missions that have to be discharged at the onset are seen as essential requirements.⁹⁸ What constitutes "enough" is more difficult to determine, but it is relevant that when the procurement of present-day Soviet forces was originally decided, the U.S. Navy was substantially larger than it is today, hence it is largely fortuitous that the Soviet deficit is not greater. What is more, over the last twenty years, the West (i.e., NATO, including France, plus Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) has taken delivery of two to three times as many distant-water surface ships as the Soviet Bloc, and the imbalance is even greater when account is taken of ship size and capability.⁹⁹ Until 1967, the West was even building

97. Gorshkov alluded to this problem when talking with Western naval officers in late 1971/early 1972. In the course of a discussion on "balanced forces," Gorshkov commented that while it was easy to defend the requirement for submarines, it was much harder to justify the need for surface ships.

98. I make such an attempt in Chapter 4 of *Securing the Seas*, by Paul Nitze and Leonard Sullivan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

99. It must be stressed that this is *not* the same as comparing naval strengths, but it does help one to appreciate the Soviet perception of Western naval programs. The comparative figures are

more nuclear submarines than Russia; after that time the Soviet delivery rate doubled. But the subsequent disparity was concentrated in SSBN, and the production rate of attack boats remained roughly in balance. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union must take account of other countries, including Sweden, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union must be wary of the large Chinese submarine force, the threat to Soviet interests is more direct. Indeed, a Soviet contingency planner has to allow that, with few exceptions, all the significant navies in the world are at best neutral and most of them must be included in the list of potential adversaries.

This is not to underestimate the very real strength of the Soviet navy, or the threat that it could pose to Western interests. The most disturbing aspect is the size of the submarine force which, by the end of 1985, could include about 230 nuclear units, of which some sixty to seventy might be SSBN, the remainder being configured for ASW and surface attack. There will also be a diesel submarine force of between 135 and 185 boats, of which about seventy will be more than twenty years old. If current building rates persist, the distant-water surface force at that date will comprise six to seven air capable ships, about thirty-five cruiser-sized large anti-submarine ships (all less than twenty years old), about sixty-five of the destroyer-sized units (including twelve conversions, whose hulls will be over twenty-five years old), four rocket cruisers (twenty-one to twenty-three years) and perhaps five command ships. By 1985, satellite surveillance systems will provide the Soviet Command with a real-time global surface plot and may have some capability against submarines. The backfire bomber will have replaced Badger, and this capacity for long-range maritime strike will be supplemented by land-based ballistic missiles.¹⁰⁰ Bulkied together in this way, it adds up to a formidable capability, of which the global systems are the most disturbing. But when we divide these forces between the four widely-separated fleet areas, Soviet naval strength falls into perspective, particularly when we take account of the demanding requirements for area defense, and consider the scale of forces that can be assembled against them.¹⁰¹ Certainly, the West has cause to be concerned. Nevertheless, Gorshkov was justified in his

drawn from my chapters on comparative naval building programmes in *SND* (Ch. 12, pp. 144-50) and *SNI* (Ch. 17, pp. 327-336).

100. See my "Soviet Naval Programmes" in *SNI* pp. 355-6.

101. See Nitze and Sullivan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9, "Comparative Force Levels: . . ." by Leonard Sullivan for an extended discussion of these points.

complaints about the serious limitations on the navy's capabilities—which flow from its narrow mission structure—its task-specific characteristics, and the paucity of general purpose forces.

However, the fact that Gorshkov's complaints were justified does not mean that the Soviet navy is not reasonably well equipped for the particular role in which it has been cast by the army-dominated leadership. There is a trade-off between effectiveness in discharging a specific mission and general purpose flexibility. The Soviets' concentration on the former at the expense of the latter reflects the ordering of their priorities.

In the event of war with the West, the primary purpose of maritime operations is to contribute to the success of the battle on land. The Soviet Union has a unified strategy for the conduct of such a war, whereby each branch of the armed forces makes a specific contribution, so that the effect of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Distant water operations are only "independent" in the sense of being separate from the coastal zone command structure, and the emphasis on a combined arms approach to military problems means that, as a general rule, naval forces are partly dependant on other branches of service in discharging their missions.¹⁰² This of course diminishes their general purpose capability. However, an exception to this rule is provided by the forces assigned to protect Soviet SSBN from enemy interdiction. Since the importance of the SSBN force stems from its invulnerability to attack on Soviet territory, its security cannot be allowed to depend on shore-based air support and other weapon and sensor systems. This means that naval forces must possess an equivalent capability, and justifies the procurement of a ship like the Kiev anti-submarine carrier. The mission of strategic strike also breaks the general rule that naval operations are subordinated to the requirements of the land battle. The importance of the SSBN force as a strategic reserve and the increased security that command of the Norwegian Sea would provide would appear to have generated a new requirement to seize key islands and stretches of coast at the onset of war. The effect of these two exceptions is to improve the Soviet navy's general purpose and projection capabilities.

Turning to consider the navy as a part of the Soviet Union's broader capability in peacetime, we start from the fact that Russia is Mackinder's heartland. It stretches from Western Europe to Japan and borders twelve

102. The first part of this paragraph draws on Welander, *op. cit.*, note 83.

states, with another seven directly accessible across short stretches of water. The country spans 170° of longitude (a full 180° if we include the Warsaw Pact), and thus looks south at half the globe, where 85 percent of the world's population lives within 300 miles of Soviet territory. Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent are all within 2000 miles of the Soviet Union, while the territories of its national security zone are continuous. With this type of strategic access, it is to be expected that Soviet perceptions of the navy as an instrument of overseas policy would have differed from America's.

At the time of the post-Stalin shift toward a more outward-looking foreign policy, the Soviet Union chose to cut back its naval programs and shift resources to commercial shipbuilding, relying on trade, aid, and arms supply to circumvent the West's world-wide maritime preponderance, rather than trying to compete with it. Despite the decision in 1961 that the navy should move forward in strategic defense, the political exploitation of this Soviet presence in distant sea areas developed very slowly, and it was not until after the Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967 that the process took hold. This delay can probably be ascribed to a preoccupation with the war-related role, coupled with uncertainty as to U.S. reactions to this intrusion into Western-dominated water. Furthermore, in the 1960s the Soviet navy still lacked a true distant-water capability, and it was only after access to Egyptian ports had been granted in the wake of the June war that the Soviets were able to maintain an effective naval presence in the Mediterranean. Thereafter, the political employment of Soviet naval forces steadily increased, but it seems likely that forward deployment was still seen as an interim phase, pending the development of global systems designed to counter Western strike carriers and SSBN. However, by 1971-72, Gorshkov and his supporters were advocating a more assertive use of naval forces for political purposes, in opposition to those whose primary concern continued to be the danger of war with the West. This was part of a broader argument about the importance of navies in peace and war, and while the final outcome is still unclear, it appears that Gorshkov's call for an improved surface capability to support the SSBN force was heeded. This has the co-lateral effect of increasing the navy's peacetime capability to project power in distant sea areas, although the extent to which these forces can be diverted from their primary areas of concern remains to be seen.

As we come to the end of the 1970s, the naval prognosis must remain uncertain until we know what the new building programs will bring. On

past practice, a new generation of nuclear submarines was to be expected in 1978, and while one such class has duly appeared,¹⁰³ the full picture is far from clear.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, the two main surface warship programs are nearing the end of their production runs and new classes are awaited.¹⁰⁵ When we have been able to evaluate this new construction, we will be in a position to assess the extent to which Gorshkov's advocacy was successful and to plot the future development of the Soviet navy.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, we can usefully consider what the past record of Soviet naval developments has to suggest about the wider questions concerning the Soviet Union's military posture and its willingness to wage nuclear war.

Professor McGwire will address these questions of the Soviet approach to nuclear war in the next issue of *International Security* (Vol 4, No 1).

103. *The New York Times*, 20 March 1979, p. 7. This is probably the Alpha that has been under development since the early seventies.

104. There has been a single mention of a 60,000 ton nuclear powered surface unit being built at Severodvinsk (*The New York Times*, 17 March 1979, p. 3) but this has yet to be confirmed.

105. *Krivak* began delivery in 1970. *Kara* began in 1972, but the *Kresta II* program completed at Zhdanov by 1978, and a new cruiser-sized class could be expected. A new 25,000 ton 650 foot well-armed surface unit is building at Leningrad (*The New York Times*, 20 March 1979, p. 7) that could be intended as a Command ship.

106. It is relevant that at this same stage ten years ago, official U.S. estimates put the new nuclear submarine building programs at twenty p.a., whereas they turned out to be only ten p.a. See *Status of Naval Ships*, Seapower Sub-Committee Report dtd 19 March 1969, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives.

Commentary

Nick Eberstadt and
Eric Breindel

The Population Factor in the Middle East

Any attempt to assess the prospects for a peace—either full or partial—in the Middle East must address the question of Israel's willingness to make substantive concessions on the West Bank-Gaza-Palestinian issue. During the more than eleven years since the Six Day War, when the areas in dispute were occupied by the Israeli army, discussion of Israel's stance on the occupied territories has tended to focus on factors such as the military security issue, American and international pressure on Israel, and the historical-religious identification of vocal elements in Israeli politics with the principle of a Jewish state in the entirety of the historic Land of Israel. It has often been assumed that the interaction of these key factors would produce the ultimate Israeli policy position on the territories. While such issues, particularly the security question, undoubtedly play a major role in the formulation of policy, it would seem that an additional factor has long been ignored: that of sheer numbers.

Israeli policy makers are confronted with a demographic crisis so acute that room to maneuver is virtually non-existent. Israel intends to remain a Zionist (i.e. Jewish) state as well as a Western-style democracy. But the state of Israel can neither incorporate the territories nor retain the status quo for any length of time and remain either Zionist or democratic in any meaningful way. To preserve the dual goals of democracy and Zionism, Israel must end the current status quo in Gaza and the West Bank, and create an alternative political status for the 1.2 million Palestinians who inhabit these areas.

Although there are some in Israel, even in Begin's own Herut (Freedom) party within the ruling Likud (Unity) bloc who, either as members of Eretz Yisrael Hashlemah (known in English as the Greater Israel Movement) or as supporters of the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) settlement zealots, favor annexation, Begin is not now and indeed never has been part of this school of thought. During his period in opposition he often identified with the anti-Labor protests of the settlers, but he drew the line on the question of incorporation. Begin is an heir to the ideology of his oft-quoted "mentor and teacher" Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the father of Revisionist (or militant) Zionism, and he has long held to a cardinal Jabotinsky principle: that the single most important task of Zionism was to establish a Jewish majority in

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Palestine, as a prerequisite to, and a condition *sine qua non* for, statehood.

Both annexation and indefinite continuation of the status quo are ruled out as viable policy options by the fact that these decisions would turn Israel into either an Arab-ruled state or a Middle Eastern equivalent of Rhodesia. At a minimum then, as Begin and his government realize, some separation between the state of Israel proper and the West Bank-Gaza must be affected. A new form of political identification must be found for the Palestinians living in the occupied territories. However, a consistent perception of Israel's security requirements held by this and all past governments in Jerusalem precludes the possibility of permitting a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian entity full sovereignty. The demographic and political implications of such a situation would be unacceptable to any Israeli government likely to assume power in the foreseeable future. Thus, demographic factors determine the maximum which Israel can concede, and the minimum it must. In the final analysis, there is little room between the two positions.

I.

At the turn of the century, or shortly thereafter, the area which the state of Israel now controls quite conceivably could have an Arab majority. The reason is simple: in Israel and the occupied territories Arabs choose to have much larger families than Jews. Even if this situation were to change overnight it would probably be impossible to prevent the eventual emergence of an Arab majority, for the laws of population growth are curiously inflexible. Political scientists and policy analysts usually deal with decisions which are at least potentially reversible. Today's distasteful treaty, after all, can be renegotiated or even broken tomorrow. With fertility, however, forces set in motion today will take decades, even generations, to work themselves through; they build up an internal momentum which can be undercut only gradually by even the most radical reversals in choice. Even if an extreme drop in Arab fertility and a dramatic rise in Jewish fertility were to take place over the next generation, Israeli Jews would be able to do nothing more than cling to a majority by a slight numerical advantage—if the areas now under military administration are to be retained.

Table 1 tells the story. Israeli Jews currently make up nearly two thirds of the population within the state of Israel and the administered territories, five sixths within Israel proper. But Jewish birth rates are very much lower than Arab birth rates. Israeli Jews have an average of three children per couple,

but Israeli Arabs average six and a half. For Arabs on the West Bank and in Gaza, thanks in part to the improvements in nutrition and health care which Israeli administration has brought, the "total fertility rate" is close to nine. Given current growth rates, Israeli Jews would double their numbers every 41 years. This is faster than most other Western peoples, but Palestinian Arabs have one of the highest growth rates in the world. Their doubling time is currently less than nineteen years. What this means, of course, is that the next generation will see a dramatic decline in the proportion of Jews in the areas which Israel now controls.

Let us assume for a moment that there will be no net migration into Israel. How would today's numbers work through to the year 2000? Surprisingly, the results are fairly insensitive to any shifts in fertility which may occur between now and the end of the century. Conditions of increase most favorable to Arabs (current fertility patterns continued, but death rates declining due to improved health) and least favorable to Jews (a drop in fertility to the replacement level of 2.1 children per family) would leave "greater Israel" with a population 47 percent Jewish, 53 percent Arab. If on the other hand we posit a rise in Jewish fertility to 3.5 children per family, and an eventual Arab drop to this same norm, the proportion of Jewish population in Israel and the territories would be only 54 percent, and declining.

With a majority of its voters non-Jews, a democratic Israel obviously could not function as a Zionist state. Even with a small but absolute Jewish majority in the Knesset the smooth functioning of a democratic and Zionist Israel would hardly be assured. Israel is a multiparty system; no party or bloc has won a majority in Israel's entire electoral history. Coalition governments are hard to form, delicate to maintain. It is not at all clear that the fragile balance in Israeli politics could withstand a large infusion of representatives unhappy with the prospects of remaining within a country they do not see as theirs. Within Green Line Israel (i.e., the 1949 armistice lines), however, Jews will continue to have an overwhelming majority. With no immigration, they stand to represent about three quarters of the total population; with some net immigration, the final proportion might not be very different from today's 83 percent. If both democracy and Zionism are to be preserved, then, the territories cannot be incorporated.

If the numbers say that Israel must relinquish direct political control over the occupied territories, it is also clear that the Palestinian entity, when it is created, will be less than fully independent. Over the past decade Gaza and the West Bank have been so thoroughly integrated into the Israeli economy

that their well being now depends on continuing, and perhaps even *strengthening*, their close financial tie with Israel.

Pressures against economic independence may come from within the prospective Palestinian entity; but perhaps more importantly, pressures against full political independence will surely come from without. From the Israeli standpoint absolute sovereignty for a West Bank-Gaza homeland is totally out of the question: Israel's present intention is to maintain a permanent security presence in these areas. Even if defense analysts in Jerusalem eventually were to decide that this force were no longer necessary, Israel would still be unwilling to permit full sovereignty for a Palestinian entity. A fully sovereign state cannot be prevented from conducting its emigration and immigration policies as it sees fit. Free migration into a Palestinian homeland is an alarming, and unacceptable, proposition for Israeli policy makers; both in absolute size and in political composition the potential immigrants could pose a threat to the state of Israel.

Of the more than two million Palestinians living outside Gaza and the West Bank, today's most likely candidates for repatriation to a Palestinian homeland would unquestionably be the four hundred thousand refugees in camps in Syria and Lebanon. Their numbers are likely to increase dramatically between now and the end of the century. A high projection would put their population in the year 2000 over 900,000; even with a low projection, however, it would be over 700,000. In part, then, the Israelis see a problem of sheer numbers. Without this massive influx, the Palestinian homeland stands to have a population close to three million people in the year 2000; accepting these refugees would push the total up towards four million—a figure which conceivably could be larger than Israel's Jewish population. The homeland, however, has a far more limited resource base, and it is not impossible that a nationalistic people crowded together in a poor land might make expansionist demands on their neighbors. The political allegiances of a large proportion of the potential immigrants, moreover, would appear to make conflict all the more likely. To the Israelis, the entire population of the refugee camps is simply one enormous *irradenta*. If this appraisal is somewhat apocalyptic, it is certainly true that the camps which house displaced Palestinians in Syria and Lebanon are either under the direct control of the Palestine Liberation Organization, or one of a number of armed groups apparently operating under the P.L.O. umbrella. And it is true that a well-armed, well-trained element within these camps is unprepared and unwilling to accept any solution short of total adherence to the Palestine National

Covenant. Even a fully sovereign West Bank-Gaza state would not satisfy their demands. And the ability of the more moderate Palestinians to exercise control over these hard core rejectionists appears to be very limited. It is hard to imagine circumstances under which any Israeli government would agree to a sovereignty scheme which would increase security problems—yet this is exactly what unrestricted immigration into the Palestinian homeland could entail.

II.

It has been our purpose here to identify Israel's policy options in the context of prevailing demographic realities. Are there factors, however, which might alter the demographic constraints under which Israel must bargain? The answer is probably not. Immigration cannot be relied upon to raise the proportion of Jews within Israel and the occupied territories significantly, although it might be able to within the narrower confines of "Green Line" Israel. Most of the great pockets of potential immigration have already been tapped. Unless great new reservoirs were to open up—and some do exist (the Soviet Union, South Africa, Argentina, perhaps Quebec)—net migration over the remainder of the century should not do much more than push back the date of Arab majority in Israel and the administered areas by a decade or so. There can be no certainty, of course, about Jewish migration to Israel, but we should note that any massive influx would be most likely to occur in the wake of a peace settlement, in which case the weight of relative numbers would be far less important. A significant surge of Jewish fertility, moreover, does not seem likely. Israeli governments have not kept secret their desire to firm up Jewish birth rates, or even push them higher, but policy efforts in this realm have been consistently unsuccessful. Unless the government is willing to make Jewish children more economically attractive—say by repealing universal education and sending youngsters to work—or more necessary for parental security—by repealing unemployment insurance and social security, for example—it will probably be unable to increase birth rates noticeably.

What, then, are Israel's options? It can be argued that a highly similar plan to the Camp David autonomy proposals would have to be proposed, whether or not Sadat had undertaken his peace initiative, whether or not U.S. pressure was present, indeed, all external factors notwithstanding. The demographic situation constitutes an objective reality, requiring at minimum that

Israel acquiesce to some sort of autonomy plan; but the security concerns of those who determine policy in Jerusalem—the factor limiting the new status for the territories to autonomy rather than full sovereignty—is an equally real, although more subjective, element in the formulation of policy.

In points 3 and 4 of that part of the Camp David pact known as the "Framework Agreement," Israel's specific concern with the admission of Palestinian refugees to the envisioned autonomous area is clearly explicated. Reference is pointedly made only to refugees displaced in 1967 (not to those who fled Israel proper during the 1948-49 hostilities) as potentially eligible for repatriation. Israel will sit on the "continuing committee," determining "the modalities of admission," with an eye directed at ensuring that this process does not create "disruption and disorder." In short, Israel intends to retain a strong hand in, or veto power over, any and all schemes involving admission of Palestinians to the West Bank-Gaza entity.

Of course, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the Camp David accords, and the specific autonomy plan formulated therein, will collapse for any of a number of reasons. What remains salient, however, is that West Bank-Gaza autonomy is a must for Israel. This is the major reality behind Camp David. It would be antithetical to Israel's interests to seek the collapse of the agreement reached with Sadat on the broad outlines of the settlement of the Palestinian question. All that could result would be renegotiation, very possibly on less favorable terms, or a unilateral concession on Israel's part. With or without the successful conclusion of the Camp David accords, the preliminary Begin-Sadat agreement on the West Bank and Gaza should be seen as the essence of any future Israeli effort to deal with the problem. Viable policy alternatives for Israel do not exist and are unlikely to emerge.

Table 1

Demographic Characteristics Of Different Groups In Israel And The Gaza-West Bank Region (Figures are approximate)

	Israeli Jews	Israeli Arabs	West Bank-Gaza Arabs
Population	3,100,000	600,000	1,200,000
Birth Rates per thousand	24	43	48
Death Rates per thousand	7	6	12
Annual Rate of Natural Increase	1.7%	3.7%	3.6%
Current Doubling Time	41 years	18 years	19 years
Proportion Of Total Population Today	64%	12%	24%
Proportion Of Total Population Today Within "Green Line"	83%	17%	—
Projections For 2000, Assuming No Net Migration			
Proportion Of Total Population, "High" Arab Fertility, "Low" Jewish Fertility	47%	18%	35%
"Low" Arab Fertility, "High" Jewish Fertility	54%	14%	32%
"High" Arab Fertility, "Low" Jewish Fertility Within "Green Line"	72%	28%	—
"Low" Arab Fertility, "High" Jewish Fertility Within Green Line	79%	21%	—

Source: Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "Realities Behind Camp David: Demographic Aspects Of The Politics Of Peace In The Middle East" Center for Population Studies Discussion Paper #101.

Correspondence

ON MUTUAL DETERRENCE: A REPLY TO DONALD BRENNAN

To the Editors:

I welcome Dr. Brennan's commentary (Vol. 3, No. 3) on my recent article on "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," (Vol. 3, No. 1) although for reasons that will become clear presently I was disappointed in it.

First let me deal briefly with one secondary point, and then turn to the main argument. On the question of certain statements on the threat of nuclear war to life on earth, Dr. Brennan expresses uncertainty over whether I am aware of the "egregious hyperbole." Yes, I am. He suggests that "The fact that some Western spokesmen (such as Henry Kissinger) have indulged in the same hyperbole does not exculpate Soviet spokesmen." If one considers that all American presidents since Eisenhower (and all top Soviet leaders since Malenkov)—in short all in the thermonuclear age—are among those who have "indulged in the same hyperbole," it seems clear that the vision of world statesmen is focused on a broad political horizon rather than on the calibrated measures of defense/arms control analysts, and that the political purposes and uses of such hyperbole do not stand in need of "exculpation." Similarly, to suggest (even "somewhat parenthetically") that such Soviet statements "impair the credibility of other Soviet statements [all other statements?] related to nuclear war" *would* require similar judgments to be made on the credibility of "other American statements" too—except that the idea should instead be dropped, as it obviously does not in fact impair most such statements.

Now to the main point. Dr. Brennan has chosen to challenge the idea that there is a Soviet constituency for "MADvocacy," "MADvocate" being a term of his coinage for "anyone (Soviet or American) who advocates that the opposing side *should* have good deterrence of his own side." MAD (for Mutual Assured Destruction), of course, is a cleverly pejorative acronym also, I believe, of Dr. Brennan's earlier coinage, and denoting a posture in which the United States and the Soviet Union, in his words, each "would hold the other side's population hostage."

Now it so happens that in the article I eschewed use of the term "Mutual Assured Destruction" precisely because the Soviet conception of mutual deterrence is broader and differently expressed—as I explicitly state and explain in the article (page 124). I am, in short, taken to task for failing to

supply evidence of a Soviet "MADvocracy" which I myself have said is not there! What Soviet military and political leaders *have* said is: (1) Soviet deterrence of the West is their principal military task; (2) that there is a "nuclear balance," strategic "parity," and a reciprocal capability for overwhelming retaliation by *either* side if attacked; (3) that this balance of mutual retaliatory capability should be maintained; (4) that nuclear parity, rather than superiority, is the goal of Soviet military policy; and (5) that negotiated strategic arms limitation is a desirable means to contribute to this maintenance of parity and a balance. There is a substantial body of evidence in the article to support all of those points. I call this acceptance of mutual deterrence.

Dr. Brennan accepts my point that "There are those—again in Moscow and in Washington—who are apprehensive as to whether this [prevailing] parity will be upset by some successful effort of the other side." "True," he says, but relentlessly pursuing the chimera of MADvocracy, he goes on to state, "but there are many in Washington who are apprehensive that this parity will be upset by some successful effort in the *American* side, while there are—so far as can be seen—none in Moscow apprehensive over the possibility that parity might be upset by some successful effort on the *Soviet* side." In fact, I have reason to believe there are such people in Moscow, but I readily agree that no Soviet leader or writer would publish such a view because of the ideological and political constraints against stating what we in the West have no compunctions about saying—that we too are deterred, or to be more accurate *would* be deterred if we had any aggressive designs, which we do not. "Mutual deterrence" really means that neither side *would* rationally choose to attack the other because of the consequences of unavoidable retaliation—whether only one, or for that matter *neither*, actually has or would have an intention to attack in the absence of such a deterrent retaliatory capability on the other side.

There are those on *both* sides who, while they might prefer the comfort of superiority on their own side, see the existing state of mutual deterrence as preferable to an unstable competition for superiority. Of course, those on each side would be especially alarmed to see the other gaining an advantage which might tempt it to greater boldness if not to attack, but recognition of that very fact leads many (though not all) on both sides to prefer to preserve the balance of mutual deterrence—even though, to repeat, many of these same people would *prefer* a cushion of superiority for their own side if it did not involve the risks of open competition. This pattern of thinking is probably widely prevalent on *both* sides. That it does not square with Brennan's

"MADvocracy" suggests, in my judgment, a limitation on the usefulness of a term we have so far gotten along without.

In any case, I welcome Dr. Brennan's careful attention to the data presented in my essay, and hope he will re-read it with my definition of mutual deterrence in view rather than his concept of MADvocracy. And I especially welcome his agreement that "Of course the Soviets 'accept the concept of mutual deterrence' in the obvious sense in which any informed person who understands contemporary reality must accept it. . . ." Alas, there are those, uninformed, who still do not!

—Raymond L. Garthoff
U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria

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